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Abstract 
 
   
This thesis contours the dynamics of urban citizenship in a postcolonial city, 
against a cautionary note that such cities are undergoing a unique 
metamorphosis triggered by the national pursuit of neo-liberalisation policies. 
In an existing condition of sharply divided geographies, postcolonial cities, by 
becoming key portals to the flows of trans-nationalised capital, are being 
subject to a spatial reordering resulting in heightened forms of socio-economic 
inequality. Amidst a reduced terrain of common allegiances, neo-liberal 
citizenship rejects the ideal of commensurable citizens and is more conducive 
to a bourgeois ethic of right, which now defines the cityscape. In this regard, 
the research examines the construction of urban citizenship by Indian middle 
class homeowners in the southern metropolis of Chennai. Residents were 
interviewed on two main issues – their use of residents’ associations as a 
means of collective action and their operation in the realm of civil society, and 
their adoption of a ‘pristine’ vocabulary in the re-imagination of the public 
spaces, mainly the beaches, in the city. Their responses are analysed against the 
state’s pursuit of a new form of urban developmentalism to establish how they 
complement each other. This reveals that – oscillating between socio-political 
absenteeism and active citizenship – the political engagement of the Indian 
middle class is paradoxically through a process of ‘depoliticisation’. While 
there is concern about the middle class’s earlier practiced politics of 
indifference morphing into a politics of intolerance, this research finds that 
their bourgeois discourse of citizenship, hinging together the notion of 
propriety and property, comes across as weak and flawed, one that is exclusive 
but easily contested.  
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Figure 1: Outline map of India 
Note: The external boundaries of India are neither correct nor authenticated;  
The territorial waters of India extend into the sea to a distance of 12 nautical 
miles measured from the appropriate baseline; based on Survey of India 
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 1 
 
 
Introduction: 
‘the hour of the citizen’ 
 
 
 
Our century is the only one in which historic dates have taken such 
a voracious grip on every single person’s life. (Kundera 2003: 11) 
 
 
Milan Kundera in his novel Ignorance reiterates at several instances that 
important dates cut deep gashes into the twentieth century. His narrative is 
interspersed with references to dates and events as historic markers, with 1989 
standing tall as he weaves the nostalgic reverie of Czech émigrés preparing to 
revisit their country after the fall of communism. But in his eagerness to 
present the great episodic events of history, he hastily claims 1989’s 
significance exclusively for European history, declaring that ‘Europe’s 
Communism burned out exactly two hundred years after the French revolution 
took fire….that was a coincidence loaded with meaning. But with what 
meaning? What name could be given to the triumphal arch spanning those two 
majestic dates? The Arch of the Two Greatest European Revolutions? Or The 
Arch Connecting the Greatest Revolution with the Final Restoration?’ (2003: 
29-30, emphasis original). 
 
Scholars have relished with indulgence the magical alignment of 1989 
(to a degree of rare mathematical precision) with the French Revolution of 
1789 drawing obvious correlations between the two events. But it needs to be 
clarified that these dates have global relevance beyond European boundaries. 
Kumar (2001: ix) insists that ‘the 1989 revolutions were about much more than 
the fate of certain regimes in East Central Europe. They opened up questions 
Absent Societies/Chapter 1: Introduction                   
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about a range of issues that concerned Europe, the West, and the wider world’. 
According to him, the events of 1989 have a “world-historical” significance 
that brought to an end the existence of a bipolar world. This removed at least in 
principle, the category of the “Third World,” as ‘a theoretical convenience 
invented for the purpose of describing societies dependent on one or another of 
the world superpowers’ (ibid.: 240).1  
 
 In emphasising its global influence, it should also be noted that the 
revolutionary events of 1989 that stretched across the globe between Eastern 
Europe and China implied more than the evident repudiation of communism. 
While it is tempting to paint a revisionist historiography of the 1989 pro-
democracy movements as the end of communism, in reality they signify more 
than the end of conflict between the warring ideologies of capitalism and 
socialism. Instead, they represent a greater rupture in international history, in 
the sense that, besides being the greatest of all revolutions marking the 
twentieth century as the age of revolutions (Bauman 1994), they have also 
brought about ideological reformations whereby the notion of nation-state and 
citizenship, society and its civil associations, and the model of economic 
pursuit have been completely revised. To a degree, perhaps 1989 brought to a 
close the conflict of ideals that began in 1789 with the French Revolution. It 
was in this context that Fukuyama (1989) proclaimed his highly criticised ‘end 
of history’ as the events of 1989 demonstrated the end of contending ideas 
about the fundamental principles of government and society and unleashed 
instead an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism.  
 
1989 thus proved to be a remarkable pivot point that signified sweeping 
political, economic and social transformations. With the fracture of nine 
political nations in East Central Europe into twenty-eight states, the modern 
notion of national citizenship was challenged, prompting Dahrendorf (1990) to 
declare 1989 as the ‘hour of the citizen’. While Roeder (1999: 745) argued that 
                                                 
1 Kumar (2001) nevertheless concedes that distinctions between “north” and “south” still 
persist wherein inequalities between rich and poor nations are, if anything, greater than in the 
past, but within the context of a unified world order.  
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the ‘outcome is increasingly homogeneous countries as the borders of nations 
and states come to correspond more closely’, Verdery (1998) observed that the 
new citizenship that arose post-1989 was a highly questionable one, often 
based on ethnonationalism and an intense struggle between the majority and 
minority ethnic groups. Consequently new ways of thinking about citizenship 
multiplied producing alternative notions, variously described as flexible 
citizenship (Ong 1999), differentiated citizenship (Young 1990; Kymlicka 
1995), multicultural citizenship (Kymlicka 1995, 1998) and cosmopolitan 
citizenship (Linklater 2002).  
 
At the same time, 1989 catalysed transitions to market economies 
around the world creating conditions of possible contradiction between 
political and economic justice.2 Replacing a centralised command state-
administered system of production and distribution with a bewildering variety 
of market and transitional forms, the economic revolution of 1989 flagged ‘the 
global victory of some version of neoliberalism’ (Appadurai 2002: 21). And 
above all, socially, 1989 marked the return of the classic bourgeois revolution 
spearheaded by intellectuals, students and bourgeois residents in towns and 
cities across the world. Essentially urban and bourgeois in character, riding 
heavily on the revival of the language of civil society and by corollary an 
independent (urban) bourgeoisie, the revolutions of 1989 gave credence to 
Barrington Moore’s (1966) “no bourgeois, no democracy” hypothesis. Rather 
than the transformation of bourgeois politics by proletarian will that the 
Marxists eagerly hailed after the 1917 revolution, the bourgeois domination of 
1989 reflected sternly on the claims of 1917 and its illusion of communism 
(Kumar 2001). 
 
While citizenship has become a topic of greatly heightened interest in 
the 1990s social science, any debate on its new course needs to consider it in 
                                                 
2 This process has been abetted by the interventions of international institutions like World 
Bank and the IMF who, since 1989, with the emergence of new democracies, have made 
transition to market economies a benchmark condition for granting loans to the newly created 
polities.  
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the fuller context of political, economic and social transformations, especially 
against the rise of neoliberalism and a bourgeois society. No where are the 
effects of this wholesome transformation more apparent than in India. Here, in 
1989, a metamorphosis of Indian politics, its society and economy, was 
triggered, albeit in a less revolutionary manner and through the forum of 
democratic elections. This determined a direction of flow that remains relevant 
to date and constitutes the subject of this thesis.  
 
1.1 1989 in India: electing to change 
In November 1989, the ninth parliamentary election was held in India. At first 
there seemed nothing spectacular about this routine event. Gupta (1989) 
remarked that this would be a wave-less election, while Kohli (1990: 4-5) felt 
that ‘it was probably the first “usual” election since 1967 in that it was not 
conducted in the shadow of mood-generating euphorias or crises’. But when it 
became obvious that the ruling Congress Party was being voted out of power, it 
was clear that the results indicated more than an anti-incumbency shift. This 
was the second time that the Congress Party lost the elections, and there was a 
compelling temptation to compare this outcome with that of 1977 when it was 
defeated by a united opposition party.  
 
But 1989 was more than a repeat performance of the 1977 elections.3 
As Rudolph and Rudolph (1987) have argued, 1977 was in no way a critical 
election, with its outcome being more of a protest vote against Congress’s 
emergency regime and less of a victory for the opposition party’s ideology. On 
the contrary, the general elections of 1989 proved to be a watershed ushering in 
a new phase of politics, wherein the Indian nation-state has been critically 
challenged. Its political operating machine, since 1989, has been debilitated by 
a continuous stream of unstable coalition governments, the growing dominance 
                                                 
3 In 1977, opposition parties united to form the Janata Party and successfully contested the 
general election. Earlier in 1967, a ‘Grand Alliance’ had similarly been formed between the 
various opposition parties and had come narrowly close to toppling the Congress-dominance at 
the Centre.  
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of regionalism in the Centre, and above all, the corruption of nationalism as it 
transforms from a postcolonial nationalistic pride to a discredited and 
repugnant ‘ethnonationalism’.   
 
1.1.1 The new rule of coalitions and regionalism 
The irony of the National Front (NF) Government taking oath in December 
1989 was remarkable, as the government was formed with outside support 
from two improbable allies: the right-wing Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP) and the communists on the left. Even though the mandate against 
Congress in the 1989 elections was obvious, there was no clear mandate for a 
single party, raising the prospect of a formal coalition for the first time. As the 
electorate denied a parliamentary majority to any one political party, it marked 
the shift away from majority to minority rule, and the dawn of coalition politics 
(Andersen 1990). It also represented a departure wherein each of the five 
national elections since 1989 has produced either a minority government or a 
coalition involving alliances amongst ideologically diverse parties in a farcical 
manner, based on short-term gains, and often operating on an issue by issue 
basis. Singh (1992a: 1) presciently viewed the 1989 elections sceptically, as 
‘this new phase has failed to provide a framework for stable and effective 
governance in a society marked by rapid and explosive changes’, resulting in 
the dilemma ‘to govern or not to govern’ (Singh 1992b: 303).  
 
Coalition governments are the result not just of the lack of a single clear 
choice of the electorate, but a fragmented set of choices, engendered by the rise 
of regionalism, a phenomenon drawn to the national mainstream post-1989. 
Nigam (1996) notices a change in the character of many of the “national” 
formations as erstwhile “national” parties went through mutations, splits and 
reincarnations, and emerged as new regional parties, remaining “national” only 
in form while embodying regional aspirations. The new alliances challenged 
the prevalent notion that the national space was something different and 
discrete from regional or state-level politics, and that national concerns could 
only be represented by the so-called national parties (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2: RK Laxman, The Times of India on the eve of 1989 elections4 
Source: Laxman (2005: 162); This cartoon illustrates the crowding of the 
national platform with national-level leaders jostling for space with regional 
politicians. 
 
Regional parties have shown consistent growth in the national electoral 
performance. This has allowed them to seek a greater share in the central 
power and a more prominent position in the nation. But this renegotiation of 
the pan-Indian identity through the “locality” has proved to be a problematic 
exercise (Nigam 1996). Most of the regional parties have grown out of the will 
of handful of people commanding only a local base, confined to a linguistic 
region and rarely organised across state boundaries (Meyer 1989), raising 
questions of vulnerability and credibility. Since 1989, with the inevitability of 
coalition politics, regional parties have assumed a larger role whereby parties 
                                                 
4 RK Laxman is a cartoonist at The Times of India (since 1947), whose front-page pocket 
column  series ‘You said it’ (since 1961) is a popular commentary on the state of things in 
India, with the common man as the observer conveying a powerful sense of middle class 
anguish (Deshpande 2003). His cartoons are a sharp reflection on national policies affecting the 
quotidian concerns of the common man. They are used in this thesis to illustrate popular 
understanding of issues discussed in various sections.  
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confined to single states hold the key to the formation of central governments. 
Jenkins (2000: 50) is pessimistic about this trend reflecting as to whether the 
‘electoral process produced not a national verdict, but an aggregation of local 
verdicts’. He views regionalisation of the Centre not as a celebration of India’s 
federal system, since regional parties are prevailingly loyal to their own ‘local’ 
interests, and are incapable of building a national manifesto required of a 
central government.5 
 
1.1.2 Nationalism rears its ugly head 
Beyond the obvious trend of coalition politics and the penetrating influence of 
regionalism at the Centre, 1989 most significantly marked the death of a 
particular kind of national politics, and the commencement of a different 
variety which seriously challenges analysis of the Indian nation-state and the 
Indian citizen. The emerging version of national politics represents as well the 
decline of a particular type of politics woven around a highly linear idea of 
what constitutes the “Indian nation” (Nigam 1996). The credibility of the 
Congress Party was based on its claim to carry the mantle of the national 
movement, and in the post-independence period the party embodied a certain 
shared imagination of the nation. But the unsuccessful Congress campaign of 
1989 brought to the forefront ‘manifestations of a much more complex 
dynamic that lies at the heart of Indian politics—one that revolves around the 
notions of nationhood and the serious contestations therein’ (Nigam 1996: 
1158).  
 
The first ruptures in the nationalist discourse appeared in the 1980s 
when myriad “fragmented” identities challenged the carefully constructed pan-
Indian identity propelled by a centrist state (Nigam 1996). 1989 proved to be a 
year of the discursive break generating a new imagination of the nation, 
modelled by the forces of an anti-secular, pro-religious discourse that replaced 
                                                 
5 This discussion becomes more relevant in Chapter Four where the focus shifts to the 
particular regionalism of Tamil Nadu as practiced by its successive Dravidian governments.   
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the secular-nationalist one. In the absence of a positive verdict in favour of any 
single party, the one party that registered a significant gain was the right-wing 
Hindu fundamentalist BJP which won 85 seats (nearly twice that of the left 
parties who won 44). Buoyed by its performance, it is the BJP more than the 
socialist Janata Dal or the left parties that took advantage of this discursive 
break in the imagination of the Indian nation, laying the foundation for a BJP-
type redefinition of the nationhood. Its attempt to present itself as a national 
alternative to the Congress Party has been successful with its percentage of 
vote share increasing from 11 percent in 1989 to 25 percent in the 1990s (while 
that of the communist parties stagnates around 10 percent), and its emergence 
as the party with the largest number of seats in three national elections (1996, 
1998 and 1999).6  
 
 Neither a rank newcomer nor an outsider to Indian politics, the BJP is a 
contemporary version of the political ideology of Hindu nationalism dating 
back to the late nineteenth century.7 The party’s remarkable performance in the 
1989 elections revealed a heightened consciousness of community, caste and 
ethnic identities based on Hindutva amongst the electorate.8 Its manifesto 
highlights anti-secular religious issues including the conflicting site of Ram 
Janambhoomi-Babri Masjid in Ayodhya, the need for a uniform civil code, the 
abolition of Article 370 in Kashmir, and the replacement of a Minorities 
Commission by the Human Rights Commission.9 Also problematic is their 
                                                 
6 On all three occasions the BJP formed the government with varying degrees of success. In 
1996, the effort was short-lived as the BJP-government lasted for only thirteen days. In 1998,  
it survived for about a year and it was only in 1999 that it finally found its footing (and right 
alliance partners), completing a full term in office. Even though the BJP lost the 2004 national 
elections to a Congress-led coalition, its presence at the national level remains significant with 
185 MPs representing its alliance. 
7 Its predecessors include the Hindu Mahasabha and the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. For a good 
analysis of the BJP and its style of nation-hood, see Hansen and Jaffrelot (1998).  
8 Deshpande (2000) distinguishes Hindutva from the more generic Hinduism, where the latter 
merely referred to the followers of the Hindu religion while Hindutva used the notion of a 
sacred geography to carve a larger imagined nation-space. This is a distinction made in the 
1920s by the Hindu nationalist leader VD Savarkar who is now considered as the forefather of 
the BJP-style of politics.  
9 The Ramjanmabhoomi-Babri Masjid shrine in the ancient twin cities of Ayodhya and 
Faizabad is claimed by the Muslims as the mosque built by the first Mughal emperor Babur in 
the 16th century and by the Hindus as the birthplace of Hindu god Rama. In December 1992, 
Hindu militant activists known as the kar sevaks razed the mosque to ground with the support 
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commitment to a process of cultural homogenisation forging ‘one nation, one 
people, one culture’ through a revised historical imagination at odds with the 
‘Indianness’ defined by the post-independence secular-nationalist elite led by 
Nehru (Khilnani 1997). Arguing for a Hindu nation, the BJP mobilised to 
extend the ideas of Hindu nationalism, transforming key items in their 
manifesto into potent symbols of a Hindu majority threatened by the Muslim 
“Other” (Corbridge and Harriss 2001). The leaders of the BJP successfully 
presented their argument that the complicity of Nehru’s secularism with a 
hegemonic nationalist project has proved to be historically unsustainable and 
ethically unjust, since the Nehruvian secular political ideology speaks only to 
an abstract set of people, and can therefore be oppressive (Nigam 1996).  
 
Since the 1980s and throughout the 1990s, opportunities for reviving 
Hindu nationalism have been ripe partly due to historical fatigue and partly due 
to the compulsions of populist politics redefining democracy as majority rule. 
As Hindu right politicians tried to reverse the spatial logic of the nation-space, 
rather than rejecting the Nehruvian structure of the secular and modern state, 
they used it to their advantage. Dubbing their secular adversaries, particularly 
the Nehruvian Congressmen, as ‘pseudo-secularists’, the Hindu right claims 
that it is not against the idea of the secular state.  Instead, it mobilises the will 
of the interventionist modernising state ‘to erase the presence of religious or 
ethnic particularisms from the domain of law or public life, and to supply, in 
the name of “national culture”, a homogenized content to the notion of 
citizenship’ (Chatterjee 1997a: 230-31; Figure 3). This is a sort of payback for 
the BJP whose Hindu nationalism was one of several nationalistic responses to 
                                                                                                                                 
of the BJP. The uniform civil code is intended to replace the existing personal laws that protect 
the Muslims where shariat laws stand above secular laws. Article 370 of the constitution gives 
special rights to the state of Jammu and Kashmir, the only Muslim-majority state in India 
prohibiting people from other parts of the country from buying land, starting a business, 
settling down, or even taking up a government job in the state. The BJP argues that Indian 
security is seriously compromised by giving such a special status to a Muslim-majority state 
bordering a hostile Islamic republic (Pakistan). It also maintains that the Minorities 
Commission entertains complaints of discrimination only from minority sections and that a 
Human Rights Commission is needed for justice to all sections of society. 
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colonialism, but was subsumed by the Nehruvian line of secular thinking 
(Khilnani 1997).  
 
Figure 3: RK Laxman, The Times of India, BJP and secularism 
Source: Laxman (2005: 276) 
 
Undermining the Indian citizen 
According to Nehru, the modern secular state was the only way of offering the 
legal guarantee of equal citizenship regardless of religion, caste, creed or other 
social attributes. By developing a citizenship defined by universalist, civic 
rather than ethnic criteria, Nehru envisioned a spatial inclusivity which 
eventually proved vulnerable to the axis of exclusivity evident in the Hindutva 
project (Deshpande 1998). Chatterjee (1998) once commented that the attempt 
to create a sovereign domain in which the people of India all became citizens 
of the republic was only a constitutional fiction. Though this retort emerged 
from a different context, it carries particular value considering the ease with 
which Hindu nationalism, embracing the armoury of the modern state, has been 
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able to associate an ethnically homogenous community with a singular Indian 
citizenship. Viewed in this light, when the BJP proposed a National Register of 
Citizens, it appears as an attempt against those not conforming to its version of 
“national culture”. This is reflected in at least two efforts made by the BJP to 
redefine the Indian citizen. Most specifically, through a reconciliatory process 
of internalised exclusion and externalised inclusion, it initiated the re-
imagination of a national citizenship of the majority: the expulsion of 
Bangladeshi and Bengali-speaking Muslims as alleged illegal immigrants and 
non-Indian citizens, while providing at the same time dual citizenship for a 
large non-resident predominantly Hindu Indian community abroad.10 
 
By conflating civic citizenship with an ethnicised national identity, the 
BJP has erected a problematic understanding of national citizenship. But the 
crisis surrounding the legibility and credibility of an Indian nation-state is a 
long-standing one. Khilnani (1997) notes that the fundamental matter of India’s 
selfhood has never really been settled since the multitude of religions, castes 
and languages cut across myriad ethnic and cultural communities, creating a 
discordant material – not the stuff from which nation states are fashioned. 
Since no common unity could be reconciled within a modern state, Indian 
identity has always revolved around pluralist compromises, wherein one cannot 
be only Indian and nothing else. The crisis of the Indian nation-state can be 
traced to the early ambiguities of Indian nationalism, which, through the 
gradual recession of the open democratic process has given way to the national 
chauvinist and communal appeals that are being mounted from the very centre 
of the state (Kaviraj 1995).  
 
                                                 
10 The BJP’s efforts to weed out illegal Bangladeshi immigrants including the deportation of 
several Bengali-speaking Indian Muslims has been described by Ramachandran (2005) as an 
exercise in “capricious citizenship”, producing a fundamentally warped conception of 
citizenship (Sen 2003). At the same time, in 2002, the BJP decided to grant dual citizenship to 
Indians living abroad, including prosperous western countries but excluding Pakistan and 
Bangladesh. While such a move was economically motivated, it also has a strong dimension of 
‘ethnonationalism’ attached to it, as the BJP sought to distinguish an ethnic rather than a 
territorial understanding of the Indian people, thereby revealing the ill-effects of “long-distance 
nationalism” (Anderson 1998).  
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1.2 Crisis of citizenship, postcolonial and otherwise 
Pessimism about the feasibility of nationalism, nation-state and its offer of 
citizenship is not peculiar to India alone. Since the 1960s, as many postcolonial 
societies became independent nation-states, much attention has been given to 
monitoring this process as the ‘postcolonies’ tried to negotiate an uneasy 
alliance with the nation-state (Badie 2000; Bayart 1993; Geertz 1963; 
Chatterjee 1986). Many Third World countries proved to still be pre-modern 
polities merely running a modern economy (Hawthorne 1991), with pre-
independence nationalism incapable of evolving from a formula of protest to a 
formula of governmental mobilisation. Instead, such nation-states showed that 
beyond liberation, they had no programme, only a vague commitment to 
continue a history (Walzer 1998). Moreover, given the pluralities of 
concomitant identities in postcolonial societies, the self-determination of the 
people has been confused with the self-determination of the nation, resulting in 
a nation that is at odds with itself.  
 
While such concerns are specific to postcolonial societies, they are 
situated within the larger universal crisis of the nation-state and its national 
citizenship which also pervades the western world. Appadurai (1996: 19, 1993) 
in noting the rather flimsy nature of the hyphenated condition between the 
nation and the state drew attention to the fact that ‘the nation-state, as a 
complex modern political form, is on its last legs’, where ‘the right-hand side 
of the hyphen can barely contain the unruliness of the left-hand side’ (1996: 
172). In this context, the changing nature of citizenship in the context of the 
1989 events and as observed at the beginning of this chapter can be viewed as a 
process where the state was unhinged from the nation. As a result, modern 
citizenship born of the nation-state was endangered and thrown into a crisis. 
These events brought to the front the uneasy relation between citizenship and 
national identity: a semantic connection that has been loosened on account of 
the disintegration of the classic form of the nation-state (Habermas 1994). 
Citizenship scholars have thus speculated on newer forms where alternatives 
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could be found in the context of the decline rather than the foundation of 
nation-states (Andrews 1994).  
 
1.3 Alternative ‘spaces’ of citizenship 
Arguments against the continued applicability of national citizenship have in 
most instances prevailed mainly by demonstrating the spatial inappropriateness 
of its current form, i.e. nation-space as a robust crucible for carrying the mantle 
of citizenship. As the need to inscribe citizenship and newer forms of 
“imagined communities” in space remains intact, attempts to redefine and re-
imagine citizenship have at a broad-brush level assumed two polarised 
positions of spatial re-conceptualisation. This involves enlarging post-
nationally at the global level, or reducing sub-nationally to the local scale. 
Sceptics argue that the inappropriateness of the nation-state triggers 
inefficiency and passivity as where a national fitting is ‘too small for global 
forces and too big for personal concerns’ (Castells 1997: 273). Even Anderson 
(1995: 66) amidst his sympathetic stand on the exaggerated death of nation-
states cannot help observing that ‘this key institution of modern society is 
apparently being squeezed by a combined pincer movement “from above” and 
“from below”’, or what Beauregard and Bounds (2000) described as an assault 
by globalisation from without and identity-based movements from within.11 
But, nonetheless, critics have sought a spatial alternative to national citizenship 
based on either of these simultaneously undermining globalising and localising 
pressures.  
 
Scholars pursuing the possibility of mapping an alternative citizenship 
on a global terrain emphasise that there is neither novelty nor radicalism in 
                                                 
11 Arguments that global restructuring triggers the demise of the nation-state are increasingly 
replaced by assertions that insertion of the global is still within the limits of the national, and 
often requires a strong nation-state (as seen in the examples of East Asian countries). Sassen 
(1991, 1996, 1998, 2000a, 2002) reflects the tension between the above two positions best, but 
for a critical summary of such arguments see Brenner, Jessop and Jones (2003). This chapter is 
slightly different as it assumes that the notion of a national citizenship is discredited due to the 
recombinant impact of ethnonationalism and economic globalisation as illustrated by the 
policies of the BJP Government (1999-2004) in India (Gopalakrishnan 2006). 
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globalisation and its associated culture of cosmopolitanism because it unbinds 
the nation-state and denationalises its democracy and citizenship in the process 
(Falk 1994, 2000; Carter 2001; Bowden 2003; van Steenbergen, 1994). 
However, building genuine conviction around this project is a difficult 
proposition.  Even if ‘the notion that there could be a “citizen of the world” has 
long been part of the utopian imaginary of the citizenship tradition’ (Isin and 
Turner 2002: 8), there is a simultaneous acknowledgement regarding the 
limited scope of its well-disposed unifying vision. Falk (1994) admits that the 
most likely candidate for a global citizen of transnational affairs is the business 
elite who lacks any global civic sense of responsibility, with global capital 
oppositional to global citizenship. There is a reluctant acknowledgement that it 
is only aspirational – a project to create a political community that does not yet 
exist.  
 
According to Carter (2001), democracy still remains a crucial criterion 
for the functioning of citizenship, and beyond the nation-state there is a 
dominant presence of transnational corporations and international organisations 
driven by trade and economic gains, rather than social or political means of 
establishing a shared sense of community. Moreover, she adds that global 
citizenship is hardly a credible alternative in many of the postcolonial nation-
states. This, she states, is because globalisation is associated with principles of 
exploitation and evokes strong adverse reactions: the celebrated global citizen 
is mostly from the West or could be even an indigenous elite, and is invariably 
the leader of some economic corporation with transnationalised interests, 
signalling a disguised form of cultural imperialism.  
 
Appadurai’s (1996: 177) consideration of the postnational imaginary 
and the cultural politics of the global modern is initially based on the 
possibility that transnational social forms may generate postnational yearnings, 
as it is in these postnational spaces that ‘the incapacity of the nation-state to 
tolerate diversity….may, perhaps, be overcome’. But as he constructs his 
argument for a world system of images built around nodes of transnational 
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imaginary landscapes, he is torn by the question of what locality might mean in 
such a situation. He oscillates between globality and locality and wonders if the 
latter as a socio-spatial formation representing the anxieties of the nation-state 
is too weak and contested. This dilemmatic poser is easily addressed by 
Chatterjee’s (1997b) assessment of the same work where he asserts that the 
need is to look not beyond the nation but within. Appadurai himself resolves 
this uncertainty in another work in collaboration with Holston (Holston and 
Appadurai 1996) where he locates the possibility of newer forms of citizenship 
more assuredly in the ‘local’ terra firma of cities. 
 
1.4 Cities and citizenship 
In 1996, Holston and Appadurai edited an issue of Public Culture on Cities and 
Citizenship, now considered a seminal piece in reactivating the discourse on 
urban citizenship.12 They discount first the ability of the nation to be a 
successful arbiter of citizenship, emphasising that liberalism’s twentieth-
century project of a national society of citizens appears increasingly exhausted 
and discredited. With the breakdown of civility and nationality that has 
characterised the post-1989 era, while ‘many are seeking alternatives in the 
post-, trans-, de-, re-, (and plain con) of current speculations about the future of 
nation-state’, they argue that ‘until transnations attain more flesh and bone, 
cities may still be the most important sites in which we experience the crises of 
national membership and through which we may rethink citizenship’ (Holston 
and Appadurai 1996: 202). Refusing to buy ‘the dematerialisation of place as a 
result of globalisation’ argument, they make a case instead for cities which 
according to them are re-emerging as salient sites of citizenship, engaging best 
the tumult of citizenship. It is in the res publica of cities that citizenship is 
reconstituted ‘to bend to the recognition that contemporary urban life 
comprises multiple and diverse cultural identities, modes of life, and forms of 
                                                 
12 The late 1990s witnessed a number of efforts to reconsider the opportunities of urban 
citizenship. Besides the Public Culture issue, Theory and Society (1997) published a special 
issue on Recasting Citizenship, and a special issue of Citizenship Studies (1999) published a 
select set of papers from a symposium entitled Rights to the City: Citizenship, Democracy and 
Cities in a Global Age held at York University, Toronto, 26-28 June, 1998. 
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appropriating urban space’ (ibid.: 195). Drawing on Young’s (1990) politics of 
difference, they echo her pursuit of a normative ideal of city life as a vision of 
social relations affirming group difference. This is further ratified by Isin’s 
(2000) observation that the claims of different groups and identities to 
citizenship rights is actually thought through the city.13 
 
Yet there are scholars who express caution in openly valorising urban 
citizenship. In the first instance is the awareness that such intentions are not in 
anyway a pilgrimage to the historically celebrated condition of city-states. 
Gupta (1997) reminds us of Marx’s remarks on the impossibility of returning to 
ancient Greece. This point is also articulated by Isin (2000), who explains that 
while western historical imagination is full of images of the birth of democracy 
and citizenship in ancient Greek cities, its republican transformations in ancient 
Roman cities, and its revival in medieval European cities, the significance of 
the city as a milieu cultivating and engendering citizenship through the modern 
democratic conception of the city does not derive from this history. Secondly, 
as Bender (1999) observes, cities operate more significantly as socio-economic 
units, never as independent political organisations. Very few citizenship laws 
have been enacted at any level below or above the national one, highlighting 
the reality that the national level remains legal while others are mere 
negotiations (Isin and Turner 2002). 
 
In addition, there is pessimism about the ability of the current urban 
metropolis to carry the mantle of citizenship. Isin’s (1992) portrayal of modern 
cities as ‘cities without citizens’ is akin to Bookchin’s (1992) observation that 
urbanisation has worked against cities and citizenship wherein people trapped 
in modern-day urban agglomerations cannot be really considered as citizens. 
This position is shared by Dagger (1981: 716) who rightly argued that:  
                                                 
13 At the same time, Holston and Appadurai (1996) acknowledge that cities are as well sites of 
xenophobic expressions, as in Mumbai, where the Shiv Sena tries to restrict the city and its 
economic fortunes to the ‘local’ Marathi inhabitants.  
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The size, the fragmentation, the fluidity of the population of our swollen 
metropolises all contribute to the loss of civic memory—the memory 
which, by tying its residents to the past of a city, enables them to play a 
part in its present and to help shape its future. As they contribute to the 
loss of civic memory, so these factors also contribute to the failure of 
citizenship. 
 
1.4.1 Neoliberal citizenship in globalising cities: urban (vain)glory? 
The above assertion that modern urban agglomerations are not conducive to 
citizenship is enhanced by the concern of whether cities can be proper breeding 
ground for citizenship in the contemporary condition of globalisation. 
Surprisingly, the effects of transnationalisation that increasingly link cities in a 
globally network of flows ranging from capital and goods to labour and ideas is 
viewed agreeably by some scholars to position cities as favourable containers 
of citizenship. Holston and Appadurai (1996) insist that in the era of 
globalisation, cities represent the localisation of global forces – a condition of 
urban multiplicity spawning new and more democratic forms of citizenship. 
The local is seen as a site of resistance and liberation emerging in response to 
managing and controlling global capitalism. Bauböck (2003: 156) is tempted 
‘to regard the global city as a new political space within which the meaning of 
citizenship can be fundamentally redefined’. And the most emphatic support 
comes from Isin (2000) and Purcell (2003) who argue that global city-regions 
provide us with concrete sites generating new citizenship rights and 
obligations, challenging established citizenship structures in a variety of ways.  
 
Nevertheless, Isin’s (2000) conviction that global cities are spaces 
where the very meaning of citizenship are constructed and transformed cannot 
be taken at face value and needs to be probed further. Sassen (2000) sets the 
tone for this when she acknowledges that a new set of dynamics are shaping 
global cities, as they emerge as key sites for globalised operations. Such cities, 
through the concentration of both the leading actors of global capital and a 
growing share of disadvantaged populations, become sites for a whole series of 
conflicts and contradictions engaging new forms of power. There is some 
initial enthusiasm about the possibility of new forms of citizenship practices, 
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but as she admits, despite the claims by global capital over the city’s spaces 
being countered by disadvantaged sections of the urban population, ‘the 
formation of new claims centered on transnational actors and involving 
contestation raise the question “Whose city is it?”’ (Sassen 2000: 50).  
 
With this question looming large, it is difficult to share Purcell’s (2003) 
embrace of the global city as one that imagines a new politics resisting the 
current neoliberalisation of the global political economy.14 Purcell (2002, 
2003) and Isin (2000) recall Lefebvre’s ‘right to the city’ as a right of the 
inhabitant to urban life, and contend that by invoking such a right to the global 
city one is able to challenge and offer resistance to neoliberal forces. Isin’s 
(2000: 14-5) interpretation that ‘the right to claim presence in the city, to wrest 
the use of the city from the privileged new masters and democratize its 
spaces….as an expression of urban citizenship, understood….as a practice of 
articulating, claiming and renewing group rights in and through the 
appropriation and creation of spaces in the city’ is laudable. And so is his 
articulation of the right to the city not as a right to property but as a right to 
appropriate the city. Similarly, Purcell (2002: 101-02) uses Lefebvre to suggest 
that ‘[t]he right to the city stresses the need to restructure the power relations 
that underlie the production of urban space, fundamentally shifting control 
away from capital and the state and toward urban inhabitants’. But does this 
really happen in a neoliberal city’s as it positions itself for global 
connectedness? Doesn’t neoliberalism abet the persistent extension of capitalist 
social relations where large corporations control material life and decrease the 
power of ordinary citizens? 
 
Even though neoliberalism can claim to have resurrected failing urban 
economies in many places, doubts persist over the kind of citizenship that 
functions in this condition, particularly when one suspects that 
                                                 
14 In this thesis, neoliberalism, at one level, is used in conjunction with globalisation, and 
concerns the opening up of national economies to global actors. At another level, it refers to 
the emerging connection between capital (mostly private and global) and the state, reinforcing 
the private individual and the market, thereby altering the process of social reproduction and 
control (Smith 2002; Harvey 2005).  
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neoliberalisation/globalisation results not in economic integration but actually 
increases poverty and inequality.15  Amidst concerns that neoliberal economic 
policies enhance socio-economic polarisation and adversely affect overall 
human development, is also the fear that the competitive environment for 
growth and efficiency imposed by the neoliberal preference for markets over 
politics hinders the development of ‘fair’ citizenship practices (Brenner and 
Theodore 2002; 2005). Neoliberal economic and political policies are believed 
to contribute to the disintegration of the urban imaginary of commensurable 
citizens, with the teleological notion of common good replaced by the priority 
of right (Holston and Appadurai 1996).  
 
1.4.2 Claiming the city: the right of being proper and propertied 
The principle of right to the city that is now exercised is not quite similar to the 
one that Purcell (2003) and Isin (2000) assert but rather formed by a bourgeois 
ethic which doesn’t allow for a substantive conception of the good.16 This 
priority of right is elevated to a supreme value rejecting the notion of shared 
allegiance and negating the redistributive right-claims of citizenship. The 
exertion of right is thus limited to a select few, and to understand better its 
exclusivity, it is useful to probe Chatterjee’s (2004) employment of the notion 
of propriety as he makes a careful distinction between ‘proper’ citizens and an 
‘improper’ population to explain the politics of the governed in India. He 
suggests that while citizens carry the moral connotation of sharing in the 
sovereignty of the state – and hence of claiming rights in relation to the state – 
populations do not bear any inherent moral claim. In fact, even though 
according to the constitution and the laws everyone is a citizen with equal 
rights, in practice, most of the inhabitants of India are only tenuously and even 
                                                 
15 This is an ongoing debate between the proponents and opponents of neoliberalisation and its 
after-effects. See for instance, Wade (2004); Amin (2004); Srinivasan and Wallack (2004); 
Kiely (2007).  For an examination of the spatial ramification of neoliberalism, particularly at 
the urban scale, see Antipode (2002), volume 34, issue 3. 
16 At a philosophical level, the argument is constructed differently, where, privileging the 
politics of right over the politics of good is seen as the hallmark of a modern liberal political 
and social order. But in the neoliberal condition, the politics of right takes a moral high ground 
over the politics of good, as it stakes a claim for a common good, but one that is imagined 
narrowly as the need of an elite social group, excluding large sections of the society.  
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then ambiguously rights-bearing citizens in the sense imagined by the 
constitution.  
 
Chatterjee (2004) further identifies a discernible shift since the 1990s 
when the idea of the post-industrial globalised metropolis began to circulate in 
India, and which has driven the wedge further between the citizens and the 
population, with the ‘rightful’ demands of the former discriminating against 
population groups belonging to the urban poor, and claimed on the basis of 
propriety. In this context, Roy (2003: 475) gathers a forceful argument against 
the new style of urban developmentalism emerging in the era of 
neoliberalisation where through various forms of urban restructuring, a 
bourgeois city that is ordered and orderly is created and justified as a return to 
the rightful citizens: ‘in the name of public interest is the attempt to reclaim 
urban space for legitimate (read: propertied) citizens’. She highlights the 
‘social articulation that takes place through repeated rounds of socio-spatial 
restructuring, to the everyday social grammar through which the paradigm of 
propertied citizenship is lived and instituted’ (ibid.: 464). Arguing that the 
paradigm of bourgeois citizenship formed in this context only recognises 
formal rights of property, marginalising the shelter claims of the poor and other 
vulnerable social groups, she adds that the employment of citizenship is 
reduced to negotiable claims rather than enforceable rights. Daniel (2000) 
adopts a similar position and draws a parallel with the emergent bourgeoisie of 
the Enlightenment where property was the prerequisite “authorisation” required 
to participate properly as a citizen, and those who were incapable of 
maintaining a “proper” relationship with property were pathologised and 
portrayed as threats to the vital linkage between property and citizenship. 
 
Of significance is the fact that this new version of the politics of right 
based on the notion of being proper and propertied is gaining formidable 
presence in cities of the global south dominated by a neoliberal agenda of 
urban development. Globalisation and neoliberalisation are processes that 
affect all cities, albeit in varying degrees. Appadurai (2000b) maintains that 
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cities like Mumbai are the loci of the practices of predatory global capital, 
seducing global capital in their own particular ways, and appearing as images 
of globalisation that are in the end cracked and refracted. The troubling aspect 
of this phenomenon is not only that such cities are the sites of various 
uncertainties about citizenship, as Appadurai (2000b) asserts, but also that the 
ensuing citizenship discourse is exclusive to select social groups. This 
highlights the need to address the role of class in making citizenship claims. 
While class and citizenship have had an entangled relationship historically (see 
the following section), neoliberalism’s perpetuating socio-economic 
inequalities complicates it further, making it necessary to place class concerns 
literally in the ‘middle’ of citizenship matters.  
 
1.5 Class and citizenship: the return of the ‘bourgeois’ citizen 
Marshall’s (1994) take on the conflict of citizenship and class is well-known. 
Here he postulates that as citizenship is based on a status of equality and class 
on a system of inequality, the rise of capitalism will inevitably set up a conflict 
between the two. The supposedly annulling relationship between citizenship 
and class compels some to propose that citizenship and class are analytical 
instruments to be used interchangeably and that in the contemporary condition 
of new social identities, citizenship rather than a redundant class apparatus 
would be a more appropriate tool to understanding the major social issues of 
the 1990s (van Steenbergen 1994). In reality, the two remain firmly intertwined 
and in the event of citizenship’s inability to reconcile the various classes to the 
status of full membership to the society, citizenship risks becoming an architect 
of social inequality, particularly in the current heightened phases of capitalism 
associated with neoliberalisation and globalisation.  
 
Another stumbling block is the rise of alternative understandings of 
citizenship, particularly based on the politics of difference, downplaying the 
tacit relationship between citizenship and class with the argument that the latter 
doesn’t work in light of the many forms of cultural exclusion interacting with 
common citizenship in different ways (Kymlicka 1998). Such arguments pit 
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the centrality of identity rather than class to citizenship claims are generally 
constructed around the larger ‘demise of class’ argument. This is explored in 
the next chapter where the relevance of bringing class back in amidst the 
challenge posed by identity-based politics is examined in greater detail. Of 
more relevance here is the fact that the possibility of viewing citizenship 
debates through a class-based lens is hindered by the tendency of current 
literature (particularly those on global cities) to be reductionist about class. It 
tends to view class conflict rather simplistically, between a global or 
transnational elite and an underclass (Isin 1999; cf. Sassen 1991; Hamnett 
1994).  
 
According to Isin (1999), this reduction not only fails to analyse the 
new class formations in the process but also makes class an easy prey to 
accusation that as a concept it can no longer capture the principles of social 
differentiation in advanced capitalism. He pleads for an analysis of globalising 
cities as sites of class and group conflicts, and focuses – for this purpose on the 
spectre of a new image of the citizen – the new middle class. His proposal for 
studying the ‘professional-citizens’ is constructed at two levels. Firstly on the 
basis that the new middle class is the class that allows us to make a new 
relationship between class and citizenship in a way anticipated by TH Marshall 
but never pursued. Secondly, because ‘studies that focus on insurgent practices 
of citizenship should be balanced with studies that focus on the new 
professions in the global city rather than opposing insurgent practices against 
an imaginary global or transnational elite’ (ibid.: 281).  
 
That the middle class have much to gain from the neoliberal agenda is 
highlighted by Boschken (2003) who, in outlining the unfolding of a new urban 
habitat reorienting itself towards global connectedness, and draws attention to 
the crucial position of the new middle class in moulding the city into an 
integrated global economy. Clarifying that the urban middle class is more than 
a “marker” of the global city, he describes their presence as a significant force 
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in policy outcomes that tailor the cityscape to meet the demands of global 
exchange.  
 
In a developing society like India, this aspect is emphasised where the 
rise of a ‘new’ middle class is highly noticeable, and whose presence is 
considered crucial to the negotiation of India’s new relationship with the global 
economy.17 This is explored in detail in Chapter Two, and it is suffice to 
mention here that the growing cultural visibility of the middle class parallels a 
shift in political culture as well as mainstream political discourses depicting the 
middle class as the representative citizens of liberalising India (Fernandes 
2006). In fact, the bourgeois nature of neoliberal citizenship and its 
paradigmatic emphasis on propriety and property links to the middle-class 
claims to the city that Chatterjee (2004) notes. Thus, according to Chatterjee 
(2004), ‘proper citizens’ are the normative citizens drawn from the urban 
middle class and the elites in Indian cities, prompting him to ask: ‘Are Indian 
cities are becoming bourgeois at last? Or, if you prefer, we could exclaim: Are 
Indian cities becoming bourgeois, alas?’ (2004: 131, emphasis added). 
 
1.6 Research objective 
The aim of this research is to examine the current rationale employed by the 
Indian middle class to redefine citizenship in the urban condition through a 
bourgeois reinterpretation of ‘right to the city’ and the re-presentation of 
themselves as ‘proper citizens’. The objective of the research can be 
summarised within the following question: 
Given the embourgeoisement of cities and citizenship, how is the 
neoliberalised middle class in Indian cities employing its bourgeois 
sensibilities of propriety and right to paraphrase urban citizenship 
and its claims to the city? 
 
Even though the theoretical and empirical investigation of this question is 
limited to the social category of the middle class, the research is a deeper 
                                                 
17 This will be discussed in detail in Chapter Two. 
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inquiry into the structural transformation of the conceptualisation of citizenship 
where one particular group attempts to extend its interpretation into a master 
narrative. The research examines the bourgeois vocabulary employed by this 
social group in framing its discourse of citizenship, and the process through 
which it is standardised and normalised.  
 
Chapter Two is a theoretical undertaking in understanding the middle 
class, and their relevance to the ongoing debates on class and culture. It focuses 
on a discussion of the literature on middle class in general, and the Indian 
middle class in particular. In addition to charting the evolution of this social 
group from the ‘old’ to the ‘new’,  the chapter examines the significance of the 
middle class in a postcolonial scenario, such as India, where they are 
considered to be elitist and part of the dominant ruling coalition. A primary 
objective of the chapter is also to chart the political construction of this social 
group and how it operates as a proponent of modernity and democracy. Given 
the contradictory nature of citizenship and class, the middle class play a key 
role as a dialectic in this conflict, as they attempt to reformat a new notion of 
postcolonial citizenship.   
 
Chapter Three discusses the methodology adopted, comprising a 
qualitative approach of semi-structured interviews with middle-class residents 
from two neighbourhoods in the city, both of which represent and highlight at a 
heightened level the aspirations of the city and its residents to a neoliberal, 
globalising status. Eighty four interviews were conducted with 110 residents in 
2003-2004, initially for a period of eight months, followed six months later by 
a 6-week second visit. Most of the respondents (84) comprised of young (under 
40 years) homeowners who had an active exposure to the ongoing 
transnationalisation of their city. The research question is tackled through an 
analysis of primary material gathered from these interviews. They focus on the 
empowerment of the middle class through their orchestration and manipulation 
of the citizenship-associated apparatuses of civil society and public sphere in 
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presenting themselves as the champions of the city. A discourse analysis of this 
material constitutes the core of the two empirical chapters. 
 
Before that, Chapter Four sets out the backdrop in terms of the policies 
and planning of an increasingly bourgeois state. While it is essential to 
establish the recent practices of the state in preparing a neoliberal ‘field’ and 
what it means for subsequent citizenship claims of the new middle class, at 
another level this chapter seeks to fill a particular void in terms of writings on 
Indian cities. Sundaram (2002) emphasises the need to steer clear of the older 
narratives of developmentalism and any larger frameworks of looking for the 
Indian City, focussing rather on particular cities. This trend is evident in the 
way Roy (2002) has composed a City Requiem for Calcutta, Hansen (2002) 
charts the Wages of Violence through the problems of naming and identity in 
postcolonial Bombay, and Dupont et al. (2000) portray the alchemy of an 
unloved city in Delhi amongst its Urban Space and Human Destinies. Such an 
effort is sadly missing in the case of Chennai where academic writing is non-
existent and popular writers restrict themselves to an anthology of nostalgic 
reveries about a city that once was. This chapter fills in this gap by recovering 
the city from the margins of academic and literary writing and raising it to a 
new public discourse interweaving its development with the political economy 
objectives emphasising the agenda of ‘bourgeois urbanism’.  
 
The empirical investigations of Chapter Five revolve around the ‘civil 
society’ initiatives of middle-class residents’ associations and raise questions 
concerning their ability to provide an alternative model of civil society. How 
this form of social organisation holds the prospect of an active form of 
citizenship for the middle class constitutes the crux of this chapter. 
Acknowledging that participation in myriad forms of collective social 
endeavour does not necessarily entail civic participation, it explores whether 
these associations are merely pursuing the same self-serving path as other rent-
seeking groups in the city. To understand if they can function as a genuine 
form of civil society this chapter considers their willingness to participate and 
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facilitate a politics of partnership – firstly in the form of cross-class alliances 
with other residents’ associations (particularly other social classes), secondly 
by extending a sense of public spiritedness by taking up ‘civil society’ issues 
outside of mere civic infrastructure concerns, and finally, engaging with the 
democratic state as citizens on city-wide issues not limiting themselves to the 
role of benefit seeking patrons from a clientalist state.  
 
Chapter Six tests the extent to which the public sphere as a crucial 
realm for the social foundations of democracy is an ideal terrain  for an active 
enactment of citizenship. Limiting itself to the physical representation of the 
public sphere, that is, public spaces, this chapter focuses on the recent debates 
surrounding the re-imagination of the beaches in the city. With a shoreline of 
20 Km, beaches are the most prominent form of open spaces, eagerly sought 
after by both the state and the society.  This chapter examines in the first 
instance the state’s vision for the Marina Beach, the most public beach in the 
city, and the politics of partnership it entailed amongst the actors who rose in 
response to its initiatives. The second part of the chapter looks at the parochial 
beach stretches in the city, where the politics of partnership mainly involves 
the middle-class residents inhabiting the shoreline neighbourhoods, as they 
(dis)engage with the fishermen and the state in their pursuit of a new beach 
imaginary. Crucial to this exercise is a process of othering, wherein the middle 
class use the discourse of dirt and danger to identify the impropriety of 
‘others’. Overall, this chapter highlights the growing contradiction between 
middle-class aspirations for developing the public spaces as spaces of 
modernity and the spaces of democracy that they are generally imagined to be.   
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2 
 
 
Epistemology and ontology  
of the (Indian) middle class 
 
 
 
If the nineteenth century belonged to the industrial bourgeoisie, the 
twentieth has belonged to the middle class. (Bhatia 1994: 1) 
 
 
Amongst the myriad events that have come to mark 1989 as an epochal year (at 
least in the academic circles) is the publication of the English translation of 
Habermas’s The Structural Transformations of the Public Sphere. First 
published in 1962, the book shows how historically an emergent European 
bourgeoisie initially managed to free the public sphere from an absolutist state 
by emphasising rational-critical debate but lost control as it was transformed 
into a place of passive consumption. Almost thirty years on, the significance of 
this book in reaching a wider audience was such that a conference was held in 
September 1989 to celebrate and contemplate the book’s continued relevance. 
Given the larger political events of its time, the conference was seen as not just 
an abstract, academic undertaking (Calhoun 1992), with Habermas (1992b) 
himself recognising a more than mere coincidence with the events of 1989.  
 
Besides the central position that the book’s theme of civil society and 
public sphere have come to occupy since then, scholars have questioned its 
other core focus – the bourgeois domination of these spheres via an emphasis 
on enlightenment and specialised forms of knowledge (see Calhoun 1992; Hill 
and Montag 2000; Negt and Kluge 1993). While early German Marxists 
criticised Habermas for idealising the bourgeois public sphere (Calhoun 1992), 
Fraser (1990, 1992) challenged its projection as the originary moment, and 
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criticised Habermas for a number of significant exclusions. She insisted that 
“subaltern counterpublics” existed simultaneously and contentiously with the 
bourgeois public, even though unequally empowered, along lines of gender, 
ethnicity, class and popular culture. Following the proliferation and successful 
campaign of mass movements promoting identities based on race, gender, and 
sexual difference, it seemed as if the bourgeois public sphere was just one 
among many public spheres, with its hegemony challenged by competing 
alternatives. It was this belief that prompted Hill and Montag (2000: 3) to 
declare that ‘[t]he public sphere as discussed in the work of the 1990s is no 
longer “bourgeois” either in its origins or in its actual functioning at present’.  
 
Nevertheless, conclusions forecasting the redundancy of a dominant 
bourgeois presence do seem to have been hastily drawn. Some view the 
‘counterpublic spheres’ such as Fraser’s feminist public sphere as a bourgeois 
subcategory variant that functions as a valuable corrective for bourgeois 
women, but hardly an alternative to it (Daniel 2000). Also, as Daniel (2000) 
explains, the official national public sphere is still very much bourgeois in 
nature wherein, wearing the mask of universality, the bourgeois subject 
controls the terms of public discussion of his/her interest, without ever having 
to acknowledge them. It is the bourgeois subject who carries cultural authority, 
is the personification of capital, and by appearing disembodied and 
disinterested, is able to speak for everyone in general but no one in particular.  
 
Amidst these arguments, if the bourgeois public sphere still comes 
across as a debilitated realm, it is mainly due to Habermas’s (1992) admission 
that his definition is not based on the class composition of its members. 
Through a vague generalisation of his notion of the bourgeois, he not only did 
not acknowledge class conflict in the public sphere (Hill and Montag 2000), 
but as Joshi (2001) notes, in missing the class aspects, he also failed to dwell 
on the extent to which it helped to create and shape a distinctive middle-class 
identity, and the crucial role played by the middle class in sustaining a 
bourgeois sphere. Joshi (2001) sees this as a major drawback failing to 
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recognise the way in which men “of a middling sort” came together under a 
middle-class identity in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century through a 
shared moral code, initiated a new cultural politics, interposed themselves 
between “people of rank and the common people”, and became hegemonic the 
world over.  
 
Joshi’s (2001) argument compels us to view the political events of 
1989 in a new light. Integral to the revival of civil society and public sphere is 
the rescuing of a condition long neglected as outdated or merely “bourgeois” 
(Kumar 1993), and despite the participation of social groups ranging from the 
working class and the peasants to the intellectuals, the communicative stream 
of civil society and a vital public sphere was very much embedded in the 
normative expressions of a bourgeois class. A prominent objective of the 
revolutions of 1989 was, in reality, the creation of conditions in which a middle 
class could arise, instrumental to establishing a “hegemonic bourgeois class” 
and instilling a political legitimacy for a liberal political system.  
 
Agh (1994) identified the emergence of a large middle class as the 
most important historical process after the collapse of communism in Central 
and Eastern Europe, transforming the comrade into the citizen. Thus, for 
societies that under state socialism were believed to be peculiarly ‘classless’ in 
structure, class became an important paradigm in explaining the transition 
process (Lane 2005), with the middle class a key measure of its success or 
failure (Vecernik 1997; Paczynska 2005). Even parties like Solidarity in 
Poland, despite its predominant blue-collar membership, argued that the 
interests of its workers were ‘best served by accepting deep sacrifices on behalf 
of a [middle] class that did not even exist, in return for benefits that it was 
hoped….would accrue in the future’ (Ost 1993: 465). Substantiating this is 
Kocka’s (1995) statement that post-1989, even though the so-called ‘transition’ 
societies have not become thoroughly “bourgeois”, the middle class has won 
against its opponents, moving far beyond the social segments where it 
originated and which it once helped to define.  
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This triggering of an unprecedented interest in the middle class is not 
restricted to Eastern and Central Europe, but carries a wider universal appeal. 
Pro-democracy movements in China and Southeast Asia laid a similar 
emphasis on the middle class as important actors in the political 
transformations of the region (Chen 2005; Embong 2001a; Robison and 
Goodman 1996), while in Latin America, the position of the middle class in 
economic development, especially in light of the recurring debt crisis, is being 
reassessed with attempts to restore them to a more prominent socio-political 
relevance (Davis 2004). In India, Mazzarella (2005) suggests that the figure of 
the Indian middle class has become one of the main idioms through which a 
series of contemporary concerns are brought into critical juxtaposition, along 
with anxiety about the relationship between normative discourses of political 
practice and more corporeal dimensions of contemporary public life.     
 
Ironically, this scholarly fetish for the middle class is set amidst 
concurrent debates about the relevance of class as an appropriate analytic 
instrument for understanding the social upheavals of the 1990s. This chapter 
begins by first addressing the relevance of the middle class against the debate 
of whether class still matters. Central to this discussion is the issue of whether 
the middle class, particularly in postcolonial societies, can be considered as a 
dominant class or at least an ally of a dominant class. The nature of the middle 
class in such societies creates a perception that it is actually an elite bourgeois 
category. Such a postulation gains greater currency in the context of the rise of 
the ‘new’ middle class. The middle section of the chapter then focuses on this 
‘new’ social group, emphasising the need to look beyond its popular portrayals 
as an all-consuming class. It investigates the various mechanisms through 
which they have come to be associated with the global structural changes 
caused by globalisation and neoliberalisation. Following this, the final section 
considers the way in which a bourgeois middle class, despite its historic 
association with modernity, democracy and citizenship, is now redefining the 
parameters of citizenship apolitically sans democracy and modernity. This 
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section illustrates how the new Indian middle class amidst its oscillating 
tendencies between periods of quiet political absenteeism and moments of 
active citizenship, attempts to rework citizenship to address its own narrow 
concerns.  
 
2.1 Resolving some Marxist concerns about (middle) class 
The explosion of identity politics in the 1980s that spawned ‘new’ social 
movements, now commonly acknowledged as the post-structuralist ‘cultural 
turn’, questioned the capacity of class-based studies to address the increasingly 
complex aspects of social difference (Smith 2001). But if class was being 
outclassed by newer social categories such as race, gender and sexuality, it was 
partly its own undoing. Most Marxist scholars using class for social analysis 
have had to cope with the fact that Marx neither specified clearly what 
constitutes a class nor systematically explained the central idea of class 
struggle, being imprecise and inconsistent in using the concept (Carter 1985; 
Abercrombie and Urry 1983). Even though subsequent scholars have defined 
class more concretely as a means of social differentiation (for instance, Wright 
1985, 1989, 1991; Giddens 1973), Marxist scholars have been criticised for 
dealing with the questions of social difference within the narrow confines of 
class and its universalist framework of master narratives.18 Moreover, the 
branching out of class studies into Marxist and Weberian traditions of 
sociological analysis has not been theoretically profitable either as it was 
widely believed that class, in this split application could only be something of a 
background variable.19 In western societies, class based analyses also suffered 
from their inadequacy to explain the changes to capitalist operations – flexible, 
                                                 
18 This relates mostly to the rise of identity politics, starting with the feminist critique which 
found class insufficient to accommodate gender issues, and expanding to include race, 
sexuality, and other interest-specific concerns. See for instance, Young (1990); Calhoun 
(1994); Bondi (1993) amongst others. 
19 Marx’s notion of class is a purely economic phenomenon related to the means of production, 
while Weber conceived of class in terms of status groups distinguished by particular styles of 
life involving both production and consumption. Traditionally, social analysts either adopted a 
Marxist or Weberian approach, although it is now acknowledged that an adequate theory may 
well need to be eclectic, incorporating and rejecting elements of both approaches (Abercrombie 
and Urry 1983).  
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post-fordist, advanced, and so forth (Carter 1985). But it was not just this that 
Pakulski and Waters (1996) criticised analysts for manufacturing class where it 
no longer exists as a meaningful social entity. Marxists scholars have also been 
criticised for their reductivist understanding of class structure, where, drawing 
on Marx’s two-class model lumping heterogeneous layers of social groups into 
the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, they failed to explain sufficiently the 
position of the middle class within the class structure (Wright 1989; Giddens 
1995; Burris 1986; Wacquant 1991; Carchedi 1975).  
 
Occupying an ambiguous position in the class stratification ladder, the 
middle class, according to the Marxist scholars, lacks a clear class identity, 
unable to embrace any form of conflict: ‘class awareness, rather than class 
consciousness, is the typical cognitive perspective of the middle 
class…Conflict and struggle play a part in this imagery, but primarily in terms 
of the striving of the individual to secure a social position which accords with 
his talents and zeal, not as any sort of class confrontation’ (Giddens 1995: 
112). This understanding mainly stems from Marx’s prediction in his 
Communist Manifesto (co-authored with Engels) that the middle mass of the 
petty bourgeoisie, small producers, artisans and craftsmen would gradually 
disappear, joining one or the other camp, i.e. the bourgeoisie or the proletariat 
(Dahrendorf 1959).  
 
Although it is now clear that Marx did caution against neglecting the 
growing middle class, and recognised its mediating power (Giddens 1995; 
Wacquant 1991), there is still a tendency to see the middle class not as a true 
class but as a contradictory location within class relations exhibiting both 
capitalist and labour affinities (Wright 1985). Such a portrayal fails to explain 
accordingly the expanding middle class and its role in capitalist development 
(Carter 1985). It is even alleged that this failure to construct an adequate 
Marxist concept of the middle class led to many questioning the general theory 
of class itself (Wright 1985, 1991). In contemporary times, the radical 
reorganisation of class also means that a majority identify themselves as 
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middle class (Seabrook 2002). This, according to Smith (2001), is actually a 
euphemism for classlessness, with class consciousness sublimated beneath the 
familiar self-deception that we are all middle class now. Against the 
diminished analytical yield for studying class concepts, the investigation of the 
middle class proves challenging, standing as a residual group that everyone 
identifies themselves with but one that Marxists and liberalists alike find 
problematic to categorise (Deshpande 2006).  
 
2.1.1 Insisting on class 
While Herring and Agarwala (2006) in their account of a disappearing class 
theory explain that global intellectual dispensations have militated against class 
analysis, it is not as if class loyalists have taken this onslaught lying down. 
Rather, they have persistently argued that class is still a powerful analytical 
tool with sufficient mileage to understand the complexities of social and 
historical processes, and that its continued application is more relevant given 
the greater magnitude of class differences (McNall et al. 1991; Wright 1996, 
1997; Scott 2001). Smith (2001: 1012) for instance believes that ‘the period 
since the 1970s may well represent an era of unprecedented global class 
formation and restructuring,…….so-called globalization is dramatically 
remaking class relations at a time when the focus of much European and North 
American academic research has been directed elsewhere’.  
 
Those who still subscribe to the continued significance of class often 
point to the growing income inequalities where class plays a greater role than 
ever before. Wright (1996) asks if inequalities in the distribution of capital 
have declined to a point that it doesn’t matter in people’s lives, and if the 
extraction of labour effort is no longer a problem in capitalist firms. Similarly, 
Fernandes (2006) argues that understanding the structuralist dimension of class 
formation captures the enduring reproduction of social inequalities and the 
ways in which such inequalities are systematically structured by shifts in 
economic policy. This is clarified by Seabrook (2002) as he adds that 
inequality is an abstraction that is often conveniently employed by the rich to 
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replace earlier concepts of class, as ordinary people are absent from inequality 
whereas in class relationships people are omnipresent.  
 
At another level, there is an increasing acknowledgement that it is 
limiting to think of culture and class politics as distinct categories and that they 
are more interpenetrating than one would like to admit. Thus, McNall et al. 
(1991) made their appeal on the basis that the ‘new’ social movements and the 
newer politics of identity continue to be shaped by class, an argument picked 
up by Smith’s (2001) emphasis that class is thickly written through the cultural, 
political and economic landscapes we interrogate. He is convinced that 
opposition on the basis of race and gender are imbricated with economic 
exploitation rooted in class difference. Struggles to dismantle racial and 
gendered oppressions therefore very quickly confront class issues at the heart 
of the social economy (Fraser 1998, 1999; Harvey 1993; Young 1999). He 
further contends that critics of class analysis are mistaking the increasing 
complexity of class relations for the dissolution of class altogether, adding that 
social theory debates cannot operate as hermetically separated concepts as they 
overlap with one another.  
 
Class in India: being ‘out-casted’ 
While such arguments against the irrelevance of class have been fairly 
successful in the western context, in developing societies like India, it has been 
more difficult to restore class to a conceptually credible status. This is mainly 
because, at least in India, social groups are not well-defined in class terms, with 
the politically active groups and movements of recent times resisting easy 
definition, and being constructed more on an exceptionalism of cultural 
identity based on caste, religion and ethnicity (Deshpande 2006; Fernandes and 
Heller 2006). Despite obvious growing income inequalities, Herring and 
Agarwala (2006) note the difficulty in employing class-based analysis in India 
where there is greater latitude to deploy social identities rather than class-
relevant programmes. The problem in India is the religious-cultural overlay on 
class stratification especially because ‘economic class has always seemed too 
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simplistic and materialist a concept for the richly stratified layers and 
dimensions of privilege and deprivation in Indic society’ (ibid.: 334).20 
 
Scholars have also had to contend with the overall scepticism of 
whether a concept and type that was developed in nineteenth-century Europe 
can be superimposed on contemporary Asian societies where a postcolonial 
critique of Western theoretical conceptions of class and capitalism have 
prompted a shift towards an exclusive focus on cultural identities such as caste 
and ethnicity (Fernandes 2006). Such a tendency however has been strongly 
refuted by Dirlirk (1997) who identifies the disavowal of class relations as one 
of the outstanding deficiencies of postcolonial criticism. Akin to Smith’s 
(2001) identification of a class and identity overlap, Indian scholars tackle the 
consciousness that caste and not class is the criterion of backwardness in Indian 
society by arguing that class formations are substantively shaped by the 
reworking of inequalities of caste, language, religion, and gender. They 
maintain that class analysis sensitive to a social embedding such as caste can 
be an indispensable conceptual tool in explaining social differences in India 
(Fernandes 2006; Sathyamurthy 1996; Herring and Agarwala 2006).  
 
2.1.2 Class/culture convergence in the middle 
Paradoxically, if there is one social category that has succeeded in gaining 
advantage from these efforts to restore agency to class it is the middle class. 
For, in recent years, it is the middle class that has captured best the shift 
signifying the ‘cultural turn’ of class. As social class shapes distinct cultural 
subsystems and the new social movements promote goals that cut across class 
lines to include gender, race, sexuality and locality, it is equally evident that 
their membership is drawn primarily from the middle class which benefits 
disproportionately from these movement campaigns (Rose 1997; Aronowtiz 
1992). The profound realignment of people’s sense of self as expressed through 
                                                 
20 This belief constitutes the background of recent historical empirical studies of peasants and 
the working class challenging a clear functioning of class consciousness (Chakravarty 1989; 
Fernandes 1997; cf. Basu 2004). 
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women’s movements, consciousness of race and ethnicity, and assertion of 
sexual orientation reaffirm the rise of the middle class (Seabrook 2002). In 
India, Fernandes (2006) explains that while identities such as caste, gender and 
religion provide segments of the middle class with an important source of 
capital, middle-class identity is equally constructed through class as well. As 
‘the resolution of the class question in India doubtless passes, even today, 
through the caste question’ (Ahmed 2001: 20), it finds its best expression in the 
middle class whose handling of caste related issues is akin to that of class 
actions.  
 
The middle class thus highlights an increasingly probable interface 
between class and culture, which is best understood by combining cultural 
modes of analysis, outlining a social relational perspective on culture, class and 
social differentiation.21 This way of unifying and defining characteristics of the 
middle class via a relational and cultural theory (Kocka 1995) is particularly 
helpful, given the inability of this social category to be defined or understood 
using traditional sociological indicators of income and occupation (Joshi 2001). 
The elusive nature of defining the middle-class category in precise socio-
economic terms is well-known, and popularly described as the ‘boundary 
problem’ (Abercrombie and Urry 1983). Wacquant (1991) argued that any 
epistemic ambition of defining the “real” boundaries of the middle class is 
doomed to fail because it rests on a fundamentally mistaken conception of the 
ontological status of classes, and that theories of the middle class should 
consciously strive to capture the essential ambiguity of their object rather than 
dispose of it.22 In most cases, the middle class is a lazily defined heterogeneous 
group of people (excluding nobles, peasants, and the lower-mass of workers) 
                                                 
21 This refers back to Bourdieu’s vast body of work, most notably Distinction (1984), where he 
argued that class distinctions of the economy inevitably generate the symbolic distinctions of 
culture, which in turn regenerate and legitimate the class structure. Bourdieu’s work not only 
triggered a spectrum of cultural scholarship but also provided a new paradigm for 
understanding middle class formation and reproduction, as seen, for instance in Savage et al.’s 
(1992) work on a contemporary analysis of Property, bureaucracy and culture: middle class 
formation in Britain.  
22 This thesis adopts Wacquant’s (1991) suggestion and does not attempt a definitional 
elaboration (at least quantitatively) of this amorphous social group.  
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differing in occupation and economic status, gender and region, religion and 
ethnicity (Kocka 1995). With members ranging from liberal and intellectual 
radicals to the right-wing conservatives, the middle class has been seen as a 
fragmented entity provoking many to address it in plural — middle classes 
(Wright 1991; Kocka 1995).23 To a large extent, this raises the question of 
whether the middle class is then simply a catch-all label with no analytical 
purpose (Joshi 2001), or if there is a value for social and cultural analyses 
(Lakha 1999), what is its positional relevance, and what does it really signify? 
 
2.2 Significance of being in the middle 
Scholars highlighting the relevance of the middle class argue in the first 
instance against a simplified polarised clustering of class forces between two 
conceptual extremes, failing to bring notice to the complexity in the middle. 
This is seen in Davis’s (2004) call for a shift in attention away from the two 
principle class protagonists of development that have dominated the literature 
for the last several decades, the big manufacturing capitalists and waged 
industrial labourers, to an examination of the class force in the middle. She 
argues that the middle class prominently enables the state to impose political 
and economic discipline on the capitalists and labourers in the absence of 
which the demands of capital and labour follow rent-seeking, short-term profit 
maximisation, higher wage rages and protectionist measures. Sridharan (2004) 
similarly observes that the rapid growth of a new middle class in India changes 
its class structure from one characterised by a sharp contrast between a small 
elite and a large impoverished mass, to one with a substantial intermediate 
class. This is actually a classic standpoint that can be traced back to Aristotle’s 
famous statement (2000 [306 BC]: 169) that:  
the best political community is formed by citizens of the middle class, 
and that those states are likely to be well-administered, in which the 
middle class is large, and larger if possible than both the other classes, or 
at any rate than either singly, for the addition of the middle class turns the 
scale and prevents either of the extremes from being dominant. 
                                                 
23 This was substantiated on field where middle class participants represented a heterogeneous 
mass, subscribing to all kinds of political, social, and economic ideologies. 
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Over the centuries, this statement has become an aphorism of sorts where the 
opposite of a middle-class society is believed to be an unequal one, highly 
polarised between a rich elite and an impoverished majority.  
 
But when Deshpande (2003) presents the middle class as a “centrist” 
group that can avoid political and economic extremes, and promotes its 
attractiveness as a social location, it is difficult to accept his assertion of its 
moral legitimacy and qualification to act or speak on behalf of society. There is 
concern about the desirability of this middleness, and whether an “average” 
class can be seen as one that best represents society as a whole. This is because 
its location within the class structure deems that the middle class occupies a 
relational rather than an oppositional position, hardly concerned with conflicts 
of material interest (Giddens 1995). Despite such doubts, in the context of 
developing countries, the general perception is that the middle class is 
significant as a politically salient class actor. This stems from a conviction that 
they play a greater role as both a dominant class as well as an ally of the 
dominant class in the state-led capitalist modernisation of the late-
industrialising societies than is generally acknowledged (Davis 2004).  
 
2.2.1 Capitalist state ally 
A characteristic feature of most postcolonial states is that it is intensely middle-
class-embedded through the presence of the latter within the state machinery in 
various forms and roles (Davis 2004). Rather than assuming that the state is 
autonomous and have at best the capitalists as its preferred partner, she argues 
for an ‘understanding of the state in ways that capture its social or class 
composition as understood by the occupations that comprise it’ (ibid.: 51). 
And, instead of seeing the state as a homogeneous institutional actor, and 
treating it as an organisational structure where only the highest-level political 
leaders and a few key decision makers are thought of as conceptually relevant 
state actors, she views it in terms of the heterogeneous personnel whose 
salaries come from the state and who can only be understood in middle class 
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terms. The state, after all, is the single largest employer in late-industrialising 
countries responsible for the livelihood of a considerable percentage of a 
national labour force, including educated professionals, clerks, and lower-level 
workers. In short, the state apparatus is essentially drawn from the different 
levels of the middle class.  
 
Stern (2003) describes a similar situation in India where the rapidly 
growing middle class became the director and constituency of political and 
economic change mainly via its representation inside the state as technocrats 
and bureaucrats (see also Vanaik 1990; Varma 1999). Through its participation 
in the decision making process, the middle class, even though not economically 
and politically dominant, was able to find efficient ways of interfering with 
public policies and establish conditions in accord with its needs. The growth of 
the middle class was stimulated further as the postcolonial state’s nationalist-
development policies centred on import-substitution industrialisation was 
managed and implemented by the middle class. This was primarily through 
their role as planners, adjudicators and regulators, technical experts, and 
managers of India’s industrial growth. This is not unique to India but typical in 
other countries where political independence was not accompanied by an 
armed struggle. Instead, when a condition of state-driven capitalism takes over, 
the middle class emerges as the operating force, giving rise to what Kalecki 
(1972, cited in Unni 2006) described as the “intermediate regime”, one that is 
equidistant from the capitalist and socialist blocs.  
 
This characteristic was summarised best by Bardhan (2004) when he 
presented the political economy of India as a coalition of the three dominant 
proprietary classes in the economy: the rich farmers, the industrial bourgeoisie 
and the professional classes (particularly those in the state bureaucracy). 
According to him, ‘if physical capital can be the basis of class stratification, so 
can be human capital in the form of education, skills and technical expertise’ 
(2004: 51). He argues that the usual Marxist practice of submerging the middle 
class in the petty bourgeoisie and treating them as an “auxiliary class” can be 
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highly misleading in a country with high illiteracy, where the educated elite 
enjoy a high scarcity value, and are constantly involved in attempts to protect 
their scarcity value.24 
 
This is not dissimilar to the way the role of the intelligentsia has been 
evaluated in state-socialist societies. Szelenyi (1982) examines Gouldner’s 
(1979) observation that professionalism leads intellectuals into the dominant 
class position using the rule of “cultural capital” to replace the rule of money 
capital. While he clarifies that professionals emphasising the significance of 
their ‘expert’ knowledge cannot claim class power on their own, he 
acknowledges the more important role intellectuals play as they not only have 
executive skills but also moral commitment and historical vision. Through a 
class power that stretches beyond the economic sphere guaranteeing social 
reproduction in state-socialist societies, they became the dominant class in East 
European societies. This is evident in India where the intelligentsia is involved 
intimately in running the state apparatus, providing leadership to all the 
currents of political thought and action from the extreme right to the extreme 
left (Rudra 1989).  
 
But there is some degree of disagreement over whether this same 
intelligentsia can be equated with the middle class. If Rudra (1989) is 
convinced that the intelligentsia are drawn from the middle class, Beteille 
(1989) argues that Rudra’s concept of the intelligentsia differs from the more 
popular idea of the middle class. He observes that the term intelligentsia is not 
part of the English vocabulary and is more familiarly employed in Central and 
Eastern Europe, particularly the Soviet Union. Seen in this way, intelligentsia 
is that category of class formation that cannot be fully explained by economic 
argument alone. Bardhan (1989) prefers the term professional classes instead 
of the intelligentsia, a category he believes will become more important as the 
                                                 
24 Abercrombie and Urry (1983) highlight the relationship between capitalism and 
credentialism where educational credentials are necessary for access to particular places within 
the social division of labour. It is also natural for such credentials to be hierarchically 
structured where particular groups effect a degree of social closure by limiting access to 
specific educational credentials.  
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economy becomes more complex, and information and organisation resources 
acquire higher market value. Vanaik (1990) on the other hand uses 
intelligentsia and middle class interchangeably, as he believes that they are all 
formulations of similar vagueness.  
 
What is undeniable though is the focus of these scholars on the 
educated Indian middle class as professionals and as part of the intelligentsia 
who have infiltrated the state apparatus at various levels. Unlike in the West, 
where the middle class emerged as a result of economic and technological 
change and engaged in trade and industry, in India, they developed as a 
consequence of changes in the system of law and public administration as a 
result of which the dominant strand was literary and professional (Misra 1961). 
The bulk of the Indian middle class thus consists of the intelligentsia – public 
servants, other salaried employees, and members of the learned professions. 
And while Palshikar (2001) stresses the need for rooting the middle class in 
class theory instead of treating them as intellectual leaders or elites, this is 
precisely the tendency in India. The middle class is often automatically equated 
with the elite, forcing the question of whether, as a capitalist state ally, it can be 
considered as constituting the elite.   
 
2.2.2 Elite tendencies25 
It is ironic that a social category that first emerged by placing itself in a critical 
position against the nobility and aristocracy now suggests a closer alliance with 
the elite. Kocka (1995), in speculating on this shift explains that as the middle 
class began to face challenges from the rise of workers’ politics, the offensive 
challenge to the old elite that had been central to middle-class politics was 
replaced by a defensive self-distancing from those below. As the split between 
the middle class and ‘the people’ grew, the circles of property and education 
merged. Moreover, Marxist scholars like Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich (1979) 
                                                 
25 Fieldwork experiences of interviewing the middle class and whether they come across as an 
elite social group is addressed in the methodology chapter. 
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argued that while the class of salaried professionals and managers may not own 
the means of production, their major function in the social division of labour is 
still broadly the reproduction of capitalist culture and capitalist class relations. 
Their tendency to ally with the capitalists is only natural given this connection 
in terms of production and consumption dynamics. 
 
In the Indian context, the question becomes even more pertinent as 
there is never ending speculation over whether the Indian middle class is 
actually an elite category or not. This perception dates back to the colonial 
times when the British presented the Indian nationalist movement for 
independence led  by the middle class as an elitist effort cut off from the 
masses of the Indian society (Markovits 2001). Emerging in a liminal space 
between the colonial state and the traditional elites, it is true that the middle 
class aspired to an elite status by displacing the former two and presenting 
itself as the vanguard of the people. Thus, the large stratum of urban 
professionals that provided all the leaders of the nationalist movement was 
identified as the educated middle-class elite (Vanaik 1990). As the middle class 
occupied prominent positions within the postcolonial state bureaucracy, it was 
assumed that the middle class is ideologically homogeneous with the ruling 
elite.  
 
Scholars generally reaffirm the poser of whether the Indian middle 
class can be considered as an elite group through enumeration exercises. They 
show that ‘what is popularly called the Indian “middle class” is actually not in 
the middle but almost at the top of the income distribution’ (Deshpande 2006: 
218; Vanaik 2004). Analysing the consumer expenditure survey conducted 
during the 55th round of the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) 
1999-2000, Deshpande (2003, 2006) establishes that the so-called ‘middle 
class’ is really at the very top of the expenditure distribution, with only the top 
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ten to fifteen percent qualifying as the middle class.26 Unlike in the West, he 
notes that the ‘middle class’ in India is not the ‘middle income group’ but is 
located much higher on the income (expenditure) hierarchy. It is thus argued 
that the middle class is in reality an affluent class and to use this term is 
misleading in relation to the actual economic location of this social group. 
Similarly, Sridharan (2004: 414) uses the National Council for Applied 
Economic Research (NCAER) data of 2002 to compute the Indian middle 
class, and finds that ‘the “broadest,” or most encompassing, conception of the 
middle class – remains a minority’. According to him, by 1998-99, in its most 
elite form, the middle class is only 6 percent of the population and in its 
“broadest” it is 26 percent of the population (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Recent efforts at measuring the Indian middle class 
Source: Sridharan (2004: 412); Deshpande (2003: 135) 
                                                 
26 Using the NSSO data, he estimates that about a third of the population qualifies for middle 
class status. But juxtaposing this figure with data on possession of consumer durables he 
concludes that the number drastically reduces to ten to fifteen percent.  
Estimated distribution of households by income groups (%); Sridharan (2004) based on NCAER, India Market Demographics Report 2002
1989-90 1992-93 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99
Urban
Up to 35,000 (Lower) 37.14 38.44 24.46 21.87 18.96
35,001-70,000 (Lower middle) 34.76 32.97 34.69 34.42 33.76
70,001-105,000 (Middle) 17.89 16.07 21.33 22.11 22.59
105,001-140,000 (Upper middle) 6.46 7.62 10.55 11.29 12.16
> 140,000 (High) 3.75 4.90 8.98 10.30 12.53
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Broadest middle class (M+UM+H) 28.10 28.59 40.86 43.70 47.28
Expanded middle class (UM+H) 10.21 12.52 19.53 21.59 24.69
Elite middle class (H) 3.75 4.90 8.98 10.30 12.53
Total (Urban + Rural)
Up to 35,000 (Lower) 58.84 58.16 44.75 42.49 39.66
35,001-70,000 (Lower middle) 26.95 25.42 32.61 33.53 34.53
70,001-105,000 (Middle) 10.11 10.35 12.89 13.35 13.89
105,001-140,000 (Upper middle) 2.66 3.74 5.46 5.80 6.22
> 140,000 (High) 1.44 2.33 4.29 4.83 5.70
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Broadest middle class (M+UM+H) 14.21 16.42 22.64 23.98 25.81
Expanded middle class (UM+H) 4.10 6.07 9.75 10.63 11.92
Elite middle class (H) 1.44 2.33 4.29 4.83 5.70
Estimated class composition of the Indian population; Deshpande (2003) based on Monthly percapita consumption expenditure data, NSSO 19999-2000
Descrpition of class
Monthly per capita 
expenditure (Rs.) % of population
Monthly per capita 
expenditure (Rs.) % of population
Below poverty line < 329 34.4 <458 29.6
Above poverty line (next 4 classes) 329-470 33.8 458-775 36.9
Less poor (next 4 classes) 470-775 24.7 775-1,500 25.9
Non poor (top 2 classes) >775 7.0 >1,500 7.6
Urban IndiaRural India
Annual Income (Rs. At 1998-99 prices)
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Another factor contributing to the exclusivity of the middle class is the 
limitation of its membership to an upper caste, English-speaking constituency. 
It cannot be denied that the social identity of the middle class is predominantly 
upper caste, right from the colonial times to the contemporary liberalising era. 
Postcolonial development strategies did not efface caste hierarchies but simply 
displaced them onto an urban social order based on class difference. A peculiar 
caste-class linkage was forged in which lower castes and ethnic minorities are 
disproportionately clustered in lower class rungs of the society, while the 
middle and the upper classes drew on members of the upper castes (Fernandes 
2006; Nair 2006).  
 
Not everyone is convinced by this direct correlation between caste and 
class where upper caste translates into upper class and lower caste into lower 
class. Some insist that the translation of caste into class is more complex than 
acknowledged. For example, Beteille (2001) believes that the Indian middle 
class plays a leading part in undermining traditional attitudes towards caste and 
gender, a point picked up by Guru (2001) as he subscribes to the view that the 
middle class is potentially a source of liberation for traditionally oppressed 
groups such as the dalits.27 Sheth (1996) uses empirical data to show that there 
is increasing penetration of the non-traditional caste groups into the middle 
class and estimates that half of the middle class consists of groups drawn from 
the Other Backward Classes (OBCs), religious minorities, Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes. On the contrary, Deshpande (2006: 231) disaggregates 
NSSO data (round 55, 1999-2000) and finds that ‘upper caste Hindus, who 
form only about 37 per cent of the urban population, are almost two-thirds of 
                                                 
27 This perception stems from the traditional portrayal of the middle class as a category whose 
membership is based on acquired virtues such as merit, excellence and efficiency rather than 
ascribed attributes of caste, religion, ethnicity or language. The middle class here is seen as one 
promoting secular universal attributes embodied in modernity. This is of course easily 
contested in India where the secular leanings of the middle class are a thing of the past as it 
displays clearer affinity towards Hindu nationalist imaginings of the nation (Dutta 2006; Joshi 
2001; Vanaik 2004). Today, the general argument is that the upper-caste middle class 
constitutes the core support group of the BJP, and since the 1989 General Election, the rise of 
the Indian middle class complements the rise of the BJP (Malik and Singh 1992; Basu 1996) 
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the Top 5 per cent of urban India’, and ‘in rural India, the UC [upper caste] 
Hindus are over-represented among the top 5 per cent by a factor of two, that 
is, their share of the affluent elite is twice their share in the general population’. 
 
While the debate still persists on whether the middle class has actually 
diversified, what is clear is that the ‘old’ urban middle class has taken an 
increasingly elitist stand against the challenges posed by the rising number of 
‘new’ vernacular middle class members in rural and small town India outside 
the traditional bastion of cities. The aversion of the former to the latter 
particularly draws on the non-anglicised nature of these new aspirants, and it 
relies on the English language to secure its dominant status. English is 
traditionally the medium of communication for the Indian middle class to build 
a rapport with the ruling elite, which also serves to alienate the large mass of 
non-English speaking indigenous social groups (Fernandes 2006; Rajagopal 
1999; Roy 1993). In a globalising context, English is even more critical for the 
middle class to access the new employment opportunities, one that they are 
anxious to protect and monopolise.28 
 
A pretentious exaggeration? 
Not all scholars endorse the perception of the middle class as elite or dominant 
social group, arguing instead that the middle class only wields an indirect 
influence on state policies. That is, while the middle class may have an undue 
sway on the political process, they are not able to dominate it (Dutta 2006). 
The very notion of a westernised middle class developing as an elite category 
during the colonial times has been challenged in the 1970s by the work of 
Cambridge School of historians. They believed that the western educated urban 
middle class controlled relatively few means of production and hence 
possessed relatively little economic power in the Indian cities (Washbrook 
                                                 
28 Most of these opportunities are in the IT (information technology) and BPO (business 
process outsourcing) sectors, providing skilled services to global companies. Medium of 
communication is English and fluency in the language is a must for any middle class member 
aspiring for a job in this sector.  
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1973, cited in Torre 1990). Rather, the growing middle class during the period 
of Indian nationalism was not part of the political elite but was a mere broker 
or intermediary between the Indian notables and the British Raj. This makes it 
difficult to understand why this “intermediate strata” can be considered a 
central element in the history of India during the nationalist era.  
 
Related to this, Fernandes and Heller (2006) drawing on Bardhan 
(2004), add that the bourgeoisie never really achieved hegemonic status in 
India. According to this view, a classic bourgeois revolution was not possible. 
In the ensuing passive revolution, the hegemonic bloc could only take a 
coalitional form, with no single class being strong enough to claim hegemonic 
status on its own. These authors stress that even though the middle class played 
a pivotal role within the ruling hegemonic bloc, it has not been able to 
consolidate hegemonic power. As the political logic of passive revolution 
proved impossible in an electoral democracy, and despite there being specific 
forms of mutual dependencies between the state, the political economy and the 
middle class, the state was never fully “captured” by the middle class. The 
middle class, in this context, has only been able to assert rather than 
consolidate hegemony (Fernandes 2006).   
 
Nevertheless, Fernandes and Heller (2006) do not deny the central 
role played by at least the dominant fraction of the middle class in the politics 
of hegemony. They revert to the popular argument of the middle class’s 
influential role in catering to the functional requirements of extended state 
management. The issue of whether the middle class are an elite social group is 
best resolved by Deshpande (2003) who summarises its importance by 
highlighting three crucial aspects of the postcolonial middle class: Firstly, the 
middle class is that which articulates the hegemony of the ruling bloc, serving 
as a link or a connection between this bloc and other classes. Secondly, the 
middle class as a rule are owners of cultural capital. And thirdly, and most 
importantly, as an increasingly differentiated class, the middle class specialises 
in the production and dissemination of ideologies. Its elite fraction specialises 
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in the production of ideologies while its mass fraction engages in their 
exemplary consumption, all of which invests them with social legitimacy. 
Paralleling the debates on the middle class’s elite nature and of more 
usefulness, at least to this research, is the speculation about its bourgeois 
tendency, an assumption that is considered critical to its development as an 
elite category. This requires careful examination, addressing not just the 
question of what it means to be bourgeois, but also to what extent does it 
influence the middle class’s elitist predilections. 
 
2.2.3 Bourgeois afflictions 
Even before one sets off to engage with the bourgeois characteristics of the 
middle class, it is useful to note that the term ‘bourgeois’ is equally as elusive 
as the ‘middle class’. It is attractive as a concept but does not correlate in 
precision. Historically, the bourgeoisie was in simple terms referred to as the 
middle class, somewhere between the land owning class and the working class, 
defined by their position of wealth, independence and non-manual work (Haupt 
2001). Emphasising that the notion of a bourgeois cannot be restricted to the 
upper strata of society, Haupt (2001) applies it to describe all those who are 
citizens, inhabitants of a town who participate in the bourgeois culture of 
rational and legal principles, the free market, functioning public opinion and 
the limitation of state power. And according to him, it was in the middle of the 
society that one could find most of the bourgeois values: ‘wealth, self-
accomplishment, energy on one hand, but also moderation against revolution, 
civility against anarchy and aristocratic egoism, and work against leisure’ 
(2001: 59).29 But as the  bourgeoisie came to be associated with norms and 
values not compatible with democratic society, and as the middle class was 
nurtured in liberal thinking and moderation, the former was soon replaced in 
public discourse by the latter.  
 
                                                 
29 This is very similar to Adam Smith’s conception of economic man who is a self-seeker of 
money, fortunes and values of possessive individualism, and who believes in private vices and 
public virtues.  
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Kocka (1995) though tends to use the two terms interchangeably, and 
concedes that “middle class” is usually broader than “bourgeoisie” in that it 
reaches further down into the “petit bourgeoisie” and more narrow in that it 
may exclude parts of the elites. While he argues that “bourgeois” lends itself 
more to critical, political, and polemical usage than the more neutral “middle 
class”, Pinches (1999: 42) clarifies that such terms are all cultural constructions 
located within a world that is being explored and problematised. He explains 
that when  
the terms “middle class” and “bourgeoisie” were popularised in 
industrialising Europe, they represented an attempt to apprehend and 
label the emergence of powerful new social forces which challenged the 
feudal order of estates and aristocratic authority. The two terms were 
invested with a shifting range of meanings,….reflecting something of the 
elusiveness and complexity of the phenomenon at hand, as well as the 
different social vantage points from which it was experienced. 
 
Marxist scholars tend to oscillate between two different positions. On the one 
hand, some define the bourgeoisie as the class of modern capitalists, as owners 
of the means of social production and employers of waged labour, thereby 
relegating the middle-class physicians, lawyers, priests, writers, and scientists 
into paid-wage labourers (Ahmed 2001). On the other hand, there are some 
who treat the middle class as an analytic extension of the bourgeoisie or as part 
of the nascent bourgeoisie (Davis 2004).  
 
Fernandes and Heller (2006) choose to differentiate between the 
bourgeoisie and the middle class in India. According to them, the strategy of 
reproduction of the bourgeoisie is driven by the systemic logic of capital 
accumulation and a structural power that translates into political power in ways 
that make it less necessary for this class to mobilize visibly and politically in 
order to reproduce itself. Whereas, the middle class is characterised by a higher 
degree of structural complexity and uncertainty and exists through itself, that 
is, through the practices via which it reproduces itself. Alternatively, there are 
others who argue that the dominant pattern of change in India today is via a 
bourgeois revolution. This emanates upward from the expanding middle class 
which reveals the continued and accelerating process of embourgeoisement 
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(Stern 2003). This can be traced back to the nationalist movement where the 
middle class doubled up as the bourgeoisie adopting its basic values, and 
occupying its economic position. In this context, Chatterjee (1986) alleges that 
it is because of this lack of a clear distinction between the native bourgeoisie 
and the emerging middle class that the bourgeois opposition to imperialism 
acquired a dubious character, resulting in the nationalist thought evolving as an 
elitist discourse. Acknowledgement of this point comes from Nehru himself 
who admitted that the politics of Indian nationalism was elitist and that of his 
bourgeois class. Since all vocal politics were those of the middle class (Varma 
1999), the middle class thus came to be associated with the non-capitalist 
bourgeoisie.  
 
2.2.4 Emerging middle class: elite and bourgeois 
Speculations about the elitist and bourgeois nature of the middle class gain a 
heightened status in the context of globalisation and neoliberalisation which 
enhances the significance of the middle class as technocrats and scientific 
experts (Zunino 2006). This gives a further fillip to the elitist assumption of an 
increasingly bourgeois middle class. In India, the middle class is believed to 
play an influential role in shaping public responses to liberalisation, emerging 
as an autonomous actor with its own set of interests and political agency. 
Assuming an increasingly crucial part in the shaping and reproduction of social 
formations, it also proves to be the new leader and economic dynamo of the 
twenty-first century world economy (Fernandes 2006).   
 
Many identify the middle class that is associated with this changing 
political-economic scenario as the ‘new’ middle class that subscribes 
increasingly to an elite culture of materialism, individualism and conspicuous 
consumption, and bears out important social tensions and hegemonic shifts in 
much of Asia (Pinches 1999). Fernandes (2006) approaches such a portrayal 
cautiously and warns against idealising the new middle class given the 
discrepancies between representations of the new middle class identity and the 
contradictory socioeconomic realities of those who both constitute and aspire 
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to this group. While she argues that there is a conceptual slippage between the 
new middle class and the “new rich”, she agrees that the new middle class 
embodies a changing set of socio-cultural norms for the Indian nation. Its 
politics signify ‘a complex configuration of symbolic, material, and attitudinal 
changes that resonate with global discourses on the “new rich in Asia’ (ibid.: 
141).30 There is no easy way of resolving such contradictory portrayals, but 
what is essential and desirable is to undertake a more detailed examination of 
this ‘new’ category, assessing it for its newness and distinction from the ‘old’ 
counterparts, and how it contributes increasingly to the interplay of class and 
power.   
 
2.3 The newness of the ‘new’ middle class 
Scholars working on the middle class have a tendency to declare at frequent 
intervals the rise of a new middle class, emphasising its distinction from its 
predecessor the old middle class. Barely had the term middle class come into 
employment in the late eighteenth century, to refer to the propertied and largely 
entrepreneurial class located between landowners on the one hand and the 
urban-industrial workers and agricultural labourers on the other, when 
observers identified a sense of inadequacy with the term (Abercrombie and 
Urry 1983). By the end of the nineteenth century, Kautsky is known to have 
identified the new middle class in reference to the rise of the salaried class with 
the industrial revolution in Europe (Carter 1985). Wacquant (1991) traces it to 
Gustav Schmoller and the German “revisionism” of the late nineteenth-century 
and early twentieth-century differentiating them from the old middle class or 
the petty bourgeoisie comprising of craftsmen and shopkeepers. According to 
Giddens (1973), the new middle class comprised of a category of people who 
possessed educational privileges and were recruited by the bourgeoisie wishing 
to slough off clerical duties. They came to represent the propertyless white-
collar worker associated with salaried employment. Unlike the old middle class 
                                                 
30 Fernandes’s (2006) jibe is against scholars like Robison and Goodman (1996) whose equate 
the new middle class in East and Southeast Asia with the new rich. 
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which was able to create its independent existence and identity through small 
business, occupied a position outside the polarised class structure, possessed 
attributes neither of the capitalist or the worker, and played little part in the 
capital accumulation process, the new middle class of the industrial revolution 
era occupied an intermediary position and took its characteristic from both 
sides (Singh 1985).  
 
Abercrombie and Urry (1983) in reflecting on the newness of the new 
middle class emphasise that it is incorrect to treat the present category as a 
direct descendent of the eighteenth- or nineteenth-century variants. Rather, the 
new middle class today is a result of the development of the global functions of 
capital where despite not owning capital legally, it acts jointly with the 
capitalists to perform related functions. At the same time, the authors clarify 
that the new middle class is a continuously transforming social group, changing 
as a result of adjustment in the employment profile, and evolving as the 
character of capitalism changes (from merchant to industrial to fordist, post-
fordist, flexible, advanced, etc.). While this may be generalised for advanced 
industrial societies, their evolution in late-developing nations took a different 
trajectory, resulting in a middle class not dissimilar yet quite specific to its 
circumstances. This is best illustrated by examining the rise of the middle class 
in India and tracing its spoor as it branched out from the ‘old’ to the ‘new’. 
 
2.3.1 ‘Old’ to the ‘new’: evolution of the Indian middle class 
The Indian middle class is generally understood to be a colonial construction 
when a loyal, subservient class was created to act as intermediaries between the 
colonial state and the local society (Misra 1961; Joshi 2000; Fernandes 2006). 
This is based on an assumption that prior to this, there was no middle class in 
India. Scholars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries believed that 
European and “Oriental” societies were differentiated precisely by the absence 
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of a “middle estate” in the latter (Markovits 2001).31 In the case of India, both 
Marx and Weber subscribed to the view that given the hereditary division of 
labour that functioned under an entrenched caste system and the absence of a 
fully developed capitalism, the development of a class structure of modern 
society was impossible. It took colonialism to create conditions conducive for 
the birth of a ‘modern’ middle class when its members sought to import the 
ideas and institutions of a middle-class order into India for assistance in 
colonial administration.  
 
Thus, this fresh class, that Marx (2001 [1853]) noticed amongst the 
Indian natives imbued with ideas of European science, was soon drawing on 
the lessons of Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment to usher in a new 
politics of representation, novel constructions of womanhood, and 
transformation of religious practices. Its members promoted temperance and 
thrift, curtailment of wasteful expenses on rituals and marriages, and 
encouraged investment in productive business enterprises as well as their 
communities to seek higher educational qualifications (Joshi 2001). But the 
middle class was eventually not content with social reformation, and soon it 
diverged into a new terrain involving the imagination and mobilisation of a 
new form of nationalism.  
 
From the 1870s onwards, the middle class began to establish some kind 
of national leadership culminating in the formation of the Indian National 
Congress (INC) in 1885 – representing the forefront of the Indian struggle for 
                                                 
31 Markovits (2001: 43) explains that ‘[r]ecognising the existence of an Indian middle class 
would have amounted to acknowledging a certain degree of similarity between the English and 
Indian societies which would have endangered the colonial project itself’. In contrast to 
Misra’s (1961) position that merchant capitalism which existed in the Mughal period in a well 
developed form did not abet middle class elements in becoming a stratified order as they 
remained divided into watertight caste-based status groups, Khan (1976) makes a more positive 
case for studying the mercantile and professional groups in the Mughal Empire amidst hopes 
that this would reveal something about the origins of the modern Indian middle class. Bayly 
(1983, cited in Joshi 2001) contests that as far as the Indian middle class is concerned their 
politics that emerged in the colonial period were shaped to a large extent by precolonial 
“mentalities”, to which Joshi (2001) responds that “civil society” and “public sphere”, the two 
essential characteristics of a modern middle class were not enshrined in the ideological 
template of precolonial India.  
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independence (Sarkar 1983). Steeped in the value of bourgeois liberalism, the 
‘educated middle-class elite, which provided all the leaders of the National 
movement, came to oppose British rule in the name of the most advanced 
bourgeois democracy, represented by Britain itself’ (Vanaik 1990: 72; 
Chatterjee 1993). Even as the nationalist movement evolved and expanded to a 
mass level and incorporated other social groups, including the peasantry, it was 
the middle class that took much of the credit for steering the country into 
independence.  
 
But this legacy of the colonial middle class entering India’s 
postcolonial era lasted only through the Nehruvian era when the state policies 
provided it with a free rein. The middle class, monopolising the state 
machinery, held the state on a tight leash. This served to perpetuate a pseudo 
policy of socialist rhetoric which seemed to insist that the state was rightly 
biased in favour of the less privileged while in reality it served best the 
interests of the middle class and the elite. Nehru’s emphasis on scientifically 
planned development had surely laid power in the hands of the educated 
middle class but their policies had achieved little in terms of economic growth 
or redistributive justice.32 In the post-Nehruvian period there was a clear shift 
as his successor and daughter Indira Gandhi changed the way the politics of the 
Indian state operated, after which it centred on the personality and authority of 
a charismatic and unquestioned leader. After nearly losing the elections of 
1967, Gandhi recognised the need to build a direct relationship with the rural 
and urban poor with populist promises that deinstitutionalised the state and 
sidelined the recommendations and strategies of the centralised planning 
committees. Through powerful slogans like ‘garibi hatao’ (abolish poverty) 
she built a new form of populism where state welfare was reduced to the level 
                                                 
32 The annual economic growth rate in the 1960s stagnated at a low level of 3.7 percent (1.5 
percent in terms of per capita), and was popularly known as the ‘Hindu rate of growth’.  
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of manoeuvre and tactic, establishing a direct system of patronage and machine 
politics with the deprived classes.33  
 
By the 1980s, the pervasive “politics without administration” syndrome 
had produced the spectacle of political anarchy and deepened the crisis of 
political and economic institutions within the state system. Faced with a 
marauding breed of political elites who had come to represent the 
“criminalisation of politics” (Singh 1990), the political identity of middle class 
activity was shaped by a sense of state failure in delivering its promises 
(Fernandes 2006; Figure 4). A dominant perception at this time was of a 
middle class (including those comprising the state machinery) left in the lurch 
by an unreliable state which had chosen to engage directly with the masses, 
striking deals in exchange for electoral gains (Varma 1999). The result of this 
was the anticipation of a disappearing middle class, akin to Dahrendorf’s 
(1959) view that in a crisis situation, an intermediate position just does not 
exist, rather what exists are two middle classes; one part of the capitalists and 
the other part of the working class.34  
 
                                                 
33 There are several scholarly works analysing Indira Gandhi’s style of politics. See, for 
instance, Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987; Malik and Vajpeyi, 1988; Stern, 2003; Corbridge and 
Harriss, 2001. 
34 The “disappearing middle class” thesis was quite popular in the western world from the 
1980s onwards when Bluestone and Harrison (1982) speculated about a disappearing middle 
class amidst increasing income inequality and socio-economic polarisation in the post-
industrial era. The rise of the global city literature in the 1990s gave further credence to this 
position as it was argued that that industrial and occupational restructuring resulted in the 
expansion of high-paying and low-paying jobs at the expense of a disappearing middle class. 
This is now a highly contested debate, for a summary of which see Nørgaard (2003).  
Absent Societies/Chapter 2: Middle Class                               
68 
Figure 4: RK Laxman, The Times of India on the Indian middle class hit by 
harsh state policies and “criminalisation of politics” 
Source: Top – Laxman (2005: 76); Bottom – Laxman (2000: 198) 
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But just as the idea of a vanishing Indian middle class was being assimilated, 
the situation reversed in the mid-1980s with the change of political leadership 
at the Centre. Following the assassination of Indira Gandhi in 1984, her son 
Rajiv Gandhi came to power and, in direct contrast to his mother’s populist 
appeals to the masses, openly sought the support of the middle class 
acknowledging its economic and political clout:  
The Rajiv era (1984-88) of Indian politics witnessed once again the 
romantic liaison of Indian middle classes with politics. What was earlier 
considered as an arena of populist vulnerability where the lay public 
mattered more than the “informed” middle classes was reversed with the 
ushering in of technocrat-politicians whose onus was on technological 
development, and instead of “welfare”, development symbolised a 
gateway to the “twenty first century”. This style of politics gained the 
admiration of the Indian middle classes. (Palshikar 2001: 172; Figure 5)35 
 
 
Figure 5: RK Laxman, The Times of India on Rajiv Gandhi’s promise for 
the twenty-first century 
Source: Laxman (2005: 112) 
                                                 
35 In this sense, Rajiv Gandhi’s flirtation with the Indian middle class was closer to his 
grandfather Nehru’s relationship with this social class than his mother’s.  
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The liberalised policies of Rajiv Gandhi’s government introduced economic 
reforms in the 1985 Budget. This included changes in taxation and policies on 
consumer goods, the benefits of which accrued to the professional middle 
class, now reborn as the consumer (Lakha 1999; Dutta 2006). This ‘marked a 
political process in which the state began to identify the middle class as a 
distinctive group with its own political and economic interests that needed to 
be consciously addressed through governmental policy and rhetoric’, and ‘a 
new understanding of the middle class that rested on specific linkages between 
middle-class aspirations, consumption practices, and policies of economic 
reform’ (Fernandes 2006: 38). With the formal launch of the New Economic 
Policy (NEP) in 1991 broadly based on the tenets of neoliberalism, the 
metamorphosis into a new middle class was complete, marking a distinctive 
shift in contemporary Indian politics, as it set about renegotiating its 
relationship with the state and a wide array of non-state actors made relevant 
by the forces of globalisation and neoliberalisation.  
 
2.3.2 New and neoliberal 
It is an uncontested statement today that the Indian middle class is the 
immediate beneficiary of globalised commerce ushered into the country by 
neoliberalisation. The expansion of the service sector and of professional, 
white-collar, private sector employment  paved the way for the rise of a new 
Indian middle class, who now occupy important positions in many 
transnational companies. Fernandes (2006: xx) explains that at the structural 
level the new middle class does not refer to new entrants to middle-class status, 
but rather is defined by a change in the status of jobs, which now signify the 
upper tiers of middle-class employment. In symbolic terms, if ‘the cultural and 
economic standard for the “old middle class” would have been represented by a 
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job in a state bank or the Indian civil service, today, the members of the new 
middle class aspire to jobs in multinational corporations or foreign banks’.36  
 
At the same time, Fernandes (2006) cautions against portraying the new 
middle class as an outgrowth that is simply defined by contemporary 
globalisation and neoliberalisation. According to her, while its newness is 
definitely characterised by the ways in which this class has sought to redefine 
middle-class identity through the language of liberalisation, not all members of 
the new middle class have benefited from liberalisation which has had uneven 
and contradictory socioeconomic effects on middle-class employment, 
including increasing job insecurity, employment of contract workers and sharp 
distinctions in income between different segments.  
 
Sridharan (2004) questions Kohli’s (1989) observation that economic 
reforms offered concrete benefits to the middle class, and that there is a direct, 
visible structural link between the growing middle class and the booming 
neoliberal capital market. Through an empirical analysis of the changing 
profile of middle-class employment between 1990-91 to 2001-02, he calculates 
that public sector employment has only decreased slightly in the post-reform 
period, from 19.06 million to 18.88 million, while private sector employment 
has only increased slightly from 7.676 million to 8.432 million. He also 
estimates that the livelihood of 67 percent of the broader middle class depends 
on either state employment or state subsidies. In this regard, responding to the 
suggestion that the new middle class constitutes only the small dominant 
fraction of the middle class, and that it ‘is still in an emerging relationship with 
traditional segments of the middle class that are still largely dependent on state 
employment’ (Fernandes 2006: xxvi), Fernandes and Heller (2006) also clarify 
that it has nevertheless become the standard against which the aspirations of 
other fractions of the middle class are measured. Thus, the implications of this 
                                                 
36 This is not the only way of distinguishing between the old and the new middle class, as an 
earlier section in this chapter used it to differentiate between the more elitist urban members 
and the vernacular aspirants. But since this thesis focuses on the urban middle class, it will use 
Fernandes’s (2000a; 2006) distinction on the basis of employment profile.  
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identity are much broader, with the new middle class presented as an idealised 
standard for an Indian nation that is finally competing in a global economy. 
This is similar to an earlier argument in this chapter about the elite nature of 
the Indian middle class where it became clear that while only a small fraction 
of the middle class constitutes the elite, it is an identity that the larger mass of 
the ‘regular’ middle class aspires to and tries to reproduce. 
 
Such observations apart, scholars unanimously acknowledge that 
analysing the new middle class is crucial to our understanding of the political 
dynamics of economic reform in contemporary India (Fernandes 2006; 
Sridharan 2004; Fernandes and Heller 2006; Deshpande 2006, 2003). 
Sridharan (2004) engages in a more careful reading of the relationship between 
the new middle class and liberalisation, and finds that there is no clear sign of 
an ideological shift amongst the middle class in favour of liberalisation, but 
acknowledges that the new economic phenomenon offers its members 
opportunities that represent an attitudinal change towards life (also see 
Ganguly-Scrase 2003; Scrase 2006). The work culture that has evolved around 
the new economy fosters an image of an employee that is far removed from 
any concept of a labouring self, emphasising work as a lifestyle, and whose 
goal is enhanced consumption (Nair 2006). Members of the new middle class 
with their new found affluence (via their strategic position in the ‘new’ 
economy) can thus indulge in lifestyles that clearly focus on improving their 
material well-being and their status (Embong 2001a). In fact, it is through these 
highly publicised consumption choices that the new middle class is gaining 
popularity and notoriety.  
 
2.3.3 Conspicuous consumption 
Shortly before his landmark visit to India in 2006, the US President George W 
Bush addressed members of the Asia Society in Washington DC where he 
identified the growing affluence of India as a potential market for American 
goods and services: 
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India’s middle class is now estimated at 300 million people. Think about 
that. That’s greater than the entire population of the United States. India’s 
middle class is buying air-conditioners, kitchen appliances, and washing 
machines, and a lot of them from American companies like GE, and 
Whirlpool, and Westinghouse. And that means their job base is growing 
here in the United States of America…Today India’s consumers associate 
American brands with quality and value, and this trade is creating 
opportunity here at home.37 
 
His statement comes amidst a growing interest in the new middle class in Asia 
whose depiction as the consuming class has reached almost cargo-cult 
proportions in the West. This is largely because they offer new markets for 
Western products especially at a moment of prolonged recession and low 
growth rates in the West. So much so that the new middle class has come to be 
viewed only via a plethora of consumption images (Pinches 1999; Figures 6 
and 7).  
 
Figure 6: RK Laxman, The Times of India on global consumer products 
flooding the Indian market 
Source: Laxman (2005: 181) 
                                                 
37 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060222-2.html. Retrieved 13 March, 
2008.  See also Gentlemen, A. (2006, 26 February). Booming India finds that America wants 
to be its new best friend. The Observer, Retrieved 13 March, 2008. 
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Figure 7: Is India the new China? Jewel in the crown, The Guardian, 09 
October, 2004 (Patrick Collinson) 
This cover story optimistically relates the expansion of the Indian middle class 
with the birth of a consumer society, and its role in fuelling the country’s 
economic boom.  In contrast is Laxman’s (2005) tongue-in-cheek cartoon 
(Figure 6) which locates the onslaught of global consumer products within an 
impoverished context. 
 
In India, scholars though have applied brakes to unabashed portrayals of the 
new middle class as the global consumer class by assessing their ability to 
consume in real numbers. Early in the 1990s, the National Council for Applied 
Economic Research (NCAER) started undertaking surveys to quantify this 
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growing social category and what it meant for the consumer market. In 1991 it 
calculated the size of the middle class to be around 275-300 million people, 
and predicted that it would reach 312.4 million in 2001 and 520.5 million by 
2007 (Dutta 2006). Were this trend relevant still today nearly half of India 
would comprise of middle-class households. But Sridharan’s (2004) more 
recent estimate finds the middle class to be somewhere between 55 to 250 
million (at its most elite form to the broadest definitional level).  
 
Using the Indian Market Demographics Report 1998, Deshpande 
(2003: 138) argues that ‘there is little room for extravagant estimates of the 
size of the middle class when less than 8 per cent of Indian households 
possessed a colour TV set in 1995-96; less than 9 per cent possessed a 
refrigerator; and only 6 per cent owned a scooter. Even a pressure cooker was 
owned by only about 25 per cent of households’. He thus argues that while the 
middle class may be very large in terms of absolute numbers, it is still a small 
proportion of the Indian population. This is similar to Nijman’s (2006: 773, 
emphasis original) conclusion that the rise of a “great middle class” is 
exaggerated and misplaced in as far as ‘the main actual change concerns 
upwards shifts within the middle class, and are in no small part based on credit-
driven consumption rather than on structural and wide-ranging transformations 
of the economy and labor market’ (Table 2).  
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Table 2: Estimates of Indian middle class consumption 
 
Nevertheless it is equally difficult to dismiss the significance of the new Indian 
middle class based on such findings. Irrespective of its actual capacity to 
consume, what is real is its fascination with the imagery of consumption which 
it uses effectively to hold no longer a middling position but a central and 
normative one (Dutta 2006). Consumerism, rather than production, is the 
principal arena in which social relations and identities are constructed (Pinches 
1999), or as Gupta puts it simply, [i]n the age of globalisation, the consumer is 
the king while the producer has been put out to pasture’ (2000: 78). Moreover, 
it is through its appetite for consumption that the middle class asserts itself as a 
more powerful economic proposition than the “very rich”, and even though 
statistically this doesn’t seem so, ‘it is through consumerism that the middle 
class aspires to be hegemonic’ (Dutta 2006: 270, emphasis original). Thus, 
while Deshpande (2003) feels that the “consumer-segment” definition of the 
middle class is too narrow to capture the critical and multidimensional role of 
Rural India Urban India All India
Consumer durable item 1995-96 (%) 1995-96 (%) 1995-96 (%)
Bicycle 52.9 48.6 51.7
Scooter 2.1 15.9 6.0
Motorcycle 1.9 5.6 2.9
Pressure cooker 13.0 56.3 25.3
Mixer/Grinder 3.1 30.1 10.8
Refrigerator 2.0 25.2 8.6
B&W TV set 15.4 45.6 24.0
Colour TV set 2.6 21.2 7.9
Washing machine 0.5 10.9 3.5
Social classification (Income in Rs.) 2003 2013
Very rich (>140,000) 3 11
Consumers (105-140,000) 46 124
Climbers (70-105,000) 74 79
Aspirants (35-70,000) 33 9
Destitutes (<35,000) 24 8
Note: Nijman (2006) dismisses the above estimate as a marketing fantasia
India's 'consuming classes' in 2003 and as projected for 2013, in millions of households; Nijman (2006) 
based on NCAER 2003
Possession of consumer durables by Indian households; Deshpande (2003) based on NCAER, India Market 
Demographics Report 1998
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the middle class in postcolonial societies, Pinches (1999) and Fernandes (2006) 
differ by explaining that the consumption patterns of the middle class in 
cultural terms reveal greater understanding of the hegemonic positions they 
have come to assume.  
 
If hegemony (which is supposed to have eluded the old middle class 
and its ruling coalition) is now reconceptualised in a world of consumption, it 
is partly due to the fact that the infallibility of professional distinctions that the 
middle class relied on to distinguish themselves has begun to falter. As a result 
there is a logical extension of the struggle for distinction into consumption 
practices (Munt 1994; Bourdieu 1984). Their evolution into a consuming class 
produces a hegemonic classificatory struggle founded on taste and “high 
culture” which generates consensus among the elite and the middle class rather 
than across the whole spectrum of social classes. Fernandes and Heller (2006) 
thus note that consumer sovereignty reproduces and intensifies social 
differentiation with the new middle class adopting strategies of exclusion to 
seek and protect their commodities.  
 
Prominent amongst these is the way the new middle class has 
appropriated the discourse of citizenship, to legitimise their consumption codes 
and practices, and extend them to wider moral dispositions. It symbolises a 
visible shift from social to market citizenship or what is popularly known as 
consumer-citizenship with never-seen-before kinds of power made available 
through consumption.38 What follows is a dynamic tension between 
consumerism and citizenship where the redistributive politics of social 
citizenship exists in tension with the aestheticisation of politics, drawing on its 
idiom and rhetoric while being threatened with co-optation by it (Rajagopal 
1999). Unlike Gupta’s (2000) suggestion that consumerism creates an ideology 
that undermines citizenship, the relationship between Indian middle class 
consumers and citizenship is best brought out by Stern (2003) when he states 
                                                 
38 Rather than the polarised distinction between a ‘public’ citizen and a ‘private’ consumer, the 
consumer-citizen yokes the two together to valorise him- or herself as well as think of the 
greater good of the greater number (Christopherson 1994; Miller 2000) 
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that for the Indian bourgeois, a perquisite of Indian citizenship is privileged 
access to consumer markets, one that is largely a privilege of the middle class. 
It is not just the new found appetite of the middle class for consumption that 
brings attention to their employment of a citizenship discourse, but as Kessler 
(2001: 44) clarifies:  
..discussion of the middle class does not serve simply to enable specialist 
sociologists to develop more technically satisfying forms of class theory 
and analysis; rather….the discussion of middle-class culture and 
character provide the indispensable foundation for moving the old 
nationalist debate forward to some ground upon which its central issue 
may be resolved….Understanding the complexity of middle-class 
political psychology and consciousness, and the management within the 
practices of civility and the “civil consciousness” of the modern citizen, 
is more than a theoretical problem in social theory. 
 
While the empirical chapters will examine in detail the middle class role play 
as consumer-citizens, at this point, it would be useful to engage more with the 
general ideology of citizenship as understood and applied by the middle class, 
as it is based on this that their recent claims of consumer-citizenship are 
constructed.  
 
2.4 Debunking some myths about citizenship  
A characteristic feature of the modernisation theory that emerged in the 1950s 
and 1960s is the emphasis of the critical role of middle class not just to 
development but to democracy as well. Here the conquest of economic 
development, participatory democracy, and public morality is seen as the 
culmination of a long road of bourgeois empowerment (Lipset 1959; Rostow 
1959). The conviction was that:  
as a country undergoes modernisation and as the middle class develops, 
there is a greater tendency towards universalism and democracy…The 
European birth into modernity was the case of the rise of capitalism and a 
middle class whose mission was to oppose the aristocratic feudal state 
and to democratise society. Not beholden to the state in terms of its 
power and wealth, it was a heroic class championing democracy and 
freedom from feudal fetters. (Embong 2001a: 15-16) 
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This understanding permeated at the political level, when in the late 1950s the 
state believed that the middle class by initiating a process of modernisation and 
democratic deepening was critical to the country’s exit from “backwardness”. 
It was also prevalent in policy documents circulated by powerful international 
organisations such as the World Bank where it was argued that middle-class 
consensus is crucial not just for ideal growth and development but also for 
democracy, political stability, and “modern” sectoral structure (Easterly 2000).  
 
It is therefore no surprise that in the 1990s a sense of euphoria 
surrounded the rise of the new middle class in east and southeast Asia amidst 
the pro-democracy political transformations. Embodying universal interests 
that are rational, democratic, secular and concerned with the rule of law, the 
new middle class was considered crucial to the creation of a liberal Asia. 
Credited with introducing the rights of citizenship and property in a 
traditionally hierarchical and status-bound society, the growth of the middle-
class led civil society organisations was deemed important to creating spaces 
for democratic participation and discourses on affairs of society. But this 
jubilation was short-lived as it became apparent that these ‘middle class 
revolts’ did not usher in an era of liberal democracy, and the “middle-class-as-
democratising-force” thesis has come to be viewed as a faulty one (Oehler 
2001).  
 
Jones (1998) questions linking the inexorable rise of bourgeois 
democracy and civil society to a self-confident middle class, and wonders if 
they played a significant role in terminating an “authoritarian cycle” of rule in 
South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia and Singapore. Even Embong (2001a) who 
highlighted the role of the middle class in effecting change and 
democratisation, concedes that it was probably more the fear of economic 
failure and monetary instability triggered by the financial crisis that forced the 
middle class to deepen their struggle for further democratisation. Given this, 
the question of whether a middle class can be considered as a key player in the 
expansion of the democratic space in the political sphere.  
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In an unpredictable stance of political fluctuation, the middle class 
often operate both as democratising agents as well as supporters of 
authoritarian rule (Jones 1998). The democratic attitudes of the Indian middle 
class have been found on many occasions to be less than strong as they 
unashamedly supported the illiberal authoritarian politics of Indira Gandhi 
when she imposed Emergency Rule in 1975 (Varma 1999). Historically, 
middle-class interventions have mostly resulted in what are simple transitions 
to new dictatorships rather than liberal watersheds, where fearing mass radical 
movements and social chaos, the middle class in many instances chooses 
authoritarianism as a safer option (Robison and Goodman 1996).  
 
2.4.1 Vacillating between absent societies and active citizenry 
This uncertainty about their role as agents of democracy also raises the 
question of whether there is a distinguishable middle-class polity at all, a 
possibility that is often dismissed by Marxist scholars. This is evident in 
Mills’s (1951) disdainful depiction of the middle class as an “occupational 
salad” who are politically homeless or “rearguarders”, and who by being 
unfocused, confused and discontinuous in their actions vacillate in their 
opinions more often than not. The political orientation of the middle class is 
restrained by the structural position of its members between labour and capital, 
and despite its growing presence, it comes across as a fundamentally unstable 
grouping possessing neither the will nor the power to transform society. Seen 
as a non-labouring class with little political significance , and no material gains 
to be had by subscribing to a middle-class identity, it is presumed that the 
middle class live in a way where their individual lives intersect with class 
structures only at certain specific moments.  
 
Kessler (2001) describes this condition best when he narrates a middle-
class life of oscillation between prolonged periods of disinterested public 
concern broken by short moments of active citizenship. He explains that the 
middle class are in general, private, prudent, circumspect, and reluctant to stick 
Absent Societies/Chapter 2: Middle Class                               
81 
their heads up. Only when the outlook is favourable, safe and possible do they 
choose to display “civil courage” and public spiritedness which quickly 
evaporates when the situation turns dangerous. Its members lack ‘impersonal 
civility and disinterested consideration where one citizen not merely owes, but 
actually enjoys extending to and finding reciprocated by another citizen, purely 
on the grounds of a recognition of common citizenship’ (ibid.: 43). Politically 
timid, passive and conformist for most times, the middle class only transforms 
into a politically assertive social group and shifts to radical action when they 
feel the need to protect the bases of their social and economic position, namely, 
capital, contracts and property. One thus confronts a condition where the 
middle-class members swing in their attitude towards the nation and society, 
resulting in an illiberal political expression where political indifference is 
mixed with high anxiety (Jones 1998).   
 
2.4.2 Apolitical citizens  
This tendency of the middle class to switch between the extremes of action and 
inaction prompts some like Saravanamuttu (2001) to wonder if there is a 
politics which typifies the concerns of the middle class. His question is set 
amidst his observation that very often active political actors championing for 
democracy, human rights, environmental awareness, and all relevant socio-
political issues are frequently members of the middle class. And yet, if politics 
means an active pursuit of social and other objectives through visible and 
clearly identifiable means to affect political outcomes, then, he believes that, 
middle-class groups are incapable of championing such politics as they do not 
constitute a unified category of social interest and action.39 Appadurai (2000b) 
indulges in a similar speculation when he narrates, in the case of Mumbai, 
extraordinary displays of courage and critical imagination after the 1992-93 
                                                 
39 A prominent example is the Narmada Bachao Andolan in India, an environmental movement 
protesting the construction of the Sardar Sarovar Dam on the Narmada River, and devoted to 
addressing the problems of the displaced communities (tribals and villagers). Led by Medha 
Patkar, a charismatic social worker from Mumbai, it is safe to say that its prominent leaders are 
members of the urban middle class. But at the same time, one cannot conclude that 
environmental activism is a characteristic feature of the middle class.   
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riots from housing activists, lawyers, social workers, journalists, architects, and 
trade union members – middle-class individuals who have held up powerful 
images of a cosmopolitan, secular, multicultural city. But he still asks with 
suspicion whether this is all just a playing of ‘the politics of conscience’? 
(Appadurai 2002: 44). At least, that’s what Palshikar (2001) seems to think 
when he views new social movements drawing their leadership as well as their 
intellectual support from sections of the middle class as diffuse and disparate 
activities through which one can obtain a moral fulfilment without necessarily 
burning one’s fingers in agitations or without dirtying one’s hands in politics.  
 
Harriss (2006) in this context suggests that this middle-class scorn for 
politics as a “dirty river” results in their paradoxical preference for political 
action through a process of “depoliticisation”. Amidst a typical argument that 
democracy’s representative institutions are undermined by the presence of 
lower-caste and class groups, or what the middle class refer to as a 
‘plebeianisation of democracy’, they shun electoral politics, as they believe that 
this is the primary process through which the masses make counterclaims on 
constitutional democracy. But by vacating the sphere of politics and failing to 
take on roles of political leadership, their scepticism of democracy reveals an 
increasingly anti-democratic impulse.  
 
Sidelined by the absence of their political participation, they end up as 
permanent outsiders in the realm of politics (Varma 1999), which compels 
them, in reaction, to delink important notions like citizenship from what they 
consider to be a corrupted electoral process. This results in a weakly developed 
understanding of citizenship, where amidst claims of rescuing Indian 
democracy from corruption, patronage, and the special interests of rising 
politically assertive subaltern groups, they construct a model of citizenship 
‘that rests on a continued struggle to reclaim the terms of democratic politics 
from subordinated social groups’ (Fernandes 2006: 182).  Hancock’s (1995) 
work analyses the cultural practices of middle class Brahmins in Madras and 
illustrates this well as she finds that the notion of common sense or civic sense 
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as promoted by the middle class is penetrated and reshaped by their upper-caste 
and upper-class sensibilities. The hegemonic principles of such a citizenship 
are consistent with class and caste privileges, and are hardly capable of 
accommodating the often antagonistic interests and idioms associated with 
different classes and castes. Her participants differentiated between 
“intelligent” and “unintelligent” citizens, specifying the latter as rural, 
“common people”. Enumerating the criteria of good citizenship, they indicated 
the categories of people who were and were not predisposed to it. Not 
surprisingly, it was the poor, especially the “Backward” and Untouchable 
groups who had the propensity to succumb to violence and moral depravity.  
 
The previous chapter has already highlighted Chatterjee’s (2004) 
useful distinction between citizens and populations. In relation to this, he 
explains that while the former operates in the realm of civil society, the latter 
do so in the terrain of political society, and that it is only a small section of 
culturally equipped citizens who claim to represent the high ground of 
modernity, while populations make instrumental use of the fact that they can 
vote in elections. Faced with the demands of electoral mobilisation and the 
logic of welfare distribution, it is the protagonists of civil society and the 
constitutional state who complain that modernity is facing an unexpected rival 
in the form of democracy, thereby highlighting a complete disjuncture between 
modernity and democracy. The suggestion being that while the civil society of 
‘respectable’ citizens remains committed to modernity, democracy loses its 
sheen, usurped and corrupted by political society.  
 
2.4.3 Not really modern either 
At stake here is the question of whether the middle class can at least be 
considered as agents of modernity. While the colonial middle class was 
initially celebrated as the bearer of modernity with a civilising influence, they 
were unable to pursue a pure vision of a modern, secular, self-regulating and 
enlightened civil society against an outright rejection of a privileged, 
hierarchical, and status-determined traditional society. Instead, they tempered 
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the modern imaginings of class, gender, national, and religious identities with 
older ideas about appropriate social relations, resulting in a fractured modernity 
stitching together the ideas of the traditional and the modern (Joshi 2001). The 
middle-class idiom of politics employed liberalism and modernity for their own 
empowerment, setting important limits to their “traditional” prejudices against 
subordinate social groups. Discovering that the colonial middle class was not 
egalitarian enough to perceive the lower social orders as equal citizens, Joshi 
(2001: 175) draws on Hobsbawm (1989) to show that this contradictory 
behaviour is inherent to the middle class where ideas about representative 
government, and civil rights and liberties are part of the political vocabulary of 
the middle class, but only so long as they were “compatible with the rule of law 
and with the kind of order which kept the poor in their place”, that is, a sense 
of superiority is central to the constitution of the bourgeois man. But this hasn’t 
prevented the middle class from frequently claming assaults on modernity as 
an instrument of citizenship, as seen in the way they have framed their 
argument against affirmative action policies pursued by the Indian state.  
 
‘Unreserved’ citizenship 
The policy of affirmative action or what in common jargon is known as 
reservation has a long historical trajectory evolving from the early missionary 
objective of advancement of the underprivileged to a postcolonial political 
arithmetic strategy. In the initial years after independence, reservation was first 
routinely implemented and systematised in favour of the Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes (15 percent for the former and 7.5 percent for the latter) in 
the three fields of education, employment and political representation. But soon 
demand for reservation arose from other backward classes or the OBCs 
culminating in the 1980 Mandal Commission Report which recommended that 
27 percent of the posts of the public sector be reserved for this group 
(supposedly comprising 52 percent of the country’s population). It is outside 
the scope of this thesis to undertake a detailed examination of the politics of 
reservation in India. This has been successfully dealt with by scholars 
elsewhere, but the intention here is to focus on the middle-class response to 
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reservation as it has crucially influenced their invocation of the citizenship 
discourse.40 
 
In 1990, when the VP Singh government decided to implement the 
recommendations of the Mandal Commission, it unleashed a violent backlash 
from the upper caste members (mostly students) who feared the loss of 
employment opportunities and their domination of the socio-political order, 
provoking the Supreme Court to suspend its implementation. Since then, 
reservations for the OBCs have been implemented in spurts by different 
governments (at both the central and state levels) amidst several pro- and anti-
reservation debates, the latter spearheaded by the members of the middle class. 
While at one level the opposition of middle class to the “Mandalisation of 
politics” is an attempt to keep the aspiring lower castes out of the rather 
exclusive upper-caste middle class (Sheth 1999), their resistance to reservation 
is mainly articulated through an emphasis on merit. The (urban) middle class 
argument is that ‘preferential treatment on the basis of caste rather than 
qualifications is undermining the principle of merit which in turn has lowered 
the standard of administration and thus diminished the country’s development 
prospects’ (Lakha 1999). In the current context of neoliberalisation and the 
opportunities offered by globalisation, the globally oriented middle class 
identify meritocracy as an important dimension of their discourse and insist 
that reservation hinders efficiency of business in a highly competitive and 
globally networked environment. 41 
 
Such a position eventually calls citizenship to its support, as seen in 
Beteille’s (1991a, 1991b, 1992, 1999) take on  reservation where he argues that 
                                                 
40 For a concise review of affirmative action in India see Jaffrelot (2006, 2003); cf. Kumar 
(1992).  
41 Merit is a historic argument employed by the middle class as it rose in opposition to the 
privileged aristocratic societies and established a basic affinity between the middle class 
culture and liberalism based on self-help and achievement (Kocka 1995). After decades of 
tussling with the reservationists, the discourse of merit is finding newfound significance in a 
climate of globalisation, where it is equated once again with quality and excellence, features 
considered essential to be ‘on top of the game’ in a competitive market-oriented global 
economy. 
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citizenship and caste are antithetical principles, and that the politics of 
reservation will prove to be a setback for the exertion of both citizenship and 
civil society. In a way, this position echoes the general scepticism towards the 
politics of difference and identity politics, primarily based on their (in)ability to 
allow a variety of dissenting groups to share a common platform when their 
positions are often fiercely antagonistic to each other (Mahajan 2002; see also 
Fraser 1995, 2000; Harvey 1993). As a result of this, doubts are cast over the 
possibility of Young’s (1990) differentiated citizenship in a ‘heterogeneous 
public’, especially when there is no ‘shared “common heritage” or “way of 
life” by reference to which citizens’ rights can be defined’ (Miller 2000: 44).42 
 
But this does not mean that the middle-class subscription to a 
homogeneous national identity reflects an all-inclusive universalism of the 
general. In fact, middle-class employment of citizenship has always been 
viewed with scepticism right from the time of Marx whose own discomfort 
with citizenship was primarily because of the cultural and social connection of 
citizenship with middle-class life. He was concerned by their artificial 
separation between political and society, influencing the way civil society and 
citizenship were understood. Viewing this as a continuation of class inequality 
in liberal capitalism, he therefore claimed that citizenship was a smokescreen 
that masked economic inequalities (Isin and Turner 2002). This led to the 
general acknowledgement of a contradictory relationship between citizenship 
and class where modern citizenship became the architect of legitimising social 
inequality, an aspect that has already been highlighted in the previous chapter.  
 
Lockwood (1996) in emphasising the relevance of the ethos and 
practice of citizenship amidst class relations elaborates that the middle class 
generally have an edge on the working class in terms of their ability to get 
more out of the same formally equal rights, particularly social rights. He argues 
                                                 
42 O’Hanlon and Washbrook (1992) raise this question in the Indian context, while in the 
western scenario, Miller’s conservative aspersion focuses on protecting national identities 
against Young’s (1990) politics of difference or even Kymlicka’s (1995) multicultural group-
differentiated citizenship. The concern here is not the evaluation of the pros and cons of 
politics of difference but an emphasis of the middle class refusal to subscribe to it.  
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against underestimating the so-called “prestige-gain” factor of the middle class 
as they are better able to communicate their needs and are more confident in 
influencing the choice of options open to them. For instance, when the 
Constituent Assembly was set up in 1946 to debate and finalise a constitution 
for independent India, it largely brought together people from the upper and 
middle class. This document conjured up a notion of citizenship and 
disseminated it through an educational curriculum available only to the middle 
and upper classes, while for the lower classes and the poor, citizenship 
imagined through the legislative forum remained blurry and incomprehensible 
(Kaviraj 1997).  
 
As the new middle class get increasingly involved in status-enhancing 
activities in their attempts to become fully distinct socially, they look for 
different means of enhancing their status, and emphasising their difference 
from other classes, particularly the lower social groups. In this aspect, issues 
surrounding status have become central to the concerns of citizenship where 
status is not just about lifestyle but also involves politico-legal entitlement in 
the way it invokes citizenship (Turner 1988). With many identifying the 
emergence of the new middle class in India as a normative political project, it 
becomes all the more essential to examine their everyday practices which 
shapes and constitutes the substantive content of citizenship, aspects which 
constitute the main focus of enquiry of the empirical chapters.   
 
2.5 Conclusion 
The narratives of middle class residents interviewed for this research were 
frequently peppered with references to ‘a typical middle-class attitude’, which 
is used in a freewheeling manner to represent an entire gamut of expressions 
ranging from helplessness and despair to criticism and anger. But most of them 
were unable to explain what they meant by middle class, despite subscribing to 
it sans reservation or inhibition. It is not just the ordinary middle class 
members who are unable to pinpoint the exact characteristics of their social 
group, but also scholars who find themselves inadequate in defining this 
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elusive category. This chapter addresses this shortcoming, as it undertakes an 
epistemology and ontology of the middle class, an exercise that is rendered all 
the more necessary in a post-1989 scenario, where the middle class has come 
through as an important social category, overcoming its general depiction as a 
euphemism for classlessness to help establish the relevance of class politics in 
a cultural landscape.  
 
Dominating its recent focus is the issue of how relevant it is to 
explaining the recent structural changes due to a globalising ‘new’ economy, 
and how influential it is in directing it. Traditionally, in postcolonial societies, 
the middle class is viewed as an elite social class with bourgeois tendencies, as 
in India, where the middle class is associated with the running of the state 
bureaucracy as the non-capitalist bourgeoisie. Speculations about the elitist and 
bourgeois nature of the middle class are heightened in the context of 
globalisation and liberalisation as many believe that this is a conducive terrain 
for the realisation of its hegemonic ideologies. The ‘new’ middle class that is 
associated with this change emerges as a politically salient actor, transforming 
from a class-in-itself to a class-for-itself. It epitomises not just a different 
relationship with capitalism, but also a cultural shift as consumers of material 
culture, claiming a clear distinction from its ‘old’ counterparts.  
 
While recent scholarly work has challenged the rather exaggerated 
enumeration of the new middle class, what is real is the fascination with the 
imagery of the new middle class which it uses to create a central and normative 
position. Integral to this exercise is its appropriation of the discourse of 
citizenship, as it attempts to retrieve its critical position to democracy and 
development. In India, the middle class is generally believed to have 
abandoned their commitment to democracy due to its ‘plebeianisation’. Its 
withdrawal from the electoral process results in an illiberal political expression, 
where it strives to reframe the notion of citizenship by delinking it from 
popular politics. This produces a weak and flawed model of citizenship that 
struggles to reclaim the ‘democratic spaces’ from the subordinated social 
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groups, and is disseminated through the middle-class domination of the 
educational curriculum and the legislative forum.  While the intention of this 
chapter was to establish a clear theoretical understanding of the (Indian) middle 
class one could take to the field, interviewing the middle class on ground 
proved in some ways a confirmation of these epistemological/ ontological 
postulations, and in other ways yielded quite a different understanding of this 
social category. The next chapter, in this sense, is not a conventional 
methodology chapter, as it also outlines the experiences of interrogating the 
middle class which, in a revisionist sense, has influenced the theoretical 
arguments put forward in this chapter. 
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3 
 
 
Methodology: 
Rigour and rigmarole 
 
 
 
In much of the ‘new’ urban geography, method and methodology 
are for the most part inconveniences in the world of ‘have theory 
will travel’…..’New’ urban geographers….seldom outline how they 
have used these methods or their relationship to the theoretical 
tracts that they follow. In other instances, they make a case for 
method and methodology but do not then follow this through in 
their research and writings. (Lees 2003: 107) 
 
 
If, as Canclini (1995) suggests, the urban sociologist studies the city, and the 
urban anthropologist studies in the city, then we could possibly add that the 
urban geographer is involved in a combination of both – speaking about the 
city as well as letting the city speak. For, the human geographer’s urban pursuit 
involves collecting both ‘facts’ about the city and ‘discourses’ on the city, 
where the ‘meaning of the city is constituted by what the city gives and what it 
does not give, by what the subjects can do with their lives in the middle of the 
factors that determine their habitat, and by what they imagine about themselves 
and about others in order to “suture” the flaws, the absences, and the 
disappointments’ (ibid.: 751). This pursuit generally requires a comprehension 
of social and spatial processes, but it is precisely this understanding that Lees 
(2003: 108) finds missing in many studies as she criticises them ‘for 
“interpreting the spatiality of human life” in the city not through ethnographic 
research but through academic accounts, poems, and secondary material 
already published’. Her concern also stems from the fact that such studies can 
limit themselves to the exterior world of surfaces and appearances, and fail to 
provide a commentary on how the lived experiences of everyday life impacts 
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the texture of the city. That is, pronouncements on the meaning of the built 
environment can become vehicles of individualistic expressions, barely 
grounded outside of the researcher’s perceptions (Jacobs 1993). In this aspect, 
Lees (2004) grudges urban geographers’ reluctance to discuss methods, and 
calls for scholars to reveal a methodological clarity to explain how they arrived 
at the links between urban spaces and social practices.  
 
Above observations notwithstanding, there is also another reason for 
spelling out clearly the methodology adopted for this research. Given the 
researcher’s training in architecture and urban design, there were initial 
concerns amongst social scientists (both at the academic institution and in the 
field location) that the research outlook will be ‘jaundiced’ by the 
superimposition of an ‘expert’ discourse. Lefebvre’s (2002) scorn for architects 
is well-known, as he scoffed at their establishing and dogmatising an ensemble 
of significations, poorly developed and variously labelled as “function”, 
“form”, and “structure”. According to him, the architect’s significations were 
elaborated not based on the perceptions of those who inhabit, but from his/her 
interpretation of inhabiting, displayed through graphic and visual tools tending 
towards a metalanguage. He was furthermore concerned that an architect’s 
system tends to close itself off, eluding all criticism, and is put forward, 
without any other procedure or precaution, as planning by extrapolation. Thus, 
Bridge and Watson (2000) believe that urban designers and planners are 
preoccupied with taming and ordering the city, making it predictable. Jacobs 
(1993) reviews literature where planners and architects are seen as “social 
visionaries” or ideological experts directly involved in producing the built 
environment. She particularly focuses on those which discuss the need to go 
beyond the domain of expert discourses to unpack meanings associated with 
the built environment not only in terms of its designers but also users.  
 
From a scholarly perspective, there is also a considerable lack of faith 
in the analytical tools of an urban designer, whose skills are generally criticised 
for being limited to a mere assessment of urban morphology. By creating a 
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typological taxonomy, this perspective sees the city as stable and fixed, and 
cannot accommodate an appreciation of difference and change (Crang 2000). 
Instead of capturing the city mechanically in print, the argument is to view the 
built form of the city beyond material spaces, and as spaces of the imagination 
and spaces of representation (Bridge and Watson 2000). That is, the city should 
be read as signs (Barthes 1966) or as text (Duncan 1990), adopting ‘a 
hermeneutic approach to understanding how landscapes are central to the 
performance of social identities, investigating how they are read both 
consciously and practically (inarticulately) by the people who produce and live 
immersed within them’ (Duncan and Duncan 2001: 390). In this context, a 
designer’s reading of the city is considered to be superficial and insufficient, 
based on a whimsical pattern of analysis that can neither be justified rationally, 
nor claim to be methodologically rigorous.  
 
Given these biases and concerns, it is imperative to establish that while 
it is impossible to completely abandon the personal (urban designer) position in 
studying (in) the city, the data assembled was through a ‘socio-scientific’ 
process. In detailing the methodological choice, the methods used, and their 
relationship to the theoretical tracts outlined in the earlier chapters, this chapter 
is more than what Corbridge and Mawdsley (2003: 3) refer to as a focus on 
‘the mechanics of fieldwork’, that is, ‘exploring some of the “practical” aspects 
of doing fieldwork. Just how are people getting their boots dirty these days’. In 
addition to highlighting the more prosaic and quotidian aspects of fieldwork, it 
explains, at the first level, the rationale behind the methodological choice 
which was driven by the compulsion of conversing with the city as well as its 
‘citizens’, one that is critical to the research’s substantive concern of urban 
citizenship. This is followed by how the material collected during the process 
of empirical investigations from the ‘citizens’, and which exhibited a tendency 
for scattering as individual experiences, was processed to bring together a 
‘coherent’ discourse. While the information collected is subject to academic 
interpretation, there is also a conscious attempt at not diminishing the agency 
of “ordinary people” (Jackson 1999, cited in Lees 2003).  
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Jacobs (1993) unpacks the city as an object of analysis and as she looks 
for the discourse of “ordinary people”, she finds that the middle class is 
strangely absent from the analysis of urban social groups. While this thesis’s 
focus on the middle-class discourse rectifies this shortcoming, it also raises 
several methodological issues regarding the research of this social category 
which are discussed in this chapter. There is as well the aspect of synthesising 
a series of concrete experiences recorded in a particular setting to a wider 
application as an interpretative concept. This is not just in terms of theory but 
also whether it is something specific to the city in which they are lived and 
enacted or a more universal phenomenon that one is likely to find in other 
Indian cities. This is addressed in the penultimate section of the chapter before 
finally explaining the ‘sites’ selected for conducting field investigations.  
 
3.1 Making the methodological choice 
In general, fieldwork choice in geography is portrayed as a polarised one 
between using quantitative and qualitative methods. Whereas the former is 
presented as a hard, value-free, objective and scientific way of gathering data, 
the latter is perceived as soft, value-laden, subjective and non-scientific. In 
recent years, such binary representations have been challenged, with Markusen 
(2003) arguing that the great divide posited between qualitative and 
quantitative methods is false. Pile (1991) suggests that there is a fundamental 
link between qualitative and quantitative exploration, forming a continuum 
rather than an epistemological break. But even though he believes that ‘there is 
little to be distinguished between analysing census data, historical documents, 
interview transcripts and newspapers’ (ibid.: 459), human geographers have 
tended to rely overwhelmingly on qualitative methods to capture the richness 
of context-dependent sites and situations (Baxter and Eyles 1997). Those 
favouring qualitative methods insist that quantitative research neglects the 
social and cultural construction of the “variables” and fail to understand the 
“meanings” that are brought to social life, a “deeper” understanding of which 
can only be provided by a qualitative form of investigation (Silverman 2000). 
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According to Cloke et al. (1991), qualitative methods, instead of creating 
lifeless abstractions like quantitative spatial science, rely on a dialogic process 
which peoples human geography through their focus on the everyday 
experience and meanings of places.  
 
It thus emerges that qualitative techniques are best suited for first-hand 
interactions with members of a local community, providing in-depth 
understanding of the inner working of a particular social group (Mullings 1999; 
Winchester 2000). Even though Pile (1991: 458) believes that qualitative 
methods can lead to an impasse where ‘we cannot go beyond being more 
sympathetic, open in revealing personal experiences, and watchful of our 
prejudices as we try to capture the everyday lived experience of other people’, 
Crang (2002; 2003) in referring to qualitative methods as the new orthodoxy 
says that they are best suited to exploring social phenomenon such as 
dominance and are not just about being ‘touchy-feely’ over issues. In fact he 
believes that the field is discursively imagined with both the fieldwork and the 
fieldworker being socially constructed. This, he asserts, constitutes a cross 
between what he calls “ontological constructivism and epistemological 
realism” as a result of which qualitative methods are best suited for mature 
reflection and evaluation. Since the objective of this research is not to evaluate 
quantitatively the middle class’s socio-economic position, but to understand 
their significance through their lived practices and codes of behaviour, 
qualitative methods were chosen to conduct this enquiry.  
 
3.2 Conversing with the city and its ‘citizens’ 
With the choice of qualitative framework established, semi-structured in-depth 
interviews were used in combination with some amount of participant 
observation and on-field ‘site’ observation to generate a large proportion of the 
primary data. Supplementary material was collected from textual sources and 
documents such as byelaws of residents’ associations, readers’ mail and daily 
reporting in the city dailies and neighbourhood weeklies, and planning/policy 
documents issued by the city development authorities. Silverman (2000) in 
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citing Mason (1996) warns that combining interview data on individual’s 
perceptions with discourse analysis of particular texts can be tricky as the 
former treats all accounts as socially constructed while the latter attempts to 
provide a definite version of reality. He is concerned with using documentary 
sources as surrogate data, as documents such as byelaws can only state their 
aspirations but hardly reveal how the organisation actually operates on a daily 
basis.  Nevertheless multiple methods are a useful way of cross-referencing the 
material assembled and help to bring rigour, reliability and validity to 
qualitative data. 
 
Participant observation was mainly undertaken at the key events of the 
residents’ associations (Extraordinary General Meetings or EGMs held 
annually and cultural celebrations). This allowed ‘hanging out’ for a longer 
period of time at the complexes than during interview sessions but didn’t 
provide an in-depth exposure that is generally associated with this technique. 
At the same time, it went beyond a mere voyeuristic or curiosity gaze, with the 
time spent yielding systematic field notes. It was not a wholly successful 
exercise as there was unease and resentment amongst some residents towards 
the presence of the researcher at these events. The EGMs, in particular, are 
generally terse-filled moments when in-fighting amongst the different groups 
within the association is exposed and creates visible embarrassment for those 
who wished to present their association as an exemplar to the researcher. 
Observing such events was important as these were the occasions when the 
residents’ tongues would ‘wag loosely’ and express opinions that they might be 
reluctant to reveal during a taped interview.  
 
Conducting ‘site’ observation was also critical, as it was felt that it was 
not simply enough ‘to know that the urban environment is meaningful but to 
know who is communicating through the environment, to what audience and to 
what purposes’ (Knox 1982 paraphrased by Jacobs 1993: 831). This was 
documented through a combination of photography and urban morphology 
analysis. The intention was not to make a semiotic pronouncement on the 
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meaning of the built environment but rather to understand the social, political, 
economic and material context of its formation, and whether this is authored by 
the interests of certain social groups at the expense of others. The urban 
analysis toolkit of the researcher, gained from experience as an urban designer 
and planner, was applied for this purpose. This involved constantly walking up 
and down the case study areas, jotting notes on a map that extended beyond 
being a mere survey to include observations on the socio-spatial evolution of 
neighbourhoods and how the social interactions are spatially manifested, 
especially in socially overlapping areas.43 
 
In terms of the choice of interview as a preferred method, it needs to be 
acknowledged that these are the staple diet of qualitative research. In contrast 
to questionnaires and surveys asking ‘a rigid set of simple questions which 
“force” or push the respondents’ answers into particular categories, which they 
may not have thought of unprompted or may not want to use’, interviews allow 
for explanations related to experiences including the expression of all 
complexities and contradictions (Valentine 1997: 110). Interviews are a useful 
mode as they are basically conversations and dialogues with a purpose rather 
than an interrogation (Eyles 1998), where participants are encouraged to phrase 
in their own words their perceptions and understanding of the subject that is 
being researched. In qualitative interviews, the dialogue itself becomes the 
object of study so as to understand the taken-for-granted social worlds, values 
and behaviours as expressed by participants and provide a focus on human 
meaning. Whereas Crang (2003) is concerned that there is an apparent 
concentration in geography on interview-based methods of research instead of 
traditional “immersive” ethnography, Elwood and Martin (2000: 656) state 
otherwise that ‘the interview is not just an opportunity to gather information by 
                                                 
43 For instance, if you assume that architecture is a style statement at one level, determined by a 
time-code, then by observing the architectural and urban design styles of the different 
developments, you are able to draw a historical timeline of their evolution. And if you also 
acknowledge that the architectural vocabulary employed has a social status connotation, there 
you can roughly map a social classification of the different projects. When two different ‘social 
classes’ are located in adjoining proximity, their interfaces are marked out to note possible 
areas of conflict or contention.  
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asking questions and engaging in conversation, but is also an opportunity for 
participant observation’. Thus, going by Rose’s (1997) position that for those 
wanting to study the situated knowledge, i.e. knowledge that is partial and 
produced under specific circumstances, in-depth interviews are the best source 
of data collection, interviews emerged as the main method for compiling 
primary material.  
 
3.2.1 Entering the field: experts and key informants44 
In the first instance, interviews were held with ‘experts’ to understand the 
recent trends in the development of the city following a committed pursuit of 
neoliberalisation policies. It included interviews with planners from the 
Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority (CMDA), an official from the 
Tamil Nadu Housing Board (TNHB), academic planners, and journalists 
writing on city/neighbourhood development issues. Their interviews provided 
an insight into the economic system of the city, its political structure, and 
development practices, helping to map the ideologies of those involved in 
producing the built environment. Through a series of informal conversations 
and formal interviews with the journalists it was possible to understand the rise 
of the middle class socially, economically and politically, and obtain an 
updated ethnographical description of their recent social and cultural patterns. 
These interviews allowed the gathering of the kinds of qualitative and 
descriptive data that could have been difficult and time-consuming, and also 
proved a good way of entering the field. ‘Experts’ were helpful in framing an 
‘ordinary’ language shorn of the academic jargon, in accord with everyday 
understanding for use in interrogating the middle-class perceptions of 
themselves as ‘proper citizens’. They grasped effectively the conceptual 
framework, and gave cues or examples of situations, identifying everyday 
practices where this might be best manifested. What emerged from these 
interviews was a predisposition within the city towards the bourgeois aesthetic 
                                                 
44 See Appendix 2 for list of interviewees. 
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of the growing middle class, substantiating the ‘bourgeois urbanism’ arguments 
presented in Chapter Four.  
 
Interviews with editors of the neighbourhood weeklies covering the 
selected areas yielded valuable information on local NGOs, and 
neighbourhood-level activity groups. Many were run by local residents taking a 
leadership role in the maintenance of and improvements to the area.  As key 
actors and local notables they are natural observers of the scene and could 
provide in-depth information on the residential groups in the area being 
researched. They offered an inside knowledge into some of the issues, aspects 
that wouldn’t have become apparent otherwise. Pilot interviews were held with 
these key residents helping to sharpen the interview topic guide. As the key 
informants were mostly from the local middle-class community, they also 
helped identify residents for the interviewing process.  
 
Although Tremblay (1957) believes that key informants have minimum 
personal bias, Ramachandran (2004) found that as community leaders working 
with the community in question, they are not neutral or impartial actors, and 
are tied to social hierarchies. In this research, there were several instances 
where the key informants were found to be at loggerheads with some of the 
participants over several issues. In such instances, it seemed as if there was an 
ulterior motive to their recommendations, as they invariably expected some 
‘reporting back’ on the adversarial position adopted by the participant to their 
project or organisation. Such expectations had to be navigated with care 
without compromising the confidentiality of the interview.  
 
3.2.2 The inner-world of ‘citizens’ 
Contacts with office-bearers of the residential associations were established 
either through introductions from the key informants or through developers of 
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such developments.45 Association officials were first interviewed to get an idea 
of the aims and objectives of the association, their rules and regulations, their 
everyday activities and concerns, their interactions with neighbouring 
associations and other organisations (state/public agencies and private groups 
catering to their consumer demands), developmental concerns, and future plans 
in terms of its evolution as a community-level organisation. Following these 
sessions, they were asked to participate individually as residents in one-on-one 
interviews and also identify other residents. While many such referrals were in 
the same complex, in several instances they introduced residents from other 
residential complexes and thus helped enlarge the initially selected list of 
residential developments.  
 
Unlike questionnaires and surveys, the aim here was not to choose a 
representative sample but to select an illustrative one. With random sampling, 
the intention is to study a representative subsection of a precisely defined 
population in order to make inferences about the whole population, whereas the 
objective here was to study a particular group of individuals and their 
actions/reactions in a specific setting. Thus, purposive sampling where 
participants were enlisted through a snowballing process of recommendations 
was used. O’Connor (2004: 172) is enthusiastic about this refereeing technique 
given the ‘rapport enhancing qualities of the referred introduction technique 
and the provisional insiderness it provided for’. While snowballing helps 
researchers to overcome one of the main obstacles to recruiting participants, 
and cuts short the warming-up process of establishing a rapport, it is also 
important to use multiple contact points so that one does not end up recruiting 
all the informants from a very narrow circle of like-minded people. Another 
problem with this is that, having been referred to by a fellow resident, 
participants were invariably curious about what his/her ‘friend’ had to say 
about the issues discussed. When an inability to reveal anything on grounds of 
                                                 
45 Mail drops or cold calling are not viable options in Indian cities as people are distrustful of 
unknown people writing to them or even worse ringing their bells. In a highly polarised 
society, strangers are seen as a threat or danger, and even a letter of introduction from a reputed 
institution like LSE could be read as a sophisticated con.  
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confidentiality was expressed, they were visibly irritated or displeased and this 
affected the quality of the interview. An extension of this problem was that 
they were all bound to compare notes at some point, thereby influencing the 
tone of future interviews.  
 
Residents from other social groups were also interviewed for 
experiences of their interactions with the new middle class.46 This included the 
upper class and the rich, the old middle class, the lower class and the poor, and 
in the case of the ECR, fishermen residing along the coast. Such interviews 
helped to get a viewpoint from a different perspective, as well as understand 
the interactions between the different residents’ associations (either in an 
associative, collaborative manner or in a contestation over a conflicting issue). 
While it generated rich empirical material, it should be noted that given a 
limited timeframe, interviewing different social groups, particularly when they 
share an antagonistic or challenging relationship can be a methodological 
conundrum as the desire to understand the perspectives of both groups in depth 
is not that easily fulfilled.  
 
3.2.3 Demographic characteristics 
As mentioned in Chapter One, 84 interviews were conducted with 110 
residents in two phases, first in 2003-04 for a period of eight months, followed 
six months later with a six-week visit. Since the focus was on transnationalised 
new middle class, participants in the age group of 30-45 were deliberately 
sought (83 in total). 27 residents, who were aged 50 and above, were also 
interviewed. In many instances they were parents of the new middle class, who 
perceived themselves as the old middle class, and provided views on the 
difference in the way the two groups approached the role of their residents 
                                                 
46 Of the 110 participants, 61 were clearly the new middle class living in residential complexes 
catering to a new ‘lifestyle’ (Chapter Five), 29 belonged to the old middle class living in the 
older residential colonies, 10 comprised of  the upper class/elites, and 10 were from the 
kuppams and slum resettlement colonies.  
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associations.47 Also, since retired people are the ones who are most active in 
the residents’ associations, it was imperative to interview them to understand 
how these associations work. Fifty seven interviews in neighbourhoods along 
East Coast Road (ECR) were conducted as against 25 on Arcot Road (two were 
miscellaneous interviews in other areas). Nine interviews were conducted as 
group discussions with residents’ association officials, 69 were with 
individuals, and six involved couples/extended family members (see Appendix 
Two). While residents didn’t make a particular request to conceal their 
identities, and no condition of anonymity was agreed, their names have 
nevertheless been withheld from use. While neighbourhood names are real, 
each resident has been giving an ‘identity tag’ to accompany verbatim 
quotations. The ‘tag’ includes the date of interview, with a prefix indicating the 
location (AR for Arcot Road, ECR for East Coast Road, and MISC for others), 
while the suffix reveals the interview number for that day (see below).  
 
3.2.4 Constructing the interview guide 
Interview guides mark a stage when the research question that is informed by 
academic literature is stripped of its theoretical references and rephrased in 
common or popular jargon easily understandable to the layperson. The first 
realisation upon arrival in the field is that the research question cannot be 
directly put to test. One cannot walk in and ask ‘so, how are you asserting 
yourself as the “proper citizen” of the city, and how do you use your residents’ 
association to make your point?’ Firstly, even though people in everyday 
conversations do make allusions to being a ‘good citizen’, citizenship as 
                                                 
47 Chapter Two discussed the difference between the old and new middle class in terms of 
employment characteristics. What emerged on field is that this delineation is often constructed 
at a generational level where the parents’ employment profile matches that of the old middle 
class while their children are mostly in new middle class employment.  
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understood in a social scientific manner is an abstract concept. Secondly, the 
question implies ‘negative’ assumption of the middle class, and is bound to be 
countered by denial, thus removing all opportunities to understand their 
everyday practices and assertions. The objective of the research was therefore 
presented simply as a study of the rise of the middle class in a changing 
economic context. Given the fact that there has been a lot of press coverage, 
nationally and internationally on the rise of the Indian middle class, they were 
aware of the growing interest in them as a social category and hence didn’t 
question the intention further.  
 
Participants were first asked to give some biographical background 
about themselves. While this was not their ‘life story’, it helped to break the 
ice, and get them talking about their middle class identity, and their 
understanding of the much discussed rise of the middle class. This gave a 
preliminary peek into how they wear their middle class ‘tag’ (proudly, 
indifferently, or ashamedly). The next set of questions revolved around their 
present residence (and how they became a homeowner). They were then asked 
to elaborate on their residents’ association, their participation in its activities, 
and their perception in terms of its potential to take on larger issues, outside of 
their residential complex.   
 
At this point, their opinions were sought on the general 
changes/improvements in the city, as initiated by the state in its pursuit of a 
particular form of urban development strategy, whether they subscribed to it, 
and to what extent. This was particularly helpful in understanding the way they 
(prefer to) engage with the state (Chapters Five and Six). Neighbourhood 
weeklies along with key informants were helpful in identifying ‘local’ 
issues/problems in the study areas, and these were flagged up for discussion. 
While seeking ‘their side of the story’, residents were also asked to think 
beyond the box, setting these concerns in the context of wider development 
objectives of the city, linking it back to their earlier comments on the state’s 
efforts.  
Absent Societies/Chapter 3: Methodology                               
103 
 
There were a few surprises though in terms of following the agenda of 
the topic guide. Initially, the guide was constructed in such a way that opinions 
of all residents would be sought on the potential of the ‘civil society’ agenda of 
their residents’ associations, as well as their formulation of a public spaces 
discourse via their re-imagination of the beaches in the city. But since 
residential developments were chosen along two different stretches in the city, 
Arcot Road and East Coast Road (more on their selection in a later section of 
this chapter), their conversations generally centred around very narrow 
concerns, specific to their particular residential stretch. Thus, it was difficult to 
engage all residents in a discussion involving a universal set of questions.  
 
For instance, as Chapter Six will show, public spaces are either public 
or parochial, depending on and related to the degree of involvement of the 
residents. Thus, while residents of East Coast Road, being close to the 
shoreline, were eager to discuss their aspirations for developing the beach as a 
(parochial) public space, Arcot Road inhabitants shied away from the topic, 
with a general comment of ‘it would be nice to have quality public spaces in 
the city, not just the beach, but parks and play grounds too’ (AR-220204-02). 
As the residential complexes along Arcot Road are large, introverted 
developments, with children’s play areas, shops, and other amenities, these 
residents subscribed less to the idea of ‘public goods’. Thus, the topic guide 
had to be revised to incorporate certain specificities related to the interests of 
the residents. In this regard, the guide was in constant evolution as every 
interview would invariably reveal something that needed to be ‘tweaked’ 
before the next one. While it is undeniable that later interviews will benefit 
from this constant ‘refitting’ of the guide, this in no way affected the quality of 
the interviews, as each interview produced a unique set of material, a valuable 
contribution to the overall process of gathering primary information.  
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3.2.5 Interpreting the data 
Of the 84 interviews conducted, 60 were taped, while detailed notes were taken 
during the non-taped interviews. Forty two of the taped interviews were 
transcribed verbatim.48 Even though the intention is to retain the voice of the 
participants in its original state, this doesn’t stop the researcher from thinking 
of interpreting their statements. In this respect, Berry (2002) believes that it is 
more helpful to create a coding template before the interviews commence as it 
increases the chances that the probes will consistently fill in the information 
needed for each case or each subject. Thus, for the discourse on public spaces, 
literature review indicated that a bourgeois imaginary would involve two main 
concerns of dirt and danger. Not surprisingly, conversations revolved around 
the same, thereby proving the usefulness of ‘pre-coding’ through the topic 
guide.  
 
But still, data in its crude form does not allow any real test of the major 
thrust of the argument, and Crang (2000) cautions against taking the full 
transcript of interviews as simply “data”. While he pushes for a more codified 
approach, and it cannot be denied that coding is crucial to establishing the 
validity of the empirical material by critically connecting it back to the 
theoretical concept, it should be noted that coding is not something that is 
blindly applied as a must-do. One needs to keep in mind that the responses of 
the participants are not structured according to any particular category in their 
minds. Coding here becomes a manipulation where the responses given as a 
direct access to their ‘experiences’ is actively reconstructed as ‘narratives’. 
Moreover, while coding furnishes “a powerful conceptual grid” which is 
helpful to organise the data analysis it also deflects the attention away from 
uncategorised activities (Silverman, 2000). Subjecting them to narrative or 
content analysis and superimposing theoretical assumptions over the data 
means that the different discourses in the respondents’ talk is summarised as a 
simple, reductive list, for on the contrary, people do not attach one single 
                                                 
48 Thirteen taped interviews could not be transcribed due to poor quality audio recording, while 
the remaining five were used directly from the tape.  
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meaning to their experiences. For instance, discussions with the  residents 
along ECR about their residents’ associations and their aspirations for the 
beach as a public space showed that these are not two different issues, and that 
their understanding of the scope of their residents’ association influenced the 
way they framed the re-imagination of the beach. Rigid coding would have 
compartmentalised the different issues and failed to accommodate these 
overlaps. Instead, following Crang’s (1997) suggestion, a process of “open 
coding” was adopted where notes were made to build a “theoretical memo” on 
what they meant in terms of the overall research question. Also, the data 
collected was presented for peer debriefing, identifying all possible sources of 
interpretation and misinterpretation.49   
 
Verbatim quotations are used throughout as much as possible for 
revealing how meanings are expressed in the participants’ own words rather 
than the words of the researcher. Also, keeping in mind Silverman’s (2000) and 
Crang’s (2000) warning that often only brief and persuasive data that are in 
favour of the research question are ‘mined’ for the ready quote, creating 
problems of “anecdotalism” where a few well-chosen “examples” of the 
apparent phenomenon are used, an attempt was made here to analyse less clear 
and sometimes even contradictory data. This was particularly the case when 
middle class residents elaborated their position on the re-imagination of the 
beach. Expressing their frustration at its ‘pitiful’ state, their first instincts were 
to indulge in a blame-game of ‘othering’, where their identification of the 
culprit was, in several instances, riddled with contradictions (Chapter Six). If 
these were not clarified during the course of the interview, they became a 
challenge during the interpretation phase. In such cases, the data is used in its 
ambiguity, corroborating to a certain extent, the ambivalence of the middle 
class discussed in the previous chapter.  
 
                                                 
49 This was done at the local institution, Madras Institute of Development Studies where the 
researcher was based as a visiting fellow during the course of fieldwork. Information collected 
was constantly presented to the staff and students during seminars and discussion groups for 
feedback and identify the multiple ways in which the same data could potentially be 
interpreted.  
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3.3 Interviewing the middle class: some issues and implications 
Researching the middle class posed several dilemmas requiring careful 
manoeuvring to ensure that the reliability and validity of the data collected was 
not compromised. With the popular press portrayals of middle-class socio-
economic renaissance in an era of neoliberalisation, studying the Indian middle 
class is becoming a cottage industry of sorts. Despite this trendiness, there has 
been little reflection on the methodological problems that arise as they are still 
practically unresearched domains in development history. First and foremost is 
the tricky aspect of addressing the middle class categorically as a social class. 
While Crang (2002) explains that it is not enough to simply listen and give 
voice to the silenced and that studying the subaltern and the elites is equally 
important to inform our understanding of an unequal world, the question is 
whether a research exercise on the middle class can be approached as a study 
of the elite?  
 
Chapter Two discussed at some length the elite nature of the middle 
class, concluding that while scholars are divided on this issue, what is apparent 
is the increasing propensity of the new middle class to assume an elite status, if 
not in real terms, at least in aspiration. But if one defines an elite as someone 
who is powerful, is in a position of authority, is a leader and has a strong role 
to play in governance situations, then doubt still persists over the ability of the 
new middle class to exercise themselves as elites. For, unlike elite interviews, 
where the interviewees are conscious of their own importance, wielding 
considerable power during the course of the interview, and are coherent and 
well-formulated in their responses, middle-class respondents displayed 
characteristics to the contrary, where there was no sensation of ‘interviewing 
up’. Even though they acknowledged their recent economic successes, their 
responses were not authoritative statements. In fact, it is more the old middle 
class members who as bureaucrats and technocrats in the “ruling coalition” 
displayed more of an elitist behaviour during the interviews. While the elite 
status of the new middle class conveyed through their consumer habits, the 
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‘old’ members revealed it through their power-tilting behaviour enabled by 
their proximity to the ruling elite, and tended to project it during the interviews.  
 
It should also be noted that middle class is an identity that is 
frequently invoked by the Indian elites, often to gain wider currency for their 
(in)actions. It is not uncommon to find influential and prominent entrepreneurs 
of the new Indian economy like Narayana Murthy and Nandan Nilekani, 
chairmen of the highly successful Infosys Limited (a company that trades at a 
global level offering technological services to multinational concerns and 
symbolises an ambitious and globalising India), referring to themselves as 
members of the middle class. What they fail to admit is that while their origins 
may be traced to a middle-class background, their entrepreneurial practices 
today are steeped in elitist aspirations. Such tendencies to disassociate 
themselves from an elite status needs to be carefully noted.50 
 
And yet with the middle-class tendency to look ‘downwards’ those 
‘below’ themselves with supremacist convictions, they are perceived as a 
‘privileged’ group. But for an academic from a middle-class background, while 
studying the middle class involves neither looking ‘up’ nor ‘down’, this 
autobiographical, autoethnographic exercise does generate its own set of 
fieldwork anxieties. Entering the field with a complacency of examining the 
practices of a social group that one belongs to, there were nevertheless 
problems of positionality and reflexivity, an issue that is generally associated 
with the studying of ‘others’. Made relevant by the work of feminist scholars, 
positionality and reflexivity is defined by Valentine (1997: 113) as 
acknowledging ‘who you are and how your own identity will shape the 
interactions that you have with others’. She adds that ‘it is important to 
recognize the different power relationships that exist between yourself and 
                                                 
50 Clark and Sison (2003: 226) in their study of elite perceptions of poverty and the poor in the 
Philippines found that several elites ‘referred to themselves as middle class when by any 
objective measure they belonged to a distinct class and status elite’. They trace a strong pattern 
of groups denying their own influence, especially among those most firmly established in 
society. One of the reasons is that by doing so, they plead their inability to take greater 
responsibility in addressing poverty or other social development issues.  
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your informants….[and] be sensitive to the power-laden nature of interviewing 
encounters’ (ibid.). But akin to Ramchandran’s (2004) experience, it was 
quickly obvious that self-reflexive and cautious methodological practices are 
not enough to solve the problematic details of positionality in the field.  
 
Valentine (1997) generally states that there is a positive aspect to the 
researcher and the participant coming from the same background, with the 
sharing of similar identities facilitating the development of a rapport between 
the two, and yielding a rich, detailed conversation based on empathy and 
mutual respect/understanding. But despite the absence of academic voyeurism 
where the marginalised groups are treated as “exotic others”, there are 
disadvantages to ‘insider’ fieldwork as well. The insider lacks the neutrality of 
an outsider who brings a greater degree of objectivity and ability to observe 
behaviours without distorting their meanings. Moreover, as Mullings (1999) 
states, no individual can consistently remain an insider and few ever remain 
complete outsiders. This was clearly experienced in the present research where 
the researcher’s position shifted constantly between being an insider and 
outsider, similar to Chacko’s (2004) description of her fieldwork experiences 
where the insider/outsider subjectivities left her with a feeling of being adrift, 
in a state of uneasy balance, a position symptomatic of “native” social 
scientists who choose to work in their own cultures and communities.  
 
3.3.1 Accommodating the multiple identities of the middle class 
Chapter Two argued that the identity of the middle class is framed prominently 
by the intersection of class and cultural politics, as a result of which it can be 
expected that its members would subscribe to multiple identities. But field 
investigations adopted a class-based discourse, focussing more on the class 
values of the respondents. This was mainly due to the participants’ reluctance 
to discuss openly their subscription to identity politics, and their discomfort 
regarding questions of caste. Though a majority of the participants were 
Hindus, their caste identities were revealed only in subtle ways. While it could 
be deduced that many belonged to upper-caste groups, an aspect which 
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influences to a large extent their decision to not ‘get their hands dirty’ and 
participate in community-level cleaning exercises (Chapter Five), or their 
perception of dirt in public spaces (Chapter Six), even indirect hints at possible 
influences of caste resulted in defensive replies: ‘I don’t think this [caste] has 
anything to do with this’ (AR-050304-01).51 Insisting otherwise would not 
only have produced an ill-fitting material, it would also have jeopardised the 
overall objective of the research. It was thus assumed that the axis of class 
primarily cuts through and dominates their cultural subsystems, with other 
identities (Hindu, upper-caste) reworked within the parenthesis of class.  
 
The research also tended to slip in positionality with respect to the 
researcher’s circumstances of feminist epistemology. Even though participants 
included both male and female members, it wasn’t possible to reflect in depth 
on the influence of gender in the responses. First of all, female participants 
were in a small minority. Only 30 out of the 110 residents were women. Of 
these, 12 were interviewed through two group-interviews, and six were 
interviewed jointly with their husbands. This relatively small sample could be 
attributed to the fact that residents were selected through a snowballing 
process, beginning first with interviews of residents’ association officials. 
Associations are dominated by men, who invariably pass on the contact details 
of other male residents.52 While arranging interviews, even though the 
desirability of other household members’ participation was clearly 
communicated, women (housewives) tended to sit in during the initial few 
minutes but never for the entire interview. Middle-class members often claim 
an ‘extremely busy schedule’ and pinning them down for an interview can be a 
                                                 
51 Of the 110 participants, only four were non-Hindus and two claimed to be atheists. One 
distinguishing feature of upper-caste Hindus is their vegetarianism. In many associations, only 
vegetarian food is served at their cultural events. Wondering whether this indicated a 
domination of upper-caste households, this issue was raised with the association officials, who 
dismissed its significance, saying that it was merely a matter of convenience. A few attempts 
were made to probe this further during individual interviews but participants similarly refused 
to engage with the issue.  
52 Of the 26 residents’ associations interviewed, only three had a considerable presence of 
women officials. But during the interviews, it was generally emphasised that while gender 
probably played a role in soft issues like organising cultural events, it really did not matter 
when it came to hard issues like infrastructure services and development concerns.  
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long process. Getting them to commit to even an hour’s conversation was a 
difficult task. Under these circumstances, it was neither possible to have a 
balanced sample, say in terms of sex, nor was there time to probe identities 
such as gender. Nonetheless, this restraint was perhaps not too disconcerting, 
as scholars like Mullings (1999) have found that positionality based on gender 
can be cut short by the dominance of class differences.  
 
3.3.2 Ethical dilemmas 
A more challenging issue was that of ethics. The research objective was to 
investigate the exclusionary practices of the middle class claim to the city and 
its public spaces. But this couldn’t be openly acknowledged as is would only 
‘put them off’ the exercise. Instead, as already stated, the research was 
introduced as an examination of the rise of the middle class given their recent 
economic success. There is a limit to how honest a researcher can be with the 
participant, and the truth was only partially revealed when the research aim 
was explained as an enquiry into how the middle class are calling upon the city 
and its spaces to make it relevant for their own lives. To avoid any 
preconceived biases, the research was also presented to the middle class as an 
opportunity to prove that they are not “judgemental dopes” but that their 
actions are driven by a rationality and moral accountability.  
 
Given the propensity of several scholars to witch-hunt the Indian 
middle class (for instance, Varma 1999), on-field investigations needed to 
ensure that the middle class was not exorcised as demons. It was therefore 
important that the interviews did not become catholic confessions attempting to 
entrap the participants during guilt-trip moments. The language of the 
interview was carefully constructed, modified and rephrased over time to 
ensure that at no point did it slip into an accusatory tone. Moreover, taking 
Silverman’s (2000) suggestion, opportunities were constructed into the 
interview for the participant to answer with examples of incidents such that the 
theoretical assumptions could be constantly refuted and disproved. At the same 
time, the middle class is an articulate social group capable of explaining its 
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opinions and actions eloquently in a convincing manner. Care had to be taken 
in weighing their  explanations, sifting carefully through their various 
statements, and rejecting some as ‘lame excuses’.53 
 
Nevertheless, the ethics of informed consent, privacy, harm, 
exploitation and sensitivity to their opinions (Cloke et al. 2000) could not be 
strictly adhered to. Crang (2003: 497) reacts to the researcher’s inability to 
fully reveal the research intention by simply saying that while ‘deception can 
and does occur, from both parties, it is also quite important to recognize that 
our projects are often unstable entities which are not only presented, but 
actually exist, in multiple versions given to funders, colleagues, friends, family, 
peers and (different) respondents, none of which need be necessarily the “true 
one”’. Thus, while there was worry about deceptive practices, of equal concern 
is the level of honesty in the participants’ responses. Being an educated class, 
they were often able to discern easily moments during the interview where 
their statements would compel ‘critical’ scrutiny. Also since the research was 
probing their attitudes towards conflicting or opposing claims they were aware 
that what they say may portray them in a bad light. At such moments they 
resorted to standard patterned answers and insincerity in their responses 
became a common problem during interviews creating the possibility of ‘poor 
material’. In these instances, instead of seeing the participant’s statement as a 
‘lie’, it was treated as a different position amongst a variety of positions that 
can be assumed by one person. Equally, as a ‘talkative’ group, the middle class 
often engaged in reverse interrogation, enquiring about the researcher’s 
opinions on the topics discussed. This required some careful negotiation as the 
responses of the participants were bound to be  influenced by the position of 
the researcher. In this respect, one can argue that irrespective of the level of 
                                                 
53 For instance, when residents of Valmiki Nagar were asked about their involvement in a 
particular NGO effort Puduvellam organised by a local resident, many confessed to their non-
participation, but suggested that it was mainly due to poor dissemination of information. 
Probing this further though revealed a deeper set of prejudices and preconceptions of the 
middle class towards this particular initiative and NGOs in general, aspects which would not 
have become apparent if their reasoning had been taken at its face value. See Chapter Five for 
a more detailed discussion.  
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honesty in the participant’s response, the researcher should come clean about 
the research intentions. While this may help build trust, there is a good chance 
that in reality it would have sabotaged the research. This risk was not taken and 
full disclosure was withheld from the participants.  
 
While Rose (1997) believes that no position is ever clearly revealed, in 
the absence of a properly spelt stand of the researcher, the participants 
sometimes assumed an experiential commonality with the researcher (given the 
same social standing). This posed a few problems. Firstly, middle-class 
residents often assumed that the researcher understood what they were talking 
about and hence did not explain themselves thoroughly leaving quite a few 
thoughts implied and unexpressed. For instance, the reluctance of their 
associations to adopt a larger, federating role was mainly due to their 
unwillingness to partner with other classes. But this was mostly expressed 
through sentences like: ‘you know, in India, everything is a hassle’ (ECR-
070404-01), assuming that as a member of the middle class, the researcher 
would have had a similar experience.  
 
Secondly, when the middle class expressed themselves invectively 
against other social classes, the researcher has a few choices – acquiesce with 
their opinion, say nothing or contradict them and challenge their position. 
Valentine (1997: 122) argues that researchers ‘must challenge offensive 
comments, because to remain silent is to reproduce and legitimize the 
interviewees’ prejudices through collusion’. But to do so would destroy the 
carefully built rapport and affect the interview adversely. The dilemma is of 
whether one should challenge them or simply play silent spectator, collect as 
much data material as possible and reflect on their comments at a later point. In 
this research, varying tactics were adopted when ‘politically incorrect’ 
comments were made, particularly when portraying the fishermen or the poor 
as ‘crooks’. Either the respondents statements were probed deeper to 
understand the context better, or if it was felt that doing so would alert the 
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participant to the fact that s/he had said something ‘wrong’, such remarks were 
left as ‘one-line reflections’ without the benefit of a deeper understanding.  
 
3.3.3 Language 
Most of the interviews were held in the homes of the participants and in 
English, interspersed by Tamil phrases.54 It was not uncommon for the 
participants to switch between the two languages, and several anecdotes were 
narrated in the lingua franca of Tamglish. There was no conscious effort to 
impose either English or Tamil as language choice on the participants. Instead 
the decision was intuitively made, with the research project explained in a 
‘common’ manner using a mix of English and Tamil words, and the interviews 
conducted in a similar fashion.55 On the other hand, interviews with the poor 
and lower-income groups including the fishermen residing along ECR were 
held in Tamil. Language plays a crucial role in indexing social group 
affiliations and is a key aspect of self-presentation and expression of individual 
identity. The previous chapter has already recounted the way in which English 
education in India is synonymous with power, status, privilege and the means 
to upward mobility. When the participants chose to speak in English (fluently), 
they were emphasising a certain identity – that of the English-speaking middle 
class, convinced more than before that English is the linguistic counterpart to 
the process of economic globalisation, at least in urban India. In this aspect, the 
obvious class line divisions apparent in the language choice between English 
and Tamil took on additional significance as it demarcated those who had 
‘done well’ with neoliberalisation and those who had missed out on its 
opportunities.  
 
                                                 
54 In terms of locating the interviews, Elwood and Martin (2000) remind that interview sites 
imply power and positionality of the research participants, producing “micro-geographies” of 
spatial relations and meanings, and where multiple scales of social relations intersect in the 
research interview. Participants had a tendency to refer back to their immediate surroundings 
(particularly when interviews were held in their homes) to not only ‘show-off’ their status, but 
also to emphasise the ‘propriety’ of their environment.  
55 Only 14 middle class residents interviewed were non-Tamil speaking, identifying Hindi, 
Malayalam or Telugu as their mother tongue. But they were fluent in English, and 
communication was not a problem.  
Absent Societies/Chapter 3: Methodology                               
114 
In terms of collecting newspaper material as textual sources, only the 
English-medium press were accessed. The city dailies The Hindu, Indian 
Express and The Economic Times, neighbourhood weeklies Adayar Times and 
Arcot Road Times, and the fortnightly Madras Musings were scanned to 
compile written discourses (from letters to the editor/readers’ mail and reports 
on city/neighbourhood development issues). The exclusion of Tamil press can 
be criticised for creating a bias dominated by the linguistic hegemony of 
English which imparts analytical priority to the empowered and denies space to 
the disempowered. But the omission can be justified on two grounds. First is 
the issue of logistics of translating the material collected into English. 
Secondly, since the focus of the research is on the predominantly English-
speaking middle class, and it is generally the English-medium press that the 
middle class largely subscribes to and communicates through, it was felt that 
the English-medium newspapers would report best their sentiments, and hence 
this reliance. As it turned out, a review of middle-class opinion as expressed in 
these print media helped clarify some of the finer points in the material 
collected. 
 
3.3.4 Reliability and validity 
Critics of qualitative research point to the problems of reliability and validity of 
the techniques adopted, especially when descriptive narratives are used – they 
are unique to the circumstances in which they are produced, and hence pose the 
question of whether they can be generalised.  Reliability is defined as the 
extent to which findings can be replicated or reproduced by another inquirer 
and validity is the degree to which findings can be generalised to other settings 
similar to the one in which the study occurred (Denzin and Lincoln 1994). 
Even though Crang (2002) believes that reliability and validity are concerns of 
rigour associated more with an empirical realist, objectivist research, Baxter 
and Eyles (1997) maintain that all empirical material collected should be tested 
for its rigour. While the responses of middle-class residents in the selected 
neighbourhoods indicate experiences in a locally specific way, is there a 
generic nature to these modes of interpretation highlighting the commonality of 
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the bourgeois systems of meaning? As the next chapter shows the political 
economy of Chennai is unique, given the nature of the Dravidian state, as a 
result of which its response to global and neoliberal capitalism will be 
particular. In this context, can these particular findings about middle-class 
behaviour in Chennai be extrapolated to other Indian cities? An initial glance 
through The Times of India and Daily News Analysis in Mumbai, and The 
Hindustan Times in Delhi indicates both similarities and dissimilarities, and a 
clear position can only be established after a more in-depth comparative study.  
 
3.4 Fieldwork: selecting sites 
Following initial interviews with prominent real estate residential developers 
and property agents, residential neighbourhoods along the two main arteries of 
East Coast Road (ECR) and Arcot Road were chosen as ‘sites’ for studying 
expressions of neoliberal, bourgeois citizenship in the city (Figure 8). These 
two roads are characteristic of the changing typology of the city, offering 
prototypes of ‘neoliberal’ housing.56 This choice of location in the southern 
part of the city relates to a clear pursuit of bourgeois urbanism by the state and 
which is influencing spatially the development dynamics in the city (see 
Chapter Four). Initially, the developers’ help was sought in identifying 
residential developments as case studies but it soon became evident that that 
their selections could be couched within hidden agendas. Instead on-field 
ground survey of the two roads was conducted mapping out all the housing 
projects along them and developments that are clearly ‘new’ in their typology 
but still set and nestled within an ‘older’ settlement pattern housing residents of 
other social classes, including the ‘old’ middle class were first short listed.57 
For this purpose, the researcher’s urban design and planning experience proved 
                                                 
56 20 developers were approached first, of which 13 obliged with an interview. Residential 
sales representatives from four property companies were also interviewed for the same 
purpose. 
57 While there are other more exclusive and gated forms of residential developments catering to 
the ‘new’ middle class, for a fuller, enriched exploration of the research question, it was 
important to locate the case studies within a condition of socio-spatial diversity, where, through 
interactions with other social groups, opportunities for conflicts are more, and documented 
examples of claims and counter-claims through prominent incidents can be investigated.  
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helpful to read the landscape as a text with an ‘expert’ eye, recognising and 
understanding the subtle messages encoded within the built environment.  
 
Figure 8: Map of Chennai indicating the location of case study areas 
 
Not to scale 
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East Coast Road (ECR)  
The first attempt to build the ECR took place in 1992 when a series of small 
village roads connecting fishing villages along the Bay of Bengal coastline 
were interlinked and improved. Until then the more inland and parallel Old 
Mahabalipuram Road (OMR) was the only available southern route. But this 
showed signs of stress from overuse. ECR was initially developed with part 
financial assistance from the Asian Development Bank as a joint venture 
project between the Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry governments, Though its 
completion was scheduled for April 1996, by 1996, improvements were limited 
as reported in The Hindu which described it as A bumpy road all the way, 
hardly functioning as a motorable stretch.58 In 2000, the Government of Tamil 
Nadu asked the Tamil Nadu Road Development Corporation (TNRDC) to take 
up the improvement, operation and maintenance of the road on a long term 
basis, extending up to Pondicherry. This time the project cost was funded by a 
mix of equity share capital and debt, with a toll established to recoup costs.59 
Completed in December 2001, improvements included widening of a select 
stretch of ECR to two-lane with a host of value added services including 24-
hour trauma care and ambulance facilities, round-the-clock patrolling and 
security services, vehicle breakdown/tow-away services, and helpline facilities 
every three Km.  
 
Celebrated as a success, similar projects are being implemented in other 
Indian states and the ECR model is supposedly the premise behind the National 
Highways Authority of India’s proposed National Highway Development 
Programme. Various aspects of the project reflect its international flavour, 
including the importation of retro reflective paint from Kuwait, delineators 
from Australia, reflectors from Austria, sign posts and high mast lamps from 
Malaysia, and the provision of 24-hour towing and ambulance facilities just 
like in any other western country. That the ECR is a symbol of a globalising 
Chennai became evident when The Financial Express wrote that the road 
                                                 
58 A bumpy road all the way. (1996, 15 July). The Hindu, p. Metro Section M2. 
59 See website http://www.tnhighways.org/tnrdc.htm. Retrieved 18 May, 2007. 
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becomes the destination, sprinkled with luxury resorts, adventure sport arenas, 
quaint eat outs, and tourist spots. Its significance was further visible when the 
Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) a key player in India’s globalisation 
process, along with the state tourism department organised a Chennai Festival 
in which the “Enjoy East Coast Road” was a prominent concept. 60  
 
 While the ECR project has been praised by the state and the press, 
identifying it as a brand entity of a transnationalising city, there has been some 
criticism of the project. This has been based on its environmental impact as 
well as its fundamental neoliberal economic premise where an existing road 
after some facelift is re-designated as a toll highway, affecting the poor 
communities who find themselves on the other side of the toll barrier. Ghosh 
(2003) comments that we now have ‘new toll-ways such as the East Coast 
Road, which are driven by the notion of user charges, and yet do not allow 
those affected any choice in the matter. Curiously, then, this scenic route 
becomes yet another expression of the distortions and contradictions of the 
current neo-liberal paradigm in economic policy’.61 This argument is easily 
dismissed by ECR enthusiasts who clarify that two-wheelers, non-motorised 
vehicles and tractors, ambulances, and fire tenders are exempt from the toll, 
and that ‘a degree of social responsibility has been built into the toll structure, 
with agriculturists and the poor given due consideration’.62 A more appropriate 
argument to use against this paradigm of branded re-imagination is the way the 
residential morphology has been transformed along the ECR, influencing and 
impacting to a large extent the social matrix of the residential neighbourhoods 
along this stretch.   
 
 For many years before these cosmetic improvements were initiated, 
neighbourhoods in this part of the city were populated by the old middle class 
                                                 
60 George, S. (2003, November). The potpourri highway. FE Business Traveller. Retrieved 18 
May, 2007. 
61 Ghosh, J. (2003, 04-17 January). Who pays for the roads? Frontline, 20. Retrieved 18 May, 
2007. 
62 ECR to become toll road from tomorrow. (2002, 23 March). Business Line. Retrieved 18 
May, 2007. 
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(mostly employed in the state sector), who constructed their own house in one 
of the several residential plot developments promoted by either the city’s 
development authority or private promoters, or purchased a flat in the public 
housing developments undertaken by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board (TNHB). 
Such residential colonies were interspersed amongst existing fishermen 
kuppams and richer enclaves catering to the upper classes who preferred living 
close to the seashore (Figure 9). But with manageable demand, the 
developments remained sparse, and their interactions distant and indifferent.  
 
Revamped as a scenic beachway, ECR is one of the most desirable 
residential addresses in the city today. This is particularly the case amongst the 
new middle class who seek ‘international-style’ quality residences replete with 
‘world-class’ facilities and amenities such as clubhouses, pools, and gymnasia, 
and which are automatically equated with ‘a proper way of living’ (see Chapter 
Five). Thus, in the past few years, private developers have promoted large 
residential complexes introducing a new social class into the neighbourhoods 
along the coastal highway. Their entry has provoked a social heterogeneity 
bringing conflicts and negotiations in its wake in terms of the urban imaginary 
of the residential landscape and the public spaces (particularly the beach). The 
ensuing interface between the different social groups are marked by unease as 
their interactions range from mutual indifference to differences of opinions, 
negotiations and reconciliations. Setting the study of urban citizenship in this 
ensuing heterogeneity provides an opportunity to examine how the middle 
class (primarily the new but to a lesser extent the old as well) frame the 
propriety of their vision/interpretation as against the demands of the other 
social classes (Figure 10).  
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Figure 9: Neighbourhoods along ECR 
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Figure 10: Characteristic features of ECR – a photo illustration 
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Arcot Road  
On the other hand, leisurely running in the south-west part of the city is the 
nearly eight Km stretch of Arcot Road between the historically prominent 
colonial routes of Poonamallee High Road and Mount Road (or Anna Salai as 
it has been renamed).63 As the road that led to Arcot, the capital of the then 
powerful empire of the Nawab of Carnatic, Arcot Road was once a princely 
route through which the Prince of Arcot would ride to enter the city in all 
splendour and glory. While the neighbourhoods such as Kodambakkam 
abutting Arcot Road can lay claims to ancient history, linking their locational 
significance to events cited in Hindu mythology, it is the more immediate 
history from mid-twentieth century onwards that made Arcot Road and its 
adjoining neighbourhoods well-known amongst the city dwellers when, with 
the advent and popularisation of cinema, Arcot Road became the desired 
address and location of the various film studios, production houses and cinema 
theatres.64 The neighbourhood of Kodambakkam is synonymous with the 
Tamil film industry and what was once the largest movie studio complex in 
Asia, Vijaya-Vauhini studio was located on Arcot Road. Other adjoining 
neighbourhoods such as Vadapalani, Saligramam and Virugambakkam 
comprised the residential hub of several personalities from the film and music 
industry (Figure 11).  
                                                 
63 Arcot Road itself has been renamed as NSK Salai after the popular Tamil film comedian NS 
Krishnan but its original name still endures in all references, vocal and written. Today, the 
redesignated version of Arcot Road ends at the Kodambakkam Railway Station, further east of 
which the road leading up to Mount Road/Anna Salai is called as Kodambakkam High 
Road/MGR Salai.  
64 Srinivasan, A. (2004, 02 January). Linked by legend. The Hindu. Retrieved 28 May, 2007; 
Federick, P. (2002, 07 August). Arcot Road: There's glamour amidst chaos. The Hindu. 
Retrieved 28 May, 2007. 
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By the early 1980s, changing styles in film production processes made the need 
for expansive studio settings obsolete and several film studio houses either 
closed down or were redeveloped for alternative uses such as private hospitals. 
The mid-1980s witnessed the entry of several private developers into the 
residential market promoting flats/multiple dwelling units. The opening up of 
large land parcels such as the former studio and production houses along Arcot 
Road was eagerly sought by private residential developers. In the rest of the 
city only small-size parcel lots were available for housing development and 
new homeowners had to contend themselves with match-box style apartments, 
cramming in barely 10-12 flats in one single plot. On the other hand, large 
parcels along Arcot Road promised larger residential complexes replete with 
open spaces, play areas, swimming pools, shopping facilities, and several 
private courtyards, all complementing more comfortably laid out flats.  
 
Such projects have been lapped up readily by the new middle class who 
see several advantages in moving to this area. Arcot Road is strategically 
located en route to Sriperambudur, the manufacturing hub for several 
multinational companies including Hyundai, St. Gobain, and Pilkington, a 
major employment source for this social category (Chapter Four). In addition, 
major branches of two prominent software companies servicing the IT industry 
are located on Arcot Road (HCL Technologies and Tata Consultancy 
Services/TCS). Thus for the new middle-class employees working either at 
Sriperambudur or in these IT companies, residing on Arcot Road is ideal. As in 
ECR, their entry marks a diversification of the social matrix already in 
existence. The large, stylised residential complexes offering a host of amenities 
to the new middle class abut old middle class residential colonies. Interspersed 
amongst them are extremes of the richer settlements of those associated with 
the film industry and the less well-to-do areas providing housing and thread-
bare existence to all the lower-level workers who find only intermittent 
employment in the film industry (Figure 12).  
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Figure 12: Characteristic features of Arcot Road – a photo illustration 
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3.5 Conclusion 
Whatever the degree of preparedness in a methodological plan, there are bound 
to be unplanned contingencies in the field. The first realisation on arrival is that 
Chennai (and, for that matter, urbanisation studies in India) is dominated by a 
tradition of positivist empiricism. This has typically involved door-to-door 
questionnaire surveys of a vast number of households. Generally based on a 
randomly drawn sample of a few hundreds if not a few thousand, local 
academics found it hard to believe that research could actually be developed 
and substantiated through a ‘touchy-feely’ interview of purposely-sampled 
residents numbering in the double digits. Residents were in fact the first to 
express this scepticism. Accustomed to a culture of door-to-door surveys 
(mostly for marketing studies) which required merely the ticking of boxes, and 
one-line responses, participants were also initially surprised not only by the 
possibility of conversing with a stranger for an hour or so, but also by the 
notion that a conversation could be sustained for so long: ‘I don’t think I will 
have much to say on this’ was a typical initial response before relaxing into the 
interview.  
 
Consistent with these concerns, in several instances, there was the 
danger of the discussion meandering through a ramble of poorly put together 
thoughts. While it is important that the researcher does not try to rein the 
conversation too much, some semblance of structure is still required if the 
information collected is to be made legible for further interpretation. Given the 
nature of the research question, a multiple method qualitative methodology was 
chosen. This combined semi-structured interviews with a limited amount of 
participant observation, some direct ‘reading’ of the built environment (despite 
all the caution of the social scientists), as well as reviews and analysis of 
textual sources, including print media, planning documents, technical reports, 
and byelaws of residents’ associations. Interviews were conducted with the 
help of interview guides which were first prepared by disaggregating the 
research question to layperson jargon based on inputs from ‘experts’ and key 
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informants. Interviews were taped, transcribed and ‘open-coded’ for 
interpretation while participant observation yielded a fair share of systematic 
field notes.  
 
The most unexpected challenge in the fieldwork actually involved 
dilemmatic issues of interviewing the middle class. Entering the field with a 
certain complacence of ‘going back home’ and interviewing members of the 
same social class, it soon became apparent that this in no way reduced the 
crisis of positionality and reflexivity. Rather, it revealed a whole gamut of 
problems, some of which were negotiated during the course of fieldwork, while 
others could only be addressed a posteriori during the process of ‘writing up’. 
While resisting the tendency of post-rationalising such issues, this chapter is a 
way of addressing them, as it also attempts to revisit and review these concerns 
from the field perspective and in relation to other chapters, thereby placing 
them back in their rightful position within this thesis. 
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Excavating Chennai from Madras: 
Archaeology of development 
 
 
 
But for all the change in a city once known for its graciousness and 
spaciousness, vestiges of things past still survive midst all the 
symbols of metropolitan growth. Madras is still a green and airy 
city beloved of those who love the leisurely tempo of the life of the 
spacious world of yesterday…..more associated with village and 
small town than with burgeoning metropolis.(Muthiah 1990: 232) 
 
 
Setting out The Problem, the March 2004 issue on Changing Chennai 
published by the Delhi-based Seminar magazine summarised that ‘[i]f Delhi 
comes across as a court surrounded by villages, its soul corrupted by power, 
Mumbai as a worshipper of mammon and Kolkata as a city more marked by its 
past than present, Madras with its unhurried, almost sleepy pace, is seen as 
representing the continuity of Indian (read Hindu) cultural traditions….To the 
outsider, the South is Madras, not just the city but the idea – ritually defined, 
vegetarian and conservative, if not orthodox’ (2004: n.p.).65 The editorial 
insists that such a representation is mistaken and that Madras-Chennai is a 
sprawling metropolis afflicted by all the problems marking large urban 
agglomerations. It identifies the city as complex and contradictory, 
experiencing the pangs of pan-Indian, global transformation, and struggling to 
define a new identity for itself while outgrowing the traditional confines. And 
yet, despite its resolve to set right this misconception, every single article in 
this issue on Chennai emphasises the very qualities to which the editorial 
                                                 
65 Changing Chennai. (2004, March). Seminar, 535. Retrieved 23 May, 2007.  This reference to 
Madras/Chennai as the unhurried city is also captured titularly in CS Lakshmi’s (2004) 
editorial effort The Unhurried City, a collection of writings on Chennai.  
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objects. The contributors nostalgically portray the city as a quiet backwater, 
conservative in its ways, placing considerable importance on old-fashioned 
values.66 Thus, the annual December Festival of classical music and dance is 
singled out as the identity of the city, the high climax of tradition that is clearly 
visible in all aspects of everyday life: dress, food, daily prayers and rituals, and 
other cultural practices. Portraying it as a forgotten city or “City of Neglect”, 
Muthiah (2004) describes it as a city of a thousand shrines, remaining closer to 
a heritage that was ancient when the city was born. Similarly, Murari (2004: 
n.p.) is convinced that ‘Madras might have been the capital of the…..Madras 
Presidency but it had never had any pretensions to capital lifestyles. Frankly, it 
was a village well into the mid-20th century’. Acknowledging ‘the winds of 
change’ happening in this ‘sleepy village’ in the form of shopping malls and 
western forms of leisure and entertainment, he dismisses them as the patina of 
modernity, and reassures that the ‘Madras air, beneath the new odours of 
Chanel and pesto sauces,…is still…soaked in culture and old traditions’ (ibid.).  
 
 Such portrayals of orthodoxy aside, of more significance is the way 
these writers engage rather awkwardly with the other prominent issue in recent 
times, and that is its name change from Madras to Chennai, officially decreed 
by the state government in September 1996. In an indication of its still 
unresolved nature, while the editorial without much explanation uses the 
hyphenated expression of Madras-Chennai, historian Muthiah’s account is 
sarcastically dotted with references to the city as ‘Madras that is Chennai’ (a 
practice associated with the decision of his bimonthly newsletter, Madras 
Musings, where, in refusing to accept the name change, the tagline was 
changed to ‘We care for Madras that is Chennai’). In comparison to Doshi’s 
inaccurate arguments against the name change, Thiagarajan’s honest admission 
that she never acknowledged the name Chennai as an English name for 
Madras, attributing the duality of the name to its twin existence in two 
languages, Tamil and English, is probably closer to truth, as she observes that 
                                                 
66 Contributions to this issue included S Muthiah’s First city of modern India, Tishani Doshi’s 
The Madras syndrome, Deborah Thiagarajan’s Chennai: Madras, Timeri N Murari’s New wine 
in the old bottle, and S Theodore Baskaran’s Turtles and Antelopes, amongst others.  
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language is an issue which has stirred Madras and its politicians over the 
decades and is key to the character of the citizens of Chennai.67 Similarly 
understandable is Murari’s perception of a generational change when he says 
that the name change indicates a new identity, not backward looking as the 
ancient name suggests. Writers and celebrity residents of the city writing 
personalised, stylised narratives will only confront such issues at an individual, 
emotional level, failing to see the larger political and even economic 
implications involved in these decisions. For all sections of the society, from 
the die-hard Madras loyalists, to the sceptics and even the indifferent, the 
transition in its usage has been anything but smooth, riddled with ambivalence, 
as references to the city, consciously, subconsciously and unconsciously shifts 
between Madras and Chennai without any rationality of choice.  
 
The official explanation given by the Tamil Nadu state government was 
simple enough: it was taking a cue from the Maharashtra state government 
where the name of Bombay was officially changed to Mumbai in 1995, 
supposedly to purge the city of its colonial corruption. But as Patel and 
Masselos (2003) have asserted, there are other, deeper resonances wrapped in 
the change of nomenclature. And much of these larger meanings will be lost to 
analysis if we assumed that the renaming was merely a means of 
decolonisation through vernacularisation. To a large extent, the name change 
served a strategy of regionalisation pursued by states governed by regional 
parties. In this aspect, the Tamil Nadu government was merely joining the 
bandwagon, representing a wider trend pursued by both the conservative and 
the left-minded forces.68 While language was forcefully applied by the regional 
governments to lend shape to their identity politics, it was also part of a larger 
                                                 
67 Doshi’s interpretation show clearly her non-Tamil speaking background, as she wrongly 
suggests that since nai in Tamil means a dog, Chennai is a kind of chinny dog. This is 
phonetically incorrect as the nai in Chennai is pronounced differently from the nai meaning 
dog. 
68 The communist government in Kerala first set the trend when they changed the name of the 
capital city Trivandrum to Thiruvanthapuram in 1991. The decision to rename Bombay as 
Mumbai was taken by the right-wing Shiv Sena, as soon as it captured state power in 1995 in 
alliance with the Hindu fundamentalist party, the BJP. In 1999, the left-wing Communist Party 
led government in West Bengal renamed Calcutta as Kolkata. More recently, in 2006, the 
Karnataka Government renamed Bangalore as Bengaluru. 
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strategic re-imagination of the economic geography of the city and its 
immediate region, where the name change was critical to the neoliberal 
direction taken by the state. Given these factors influencing what seemed a 
‘simple political gimmick’, understanding the context in which Madras became 
Chennai is essential to comprehending the newer forms of citizenship claims 
that the current political economy has set loose. This requires excavating 
Chennai from Madras, revealing as a result not just the spatio-temporal 
archaeology of the city but also the embourgeoisement of a Dravidian state and 
its global mission, amidst attempts to shrug off the ‘backwaters’ image.  
 
 Adopting a historical narrative, the chapter begins by outlining the odd 
trajectory of the evolution of the ‘city that was never meant to be’. The 
postcolonial period witnessed the emergence of Tamil cultural nationalism 
which not only adversely affected the economic fortunes of the state but that of 
Madras as well. The city was reinvented as a regional capital, cutting short its 
development as a national metropolitan city. Yet, the city fell woefully short of 
providing a true Dravidian identity, thus only partially meeting the demands of 
the Dravidian politics to carve a ‘Tamil geography’. This affected its growth to 
a large extent, slipping in its standing amongst the competitive network of 
Indian metropolises. While Indian cities in general suffered from urban blight 
under the pressures of what is often referred to as hyper-urbanisation, a 
condition signifying the 1970s and the 1980s, regionalisation of cities like 
Madras and Calcutta only worsened their problems. But the onset of economic 
reforms and its accompanying phenomenon of neoliberalisation since the 
1990s have triggered an ‘urban turn’ (Prakash 2002). Neoliberalisation 
unusually found a willing partner in the Dravidian parties who could no longer 
afford to neglect their capital city as it became crucial for reaping the benefits 
of economic liberalism. This has meant a complete ‘makeover’ for the city, 
starting with its name change to the pursuit of new tenets of urban 
development. While a rampant image of bourgeois urbanism now signifies the 
city’s landscape, it has also fractured it as a result, producing a sharply divided 
city, aspects which are discussed in the last section of this chapter. 
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4.1 A city that was never meant to be 
The irony of portrayals described in the first few paragraphs of this chapter is 
that, Madras as a city did have a promising start. Its colonial foundations trace 
back to 1639 when a tract of land along the beach was granted by the local 
Hindu Nayak to the British East India Company for setting up a cloth 
manufacturing factory (Lewandowski 1977; Neild 1979; Evenson 1989; 
Muthiah 1990). It proved to be an early economic success, and soon became an 
important trade centre. Madras was made a Presidency in 1653 and five years 
later all English settlements on the Coromandel Coast were subordinated to it. 
By 1687, it was considered the ‘Urbs Prima in Indies’, and a Corporation and a 
Mayor’s Court was established to ensure good governance (Pinto 2000). But 
this political glory lasted for just about a century. Trade was soon diverted to 
the growing port cities of Calcutta and Bombay, which had a rich, resourceful 
hinterland, and served better the British trading interests. Calcutta became the 
capital of British India until 1911 (when the capital was shifted to Delhi), and 
Bombay through its sustained economic success captured the motto ‘Urbs 
Prima in Indies’, a title it still holds.  
 
In hindsight, it would appear that Madras was a city that was never 
meant to be. Bradnock (1984: 38-9) cheekily wrote that: 
The description of Madras as a “colonial” city may seem to imply some 
sense of grand strategy on the part of the colonial power…In fact, nothing 
could be further from the truth….The choice of location was dictated 
simply by the favourable prices of cotton…There was little else to 
recommend the site—no natural harbour, no great agricultural hinterland. 
A low-lying marshy lagoon surrounded the first settlement. The only 
advantage it did have was fortuitous. Located on the windward side of the 
Bay of Bengal, it was in a relatively good position to defend British 
colonial interests against those of the French and Dutch during a period 
of intense competition for maritime supremacy between the colonial 
powers. From this unpromising environment grew south India’s largest 
city.  
 
Given these unfavourable circumstances of its foundation, it is not surprising 
that Madras was unable to sustain its growth. By the end of the nineteenth 
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century, Rudyard Kipling was lamenting that the city that was ‘Crowned above 
Queens’ is now a ‘withered beldame’. Even though Madras was a prosaically 
thriving modern settlement of over half a million, it simply did not look like a 
city (Evenson 1989). On the occasion of the Madras Tercentenary Celebration 
in 1939, an official recorded that “the scenes around the city’s temples, tanks 
and squares are still the same as those witnessed in distant days, the 
crowds….little different from their predecessors in earlier years, and the 
Madras fisherman still goes out in his frail craft….exactly as his forefathers did 
many centuries ago” (cited in Evenson 1989: 218).  
 
If Madras failed to develop a truly urban image it was partly due to the 
fact that the great industrial boom that transformed the cities of Bombay and 
Calcutta bypassed Madras as it lacked a surrounding region of natural 
resources required for a strong industrial economy. With the establishment of 
the British empire in 1858, the city assumed a new urban status as the 
administrative capital of a sizeable British Presidency of Madras in south India. 
But the economic dynamic, based on trade, did not have a major impact on the 
physical form of the city which retained its semi-rural atmosphere without any 
metropolitan grandeur (Lewandowski 1975; Evenson 1989).  
 
Such depictions of the city endured well into the twentieth century 
extending late into the post-independence period. In 1977, when Aside began 
publication as ‘a magazine of Madras’, it bemoaned that Madras lacks the 
distinctive ethos of a city, unlike Calcutta or Bombay or even Delhi, still hiding 
within itself that wonder and surprise of rising out of a village.69 And, writing 
at the turn of the millennium, Muthiah (1999: 402) insisted that ‘Madras 
today…has grown into a metropolis, but it has still not been able to shake off 
its small town atmosphere’. Madras stepped into the post-independence period 
as the chief political and administrative centre of southern India and it seemed 
that this role didn’t really challenge the city to redefine its image.  
                                                 
69 A write up on Aside. (1997, 1-15 February). Madras Musings, p. 4. 
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Although portrayed in the postcolonial era as one of the four major 
metropolitan cities in India (along with Bombay, Calcutta and Delhi), it was 
obvious that Madras was poorly qualified to occupy the national platform. 
Evenson (1989) notes the per capita annual income in the four cities at the 
beginning of the 1960s: while Rs. 1,180 in Greater Bombay, Rs. 872 in Delhi 
and Rs. 811 in Calcutta are comparable, Madras’s Rs. 437 was a pale fourth. 
The percentage of industrial employment was again nothing remarkable. 
Madras had less than 10 percent of its population employed in the 
manufacturing sector, increasing to 25 percent by the 1970s, much less than 
Bombay and Calcutta where it ranged between 40 and 60 percent (Bradnock 
1984). Comparing the port activities in the three colonial port cities of 
Bombay, Calcutta and Madras, Evenson (1989: 216) found that the Madras 
port in 1960 ‘showed no increase in cargo activity over the preceding two 
decades, as well as indicating a decrease in the number of vessels using the 
harbor’. In 1964-65, Madras port handled 4.4 million tonnes of traffic (9 
percent of India’s total) while Bombay and Calcutta together handled 60 
percent of India’s total maritime traffic.70 Above all, the factor that influenced 
Madras’s failure to establish itself as a national metropolis was the emergence 
of a new regional political platform in the 1950s and the 1960s which created 
ambiguity in its position vis-à-vis the national realm and redefined the city 
more narrowly with respect to its immediate region. 
 
4.2 Dawn and darkness of a Dravidian state 
Soon after independence, India found its national unity challenged by the 
resurgence of regionalist forces that were largely organised around linguistic 
                                                 
70 National Council for Applied Economic Research. (1968). Traffic survey of Madras port. 
New Delhi: NCAER. 
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identity. This resulted in the reorganisation of states along linguistic lines.71 
Caught in the midst of these agitations were metropolitan cities like Madras 
and Bombay which had large multilingual populations, and due to their 
economic prominence were claimed by rival linguistic groups. While the 
Gujarati speaking population of Bombay argued that the city belonged to the 
newly formed state of Gujarat, not the predominantly Marathi speaking group 
and the state of Maharashtra, the supporters of Andhra State clamoured for 
Madras. Eventually Bombay was retained by Maharashtra and the protagonists 
of Andhra State had to relinquish their demand for Madras. 
 
The reorganisation impacted the way metropolitan cities like Bombay, 
Madras and Calcutta evolved within a tension created by their dual roles—as 
cosmopolitan, metropolitan cities that served as national engines of growth and 
as regional capitals which reinforced regional identities. Thus, Bombay, 
Madras and Calcutta have been constantly reshaped by the regional parties to 
highlight a culture mainly framed by the local language – Marathi for Bombay, 
Tamil  for Madras, and Bengali for Calcutta. This yielded ‘an inflammatory 
parochialism in conflict with the nationalist ideal’ (Khilnani, 1997), whereby 
these cities, instead of endorsing a national ethos, served to strengthen new 
regional identities, one that was little more than provincial.  
 
In Madras, this new identity was shaped by the emerging force of 
Dravidian politics. The Dravidian movement initially promoted the idea of a 
Dravidanadu, the southern  land of Dravidian people and languages, distinct 
from the Indo-Aryan culture prevalent in North India, but eventually evolved 
into a more viable regional identity of Tamil nationalism, creating ‘a new 
cosmology for a new Tamil nation’ (Price 1993: 504).72 The cultural 
                                                 
71 14 States and 7 Union Territories were first established, which have been subject to further 
reorganisation through the years. India today has 28 States and 7 Union Territories.  
72 There have been several academic publications on the history and character of Dravidian 
politics. While Barnett’s (1976) The politics of cultural nationalism in South India and 
Hardgrave’s (1965) The Dravidian movement are classics, more recently, Subramanian (1999) 
has also provided a comprehensive analysis of Dravidian politics. Also see, Widlund (2000); 
Wyatt (2004); Harriss (2001); Washbrook (1989); and Rajadurai and Geetha (1996, 2002).  
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movement began to reap political gains when the Dravidian party Dravida 
Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) swept to power in the 1967 State Assembly 
elections. Since then, Dravidian parties in one form or the other have retained 
power at the state level, articulating their politics of cultural nationalism within 
a populist discourse.73 They reinforced cultural distinctiveness through official 
steps such as renaming Madras State as Tamil Nadu in 1969, amidst a series of 
populist actions associating Tamil identity with the anti-elite (Subramanian 
1999). But overlapping economic populism with ethnic identities is 
problematic as it is merely a tool for capturing electoral advantages, yielding 
economic policies mostly based on entitlements and subsidies. 
  
Continuous Dravidian rule has thus meant a stream of illogical fiscal 
measures and unsustainable funding mechanisms affecting the economic 
performance of the state, with Washbrook (1989) alleging that the Dravidian 
ideology had no means of comprehending policies and arguments geared to the 
development of a bourgeois state. General indicators of growth reveal that 
Tamil Nadu witnessed a slump when the Dravidian parties ruled at their 
populist extremes (MIDS 1988; Table 3). Sinha (2005) explains that the 
substitution of political strategy in favour of Tamil cultural nationalism based 
on symbolic and leadership-based politics resulted in a neglect of the 
institutional conditions necessary for economic development and industrial 
advancement. Tamil Nadu, between 1967 and 1991 emerged as a state with 
low regional institutional capacity, where an isolationist non-productive state 
resulted in low investment. Given the impact of Tamil nationalism and its 
specific form of populism on ebbing the economic growth of the state in the 
postcolonial period, it would be useful to examine how these ideologies also 
shaped the development of the regional capital city, Madras.  
                                                 
73 DMK and its breakaway faction Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (ADMK) are the two 
main Dravidian parties. There are other parties, such as the Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK) and 
the Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK), which also emerged from the 
DMK. However, they, along with national parties like the Congress and the BJP, mostly 
contest the state elections in alliance with either the DMK or the ADMK. More recently, a new 
party Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam (DMDK) was formed by the Tamil film actor 
Vijaykanth, contesting the 2006 elections on its own.  
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Table 3: Tamil Nadu’s economic growth 1960-1983 
Source: MIDS (1988: 337-38) 
 
4.2.1 Ill at ease: Madras as a Dravidian capital city 
Dravidian leaders seeking to project Tamil cultural nationalism on to the state 
capital, were initially uncertain over how to implant such an identity. Madras 
could neither show a ‘glorious’ Tamil past nor claim to be a ‘genuine’ Tamil 
city like Madurai or Thanjavur.74 Its colonial foundation hardly allowed any 
historic credibility, to the extent that in 1962, Kamaraj, the Congress Chief 
Minister suggested transferring the capital to Madurai because it had 
“nurtured” Tamil language, culture, and political life (Hardgrave 1964). But as 
                                                 
74 Madurai and Thanjavur were the capitals of ancient Tamil kingdoms such as the Pandyas 
and Cholas, who along with the Pallavas (ruling from Mamallapuram near Chennai) comprised 
the three main political units of the historic Tamil geography.  For the Dravidian parties, these 
cities were important as their prosperity was often citied in Tamil epics, legitimising them as 
the heart of Tamil Nadu.  
Year
National State 
Domestic Product 
National 
Income (India)
State Share of 
National 
Income (%) Tamil Nadu India
1960-61 1,111.85 13,263 8.38 334 306
1961-62 1,107.60 13,763 8.05 324 310
1962-63 1,138.93 14,045 8.11 327 309
1963-64 1,160.57 14,845 7.82 328 320
1964-65 1,200.92 15,917 7.54 333 336
1965-66 1,174.28 15,082 7.79 317 311
1966-67 1,210.90 15,243 7.94 322 308
1967-68 1,261.11 16,660 7.57 329 329
1968-69 1,296.03 17,057 7.60 332 330
1969-70 1,339.85 18,152 7.38 337 343
1970-71 2,371.10 34,235 6.93 581 633
1971-72 2,490.80 34,713 7.18 599 627
1972-73 2,499.80 34,215 7.31 589 603
1973-74 2,609.30 36,033 7.24 603 621
1974-75 2,265.70 36,590 6.19 514 617
1975-76 2,679.00 40,274 6.65 597 664
1976-77 2,763.20 40,429 6.83 606 652
1977-78 3,030.90 40,046 7.57 654 695
1978-79 3,142.20 46,546 6.75 669 717
1979-80 3,182.60 44,085 7.22 668 664
1980-81 2,812.00 47,507 5.92 584 700
1981-82 3,291.20 49,631 6.63 674 715
1982-83 3,241.80 50,437 6.43 625 711
Per Capita Income (in Rs.)(in Rs. Crores)
Note: State and national income are at 1960-61 prices for 1960-61 to 1969-70, and at 1970-71 prices for 1970-71 to 1982
83
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Cutler (1983: 271) explains Madras may not take pride of place in the annals of 
Tamil cultural history, nevertheless the politics of Tamil nationalism has made 
a significant impact upon the city: ‘Madras’s cultural identity is complex and 
ambiguous. To describe Madras as a Tamil city would be to overlook its 
cosmopolitan flavour; but to ignore its strong ties with Tamil culture would 
also result in a distorted view of the city’s character’. It was in Madras that all 
Dravidian parties found their footing, developed their ideology and established 
their initial success. And significantly, it was in the 1959 Madras Municipal 
Elections that the DMK tasted its first prominent electoral win.  
 
Nonetheless, for many, Madras as a political headquarters was merely a 
logistical, operational choice, a convenient, administrative centre, with a well-
developed infrastructure system not available in other Tamil cities. To a large 
extent this reflects the behaviour of Indian nationalists towards the Indian 
capital cities, which were seen as products of British colonialism, and hence a 
strong inclination to reject them. But in reality they could not turn their backs 
to these cities. And it was from here that ‘the Nehruvian ambition to modernize 
and develop Indian society was scripted and broadcast, radiating outwards 
across the villages’ (Khilnani 1997: 109). Similarly, for the Dravidian leaders, 
Madras was the unavoidable hub from where they would begin their 
acculturation process, spreading beyond the city to the entire state.  
 
 At the same time, Dravidian leaders were well aware that cities as 
cultural landscapes are both the medium and outcome of power relations (see 
Kong and Law 2002). During the colonial period the British had used the urban 
setting effectively to extol the virtues of imperial image making via prominent 
building projects and the display of symbols of colonial might (Metcalf 1984). 
In the postcolonial era, nationalist leaders understood well its value, with the 
urban landscape offering an opportunity to convey particular historiographies 
(Alley 1997). This involved changing the names of roads and buildings from 
their British references to Indian leaders, and ridding the landscape of colonial 
icons including monuments and statues (Figure 13). Larger colonial structures 
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and buildings however remained, and after a simple corrective exercise of 
renaming, leaders moved into these structures using them as centres of the new 
governments.  
 
Figure 13: RK Laxman, The Times of India on the politics of name change 
Source: Left –  Laxman (2004: 38); Right – Laxman (1990: 128) 
 
Thus, the Fort St. George in Madras, transferred from being the centre of 
British administration of the Madras Presidency to accommodate the legislative 
assembly and secretariat of the new state government. The exercise then moved 
to the next level where the public sphere was repopulated with statues, 
monuments and memorials, all attempting to narrate a particular version of 
history and identity. This technique was prominently employed by the 
Dravidian leaders in fixing a Tamil tag to Madras. When the DMK took control 
in 1967, the power of spatialising history and popular memory was 
implemented at its fullest potential. The landscape of Madras was refitted with 
material structures and icons to communicate a political transformation in 
which the regional self is simultaneously purged of the colonial and national 
other.  
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4.2.2 Identity rhetoric: symbols and ‘sets’ in the city 
The DMK government sought to construct and reify a selective vision of the 
past through a spatio-temporal marking, one that helped to project Tamil 
cultural nationalism into the practices of everyday life.75 Spatially, the grand 
plan was to dot important sites within the entire geography of Tamil Nadu with 
monuments that commemorated the Tamil past (Srivathsan 2006, 2000). In 
Madras, besides renaming the streets and buildings with that of Tamil heroes, 
on the occasion of the 1968 second International Tamil Conference, statues of 
ten writers and scholars who contributed to Tamil language and literature were 
installed on the Marina beachfront (Pandian 2005; Srivathsan 2000). As 
‘geography is not simply the “incidental material backdrop” for memory but 
plays an active role in constructing the meaning of commemoration’ 
(Alderman 2000: 675), the urban landscape became significant for developing 
a socio-political identity associated with the invocation of a Tamil past. But it 
was done in a superficial manner where all civic projects simply involved 
either the raising of statues or building of monuments, not more.76  
 
One prominent civic project was the construction of Valluvar Kottam, 
conceived as a memorial to the Tamil saint Thiruvalluvar, a public hall, and a 
research and learning centre (Srivathsan 2006; Figure 14). Interestingly, the 
site chosen was a seasonal irrigation lake which was drained out for this 
development. The government also decided to relocate a popular private school 
located on the edge of this lake to another site, a dedicated open space/park 
within a prominent public housing development (KK Nagar). Development 
issues like safeguarding open spaces and protecting important water bodies 
                                                 
75 Temporally, the day after Pongal festival in mid-January (a harvest festival with secular 
Tamil connotations) was declared as Thiruvalluvar Day, a state holiday. Similarly, birthdays of 
Dravidian leaders like Periyar are celebrated with much fanfare as key moments in Tamil 
history. 
76 It should be noted that such interventions carry much political currency even today. The 
removal of one of the ten statues, that of Kannagi, a fiery female character from a Tamil epic 
and an epitome of Tamil feminism, by the ADMK government in 2001 caused much 
controversy, and when Karunanidhi and his DMK party came back to power in 2006, his first 
action was to reinstate the statue amidst much fanfare (see Pandian 2005).  
Absent Societies/Chapter 4: Excavating Chennai                            
141 
seemed  trivial when compared to the larger need of establishing a Tamil 
cultural identity. 
 
Figure 14: Valluvar Kottam, Chennai 
Source: © Shiva, retrieved from www.flickr.com on 10 August, 2008. 
 
Dominated by personality-driven leadership, Dravidian politics employed the 
city as a discursive space to literally stage the projection and glorification of 
the leaders and their party ideals. The city was seen as a prop from which large 
cut-outs, hoardings, advertisement boards, banners and flags dominate the 
townscape overwhelming the buildings and permanent structures (Figure 15). It 
is a large performance space to celebrate the cult-like status of the leaders, a 
space for the parties to stage their spectacles. There is an undeniable dimension 
of temporality to the imagination of the city and its spaces: most public spaces 
wallow in neglect for a large part of the year, only to come alive during 
periodic occasions such as birthdays of the party leaders and party 
anniversaries/annual conferences when they become an essential accessory to 
the celebrations. Accordingly, they are cleaned, decorated and prepared for 
enacting the festivities.  
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Figure 15: Reel and real aspects of Dravidian politics  
Source: www.flickr.com, retrieved 10 August, 2008; a billboard celebrating 
Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M Karunanidhi’s golden jubilee in politics hangs 
precariously from a dilapidated building 
 
Rajadurai and Geetha (1996) call this simulative tendency as ‘cinematisation’, 
as the public spaces came to represent cinematic interiors, a kind of a 
proscenium stage for the dissemination of party ideals but not more. This is not 
surprising given the critical role of cinema in Tamil politics, serving as a 
serious vehicle of political mobilisation for the Dravidian parties in the 1950s 
and 1960s and served as an effective propaganda machine. Many of the 
Dravidian party leaders began their careers in films, either as writers or actors. 
The last five chief ministers in the state have had film connections (Hardgrave 
1971; Dickey 1993), and this has probably influenced the way they conceive 
the city as a ‘reel’ rather than ‘real’ space for enactment of their ideologies. 
Thus, enormous expenditures are made by the state government in staging 
temporary events like the International Tamil Conferences when it could be 
‘spent on really constructive projects to better the lives of Tamilnadu’s people’ 
(Cutler 1983: 286-7).  
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4.3 When development took a backseat 
Cutler’s (1983) question on what are the tangible benefits of such events to the 
overall development of the city draws attention to the darker side of 
commemoration practices, where, by making a virtue of its cultural 
nationalism, the Dravidian ideology was rendered dogmatic, one which could 
only be realised via frivolous projects like building of statues and monuments. 
As the Dravidian leaders made flashy and episodic attempts to utilise the city’s 
landscape as a backcloth from which the much hailed Tamil identity could be 
tailored, there was no space/time for no-nonsense development projects to 
address fundamental infrastructure issues and the physical well-being of the 
city.  
 
 This stubborn reliance on rhetoric rather than reality soon began to take 
a physical toll on the city. When the DMK won its first victory in the Madras 
Corporation elections of 1959, it claimed that its new administration brought 
about desirable changes in the provision of drinking water, in education, health, 
road maintenance, and a crackdown on tax evaders (Barnett 1976). But in the 
ongoing tussle between rhetoric and reality, the DMK could eventually only 
pay lip-service to its promise of addressing ‘real’ issues. In the 1968 Municipal 
elections, when the DMK failed to obtain an absolute majority, there was 
widespread criticism of corruption in the city administration and a general 
deterioration of the city (ibid.). During the 1961-71 decade, while the city 
showed the highest annual population growth of around 5 percent amongst the 
metropolitan centres in the country, it had advanced little in terms of improving 
the conditions of housing, water supply, and household income (Box 1). The 
situation was similar in the following decade. Sivaramakrishnan and Green 
(1986) find that at the end of the 1970s half of the city households earned a 
third of the metropolitan average, were not connected to the water supply 
system and lived in substandard housing, while a quarter were not connected to 
the sewerage system.  
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Box 1: Chennai in the 1960s – some grim statistics 
Source: Madras metropolitan plan, 1971-1991. (1971). Madras: Rural 
Development and Local Administration Department. 
 
4.3.1 Decadent seventies and malignant cities 
One could argue that such statistics signify a general state of blight that had 
come to typify the Indian cities in the 1970s. Writing about Bombay, 
Appadurai (2000b: 628-9) commented that: 
 …until the 1950s, it retained the ethos of a well-managed, Fordist city, 
dominated by commerce, trade, and manufacture….Well into the 1970s, 
in spite of phenomenal growth in its population and increasing strain on 
its infrastructure, Bombay remained a civic model for India. Most people 
with jobs had housing; most basic services (such as gas, electricity, water, 
and milk) reliably reached the salaried middle classes. The labouring 
classes had reasonably secure occupational niches….Until about 1960, 
the trains…seemed to be able to move people around with some dignity 
and reliability and at relatively low cost.….Sometime in the 1970s all this 
began to change and a malignant city began to emerge from beneath the 
surface of the cosmopolitan ethos of the prior period….Jobs became 
harder to get. More rural arrivals in the city found themselves economic 
refugees. Slums and shacks began to proliferate. The wealthy began to 
get nervous. The middle classes had to wrestle with overcrowded streets 
and buses, skyrocketing prices, and maddening traffic. The places of 
leisure and pleasure….began to show the wear and tear of 
hypermodernization. 
The National Sample Survey data for 1968-69 found that 38.5 percent of the 
households in the city of Madras had an income of less than Rs. 200 per month, 
less than a third in comparison to the Rs. 623 average for Madras Metropolitan 
Area, and well below the Rs. 372 average for Tamil Nadu.  
 
Only 50 percent of the housing could be classified as pucca structures (built 
with permanent building materials) and nearly 30 percent lived in kutcha 
structures (temporary and dilapidated). While nearly 200,000 families had been 
added within the Madras Metropolitan Area since the 1961 census, only 31,000 
households (i.e. 15 percent) have been added. The deficit of 170,000 houses 
was estimated to double to 380,000 units within a couple of years.  
 
Between 1954 and 1970, the slum population in the city had nearly doubled 
from 265,000 to 500,000, and the actual number of slums more than doubled 
from 300 to 650.   
 
Although the water supply to the city doubled between 1950-51 and 1968-69 
from 75 million litres per day to 140 million litres per day, its per capita daily 
supply only slightly increased from 53 litres per day to 64 litres per day. This 
was much less than the average in 1931-32 of 110 litres per day. 40 percent of 
the city was still unsewered.  
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Kaviraj (1997: 106) talks about a similar urban deterioration in Calcutta, noting 
that until the 1960s the municipality was able to maintain the public spaces in 
the city in exemplary cleanliness. But it slipped out of control with refugees 
and migrants pouring into the city, spilling out of the already overflowing 
slums into whatever spaces could be found, signalling ‘the start of a process of 
irreversible plebianisation’. This is described by Chatterjee (2004) as the 
moment when Indian cities failed to make the transition to proper urban 
modernity. Chandoke (1991) in discussing the “urban explosion” in the 
postcolonial world argues that the postcolonial city instead of becoming an 
indicator of development and a place of diffusion of modernist values 
symbolises more the spread of absolute deprivation in the haphazard or the 
unintended city. Rebuking the postcolonial city as a monstrosity, she describes 
postcolonial urbanisation as “pseudo-urbanisation” or “hyper urbanisation” 
whose immediate repercussion has been the collapse of the administrative 
mechanism failing to cope with the pressures of development (Figure 16).  
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Figure 16: RK Laxman, The Times of India – ‘The haphazard city’ 
Source: Left – Laxman (2004: 3); Right – Laxman (2004: 12) 
 
4.3.2 Urban and ungoverned 
Even though the DMK had managed to scrape through the Corporation 
elections of 1968, it continued to be rocked by accusations of corruption and 
inefficient administration. Finally in 1973, following a major financial scandal, 
the Corporation was superseded, bureaucratised in administration and placed 
under the control of a Commissioner appointed directly by the state 
government (Pinto 2000). The latter established in 1973 the Madras 
Metropolitan Development Authority (MMDA), a para-statal organisation with 
a statutory footing. It was initially given the responsibility of interpreting and 
implementing the Madras Metropolitan Plan for 1971-1991 prepared by the 
state government. Eventually many of the responsibilities for the provision of 
services in the city were shifted to other agencies, whereby the ‘responsibility 
for the execution of development projects and operation of urban services rests 
with more than fifty governmental, parastatal, and municipal organizations’ 
(Sivaramakrishnan and Green 1986: 235). In 1978 responsibility for water 
supply and sewerage was transferred to the Madras Metropolitan Water Supply 
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and Sewerage Board (popularly known as Metrowater). The departments of 
Public Works, Highways and Rural Works, Education and Health, and Social 
Welfare remain the principal state agencies responsible for the administration 
of the main urban services, while all new investment is undertaken by state 
departments and enterprises.  
 
Sivaramakrishnan and Green (1986) have assessed well the limitations 
of the MMDA within the context of urban governance in Madras. They clarify 
that the MMDA’s principal function was initially to oversee land and urban 
development planning via the preparation of master plans and development 
plans, with some executive responsibilities such as the urban development 
projects sponsored by the World Bank. The MMDA also supervises the 
execution of multi-sectoral programmes but without any financial or 
administrative control. The MMDA itself lacks a significant source of revenue 
except for a small development cess (a surcharge on municipal taxes) and 
contributions by local authorities. Though there were expectations that it would 
reform local government finances and prepare a capital budget for the 
Metropolitan Area, it only undertakes non-statutory capital budgeting and 
monitoring tasks on behalf of the state Finance Department. In effect, the role 
of local government institutions in metropolitan management has since then 
become marginal as metropolitan priorities are set by the Tamil Nadu 
government on the advice of a techno-administrative institution (the MMDA) 
and in consultation with either its own ministries or with other techno-
administrative institutions, all appointed by itself. The master plans of MMDA 
are subject to approval from a multiplicity of other organisations who exercise 
control over the development thus causing delay and increasing costs.77 More 
worryingly, with the suspension of the Corporation as an elected body, urban 
management in Madras failed to resolve the fundamental issue of 
                                                 
77 Even as the first master plan for the period 1971-1991 hardly made much headway, a second 
master plan was prepared for 1991-2011. Issued as a draft in 1995, the government failed to 
adopt it, thereby stalling the implementation of several schemes. In 2006, the DMK 
government scrapped this plan and asked for a new draft to be prepared. Released for 
consultation in 2007, this revised second master plan is currently awaiting approval from the 
state.  
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representative government.  
 
Thus the city’s physical and social infrastructure continued to stagnate 
or deteriorate in the absence of a proactive local government. While the 
discredited Madras Corporation still retained some primary functions such as 
the development and maintenance of roads, drainage, street lighting, and solid 
waste disposal, its budget hardly allowed for its efficient functioning. Until 
1976-77, the Corporation consistently incurred annual deficits on its current 
account. The state exercises substantial control over the budget of the 
Corporation, including fares and borrowings. The Corporation exerts a very 
limited influence, with its own tax sources contributing only 38 percent of its 
revenue in 1995-96, compared to Bombay which raised 83 percent of its 
revenue on its own (Table 4). From 1977-78 to 1981-82, the infrastructure 
investment in the Metropolitan Area accounted for about 13 percent of the total 
infrastructure investment in the state during the five-year period. That the 
Madras Corporation accounted for only 9.5 percent of the investment while 
close to 40 percent of the investment was incurred by the state government tells 
a lot about the financial capability of this body (MMDA 1995). This status quo 
however changed in the 1990s following the decision of the Central 
Government in 1991 to implement economic reforms. This official initiation of 
neoliberalisation in addition to other structural political changes have had 
major ramifications for the way the Dravidian governments in Tamil Nadu 
approached the development of the state and the role of Madras as a capital city 
in the process.  
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Table 4: Comparison of municipal budgets (1992-93) 
  Ahmedabad Bangalore Chennai Mumbai Pune
Actual revenue 
income  
(in Rs. crores) 
198.9 144.3 133.3 911.3 107.8
Actual revenue 
expenditure  
(in Rs. crores) 
199.8 120.5 107.7 1005.6 110.3
Per capita revenue 
expenditure  
(Real in Rs.) 
288.9 138.9 108.7 351.8 266.8
Revenue from own 
sources, 1995-96  
(in %) 
80 61 38 83 74
City revenue as a 
share of state 
revenue (in %) 
3.4 2.7 1.9 8.4 1.0
Source: Sekhar and Bidarkar (1999) 
 
4.4 Neoliberalisation and changing tides 
As mentioned earlier, in 1991, the Congress-led minority government at the 
Centre launched a radical New Economic Policy (NEP) grounded in a reform 
trinity popularly known as liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation. The 
Indian Planning Commission and its Five Year Plans launched in 1950 had 
traditionally been geared towards the ideal of import-substitution 
industrialisation based on public investments in long-term capital-intensive 
projects. But the unchanging slow aggregate growth rate of the Indian economy 
at 3.5 percent from 1960 to 1985 (the Hindu rate of growth), and the failure of 
this economic policy in terms of stemming regional growth disparities and 
achieving distributive justice, called for a reconsideration of this policy in the 
1980s. After the balance of payments crisis in 1990-91, the government 
implemented the economic reforms in earnest. These included the dismantling 
of the industrial licensing regime, opening up public sector industries to private 
participation and foreign direct investment (FDI), and removal of inhibitive 
trade policies, creating an environment of liberalised trade (including removal 
of restrictions on import, customs tariff, deregulation of interest and exchange 
rates, and restructuring of the capital account).  
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An interesting aspect of the 1991 economic reform process is that it did 
not come through Parliamentary approval, and neither did it consult the states 
in its implementation (Naganathan 2002). Rather, the onus of implementing the 
reforms was on the regional governments. This was not due to any punctilious 
commitment to the principle of decentralisation, but an uncanny political 
realisation that it was wiser to let regional politicians appear responsible for 
implementing unpopular economic measures linked with liberalisation 
(Khilnani 1997). An unexpected outcome was the strengthening of political 
subnationalism through economic globalisation (Chakravorty 2000). In this 
process, regional states have emerged as important actors mediating the 
process of adjustment and institutional changes with their role in attracting 
foreign capital acquiring independent value (Sinha 2005). The chief ministers 
of all major Indian states, in this context, have been actively involved in 
seeking investments, and almost all have led delegations overseas to advertise 
the investment merits of their respective states.  
 
Sinha (2005) explains that liberalisation enhanced the role of regional 
governments in three distinct ways.78 Firstly, the covert role played by the state 
became more visible to investors, policy makers and scholars. Secondly, the 
state institutions tried to adapt the new economic policy to suit their specific 
regional conditions, relevant to their provincial realities. And thirdly, regional 
states found themselves engaging in administrative reform, initiating new rules 
and policies in the midst of a regulation vacuum created by the withdrawal of 
the central state. She highlights the fact that while globalisation and 
liberalisation have offered the leaders of the regional states opportunities to re-
emphasise their provincial interests, there is another important reason for the 
emergence of regional rulers as economic power-seekers in the neoliberal era: 
the changing profile of the central government, where the formation of regional 
coalition governments at the centre have led to the incorporation of strong 
                                                 
78 At the same time, she clarifies that it is historically inaccurate to characterise this renaissance 
of the regional states as a product of the 1991 policy changes. According to her, such actions 
have deeper historical roots, and she cautions against viewing 1991 as a radical moment as 
many believe it to be (see Rodrik and Subramanian 2004; Nayar 2006; Nayyar 2006). 
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regional elements in the government itself since the 1990s. This has already 
been noted in Chapter One.  
 
4.4.1 Tamil Nadu’s economic renaissance 
The trend of regionalised coalition governments at the centre implies that many 
of the central ministry portfolios are held by representatives of regional or state 
parties who pursue the developmental interests of their regional states 
aggressively. Sinha (2005) cites Tamil Nadu as an example, where the regional 
Dravidian government used its national presence in the coalition government to 
harness the opportunities of liberalisation for the benefit of the state, and thus 
bringing a turnaround in the state’s economic fortunes. In 1991 when the 
reforms were first launched, the ADMK government was in alliance with the 
central Congress ministry and exploited the linkage to launch a regional 
strategy of liberalisation. In 1996 when the DMK government came to power, 
there was again a coalitional arrangement with the new central government 
with influential portfolios, like industry and commerce, given to DMK MPs 
who played a crucial role in directing investment toward Tamil Nadu.  
 
In 2001, when the ADMK government returned to power, Tamil Nadu 
was emerging as one of the prime destinations for foreign investment among 
Indian states (third largest in India according to Tewari 2000; also see 
Ramachandran and Goebel 2002; Sachs et al. 2002). Unlike the dismal 
economic performance of the 1967-1991 Dravidian regime, there was a radical 
shift in the post-liberalisation Dravidian politics and its economic mission. By 
1998, the share of the state in the country’s total investment stood at 10 
percent, as against 4.8 percent in 1991 (Sinha 2005). More recently, the Tamil 
Nadu government website estimates that this share is now between 11 and 12 
percent, the highest share recorded by the state since 1970.79 Tamil Nadu at the 
turn of the millennium represented about 11 percent of India’s GDP and 15 
percent of its exports (Maclay 2000). Institutional reform, aggressive 
                                                 
79 See http://www.tn.gov.in. Retrieved 28 May, 2007. 
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promotion of the state to the media and to private investors, and the use of 
influence at the Centre to attract foreign and domestic investment have played 
a significant role in the transformation of Tamil Nadu from a middle-range 
state during the pre-liberalisation period to a state having one of the highest 
shares of investment flows after 1993.80 Tamil Nadu, in fact, has completely 
revamped its image from that of a corrupt and entrepreneurially inward state to 
an enterprising one that is oriented towards the free market in a competitive 
and globalised environment (Sinha 2005).  
 
In this aspect, liberalisation has in a counterintuitive manner made the 
regional states even more sensitive to their provincial boundaries. In a quirky 
way, the neoliberal agenda has come to suit the taste of Dravidian leaders who 
have taken to this exercise with much relish. One possible explanation is that 
global pursuits are compatible with the personality cult status of the regional 
leaders in states like Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. Neoliberal economic 
activities satiate the ego of regional politicians who wish to display the recent 
economic success as an extended benefit of their patronage politics.  
 
Lobbying the investors on behalf of the state, politicians like 
Karunanidhi or Jayalalithaa in Tamil Nadu and Chandrababu Naidu in Andhra 
Pradesh seem to imply that it is due to their charismatic personality that they 
are able to woo investors to the state. On 21 February 2004, a bold two-page 
spread advertisement appeared in The Economist under the title ‘Tamil Nadu – 
Your reasons to invest in India’ (Figure 17). Carrying a picture of the Chief 
Minister Jayalalithaa and underlining her vision of making Tamil Nadu ‘the 
Numero-Uno state in the country in all spheres’, the advertisement sought to 
emphasise several things. It clearly indicated that Tamil Nadu was seeking its 
economic prosperity on its own terms, and secondly it linked it to the 
successful entrepreneurial skills of an enterprising Chief Minister who was 
                                                 
80 Based on reports published on Tamil Nadu’s economic performance by the Centre for 
International Development, Harvard University. http://www.cid.harvard.edu/india/papers.htm. 
Retrieved 28 May, 2007. 
 
Absent Societies/Chapter 4: Excavating Chennai                            
153 
luring potential foreign investors. The upbeat manner of this advertisement is 
reminiscent of the ‘cut-outs and hoardings’ culture of the state politics where 
banners are employed to announce unsubtly the significant achievements of the 
leaders.  
 
Figure 17: Tamil Nadu – The state of today’s India, 
The Economist, 21 February, 2004 
 
Tamil Nadu’s efforts in this respect are not unique but in compliance with a 
universal shift in both advanced and developing capitalist societies where after 
decades of growing fiscal distress (a condition made worse by depleting federal 
funds), regional and local governments have had to reorient themselves, away 
from the “managerial” welfare-oriented approach typical of the 1960s, giving 
way instead to “entrepreneurial” forms of action in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Harvey 1989). Sub-national governments have had to adopt a range of 
activities that are speculative in nature and assume more risk, focussing on the 
political economy of place rather than territory. For regional states like Tamil 
Nadu, as they get embedded in a zero-sum, inter-state competition for 
resources, jobs and capital, this means that they have to reassess and revise the 
rather tangential relationship they had developed with their capital cities. 
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As noted earlier, the nature of cultural nationalism practiced by the 
Dravidian parties allowed them to view the city’s spaces only from a cosmetic 
perspective of ‘show and display’ rather than address the pressing development 
imperatives. But since the 1991 economic reforms, capital cities particularly 
those of a metropolitan nature have come to play a crucial role in promoting 
the state to investors, and no longer can the Dravidian politicians afford to 
harbour an indifferent and superficial stance towards the city.81  
 
Select metropolitan regions are being promoted by the regional states 
for receiving investment, especially FDIs, resulting in an altered geography of 
investment opportunities. Chakravorty (2000) observes that the most important 
structural factor is the availability of infrastructure with metropolitan regions 
having by far the highest standards of physical infrastructure—power, roads, 
housing, telecommunications—and social infrastructure, such as health and 
education. Thus, regional governments tend to emphasise the development 
virtues of their largest cities. Tamil Nadu state realised the significance of its 
capital city Madras to its entrepreneurial efforts when in one of the first major 
foreign investments in the city, the Korean car manufacturer, Hyundai, was 
offered a choice of sites: Sriperambudur (located on the metropolitan fringe of 
Madras) or a more inland Arakkonam (which ironically was one of the 
industrial factory towns developed during the quintessential state-development 
era of locating industrial developments in marginalised districts). Needless to 
                                                 
81 The growing role of cities (mostly the metropolitan megacities) in helping developing 
countries plug into the global economy has been noted by the Asian Development Bank’s 
report on Asia’s Megacities (Clark and Stubbs 1996). This has also been acknowledged by the 
World Bank (Pugh 1995), and in the Indian context by several scholars, starting as early as 
Turner (1961) and extending more recently to Mohan and Dasgupta (2006). With 60 percent 
contribution to India’s GDP as against an urban population of 27.8 percent in 2001, the role of 
Indian cities in India’s economy cannot be ignored. Also to bear in mind is the disproportionate 
nature of this contribution considering that the national Indian budget sets aside only about 2.5 
percent for urban development projects, while nearly 30 percent is earmarked for rural 
schemes. See http://www.indiatogether.org/2005/mar/opi-budget05.htm. Retrieved 10 August, 
2008. 
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say the investor chose the former with its traditional locational advantages of 
being close to a metropolitan port city.82 
 
4.5 Rewriting the tenets of urban development 
In general, most metropolitan cities in India provide to a select few some of the 
best opportunities for leading full and satisfying lives, while simultaneously 
offer to the majority appalling living conditions defined by proliferation of 
slums, perennial shortage of basic amenities, environmental pollution, traffic 
congestion, crime and social alienation. Throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 
1980s, major Indian cities tried various city planning strategies such as 
preparation of long-term master plans and structure plans to address these 
shortcomings (Lea and Courtney 1985; Richardson 1993; Angotti 1993; Pugh 
1995; Sivaramakrishnan and Green 1986; Gnaneshwar 1995). Most of these 
attempts fell way short of expectations both in terms of the growing demand in 
quantity and quality of the product (McGill 1998). By the 1990s, the nature of 
the master plans shifted as they became important documents doubling as city 
marketing strategies (Baviskar 2003). This new phase of urban development is 
an offspring of the new economic policy translating spatially the principles of 
deregulation, privatisation, flexibility of labour markets to benefit private 
capital. Civic boosterism is a prerogative as socially redistributive projects like 
housing and education are replaced by business parks, shopping malls, civic 
and conference centres (Harvey 1989). This is clearly evident in the 
development plans for Madras that have been outlined since the 1990s. 
Specifically, the 1995 draft Master Plan for the Madras Metropolitan Area 
1991-2011 acknowledged the economic changes and identified ‘master’ 
strategies such as the creation of Madras Export Processing Zone, the ‘Indo-
                                                 
82 Jagannathan, V. (1996, 16-31 July). C.M. favours power, port, road plans. Madras Musings, 
pp. 4-5. 
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Singapore Corridor’ and the planning for development of World Trade Centre 
and National Convention Centre.83  
 
4.5.1 Flagship projects and investment ‘baits’ 
As a part of a ‘civic boosterism’ strategy, the state undertook several 
‘spectacular’ projects such as its successful bid to host the 1995 South Asian 
Federation Games (SAF Games) in Madras. The synergies between sport and 
urban development first became apparent to Indian cities when New Delhi 
hosted the 1982 Asian Games. This provided the city with an opportunity to 
display its ability in successfully organising such an event requiring a complex 
range of infrastructure. It also gave the city a longer lasting physical facelift 
setting the ensuing tone of development (Baviskar 2003; Uppal and Ghosh 
2006). The glamour of the projects involved caught the fancy of the 
development planners. Delhi was dotted with flyovers, state-of-the-art sports 
facilities and luxury apartments (doubling up as sports villages), all designed 
by the best architects in the country, a model worthy of emulation. While in the 
1980s, only Delhi as the national capital seemed to have the capacity and 
ability to organise such events, by the 1990s, regional cities tried to prove their 
mettle by organising similar events.  
 
Thus, Madras hosted the SAF Games in 1995, Bangalore was the venue 
for the National Games in 1997, and Hyderabad ambitiously organised the 
Afro-Asian Games in 2004. Heitzman (1999) picks on Harvey’s emphasis on 
the recent fad for such “consumption artefacts” to explain the stadium 
syndrome that afflicted the regional Indian cities. While on the one hand they 
wished to challenge Delhi as the sports capital of the nation, on the other, they 
pursued this strategy within a plan to attract pieces of global or national capital. 
In Madras, in preparation for this event, centres for sporting excellence were 
constructed in various parts of the city. The city was cleaned, pruned and 
                                                 
83 As stated earlier, this draft was scrapped in 2006 and a fresh one was prepared in 2007. It 
would not be an understatement to say that neoliberal aspirations find an enhanced expression 
in the latest version. 
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decked up for the occasion, with banners everywhere. The state was keen to 
prove the city’s ability to provide world class sports facilities. In 1996, the 
International Hockey Federation’s Champions Trophy which featured the top 
six nations was held in one of the newly revamped stadium. Since 1997, an 
ATP tournament is being held in the city, only one of its kind in India, in 
another stadium which was also built for the SAF Games.  
 
Regional governments believe (or are led to believe) that engaging in 
high-end spectacles such as sports events proves their competitive mentality, 
and can advance them in the global race for supremacy. Moreover, such events 
offer cities an opportunity to showcase its wares to international visitors and 
investors. Little attention is given to the fact that these are ephemeral, high-risk 
projects that can very easily fall on hard times, and prove a financial disaster 
(Harvey 1989). But true to the Dravidian nature, flashy set-piece projects 
appeal to their taste, and they have continued with this approach.  
 
Such projects aside, in another pre-emptive move, in 1996, the DMK, 
after coming to power, saw in the ongoing climate of neoliberalisation an 
opportunity to link newer city development initiatives with its own project of 
Tamil revivalism.84 Understanding well the significant role of Madras in the 
new context, the DMK sought to inscribe a renewed Tamil identity to the city, 
one which would successfully harness the opportunities of globalisation and 
neoliberalisation. It achieved the same through a couple of master strokes. First 
was to rename the city as Chennai. Secondly, by implementing the 73rd and 
74th Constitutional Amendments, the DMK government decided to restore all 
local bodies as elected organisations, thereby returning to the capital city a 
democratically elected municipal government and a symbolic head in the form 
of a mayor. The importance of a visible local political identity to economically 
competitive cities like Madras could hardly be missed.  
                                                 
84 Neoliberalisation started in earnest in Tamil Nadu from 1991 onwards under the regime of 
the ADMK leader Jayalalithaa. Karunanidhi continued its implementation when he returned to 
power in 1996, albeit in his own signature style of combining it with Tamil nationalism. 
Neither Jayalalithaa’s subsequent return in 2001 nor Karunanidhi’s present reign since 2006 
seem to affect neoliberalisation’s pace, which has established a momentum of its own.   
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4.5.2 Chennai, not Madras: original and new85 
As already stated in the introduction to this chapter, the DMK government’s 
decision to rename Madras as Chennai is set in the context of a trend in India 
since the 1990s when many regional governments changed the names of their 
prominent cities from their colonial ‘corruption’ to the vernacular ‘original’.86 
Initially, the regional nature of the state governments made many wonder if it 
was simply a weak display of parochialism and narrow-mindedness. The 
decision to rename the city met resistance from the Madras loyalists who 
argued, on the basis of everything from historic inaccuracy to a narrow-minded 
nativist agenda, that this would only adversely affect the economic fortunes of 
the city, particularly at a moment when it was at the threshold of globalisation. 
For those who remained indifferent, the uppermost question was whether the 
change was going to address the developmental challenges that the city was 
facing.87 What these groups failed to see is that language can be a geopolitical 
tool that can carve a new spatio-temporal order for the city, and that the name 
change was significantly intended to coincide precisely with the moment when 
the city was globalising. The renaming exercise attempted to associate the city 
with a globalising present, shorn of a colonial past and equipped with a 
postcolonial postmodernity that allows the vernacular and the global to cohabit 
within the same space.  
 
 In the case of Bombay, postmodern globalisation is not the only aspect 
of name change. The transition from Bombay to Mumbai has also been linked 
to the rise of a violent and inflammatory form of parochialism associated 
                                                 
85 Chennai, not Madras: perspectives on the city is the title of a volume edited by AR 
Venkatachalapathy. The chapter contribution in this book by the researcher is based on 
arguments discussed in this section.  
86 This indigenising toponymic strategy is worldwide involving cities and countries. Formosa is 
now Taiwan, Ceylon is Sri Lanka, Peking is Beijing, and Leopoldville is today Kinshasa in 
Congo.  
87 Muthiah, S. (1996, 1-15 August). A letter to the C.M. Madras Musings, p. 1; Editor, The. 
(1996, 16-30 September). But we're also disappointed, Sir. Madras Musings, p. 1; Chennai 
versus Madras. (1996, 29 July). The Hindu, p. Metro 1; Sambandam, V. S. (1996, 29 July). 
Why 'Chennai'? The Hindu, p. Metro 3. 
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mostly with the nativist politics of Shiv Sena, a pro-Marathi, Hindu right-wing 
party. While a similar expression of violence may have been anticipated with 
the name change of Madras to Chennai, given the agitational history of the 
Dravidian ideology, it was not the case. Rather, this political manoeuvre 
ensured that the moment of provincialisation benignly coincided with and 
became essential to the moment of globalisation. Whether it is the case of 
Bombay, Calcutta or Madras, the name change was central to and integrally 
articulated with the material transformations engendered by global capitalism 
(Varma 2004).  
 
 If Madras, unable to reconcile the differences between the priorities of 
the national and the regional, tried hard to make the most out of the state-led 
industrialisation opportunities but never quite managed to achieve the desired 
results, today Chennai presents a completely different scenario. For instance, in 
the 1970s and the 1980s, industrialists in the automobile-manufacturing sector 
(and the ancillary industries) in Tamil Nadu were considerably frustrated, as 
they felt that Madras had allowed the regional balance in automobile industry 
to shift to north India (Sinha 2005). By the end of the 1990s, the trend had 
reversed. But this time it was Chennai, not Madras, that emerged as a favourite 
destination of foreign investors in automobile and its ancillary industries, 
carrying proudly the title ‘Detroit of India’. This symbolised an economic 
success that was never experienced during the time the city was known as 
Madras (Figure 18). In a rather prescient manner, a 1996 editorial in The Hindu 
writing in response to the concerns of Madras being edged out of the Indian 
Map by the name change wrote that ‘[t]he changing face of the city may spawn 
a new breed of Chennaites altogether altering the image of the Madrasi’.88 
  
Since 1996, Chennai is a choice location for several car manufacturers 
including Hyundai, Mitsubishi, Renault, BMW, Nissan and Ford, the 
                                                 
88 Chennai and the Madrasi. (1996, 04 November). The Hindu, p. 12. 
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manufacturing plants of several foreign companies including the glass 
manufacturing companies Pilkington and Saint Gobain, not to mention the 
back-office operations of several international organisations such as the World 
Bank, Citibank, ABN Amro and Stanchart.89 In The Economist advertisement 
published on 21 February 2004, there are proud and repeated references to the 
advantages of Chennai — its human capital (a skilled labour force), excellent 
transport facilities (including its port and airport), and industrial parks with 
‘world-class facilities’ and ‘state of the art infrastructure’. Madras hardly 
carried such distinctions. In contrast to the languishing Madras Port of the 
1960s, the rechristened Chennai Port is considered to be one of the most 
modern ports in India with efficient container facilities, projected as a gateway 
for automobile exports, and the amount of cargo handled (import and export 
only) that is second highest in the country ahead of Mumbai (Table 5).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
89 KPMG (2005). Indian states: Economy and business - Tamil Nadu. Gurgaon, India Brand 
Equity Foundation. See also Tewari (2000, 2001). 
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Figure 18: From Madras to Chennai: An image makeover 
Source: Retrieved from www.flickr.com on 10 August, 2008. 
Madras was defined quintessentially by its colonial remains (such as the 
Central Railway Station and Rippon Building, the Corporation headquarters) 
On the other hand, Chennai’s stakes ‘have gone global’. A banner outside the 
airport welcomes you to the ‘Hometown of Hyundai’, and billboards across the 
cityscape display ongoing investment projects with a global architecture 
indicating that it is not somewhere in Europe, but ‘right in Chennai’. 
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Table 5: Cargo traffic at major Indian ports April 2006 – March 2007 
Port   In 000's Tonnes 
      
Visakhapatnam   56,385 
Kolkata    55,050 
Chennai   53,414 
Mumbai   52,364 
Paradip   38,517 
Mormugao   34,241 
New Mangalore   32,042 
Tuticorin   18,001 
Cochin   15,257 
Ennore   10,714 
Source: Indian Ports Association; Note: While Chennai is ranked third in this 
list (above Mumbai but below Kolkata), Kolkata’s traffic is handled by a 
combination of two ports – Haldia (42,454 tonnes) and Kolkata (12,596 
tonnes).  
 
Chennai has also emerged as a major hub of software development in the 
country and its potential to become an IT corridor to South East Asia was 
recently identified (Bajpai and Dokeniya 1999). Tamil Nadu is the second 
largest software exporter in India and Chennai’s role in abetting and enhancing 
this performance is critical, ranking first among Indian cities in terms of 
technology exposure and responsiveness in a 1999 survey by Business World. 
NASSCOM (National Association of Software and Service Companies) rates 
Chennai as the ideal location for software projects in India, given the fact that 
Chennai is a major producer of software professionals in India and has the 
largest mainframe capacity in Asia. Companies such as Alcatel, TCS, Ramco, 
Pentafour, Cognizant, Singapore Airlines, EDS, Infosys, and MNCs like 
Matsushita have set up their base in Chennai. More than 769 companies are 
operational with over 35,000 professionals employed in over 1.6 million square 
feet of built-up office space. If Tamil Nadu registered the fastest and highest 
growth rate in software exports from 1998-2001 (an 800 percent increase from 
Rs 4 billion to Rs. 31.2 billion), it is largely due to Chennai which has India’s 
largest and most modern IT Park (TIDEL Park, a 1.3 million square feet plug 
and play development employing 12,000 software professionals and playing 
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host to the who’s who of the world’s IT companies including Verizon, 
Sutherland Technologies, Ford Business Solutions, EDS, etc.) (Ramachandran 
and Goebel 2002; Figure 19). 
 
Figure 19: Tidel Park, Chennai 
 
While the above information substantiate that the improved economic turn that 
Chennai is currently experiencing, a more comprehensive assessment of this 
‘urban turn’ needs to be made. Foremost is the issue of whether neoliberal 
economic policies resulting in the above investments have also resulted in 
equitable growth and development. While this question remains unresolved at 
the national level (Datt and Ravillon 2002; Dreze and Sen 1995; Figure 20), 
institutional studies on Tamil Nadu tend to focus on the merits of economic 
reform.90  
 
                                                 
90 See for instance the reports produced by Harvard University’s Research and Advisory 
Project for the Tamil Nadu Government. http://www.cid.harvard.edu/india/papers.htm 
Retrieved 28 May, 2007. 
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Figure 20: RK Laxman, The Times of India, on India’s NEP, increasing 
GDP and persistent poverty 
Source: Laxman (2005: 186) 
 
Thus, a report by the World Bank (2005) associates Tamil Nadu’s improved 
Human Development Index (HDI) to its economic policy, insisting that the 
state is on track to meet most of the Millennium Development Goals, with a 
strong performance trend in sectors like poverty reduction, child malnutrition, 
school enrolment, and infant mortality. Going by this measure, Chennai reveals 
some cheerful statistics. While the fact that Chennai and its surrounding district 
has the highest per capita income in the state doesn’t come as a surprise, it also 
shows some impressive HDI figures. Its HDI is 0.757, much higher than the 
state and all-India average. It also fares best in the GDI (Gender Development 
Index).  
 
But there are aspects where Chennai fares poorly, factors which are 
more obviously related to liberalisation. For instance, Chennai’s employment 
increase has mostly been generated amongst the marginal workers as opposed 
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to main workers, reflecting the increasing informalisation of labour with the 
rising influence of a neoliberal economy. It has the highest Gini Index in the 
state (33.3 as against the state average of 28.32). But measuring economic 
success in terms of poverty reduction is arduous given the difficulty in making 
accurate measurements (Datt and Ravillon 2002), with different studies 
yielding distinct figures. Against the Planning Commission’s use of the 
unadjusted numbers where poverty in Tamil Nadu has decreased from 35.4 to 
21.1 (with urban poverty reducing from 39.9 to 22.1) between 1993-94 and 
1999-2000, Deaton and Dreze’s (2002) adjust the NSSO 1999-2000 data to 
identity a drop from 30.3 to 20.0 at the state level and 20.8 to 11.3 for the 
urban areas, i.e. it has halved. On the other hand, Kijima and Lanjouw (2003) 
use a different set of adjustments to paint a bleaker picture: poverty has only 
slightly dropped from 30.3 to 28.9 and in the urban areas it has increased from 
20.9 to 22.0.91 More worryingly, disaggregation of these figures reveals that 
urban poverty has increased from 20.9 to 29.0 in the coastal north, the area 
(including Chennai) most closely associated with liberalisation (Table 6). But 
since there is no consensus on these estimates, poverty evaluations have 
remained only tentative.  
 
Table 6: Estimates of poverty incidence in Tamil Nadu  
Source: World Bank (2004a) 
                                                 
91 The comparison with urban areas is important here as it is mostly the urban areas that have 
benefited from and served most the interests of neoliberal economic strategies.  
Urban Rural Overall Urban Rural Overall
Planning Commission - Tamil Nadu 39.9 32.9 35.4 22.1 20.6 21.1
Planning Commission India 33.2 37.1 36.1 23.6 27.1 26.1
Deaton and Dreze (2002) - Tamil Nadu 20.8 38.5 30.3 11.3 24.3 20.0
Deaton and Dreze (2002) - India 17.8 33.0 29.1 12.0 26.3 22.2
Kijima and Lanjouw (2003) - Tamil Nadu 20.9 38.5 30.3 22.0 31.8 28.9
Kijima and Lanjouw (2003) - Tamil Nadu 
Coastal North 20.9 49.5 N/A 29.0 37.3 N/A
1993-94 (50th Round) 1999-2000 (55th Round)
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4.6 Some spatial implications: a ‘tale of two cities’ 
While there is ambiguity in these socio-economic fact files, more obvious is 
the clarity in the physical nature of the ‘urban turn’ instigated by 
neoliberalisation. A polarised geography of the city clearly emerges between 
areas that have benefited from neoliberal reforms and those that have been left 
behind, resulting in a sorry ‘tale of two cities’. Giving an example of this effect 
in Delhi, Baviskar (2004) recounts the manner in which the city is splitting into 
two: ‘One half is a Singapore-clone, sanitised and policed, where the affluent 
can entertain themselves with round-the-clock eating and shopping. And curled 
around it is its ugly twin: the invisible yet sprawling mega-slum that circles the 
enclaves of the rich and powerful, providing them with goods and services’.92 
Such a manifestation is visible in Chennai as well, one that takes added 
significance when weighed against its recent name change. For, Madras 
becoming Chennai signifies more clearly the city’s polarisation at a socio-
spatial level where both the proper names now co-exist symbolising two parts 
of a city split by contrasting physical features.  
 
With a socio-economic fault line emerging between the northern and 
southern parts of the city (roughly along the Cooum River), the two names 
represent two distinct realities: North Madras embodies the values of the 
colonial history that produced it but woefully outdated, while South Chennai 
carries with it all the attributes of a globalising city. This spatial coexistence of 
Madras and Chennai is not a recent phenomenon, as it dates back to the 
colonial period when the former referred to the White Town and the latter the 
Black Town. What is notable is the quirky twist of fate: Madras once connoted 
a southbound modernising colonial city with Chennai representing the 
congested native settlement to the north. Today, the role is reversed as Chennai 
emerges as a postcolonial, postmodernising global city growing southward 
while Madras remains arrested in the north as a blighted, former colonial area. 
                                                 
92 Baviskar, A. (2004, 30 May). Tale of two cities. The Hindu. Retrieved 28 May, 2007. 
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And they stand not in mutual indifference but in opposition infusing tensions 
into everyday life in the city. ‘The divided geographies heightened by divided 
names tell the tale of an exclusionary city practising forms of segregation 
worse than those known during colonial times’ (Arabindoo 2006: 37). It also 
reveals a structural shift wherein the welfare populism of North Madras now 
known for housing mostly the poor and the lower classes is held in contempt 
by the bourgeois ambitions of South Chennai.  
 
4.6.1 The unbalanced act of bourgeois urbanism 
Washbrook (1989) had criticised the Dravidian state claiming that as a 
managerial state the Dravidian government could neither achieve capitalist 
development nor the institutionalisation of bourgeois dominance. But the 
state’s recent urban development policies (since the 1990s), particularly for 
Chennai, prove him wrong, as successive Dravidian governments embrace the 
project of a bourgeois state. Ironically the bourgeois project is embarked upon 
by using a proper Tamil name (Chennai). Associated with the name change and 
its socio-spatial polarisation is the embourgeoisement process marked by 
physical purification of the city. In the 1996 Mayoral election, the DMK 
canvassed with the promise of creating a Singara Chennai, a beautiful Chennai, 
a city that is clean and orderly, in other words a modern, elegant, bourgeois 
city.93 The post-election agenda was dominated by infrastructure projects and 
beautification schemes that catered to the city’s middle and upper classes and 
the potential investors. In 1996, soon after assuming power as the city’s mayor, 
MK Stalin (son of the DMK leader M Karunanidhi) announced several 
schemes to ‘beautify’ the city, with infrastructure development projects 
reflecting a conspicuous elite bias. This is obvious in the character of the traffic 
solutions proposed over the past decade in Chennai. In the earliest instance, in 
an attempt to tackle the burgeoning traffic problems, mostly due to ill-
                                                 
93 Hansen (2001) identified a similar mandate for creating a Sundar Mumbai, again a beautiful 
Mumbai in the 1997 Mayoral election. But as he explains, the process of creating a clean, 
bourgeois city overlapped with the social purging of the city by the Shiv Sena to create a 
Marathi Mumbai. As already noted, this social purification angle was thankfully missing in 
Chennai. Singara is the Tamil word for beautiful, while Sundar is its Hindi equivalent.  
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maintained, congested roads bursting at their seams, the Mayor’s office 
announced the construction of a series of flyovers, expressways, subways and 
mini-flyovers at various points in the city. As a solution this was propelled 
more by the need to shift the image away from that of a languishing Third 
World city to one that is fast-moving and high-tech, emulating the First World.  
 
The Corporation had a grand 21-flyover plan for the city, which 
included widening roads at several locations along with a first phase of 10 
flyovers, with nine eventually built (Figure 21). While there were murmurs of 
discontent against this initiative, the flyovers went a considerable distance to 
satiate the pride of several middle and upper class residents of the city who 
benefited from this speed-enhancing traffic solution. Despite press queries as to 
whether flyovers offered only a ‘band-aid solution’, in middle-class 
neighbourhoods where flyovers hadn’t been proposed, residents and their 
associations rued its absence, convinced of its real and ‘imagined’ makeover 
ability. 94  
 
                                                 
94 Ghosh, G. (2000, 27 November). A band-aid solution? The Hindu; Resident interviewee AR-
290204-01; Flyovers 'can ease traffic flow' in T. Nagar, Kodambakkam. (2005, 09 February). 
The Hindu. 
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Figure 21: Flyovers in Chennai 
 Source: Venkatachalapathy (2006: 33; © Aravindan 2006) 
 
Toeing this line, in 2003, Chief Minister Jayalalithaa announced an impressive 
Rs. 180,000 million Chennai Infrastructure Development Plan to help 
reposition Chennai as the best investment destination in Asia. This budget was 
primarily earmarked by the desire to transform the city into the “City 
Beautiful”, and ensure that “Chennai is certainly on its way to becoming the 
most happening place”. In order “to reposition Chennai as the city premiere in 
South India; as a gateway to South East Asia, as the best metropolis destination 
for investments in Asia”, the emphasis is on building world-class 
infrastructure, with a focus on roads, especially of the high-speed variety – 
flyovers and expressways.95 A prominent project is the conversion of the 20 
Km stretch of Old Mahabalipuram Road (OMR) in Chennai (housing several 
IT and business parks) into a six-lane IT Expressway (Figure 22). That the 
                                                 
95 Although in all budgetary and public speeches the government insisted that this outlay was 
intended for a comprehensive development plan including energy distribution, traffic and 
transportation, water supply and sewerage, solid waste disposal, and housing, the only clear 
and visible outcome so far has been the redevelopment of the IT corridor to ‘international’ 
standards, envisioned by Jayalalithaa as “the billion dollar corridor of the state”. 
http://www.blonnet.com/2003/03/20/stories/2003032002051700.htm. Retrieved 23 May, 2007. 
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transnationalised middle-class desire of ‘life on a fast lane’ is obvious from this 
resident’s comment: 
I look at what they did in Bombay, okay, on the eastern express highway 
and the western express highway. To me it looks very similar to a large 
extent to what we have in the greenways in the US, okay. [In Chennai] I 
mean every single road is real congested. But I have possibly one of the 
best drives for 25 Km. I go in 35 minutes because I go on the IT corridor. 
But anywhere else in the city it will take me two hours to go. (ECR-
210304-02)  
 
Figure 22: IT Expressway, ‘the road of our dreams’ 
 
While it can be argued that government spending on roads has a beneficial 
value to all sections of the society, egalitarian intention of such exercises 
remains suspect. The high-profile national project, popularly known as the 
Golden Quadrilateral project, involves the upgrading of existing highways 
(3,625 miles) connecting the four important metros of Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata 
and Chennai to four and six-lane expressways. Started in 1998 as a ‘pet 
project’ of the then BJP Prime Minister, AB Vajpayee, this project got good 
reports in international press such as The New York Times, where its mammoth 
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aspirations were compared with the building of the railways in British India or 
the Inter-State Highway project of post-war America. The project reflects the 
grafting of western notions of speed and efficiency, a mechanism to jump-start 
India’s growing global competitiveness, a conduit for even flashier cars, 
evidence of a frenzied new consumerism, leaving traditional modes of 
transport behind.96 Implemented with World Bank and Asian Development 
Bank funding assistance, the project is indeed conceived like an ‘American-
style interstate’, built by multinational companies and functioning as toll roads 
which only the upper crust of the society can afford to use (similar to the ECR 
example cited in the previous chapter). Ignored though is the fact that the 
point-to-point high-speed highway pays little heed to the socio-economic 
network of small towns and villages dotting the routes.   
 
Another example is the development of a Mass Rapid Transit System 
(MRTS) in Chennai (Figure 23). The project was first conceived in 1984 as a 
rail-based solution to expand the connections between the city and its suburbs, 
but took time to be delivered, with the first phase of 9 Km not completed until 
1997. Ten years on, the second phase is under construction and a third phase is 
planned. Today, the MRTS operates at a loss with less than 9,000 passengers a 
day. Despite a World Bank (2005) study identifying the first phase as being 
nothing short of a functional and financial failure, it is interesting to note how 
the state now hypes it from its early image as another tried and tested 
commuter rail solution to a more upscale mega infrastructure project, one that 
complements and serves well the IT corridor in the city.97 The study comments 
on the preference of the state for large-scale investment project, and notes that 
the MRTS line runs along competitive bus routes. It asks if the funds used for 
the MRTS had been available to spend locally, with operational subsidy also 
being a local responsibility, would the MRTS have been built? Its ‘white 
                                                 
96 Walderman, A. (2005, 04 December). Mile by mile, India paves a smoother road to its 
future. The New York Times. Retrieved 18 May, 2007. 
97 The Tamil Nadu government website on Information Technology Enabled Services (ITES) 
Policy emphasises that ‘Chennai offers a fast track Mass Rapid System for Transport (MRTS) 
from the city centre to major commercial and ITES hubs along a corridor for 16 Kms’. 
http://www.tn.gov.in/misc/TN-ITES-2005.htm Retrieved 18 May, 2007. 
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elephant’ status notwithstanding, the state remains convinced by the 
promotional quality of such projects.  In 2006 additional infrastructure plans 
framed on similar lines were proposed including a 300Km Monorail Mass 
Rapid Transit System citing examples from Jakarta and Singapore.98  
 
Figure 23: MRTS Station, Chennai 
 
Siemiatycki (2006) through his analysis of the Delhi metro project assesses the 
way state officials are enamoured with this new paradigm of a mega 
infrastructure project. Transport projects are translated into a broader public 
image for the city, projected as a catalyst towards the development of a modern 
(read global) city, carrying symbolic meaning and evolving as a ‘hyper-
branded project’. Boschken (2003) similarly explains that for cities with global 
aspirations, a highly specialised urban infrastructure is a must, one that is 
designed for the mass movement of information, goods and people in accord 
                                                 
98 http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2006/02/03/stories/2006020302161900.html. 
Retrieved 18 May, 2007. 
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with the requirements of global connectivity. Stylistic advanced transit systems 
are a key ingredient. As a result, urban transit has shifted away from 
connecting all parts of the city, equitably serving the poor and the rich, to one 
that is synonymous with providing access to economic opportunities, 
amenities, and entertainment venues of the urban global platform. Instead, the 
image enhancing features of such symbol-bearing systems are used to reify a 
city’s global status.  
 
Table 7: Investment Plan summary, Chennai Metropolitan Area  
Source: CMDA (2007) 
 
Thus, in Chennai, of the proposed Rs. 45,000 crore investment plan, Rs. 4,000 
crore has been earmarked for the provision of services to the poor (9 percent), 
whereas, 17 percent is dedicated to the ‘global symbol’ infrastructure projects 
such as the MRTS and Metro Rail. While Rs. 17,000 crore has been identified 
for transportation improvements, only Rs. 1,300 crores is dedicated to the 
improvement of bus services. The rest is mostly meant for improving the 
general road conditions, enabling the private vehicle pliers more than anyone 
else (Table 7). What is also notable in cities like Chennai is that the modest 
financial status of the regional/local government means that such schemes 
Expenditure
Cost (in Rs. 
Crores)
Water Supply 6,321.00
Sewerage 2,299.00
Solid Waste Management 847.80
Storm Water Drainage 1,423.88
Transportation 17,254.08
Mass Rapid Transit System 600.00
Metro Rail (45 Km) 7,000.00
Parking Lots & Spaces 43.85
Heritage and Recreation 103.08
Satellite Town Development 5,000.00
Urban Basic Services for Poor 3,887.23
Total 44,779.92
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cannot be implemented at a grand scale arching over the entire city.  Instead, 
the state has to contend itself  with patchy interventions in a select few areas 
and neighbourhoods as a ‘show window’ to lure potential investors, while other 
parts of the city wallow in a continued crisis of poor infrastructure. Thus, state-
sponsored infrastructure projects and traffic improvement solutions drive the 
wedge further in an already divided city (Figure 24). Commenting on the 
imbalance in the infrastructure investments between the northern and southern 
parts of the city, the Joint Commissioner of Police (Traffic) GUG Sastry 
admitted that: 
It is there. I do agree that there has been a focus on attracting investment 
over the last, over the last, I would say, after 1991, after liberalisation. 
But in the last 4-5 years it has been more. Something has been done to 
improve the other parts also. There is a conscious effort which is being 
made on the part of the government that we should not ignore the other 
areas. But all said and done, you can see the divide between the north and 
the south. There is a divide. Not only in terms of …the moment you go to 
the north, the kind of traffic you see is also different. Certainly there is a 
transformation. In terms of the type of vehicles, type of other things and 
all those things, it is completely different. Like in the south, we still have 
a ban on the movement of lorries in the morning and then we have the 
movement in the…some movement in the north and the movement of 
slow moving vehicles, particularly bullock carts and other things. In the 
north, there is no such ban. (GUGS-100904-02) 
 
Figure 24: Differing road conditions – North and South Chennai 
Source: Left – Venkatachalapathy (2006: 21; © Aravindan 2006) 
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This, in reality, is not a new phenomenon but one with a historic propensity 
where the city has been known to gravitate towards the south since its colonial 
foundations (Murphey 1996; Neild 19979; Lewandowski 1975). In the 
postcolonial years, this trend exaggerated with North Chennai developing a 
derogatory image of low-lying areas marked by large-scale polluting industries. 
It should be noted that this difference has been exacerbated by the urban 
development policies when a cash-strapped Corporation chose to concentrate 
efforts in the more viable southern pockets. Amongst the ten initial flyover 
projects launched in 1997 by the city’s then mayor MK Stalin, only one was 
located in north Chennai, and even this has since been stalled. Similarly when a 
decision to privatise garbage collection in the city was taken, a seven year 
contract was given in 2000 to the private company Chennai Environmental 
Services (CES)-Onyx covering only the three southern zones of Adyar, 
Kodambakkam and Ice House. Given the ‘global’ nature of the operation, 
promising to bring in global standards of maintenance via the expertise of a 
global company, it seemed as if only the south deserved this exclusive 
treatment. 99  
 
Press portrayals note the state’s differential treatment of the two parts 
of the city. Writing about the dismal condition of North Chennai, while one 
portrayed it as ‘a symbol of neglect’. Another projected it as a “domain of the 
labour class”, which had failed to catch up with the bourgeois dreams of South 
Chennai, and its amenities of a globalising city including amusement parks, 
weekend getaways, restaurants, Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs), shopping 
malls, multiplex cinemas and parks.100 That the global pretensions of the city 
                                                 
99 In 2007, the seven-year contract with Onyx terminated and a new contract was awarded to 
Neel Metal Fanalca, a joint-venture company between a Delhi- and Columbia-based 
companies. In early 2008, the Corporation and the company promised extending garbage 
collection services to North Chennai, with one zone, Pulianthope being selected on an 
experimental basis.   
100 North Chennai a symbol of neglect. (2004, 10 January). The Hindu. Retrieved 23 February, 
2005; Subramanian, K. (2004, 13 March). A different world altogether? The Hindu. Retrieved 
23 February, 2005. 
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have only skewed the polarity further is observed by an editorial in the 
fortnightly Madras Musings which asked if it wasn’t  
time to pay as much attention to the Ennore Highway to the north, where 
the “dirty industries” grew, as it is to the East Coast Road and the Old 
Mahabalipuram Road, homes of the new “clean” industries? While 
existing infrastructure in the north is allowed to go to seed….the 
development of the South….has the authorities falling over themselves to 
please the new investors and those who have, employment-wise, 
benefited from them.101  
 
It is in the context of these discussions alleging bourgeois urbanism’s tipping 
of the development balance towards the south that fieldwork is located in the 
southern part of the city, with the study sites already explained in the previous 
chapter.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
Residents of Chennai who have lived in other Indian cities like Mumbai, Delhi 
or Bangalore are quick to point out that ‘Chennai hasn’t quite caught up yet’. 
There is a clear tinge of envy in their narratives as they recall Mumbai’s 
cosmopolitanism, note Delhi’s knack for governance and managing the city, 
and marvel at Bangalore’s ‘technological jump’ visible in all aspects of city 
life. In contrast, they find Chennai to be conservative, parochial and stagnant, 
much like the observations of the city’s celebrity writers highlighted at the 
beginning of this chapter. Speculating on why the city ‘fell behind’, they 
invariably blame the politicians for failing to do anything meaningful for the 
city. As one resident observed, ‘they [the politicians] have single-handedly 
allowed the city to go to the dogs’ ( AR-160204-01). In a sense such outbursts 
are not surprising given the middle class’s long-ingrained distrust of 
                                                 
101 Why the neglect of North Chennai? (2003, 16-30 November). Madras Musings, p. 2. The 
editorial was responding to a research proposal Envisioning the city and the politics of 
development by Pandian and Srivathsan to study amongst others, the north-south divide, which 
has a long history but is being accentuated through the new vision for the city. A film Chennai: 
The split city was made by Venkatesh Chakravarthy to complement this study. See also 
Chakravarthy, V. (2006, 17 August). Chennai: The split city. New Indian Express. Retrieved 
10 August, 2008. 
 
 
Absent Societies/Chapter 4: Excavating Chennai                            
177 
politicians. As already noted in Chapter Two, for members of the middle class, 
politicians are criminals, corrupt and vulgar, who cannot be trusted with 
running either the cities or the country.  
 
This chapter attempted to go beyond the rhetoric of the above position, 
and examined in the first instance, the way Chennai (mal)developed at the 
‘hands of the politicians’. Chennai’s peculiar geography (harsh climate, lack of 
a natural harbour, and a hinterland with no resources) played a role in its 
development as ‘a city that was not meant to be’, resulting in a short-lived 
colonial glory. Its postcolonial fate was primarily sealed by the rise of 
Dravidian politics in the region which, in the first instance, attempted to 
‘withdraw’ the city from the national metropolitan platform and redefine it as a 
regional capital. The insistence of the Dravidian political parties in framing a 
Tamil geography that could suitably accommodate their claims of Tamil 
cultural nationalism meant that the landscape of a city like Madras was seen 
merely as an opportunity to convey particular historiographies, mostly in the 
form of dispersed symbols and icons. In addition to renaming streets and 
buildings, purging them of their colonial identity and infusing with a Tamil 
pride, the city was developed as a ‘prop’ or set-piece for enacting the Dravidian 
spectacle. Temporal in nature, this meant that the city came alive only 
momentarily during such festivities and celebrations. For the rest of the time, it 
literally languished in the dark side of cultural nationalism and its 
commemorative practices. In the absence of any ‘real’ civic, improvement 
projects, the city’s infrastructure began to wear down and by the 1970s, it was 
showing the strains of a ‘malignant’ city.  
 
Though this syndrome is not dissimilar to the experiences of other 
Indian cities during this period, Madras’s plight is clearly attributable to the 
continuous period of unbroken Dravidian rule whose corrupt, economically ill-
informed populist practices eventually left the city bankrupt and ungoverned. 
The decade (1961-71) when Madras registered the fastest population growth 
was also the period when development seemed to evade the city. This parallels 
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the acute moment of abandonment experienced by the middle class, 
disillusioned by state failure (Chapter Two). While the 1980s witnessed some 
surge of confidence in the middle class with early efforts at liberalising the 
Indian economy, Madras continued to stutter its way through one infrastructure 
crisis after the other. The ‘urban turn’ finally occurs in 1991 when the central 
government officially launched a New Economic Policy of neoliberalisation.  
 
Given the onus of these reforms on regional implementation, 
neoliberalism has found an unexpected partner in the Dravidian parties as it 
allows them to refashion their personality-cult politics in new ways. More 
importantly, there is a clear shift in their attitude towards the city, as 
metropolitan port cities like Madras have become important playgrounds for 
enacting neoliberal policies, and hence Dravidian politicians had to revise their 
earlier indifferent and superficial stance towards the city. Amidst a flurry of 
civic boosterism initiatives involving flagship projects and investment ‘baits’, a 
new tenet of urban development is being written. It is against this trend that 
even ‘simple’ political gimmicks like the 1996 name change of the city from 
Madras to Chennai needs to be seen. The name change was significantly meant 
to coincide with the globalising present and carve a new spatio-temporal order 
for the city. But the result is a twinned form of polarisation, where ‘a tale of 
two cities’ develops within one, wherein the divided geography reveals not just 
a fault line between the northern and southern parts of the city, but as well a 
tension between the welfare populism of a blighted north Madras, now known 
for housing the poor and the lower classes, and the bourgeois ambitions of a 
globalising south Chennai, which is the preferred location for the 
transnationalising middle and upper classes.  
 
During fieldwork, several middle-class residents in explaining their 
choice of residence in the southern neighbourhoods, revealed that they had 
grown up in north Chennai, and that this transition amounted to climbing the 
social ladder, ‘having made the cut’ as one resident suggested (ECR-250304-
02). In such statements, one could also observe the glint of pride in their 
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contemporary bourgeois environment, comfortably set in south Chennai. But 
can we conclude that the tenets of bourgeois urbanism as promoted by the state 
in creating this schism is unflinchingly absorbed and endorsed by its bourgeois 
society, i.e. the middle-class residents? The next two empirical chapters are 
devoted to the investigation of this query, with Chapter Five focussing on the 
middle-class residents’ associations as a civil society, and Chapter Six looking 
into their involvement in the re-imagination of the public spaces in the city (in 
this instance, the beaches).  
Absent Societies/Chapter 5: Residents’ Associations                            
180 
5 
 
 
Residents’ Associations:  
An Alternative Civil Society? 
 
 
 
…it was in a large middle-class colony, typical of the thousands 
of such hodgepodge agglomerations of buildings that exist in 
cities all over India. The roads within the colony were all 
unpaved, and were most certainly unusable during the monsoons. 
Wild grass and weeds grew unchecked everywhere. At the back of 
every house lay gigantic mounds of garbage….it wasn’t for lack 
of money that such appalling civic conditions were allowed to 
prevail. If anything, the blame lay with the sudden plenitude of 
money: far from fostering any notions of civic responsibility, it 
had encouraged in its beneficiaries only a kind of aggressive 
individualism. The colony didn’t matter as long as one could 
obtain, through bribing, through one’s predatory prowess, illegal 
water, power, and telephone connections for one’s house. 
(Mishra 1995: 8-9) 
 
 
According to the above citation, it would appear that a chapter on collective 
middle-class participation in a ‘civic forum’ couldn’t go very far. It suggests an 
insensitivity to the environment and a crippling sense of civic barrenness, as 
the middle class inhabit a ‘hopeless’ condition, failing to exert any kind of 
countervailing pressures. And yet, Chatterjee (2004) believes that there is 
indeed a movement propelled by the citizens’ groups asserting their rights to a 
healthy environment, calling for a concerted attempt to clean up the cities, rid 
the streets and public lands of squatters and encroachers, and to reclaim public 
spaces for use by ‘proper citizens’. He seeks to address the question of whether 
Indian cities are turning bourgeois at last (Chapter One), by examining the 
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efforts of these ‘proper citizens’ and their terrain of civil society, and argues 
that since the 1990s there has been a shift in the ruling attitudes towards the big 
city in India, accompanied by a surge in the visible activities of a bourgeois 
civil society. This is related to the recent rise of the new middle class, as 
discussed in Chapter Two, and who clearly wish to dictate the terms of their 
presence and participation in the urban environment. The clarity with which a 
polity of bourgeois urbanism is being formulated and implemented by the state 
also seems to be a clear signal of such a revival (Chapter Four). It is this 
context of bourgeois urbanism that makes it imperative to consider not just 
middle class’s subscription to the same, but also the various mechanisms 
employed by them in the process. As Chatterjee (2004) suggests, this 
prominently involves the claim of propriety of their citizenship which, in most 
cases, is asserted collectively on a civic platform.  
 
An established form of collective action for the middle class is their 
residents’ association, and it is therefore normal to expect that this forum 
would be actively used to develop a dominant bourgeois ideology in making 
claims to the urban domain.  This chapter is one of two empirical investigations 
of the middle-class articulation of a collective activist position to pilot the 
changing geography of Chennai. It considers the way the new middle class, 
empowered by their recent social promotion as young homeowners use their 
residents’ associations as a means of not only making citizenry demands for the 
provision of basic amenities and infrastructure but also to present a collective 
voice in consumerist bargaining. Both demands are made in tandem to 
reinforce their position as a citizen-consumer. Evaluating the extent to which 
the middle class view such associations as a civil society platform, this chapter 
examines their politics of partnership as they engage with other residents 
associations (of all social classes), ‘organised’ civil society initiatives, and the 
state. The latter reveals, in particular, the degree to which the middle class 
engage with the bourgeois urban imaginary of the state discussed in Chapter 
Four. But before delving into these investigations, the next section will first 
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trace the typological spoors of residential development within the context of 
the postcolonial city.  
 
5.1 Residential morphology of a postcolonial city 
One of the elements that contribute to the ‘backwater’ image of 
Madras/Chennai (as discussed in Chapter Four), where it is still viewed more 
as a cluster of villages than a city, is its residential morphology, with 
sprawling, low-density “garden houses” characterising its colonial urban form. 
Unlike Bombay and Calcutta which had witnessed the fast growth of high-
density, multiple storey apartment complexes to cater to the housing needs of a 
burgeoning population, Madras has remained a city with garden houses, palm 
groves, open spaces and fine avenues (Evenson 1989; Figure 25). Though 
Ellefsen (1966) clarifies that this description is applicable only to the areas of 
European settlements, he adds that the presence of a wide area of low-density, 
garden-house suburbs was a unique and prominent feature resulting in its 
generalisation. Over the course of the nineteenth century, this pattern remained 
largely intact (Figure 26). Even during the first half of the twentieth century 
even when the pressure of urbanisation was acute, many of these garden houses 
remained untouched. This meant that instead of densification, the city spread 
outwards, the lack of sufficient infrastructure notwithstanding (Lewandowski 
1975). And this is what the postcolonial city inherited after independence in 
1947.  
 
Figure 25: Aerial and street views of Chennai 
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Figure 26: Chennai at the end of the 19th century 
Source: Constable's 1893 Hand Atlas to India; Retrieved 28 May, 2007, from 
http://homepages.rootsweb.ancestry.com/~poyntz/India/images/Madras1893.jpg; 
Areas in red indicate the dense native quarters in between which the sparse 
European settlements grew outwards from Fort St. George 
 
Faced with the pressure of continuous waves of immigration into the city, and 
the fast development of slums in various parts of the city, the government 
constituted the City Improvement Trust (CIT) in the 1950s to improve the 
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housing situation. The prototype at this time was a ‘one house-one parcel’ 
model, of one or two storeys height. A decade later, the Tamil Nadu Housing 
Board (TNHB) was established in 1961 to undertake the provision of housing 
throughout the state.102 By the late 1960s a series of housing development 
schemes were announced by the TNHB in the city for different social classes, 
popularly known as the EWS, LIG, MIG and MIG.103 In 1971, a separate body, 
Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board (TNSCB), was set up to take over the 
activities for slum improvement and clearance, with the TNHB concentrating 
on the lower, middle and upper middle classes. Yet, these attempts proved 
inadequate as 20,000-30,000 units continued to be identified as an annual 
housing shortfall within the city (MMDA 1995).  
 
Every city-dweller, whether a long-time resident or a recent immigrant, 
and irrespective of class, continues to hold as his/her ideal the ownership of an 
independent parcel of land with a garden house on it, however small it may be. 
While in the initial decades, government-sponsored schemes provided such a 
typology, soon the increasing figures of unfulfilled demands resulted in a 
change in strategy. TNHB shifted to providing denser, multiple dwelling units 
or flats constructed in 3-4 storey walk-up apartment blocks, changing the 
profile of the city. A further propeller came in the mid-1970s, when the face of 
development in the city was considerably altered by the enforcement of the 
Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act (ULCRA).  
 
Enacted nationally in 1976 and amended in 1978 to prevent the practice 
of land hoarding, and release land for equitable development, ULCRA’s 
implementation proved to be poor, as a result of which very little land was 
declared surplus.104 In an ironic twist, the act proved to feed the very land-
                                                 
102 TNHB’s efforts are concentrated disproportionately in Chennai with a third of its schemes 
implemented between 1961-2003 being located in the Chennai Metropolitan Area (TNHB 
interview 091203-02; CMDA 2007). 
103 Economically weaker section, lower income group, middle income group, and high income 
group.  
104 ULCRA was enforced in 64 notified urban agglomerations as a follow-up to the rural 
version, adopted by some states as a Central Act, and others like Tamil Nadu implementing its 
own (albeit identical to the national one). A ceiling of 500 – 2000 square metres was set with 
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bankers that it sought to regulate. With the advantage of various loop-holes, 
they reinvented themselves as flat promoters, rather than releasing their land to 
the public authorities for managed development. In the early 1980s, the urban 
landscape witnessed a dramatic turn in its built form as multiple dwelling flat 
developments, popularly referred to as the ‘night grown mushrooms’ sprung 
across the city with no planning rhythm.105 For the average middle class 
resident eager to become homeowners, this was an ideal opportunity. 
Frustrated with the TNHB and its endless waiting period for housing 
allocation, and faced with the escalating land prices which made the purchase 
and construction of their own independent houses impossible, private flat 
promoters were seen as a veritable bird in hand.  
 
5.1.1 From cash to capital 
In the 1980s, jobs in the public-sector were not only fashionable but also highly 
sought after. This was the period when the old middle class employed in state 
agencies would wait for decades, nearly reaching their retirement age, to 
purchase or construct their own home. This is what Appadurai (2000b) might 
have called as the age of ‘cash’. Distinguishing between the circulation of cash 
and capital, he explains that cash has a more complex life: 
It is locked, hoarded, stored, and secreted in every possible way: in 
jewellery, in bank accounts, in household safes and mattresses, in land 
and housing and dowries, in boxes and purses and coffee tins, and behind 
shirts and blouses. It is frequently hidden money, made visible only in the 
fantastic forms of cars and mansions, sharp suits and expensive 
restaurants, huge flats and large numbers of servants. (2000b: 631) 
 
                                                                                                                                 
the former applying for Class A cities like Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras. Owners 
holding land in excess were required to build housing for the poor on a part of it. 220, 674 Ha 
was identified by the government as excess of the ceiling limit, of which only 19,020 Ha, i.e. 9 
percent could be acquired. With 61,967 Ha exempt, the loopholes in the Act resulted in its 
weak implementation, and it was repealed in 1999. See Bhargava (1983); Sivam (2002); Pugh 
(1995).   
105 This understanding of ULCRA is based on an interview with CH Gopinatha Rao (091203), 
who has written and commented extensively on the post-independent housing scenario in the 
city. He argued that in its urban form, the Act was a failure, as property prices skyrocketed 
overnight with its implementation, bracketing out the very sections of society it was supposed 
to help. 
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This was also the last gasp of the Nehruvian era when the state was the 
principal agency for ensuring development, and state employment was 
considered socially gratifying. Economically though, it meant that one was 
held to ransom by the circulation of cash, which very quickly and easily 
slipped into the shadowy grey areas of black marketing and hoarding. The old 
middle class realised this when they tried to enter the realm of homeownership 
via the private world of flat promoters.  
 
 In a situation where bank loans, if available, comprised a skeletal cost 
of the flat, payment was often secured through a complicated combination of 
cash, including one’s own life savings and a socially mediated chain of debt 
from family and friends. This created a fertile condition for the reign of black 
marketing in the construction sector. As many of the flat builders were land 
bankers in disguise, their real estate business operated as a disorganised sector 
sans legislation and in violation of most regulations. Typically, anywhere 
between thirty to fifty percent of the flat cost had to be paid in cash, meaning 
that money could be unaccounted for. For a long time, the government refused 
to give industry status to the real estate and construction sector, for fear of 
legitimising black money, making this sector ineligible for various 
infrastructure-level funding subsidies.  
 
With the introduction of neo-liberal reforms in the early 1990s, things 
began to change. The circulation of cash was replaced by a circulation of 
capital. Through the benevolence of the proto-global link this allowed the 
middle class to move out of the raw end of the cash economy into the magic 
circle of bank accounts, insurance policies, savings, investments, and other 
strategies. New understandings of monetary phenomena such as credit, 
mortgages and other financial ‘derivatives’ entered the Indian cities, opening 
up wide opportunities for the urban middle class in scaling the socio-economic 
ladder. Housing was one sector in which capital in the form of mortgage made 
its entry in a grand manner creating an unparalleled hysteria for 
homeownership amongst the new middle class (Figure 27).  
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Figure 27: Property fairs promoting home ownership opportunities 
Source: Top left – The Hindu, 23 September, 2003; bottom right - ‘Your Home 
2003’, The Hindu, 19 December, 2003, Brochures collected at different 
property fair events; During  fieldwork in 2003-04, housing fairs were 
frequently organised by a combination of finance companies, builders, and 
others associated with the construction industry. It was not uncommon for 
mortgage companies to approve spot loans, as competitors wooed the new 
middle class shamelessly.  
 
This new trend of homeownership was further strengthened by a series of other 
initiatives. The Tamil Nadu Apartment Ownership Act 1994 was introduced in 
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1997 to safeguard the interests of the buyer against the misdeeds of the builders 
and promoters. In 1999, ULCRA was finally repealed after two decades of 
ineffective performance. The central government is pursuing a persistent policy 
of sustaining the economic reforms, attempting to convert India into a virtual 
deposit and investment zone for transnationalised capital. It announced 
financial sops regularly in its annual budget for the new middle class.106 
Income tax deductions were announced not only to lure them into 
homeownership but also to regularise the real estate sector. Capital thus entered 
the housing scene in the form of lucrative home loan and mortgage deals 
offered by nationalised banks, private and international banks, and housing 
finance corporations. And capital, oddly enough, helped to clean the 
development scene.107 The new middle class prospective buyers, who are 
comparatively young, are not in a hurry. Propped up by the transparency of the 
capital-based transactions, and fed by the transnationalised images of home and 
luxury, they are seeking homeownership as a lifestyle choice and statement.  
 
Flat promoters in the 1980s were only interested in making a quick 
buck and were notorious for building badly constructed, poorly-ventilated units 
with hardly any semblance of quality finish. Because of ULCRA, land parcel 
sizes were small, and existing development regulations allowed only 6-10 flats 
on each lot. But the housing complexes that are being built today reflect a 
complete turnaround in residential living. Rather than pigeon-coops, the new 
developments resemble ‘luxury pads’. The housing projects that are advertised 
and built to cater to the new middle class are typically tall complex-style 
development comprising of multiple housing towers w a range of facilities 
including swimming pools, supermarkets, and play areas (Figure 28).  
                                                 
106 This is in sharp contrast to the budgets presented in the 1970s and the 1980s where the 
middle class dreaded its annual announcement, as it was saddled with taxes and stripped of 
benefits (see Figure 4 in Chapter Two).  
107 It should be noted here that while capital has helped to regularise the housing development 
scene, it has also escalated the value of development, leaving a large section of the society to a 
harsh realisation that legitimacy is expensive.  
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Figure 28: Old and new options of housing in Chennai 
Source: Photos – www.flickr.com, retrieved 10 August, 2008; Top right – 
(2003). A guide to Chennai real estate, 4(1), 17; Bottom right – The Economic 
Times, 23 October, 2003, Madras Plus, p. 8.  
 
In a city where there are anywhere between 600-2000 builders, and in a 
profession which was largely unlicensed and unregistered, the demands of the 
new middle class has helped to streamline the industry. In Chennai today there 
are probably only about 30-50 builders of repute who can build this kind of 
complex-style living, and accommodate capital instead of cash payments.108 
Once, where there were builders bordering on criminality and operating in the 
                                                 
108 Interview with V Nagarajan, editor of A Guide to Chennai Real Estate (CRE-201003-01). 
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shadows, today many are comfortable in the limelight, applying for ISO 
qualifications (from the Indian Standards Institute) and CRISIL ratings. This 
turnaround is attributed largely to the demands of the new middle class. This is 
what one of the prominent developers in the city had to say about their impact: 
I have a feeling they have done a great deal of service…they have 
continuously hammered on the developers that they are looking for some 
kind of quality and that they won’t accept everything. So it is only after 
they have started buying in the city I think that the developers have 
become slowly conscious of quality. If the developer is able to 
accommodate it then a whole range of facilities are being offered. If I am 
building a two ground [5000 SF] eight flat kind of situation I cannot give 
very many facilities. In a fairly large development, um, then, you have all 
kinds of attendant facilities are being offered um which includes, let’s 
say, a gym, Jacuzzi, things like that and a community hall for instance, 
centralised security, good water with water treatment plant, so these 
certainly serve as an incentive to the buyer. (KE-161203-01) 
 
It needs to be stressed that these premium projects are not just for the elite, but 
are really aimed at the middle class who find this new typology appealing for 
different reasons. A young couple in their thirties, who have lived and worked 
in Singapore, said that:  
As an ex-NRI [non-resident Indian] we have had the experience of living 
in condominium style developments outside India. We like that, then, you 
know, we don’t need to take the children outside for everything, huh, 
everything will be available inside. We did realise that in India facilities 
are provided at the neighbourhood level and when I was searching the 
internet for flats to buy, we found this advertisement from the builder for 
this project, advertising a complex style with all facilities. So we don’t 
have to go out. There is gym, swimming pool, kids play area, 
supermarket, water treatment plant everything within. Of course both of 
them [complex and neighbourhood] provide the same kind of amenities. 
Here the quality is at a different level. And for us young professionals, 
you know, we work lot of long hours in the IT, this was ideal, this was 
something we were familiar with. (AR-290204-01) 
 
On the other hand, a thirty-something man working in the pharmaceutical 
sector, coming from what he calls a ‘regular middle class’ background or what 
we refer to as the old middle class, said: 
…because we have been deprived of so many things earlier when we 
were at young age…Whichever flat I have been to, we have not seen any 
swimming pool over there, we have not seen any gym over there. It was 
still very remote you know, very hi-fi people would have gym and 
swimming pool that too only in independent house, okay. For me, an 
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actor would have a swimming pool or a politician would have a 
swimming pool but now we feel that our own children should not be 
deprived of enjoying all these facilities which we were not enjoying 
earlier. So we, though we have missed certain things in life let our 
children should not miss it. So we thought we can have our house in a 
place where all these amenities are there, all these facilities are there like 
swimming pool, though we pay you pay more you get more benefits out 
of it. (AR-070304-03) 
 
In this aspect many young professionals find liberalisation beneficial, as they 
are able to dictate choices not just in the purchase of consumer durables but 
also crucial sectors like housing, a good couple of decades ahead than their 
parents. Given this socio-economic stabilisation via these desirable residential 
developments, it is important to understand their negotiations with the outer 
world, which is mostly undertaken  on a collective basis through their 
residents’ associations.  
 
5.2 Residents’ associations in a postcolonial city 
At the time of independence, the municipal government of Madras found itself 
precarious in a city making its transition from a colonial past to a postcolonial 
future. The partisan priorities of the colonial government had left the city ill-
equipped in terms of city management, where the limited resources of the 
municipal administration had been diverted to develop and maintain the 
colonial areas, while the crowded indigenous sectors were neglected (Neild 
1979; Lewandowski 1977, 1975; Evenson 1989).  This inadequacy carried over 
into the postcolonial period, and if residents were not to choke in a system that 
was reminiscent more of an industrial archaeology than a modern development 
feature, then, they (whether the rich, the middle class or the poor) had to 
organise themselves collectively to obtain the basic facilities. Thus, residents 
found themselves playing a significant role in the shaping of local landscapes, 
through varying degrees of self-management in service delivery.  Each class 
used their own means and methods of procuring what the municipality had 
failed to provide. For the upper classes, this meant employing elitist 
manipulations to ensure that resources were diverted to serve their private ends 
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(akin to what the Europeans had done during the colonial times). The middle 
class adopted measures of petitioning and collectively organising their 
complaints to ensure that their colonies were provided with the necessary 
infrastructure, while the poor, often living in illegal settlements, resorted to 
more agitated forms of protests to not only safeguard themselves against future 
evictions but also to procure a semblance of urban services.  
 
Take for instance, the following account of a long-time resident from a 
well-to-do neighbourhood in southern Chennai: 
…see, when this colony was plotted and developed in the 1960s, most of 
the people who bought plots were judges, senior bureaucrats or public 
servants in high positions. They could therefore very easily get some 
improvements done like laying out the roads, telephone lines, a bus 
connection…..and what not, you see what I mean. It was all a phone call 
away. (ECR-010304-01) 
 
Those who exercise the habit of getting things done ‘with a phone call’ view it 
as not flouting the law but seeking some form of privilege. Ironically, it is only 
by ‘pulling some strings’ that a particular neighbourhood of elite residents  
living in an unapproved development has been able to obtain funding 
assistance from the Prime Minister’s Village Road Scheme for their local 
street.109  
 
 Further down the spectrum are the old middle class living in one of the 
many plotted layout developments in city with non-existent infrastructure. 
Locally known as colonies or Nagars, they were developed either by private or 
public bodies and purchased mostly by middle-class employees working in 
public-sector corporations. In the absence of civic amenities, they organised 
themselves collectively into Nagar associations to obtain services from their 
local municipalities. A former president of one such Nagar association 
explained: 
                                                 
109 Known as the Pradhan Mantri Gramin Sadak Yojana (PMGSY), the objective was to link all 
villages with a population of more than 500 with all-weather roads by 2007. This particular 
neighbourhood in concern being located in a village Panchayat within the Chennai 
Metropolitan Area was able to claim the funds and as well have a sign-post indicating the 
same. 
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I built my house in 1985-86 and settled here after retiring. At that time 
very few houses were there……..the association was set up in 1981. 
Since 1981, the association has done a lot of good work for our welfare. 
Lot of good work they have done. I was also president of the association 
for about six years and during my regime we got this Indian Bank, (?), 
Aavin automatic milk booth, temple, post office, police station, so, all the 
important community facilities so that people need not move out of K 
Nagar for that kind of things. (ECR-210304-01) 
 
Due to their employment in public sector corporations, these residents had 
already experienced collective organisation through their trade union 
membership. They used this experience to come together collectively and bring 
some respectability to their Nagars. But often their patient and persistent 
petitioning prolonged into multiple back-to-back marathon efforts spanning 
over many years. As one Nagar association member proudly said ‘since the 
1970s we have written nearly 1000 letters alone to various officials of CMDA, 
TNPCB and PWD [Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority, Tamil Nadu 
Pollution Control Board and Public Works Department, respectively]’ (AR-
060304-02). The ‘letters to the editor’ or the ‘readers’ mail’ columns in any of 
the city dailies and neighbourhood weeklies is monopolised by the middle-
class voices expressing dissatisfaction with the public services, be it 
telephones, electricity, buses, water or drainage, and hoping that by exposing 
the problem to the media some kind of ‘immediate action’ would be taken to 
address the issue (Box 2).  
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Culvert on GST Road 
Sir, — The construction of a culvert and raising of the road level will no doubt 
prevent flooding of both the national highways and the Chromepet Government 
Hospital but we the residents who live near the culvert will continue to suffer. The 
residents built their houses according to the level of the municipal road and the 
GST Road. While the level of the GST Road has been raised, the residents cannot 
be expected to raise the plinth of their buildings.  
Therefore, in order to prevent flooding we suggest: (1) The waters of TB 
Sanatorium and adjoining colonies which flood GST Road should be diverted to 
the Chitlapakkam lake; (2) The level of other culverts on the 500-metre stretch 
should be raised; (3) All encroachments on and the blocks in the canals that lead 
to the lake should be removed.  
V. Santhanam, president, Chromepet New Colony Residents’ Welfare Society, 
Chennai 
 
Low voltage 
Sir, — The residents of Nanganallur are put to hardship because of frequent low 
voltage. This adversely affects domestic appliances. Streetlights do not burn 
properly and have to be often replaced. Besides, the supply of Palar water is also 
irregular. Many a time, the authorities attribute low voltage as a reason which 
hinders pumping of water. In view of the increasing number of flats, we request 
early action for installation of more transformers to overcome the low voltage and 
high power generators for uninterrupted pumping of Palar water.  
 M. R. Swaminathan, secretary, Welfare Association T.N.G.O. Colony, 
Nanganallur 
Box 2: Excerpts  from Reader’s Mail, The Hindu, 28 April, 1997 
 
Middle-class forms of collective protest can be ridiculed for their passivity, 
incapable of triggering a wave of trade-union militancy. When, as ‘respectable 
people’, they stage on-street dharnas and demonstrations holding banners and 
placards, they remain one-hour token gestures that rarely develop into 
prolonged acts of collective action.110 The more agitational and sustained 
forms of protest comes mostly from the poorer sections of the society who 
organise collectively in a context where they have nothing to lose and 
everything to gain. Rioting and other violent forms of agitation are often 
associated with the poor and the lower classes whose living environments are 
shrouded in illegality. Whenever threatened with eviction, the residents from 
the slums and squatter settlements are able to mobilise rapidly, countering with 
threats of violence and vote repercussions (Box 3). 
                                                 
110 Dharnas are a peaceful form of on-street protest where people block the road, sitting, and 
sometimes fasting demanding redress from the appropriate authorities. 
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‘Slum-dwellers storm into BMC’ 
New Indian Express, 28 January, 2006 
 
Around 200 dwellers of Buddha Nagar slum stormed into the Bhubaneswar 
Municipal Corporation (BMC) and damaged office furniture on Friday. The 
agitators hailing from Ward No. 24, were angry over demolition of a slum and 
wanted to lodge their protest with BMC authorities. However, when they reached 
the corporation office, the top officials were busy in the monthly council meeting. 
Since no one came to pay heed to their demands, they lost their cool and barged 
into the BMC office. Some of them were armed with kitchen knifes. They reached 
the main hall where the meeting was going on and shouted at the officials and on 
their way back, damaged some furniture.  
 
 
‘Buddhadeb Government puts on hold eviction programme’ 
The Hindu, 03 March, 2005 (Malabika Bhattacharya) 
 
The Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee Government today put on hold a programme that, 
upon full execution, would have resulted in the eviction of about 20,000 people, 
consisting of about 4,000 families, from railway land across the Rabindra Sarovar, 
a lake in south Kolkata. The Trinamool Congress leader, Mamata Banerjee, 
claimed the deferment of the programme as her “own victory.” She had set up a 
resistance formation on a 4-km stretch between Tollygunj and Dhakuria railway 
stations falling in her South Kolkata constituency. “We did not carry out the 
programme because of certain concerns which we are going to convey to the High 
Court which had fixed today for eviction. But suffice it to say, the Railways are 
found wanting in playing the desired role,” said the Chief Minister, Buddhadeb 
Bhattacharjee, at Writers’ Buildings. The dislocation of such a large number of 
poor families, though at the behest of the Kolkata High Court which had directed 
the State Government and the Railway authorities to carry out the eviction by 
March 2, would have shown up the Government and the party, CPI(M), in a poor 
light, a section of party functionaries argued. Ms. Banerjee’s Trinamool had put 
up resistance because the eviction programme would hit the party hardest in that 
the bulk of the targeted settlers are known Trinamool supporters. “As it is, we will 
have a big fight on our hands if we want to retain the Kolkata Corporation. The 
eviction, if allowed to be carried out, will make it a very stiff fight,” Ms. Banerjee 
told her functionaries.  
 
Box 3: Protests by the poor and the repercussion of political society 
 
5.2.1 From welfare to well-being 
In the post-independence decades, almost all sections of the society remained 
preoccupied with gaining the attention of public authorities to secure their 
social and civic interests. Under the aegis of residents’ associations, the 
residents pursued vigorously the interests of their welfare (primarily 
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infrastructure facilities). But since the economic reforms of 1991, there has 
been a drastic change in the way the collective efforts of people have been put 
to use. Nowhere is this change more visible than among the new middle class, 
which has benefited most the fruits of liberalisation (Chapter Two).  At least, it 
is in their agenda of collective action that one can discern a radical shift in 
priorities, with their collective platform expanding to accommodate new 
interests.   
 
Issues pertaining to civic provisions still remain a priority, but their 
‘quality-of-life’ concerns have been considerably revamped. A relentless 
hypermaterialisation of the middle class has resulted in material interests taking 
equal attention. The new middle class homeowners are unwilling to settle in 
places that are devoid of infrastructure, where they would have to spend at least 
a decade in innate struggles to obtain facilities. Instead they prefer their homes 
delivered in a ready-made kit, so to speak. Well-being and lifestyle choices, 
and not welfare are uppermost in their choice of dwelling now. In 1996, a 
feature on ‘sheltering in style’ appeared in the city daily The Hindu  remarking 
on the ‘[m]ammoth building complexes constituting a mini-city or a big colony 
complete with school, shopping arcade, entertainment centre, fitness centre, 
gym, swimming pool, garden and parks, fountains and even a creche’ having 
become the order of the day.111 Commenting on this changing typology, a 
young professional who recently bought a flat in such a complex observed that 
his choice of flat was determined by his need to lead an ‘organised lifestyle’ 
ECR-140304-01). 
 
With this changing environment comes a new framework of socio-
economic meanings, resulting in a reassessment by the new middle class of the 
value of collective presence. Imparting a new interpretation to the ‘paradigm of 
propertied citizenship’, their experience of becoming propertied is about 
participation in the mass consumer market. Driven by a sense of corporatism, 
free entrepreneurialism and consumption, the ‘corporatization of home’ is a 
                                                 
111 Kalidas, V. (1996, 2 September). Dream houses changing the skyline of Madras. The Hindu. 
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reality (McKenzie 1994: 142), where collective bargaining for consumption 
gains is normalised as a discourse. Instead of coming together simply to 
demand the provision of civic amenities, the new homeowners prefer 
‘collective bargaining for the inevitable goodies’ (AR-190304-02).   
 
In an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) of one of these integrated 
housing development, when the agenda seemed be dominated by the concerns 
of water and electricity, a committee member called order to the proceedings 
and insisted that instead of letting civic concerns derail the meeting, the focus 
should be on a creative implementation plan for the future. He then outlined a 
road map for the next one year with a list of desirable actions to be pursued. 
These included waste water treatment and recycling, installation of solar power 
panels, allocating space for a reading room/library, and increasing the green 
cover within the complex. He also highlighted the need to build on collective 
bargaining, whether it comes to service providers like cable TV and telephone, 
or tying up with retail outlets for mass discounts and promotional offers. 
Discussing the potential of increasing the revenue of the association he 
proposed displaying advertisement balloons, hoardings, leasing their rooftop to 
mobile phone companies for micro-towers, and even renting the complex out 
for film shoots.   
 
Whether all these items were unanimously endorsed by the residents is 
beside the point. What is significant is the fact that they are being discussed 
and debated. It is not uncommon to see retail agencies selling consumer 
products ranging from refrigerators and washing machines to cars and higher 
luxury goods, putting up temporary stalls in many of these complexes, with the 
associations even charging a fee for such displays (Figure 29). Residents’ 
associations convey an important institutional transformation reflecting an 
ideological shift towards the consumption characteristic of the neo-liberal 
consensus. The financial empowerment that the new middle class experience is 
mirrored in the way they run their associations. The associations are no longer 
run on a voluntary basis, tottering on meagre funds. Neither are they a hasty 
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response to some service crisis nor are they functioning in disarray. Many of 
the associations today work with the interest accrued from huge corpus 
funds/deposits and an expensive monthly subscription.  
 
Figure 29: Retail kiosks in a NMC residential complex 
 
Until recently, associations had generally functioned on an ad-hoc basis, 
without registering and without an organised attempt to raise reasonable 
revenue. Today, the trend has reversed with many apartment complexes 
choosing to not only register their association but also indulging in serious 
fund-raising activity. Nowadays, when purchasing a flat, an additional amount 
is paid by every homeowner towards the setting up of a corpus fund, the 
interest from which is used for the maintenance of the building. Being a 
registered outlet, the bye-laws of the associations are clearly written, 
explaining the rules and regulations, the responsibilities of the residents, and a 
check-list of dos and don’ts.  
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The suspicion is whether, as a result of institutionalisation, associations 
will begin to behave in the same manner as other rent-seeking groups in the 
city. Alternatively, being better organised, there is a potential for the 
associations to develop a civil society agenda which can extend beyond mere 
expressions of civic and consumer concerns, and engage instead with foresight 
on issues spanning the larger context of the city. This can be understood by 
looking at the relationship they establish with the state and other non-state 
actors who have a bearing in the fulfilment of their interests. So far these 
associations have operated in the name of their own welfare without a clear 
picture of their position or role as a key socio-political actor. To probe this 
further, the following section will consider the attitudes and responses of the 
residents’ associations (primarily those of the new middle class) in establishing 
a dialogue with other non-consumer groups, be it neighbouring residents’ 
associations, civil society organisations at the neighbourhood and city level, or 
the state. This will help map the position of residents’ associations in relation 
to the emerging geography of governance at the city level.  
 
5.3 A new geography of governance 
Appadurai (2002: 22-4) notes that the global aspirations of Third World cities 
are producing unexpected forms of alliances, and ‘a politics of 
partnership…between traditionally opposed groups, such as states, 
corporations, and workers’. The emerging ‘new geographies of 
governmentality’, according to him, is set in a complex terrain of relationship 
between the state, the official public sphere, civil society initiatives, and local 
communities, where one cannot be complacent about the traditional dynamics 
of power. With the state’s recent overt operation of bourgeois urban policies, it 
is important to understand how the new middle class residents’ associations 
play this politics of partnership, how they are defining their relationship with 
other actors, and if they are able to help ‘deepen democracy’ through this 
exercise. Their politics of partnership will be tested in the first instance in 
terms of the ability of the residents’ associations to federate with each other 
and operate on a wider canvas. At the second level, the enthusiasm of 
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residents’ associations to take up the cause of non-state or non-governmental 
actors will be examined. And finally, their desire/ability to assume a larger role 
in governance will be assessed through an examination of their engagement 
with the state.  
 
5.3.1 Federations and fragmentation 
Federations are a central feature in the geography of governmentality outlined 
by the new politics of partnership (Appadurai 2002). Yet, while federation is a 
seemingly innocuous concept that merely requires a formalised sense of union 
amongst a set of pre-existing collectives, on ground, it has often proved to be 
an uphill task, particularly when it comes to collecting together the efforts of 
residents. In Chennai, a common complaint relates to the tendency of residents’ 
associations to fragment and splinter in pursuit of smaller group interests. 
Thus, nearly every colony or Nagar association today begrudges the flat-
complexes for forming their own associations and internalising their concerns.  
 
Take for instance, the case of Valmiki Nagar, a residential colony along 
ECR plotted privately in the 1950s. With the establishment of an association, it 
was decreed that any purchaser should automatically become a member. But 
with many plots remaining vacant, there was little for the association to do. 
After the death of the original office-bearers, the association became dormant. 
When ULCRA was enforced in the mid-1970s, several owners sold their plots 
to flats promoters. In response to this transformation that brought in a new set 
of residents (in higher density) to the neighbourhood, a new association was 
reformed in the early 1980s, but it proved to be a non-starter. As the president 
of this association said: 
We thought we would go another round. The fact was every block of flats 
that came up had its own association. Their interest was not always the 
same as the interest of the entire area…..and therefore to have an 
association which will look after the interests of all these various kinds of 
buildings was meaningless. (ECR-150304-01) 
 
When asked whether the Nagar-level association had lost to the flats, his 
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response was: 
We didn’t even try. They overtook us, the growth overtook us. We did try 
I mean we did do something when there were about say twenty houses 
and two-three blocks of houses and so on. After that, this growth 
overtook us. (ECR-150304-01) 
 
As stated already in the beginning of this chapter, associations are mostly 
needed to address the essential civic concerns, especially that of garbage 
clearance and street maintenance. In Valmiki Nagar, residents of different 
blocks of flats along each street initially united together to form a street-based 
association, overriding the larger Nagar-level association. But even this 
worked well only for a short time. With the Corporation sub-contracting 
garbage collection and disposal to a private entity, there is less motivation for 
the residents to collectively organise themselves.112 Also, associational 
activities such as these often tend to be a first-generation exercise that fizzles 
out quickly when there is no one to take over. In Valmiki Nagar, the 
generational indifference is evident: 
[t]here is a ladies club of which my wife is a member. There these 
members are the people who came here years ago. The newcomers have 
evinced no interest what so ever. Only absolutely senior citizens, old 
people who have been here for a long time. (ECR-010304-01) 
 
When a woman resident of a relatively new flat complex was asked about her 
participation in the Valmiki Nagar residents’ association or the ladies club she 
said: 
I don’t know what collective forum can be there beyond the association 
of the building. I know about Valmiki Nagar Residents’ association 
vaguely. I don’t know about the ladies club. I am sure it is a very 
personalised thing with some old members who are not willing to hear. 
(ECR-070304-04) 
 
It is not just the Nagar associations who are bitter about this fragmentation 
phenomenon, but one acknowledged by the traffic commissioner of the city as 
well: 
                                                 
112 As noted in the previous chapter, CES-Onyx was contracted from 2000-07, with Neel Metal 
Fanalca winning the new tender in 2007. Since fieldwork was done in 2003-04, all references 
here are to CES-Onyx, or simply Onyx.  
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Each residential area, if you take it, earlier it was a bigger area, now 
every 200 houses have got one association. The moment flats or half a 
dozen flats come up, each flat….that itself becomes an association or 
colony like that large numbers have sprung up over the last few years. 
Like that, that are creating problems and they have their own internal 
problems of the association and other things. (GUGS-100904-02) 
 
Admitting that there will be shrinkage in their concerns, he was more worried 
about the limited purpose of these associations: 
…there are some associations, some of them we don’t know how they are 
existing, what they are existing for, if only for minimum internal very 
limited purpose of maintaining their own flats. Their associations exist 
only for that purpose. They collect Rs. 200/- or whatever it is to pay 
water supply and to take care of the cleanliness of the place. Beyond that 
they don’t look beyond that. (GUGS-100904-02) 
 
Given this natural propensity for fragmentation and secession, aspirations for 
federating together hit a formidable barrier. This tendency echoes Olson’s 
(1971) seminal work on collective goods and collective action, which 
illustrates that non-exclusivity and joint consumption features of collective 
goods make voluntary actions for larger groups uncertain. Residents’ 
associations are unsure about federating mainly because they are concerned 
about the extra-burden of responsibility they may have to shoulder. They are 
well-aware that federations require a lead association to become the de facto 
umbrella organisation that is expected to hold the different groups together. In 
reality, not many are willing to be the leader. As one association official 
explained, ‘we are not the big brother’ (ECR-100904-01).  
 
Nevertheless attempts at forming federations continue to take place.113 
But their main concern is their ability to foresee problems and policy changes. 
A recently formed federation explained that despite coming together, while 
                                                 
113 In early 2004, the city daily New Indian Express launched an Express Exnora Civic Forum. 
The objective of this exercise was many-fold, besides the fundamental one of bringing the 
different fragments of residents’ welfare associations under one umbrella. The idea was not 
only to delegate some valuable media space but also to bring the associations together as a 
more meaningful bloc-entity and create a reasonable interface with the civic authorities. To this 
extent, federations were formed in different neighbourhoods of the city and inaugural meetings 
were held on a grand scale. Since its initiation happened only towards the end of fieldwork, it 
was not possible to study this initiative.   
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physically their area of remit had enlarged, residents still kept raising the ‘same 
small issues’. Explaining this further, an official of this federation said: ‘you 
might think that you have enlarged your canvas. But people, they still prefer to 
think in compartments. They don’t want to go outside of their square’ (AR-
040304-02). Also, they found that residents’ associations still retain their 
original characteristic of gathering themselves in response to a crisis rather 
than acting in anticipation and irrespective of crises. As a result they are unable 
to engage with the larger issues of the city. Thus, federations that had been 
formed in earlier conditions as a response to a specific crisis found themselves 
disbanded immediately afterwards, exhausted by their own efforts. 
 
ECR Federation: running out of steam114 
One of the earliest example of a federation of residents’ associations was 
formed in the 1984. Called as the Federation of Welfare Associations of East 
Coast Road (ECR Federation hereafter), it gathered together all the 
associations from Thirvanmiyur to Uthandi (the neighbourhoods running along 
the ECR) to address collectively several issues. Their prime concern was a 
government order that was passed in the mid-1970s prohibiting the 
construction of houses along the coastal roads. Many residential plots had 
already been sold (mostly to the middle class) prior to this regulation, and the 
owners feared that they wouldn’t be able to construct their houses hereafter. 
The federation made a representation to the government, and filed a writ 
petition in the High Court. Judgement was passed in their favour and, 
encouraged by this success, the federation used its collective prowess to 
procure basic infrastructure services for the middle-class colonies.  
 
In the early 1990s, the federation proved to be a powerful voice again, 
when the city was reeling under an acute water shortage. Looking for new 
sources, the official water supply and management body, Metrowater, dug a 
                                                 
114 This section is based on an interview with the president of this federation (ECR-070404-
01). 
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series of bore-wells along the southern coastal belt where water was abundant 
and of good quality. ECR Federation rallied against this exploitation of their 
settlement stretch, and even though they understood that their opposition was 
denying the rest of the city a crucial supply, they argued that this operation 
spurred illegal activities in the private sector, creating what is now commonly 
referred to as the ‘water mafia’. Their efforts have been futile on this issue as 
the ECR belt continues to be pumped indiscriminately for water. In 2003, 
amidst yet another water crisis, the Federation found itself tried and tired, a 
rather exhausted spectator to what in their eyes is a spurious operation and to 
others an essential service.  
 
At the time of fieldwork, an attempt was being made to reinvigorate the 
Federation and address yet again not only the issues of unauthorised and 
excessive water pumping but also other development concerns. In recent years, 
land values along ECR have spiralled amidst a glitter of leisure and 
entertainment facilities (Chapter Three).  Irrespective of whether they are 
approved or not, plots along ECR are in great demand. The Federation finds 
itself in a tricky situation in terms of allowing membership to unapproved 
developments. Admittance of new members is a burning issue, distracting their  
renewal efforts. Their reluctance is also due to the diversification of class 
groups along the ECR from the earlier mostly middle-class settlements, to a 
more heterogeneous composition, including the rich, upper classes, different 
rungs of the middle class, as well as the poor and marginalised groups. As a 
result of this heterogeneity, middle-class associations shun federations citing 
their unwillingness to form cross-class alliances.  
 
5.3.2 Federations: cross-class alliance 
Residents’ associations have a tendency to thrive on the homogeneity of class 
interests making it virtually impossible for them to extend beyond their class 
groups. When discussing the success of their associations, residents often 
highlighted the need to be on the same wavelength. In an ironic fashion, while 
many residents in the new flat-complexes heralded the cosmopolitanism of the 
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new middle class, proudly claiming that there are people from all parts of the 
world residing in their complex, when it came to the question of expanding 
their associational activity, they still preferred to remain fenced in within their 
strongly defined property boundary.115  
 
The reluctance to form an alliance with either the lower classes or the 
upper classes is a marked trait of these associations. For instance, the 
Kapaleeswarar Nagar residents’ welfare association in the neighbourhood of 
Neelangarai along ECR has members only from the middle-class settlement 
excluding the elite residents of Casuarina Drive and the upper class inhabitants 
of Sunrise Avenue in the area (Figure 30). For the association officials, the 
problem is mainly from the ‘other side’: 
See the main problem is they don’t interact with people you know. They 
are all isolated, they barricade themselves. Now, here, when we have 
welfare association meeting, they don’t come and attend the meetings or 
conduct their meetings here in our hall. They conduct the meetings in 
their own houses…..They don’t interact because they are all busy people, 
they are all business people….they cannot come and interact with us. 
They have their own way. There is one guy to clean Casuarina Drive, one 
to clean Sunrise Avenue, like this it happens. (ECR-210304-01) 
 
A different version emerges when a resident of Casuarina Drive was 
interviewed to clarify the allegation. He said that for a while the residents of 
Casuarina Drive were members of the Kapaleeswarar Nagar association but 
merely as observers with no voting powers. Finding the association to be 
involved in ‘useless functions’, he said that they eventually withdrew from the 
association (ECR-120904-01).  
                                                 
115 Their reaction is a reminder of some scholars’ reservation about cosmopolitan citizenship as 
they fear that it is merely an articulation of ‘an appropriate ideology for the “global village” of 
the new liberal managerial class’ (Harvey 2000: 530).  
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Figure 30: Social fragmentation in Neelangarai, Chennai 
 
Even as one resident commented proudly that the middle class are crucial to 
spreading a sense of equality, reducing disparity, and making the city more 
lively (AR-060304-01), many middle-class associations are wary of 
collaboration with other associations, even if they are from the middle class. 
While an association on paper and in its bye-laws recognises the need ‘[t]o 
associate and to co-operate with any external agency or similar associations in 
the neighbourhood to actively promote common interest and maintain a safe, 
clean, healthy and happy environment’, the reality is different.116 Most of the 
associations insist that they are bogged down by internal problems relating to 
their daily needs, and haven’t reached the stage yet of federating with other 
associations. They also reveal a rigid mental block against federations resulting 
from their petty fear of compromising whatever little advantage they may have 
                                                 
116 Based on material provided by ECR-250304-02 
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gained. There is little conviction that federations could actually strengthen their 
association. The ones who do express confidence in a federal approach are a 
limited minority, and are plagued by self-doubt about the feasibility of such an 
initiative. 
 
Unable to look upwards (to the upper class) or sideways (to other 
middle-class groups), it is equally impossible for these residents’ associations 
to look towards the poor and working class communities. If anything it is 
literally a downward condescending glance. There are numerous preconceived 
biases in the middle class minds about the poor that prevents the formation of a 
democratic partnership. This is a major hurdle in achieving a cross-class 
alliance for federations to operate successfully.  
 
Engaging with the political society: patronage, not partnership 
In many Indian cities, despite the insignificant physical distances that separate 
different social classes, social mechanisms have been devised to keep their 
interests spatially apart. Interactions between the classes are still structured 
hierarchically, and an inherent quality of the relationship between the middle  
class and the poor is one of patronage. In the early post-independence decades, 
the urban middle class provided social, cultural and moral leadership to the 
urban neighbourhoods with an associational life that was almost caste-like and 
revolved around a patron-client relationship (Chatterjee 2004). This notion of 
patronage continues to define efforts extended by middle-class residents’ 
associations towards the lower-income groups living in their areas, with claims 
to public spiritedness underlined by tones of charitable benevolence. Common 
area billboards in the new flat-complexes are pinned with requests by 
conscientious residents requesting the fellow-residents to donate generously 
old clothes, and school text books to help the poor and the needy (Box 4). 
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To all residents: 
It is time that we as a community try and do something for the needy and under 
privileged. With that in mind, we have come up with the following plan. At the end 
of every month, we plan to collect all old newspapers and magazines at the 
Children’s room, located in B Block. We will then dispose the newspapers and 
magazines. The money collected from the disposal of the newspapers will be used 
for charity and we will keep you informed of the details. We also encourage 
residents to participate in these activities.  
Box 4: Billboard notice in a residential complex on ECR 
 
In Neelangarai, middle-class residents of Kapaleeswarar Nagar started a ladies 
club in the late-1980s to promote interaction amongst the residents. A few 
years later they started a Sowbhagya Educational Trust to help the poorer 
families from the adjoining village and the fishermen kuppam. While the 
membership of the ladies club is confined only to women from the middle and 
upper class households, the Trust is seen as a way of reaching out to the lower 
class settlements within the area. When queried as to whether the women from 
the kuppam or the village have membership to the ladies club, the president of 
the Trust who is also the founding member of the club insisted that the Trust 
was formed specifically to meet the needs of the kuppam and village 
communities and that membership to the ladies club doesn’t extend to them: 
You know this Sowbhagya Educational Trust is concentrating focussing 
only their problem. Membership is difficult. Those ladies [from the 
kuppam] don’t come. How we are meeting with them is because of the 
Trust. Because most of the children, the Trust’s children’s mothers are 
like that, fishermen, construction workers, servant maids and like 
that…..once in three months we will keep a counselling, meet the 
parents…..we do that and help if they want any help with jobs like that, 
government loans, etc. (ECR-190304-03) 
 
In response to why they are not allowed membership to the club, she explained 
that: 
If you become a member of the association, they have to pay some 
money, payment is also there, they have to come well-dressed. If you 
come for a meeting and they have to talk they have to mingle with 
everybody and they are finding it very difficult to run their own bread and 
butter for their children and their own family….how can you expect them 
to be our members, ok..this economic difference you know makes a lot. 
(ECR-190304-03) 
Absent Societies/Chapter 5: Residents’ Associations                            
209 
 
Though she was proud of the fact that the ladies club helped to include women 
from the upper class households in a situation where Kapaleeswarar Nagar 
residents’ association had failed, it was clear that a separate organisation was 
required for engaging with the poorer communities, conceived on a charitable 
level, not one of partnership. It is evident that their sense of patronage towards 
the poor comes from the superiority of the middle class as employers. The 
slums continue to be viewed as a ‘necessary evil or eye-sore’ if the everyday 
needs of the middle-class households are be serviced by the domestic maids, 
the drivers, the security guards, and the errand-boys who live in the squatter 
settlements right next to them. In such circumstances, Appadurai’s (2002) 
mooting of a politics of partnership transposing across classes seems to be 
fabled and utopian, at least in the less formal set-up of residents’ associations.  
 
There is one instance where some semblance of a partnership seems to 
have been established. In the middle-class neighbourhood of KK Nagar near 
Arcot Road, a federation was recently launched. This started in January 2003 
as an attempt to bring the existing sixty or so associations in the neighbourhood 
under one umbrella and display a sincere commitment to establishing a true 
partnership by engaging all classes in this initiative. Bordering along the 
middle-class colonies is a series of TNSCB slum resettlement colonies 
comprising of the poorer groups. Associations representing their interests have 
been invited to join the federation. The response has been cautious as every 
small association, especially the ones relating to the poor suspect a mismatch 
of interests and fear a dilution of their own agenda. At the time of fieldwork, 
only one of them had chosen to join the federation.  
 
In the post-liberalisation years, with the state making a u-turn to indulge 
the civil societies and its middle-class members, the political society of the 
poor finds itself considerably weakened. While some settlements still feel that 
their basic-needs and welfare demands are best met via political society, there 
are others who are beginning to toy with the idea of aligning themselves with 
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civil society. As threats of political reprisal are not as effective as they used to 
be, they are left to adopt the ‘middle-class politics of negotiation’ rather than 
the ‘lower class politics of confrontation’. The president of this Nagar that 
chose to join the federation explained that there was at one point a city-wide 
association for the TNSCB resettlement colonies, but their agendas became 
dominated by politics, rowdyism, and caste-based interests. He argued that 
political societies revolved around the charisma of leadership, wherein, the 
voices of the non-followers are stifled and as their particular settlement were 
disadvantaged by the lack of a strong caste identity, they didn’t find it 
beneficial. He added, ‘we don’t want leadership, we want consensus……we 
have realised that political participation is not effective in obtaining common 
services for the residents’. His remark on using political alignments for using 
favours was that ‘this is not about freedom struggle but basic needs struggle’: 
We are attracted by the fact that their [middle class] associations are more 
democratic, more decent…..our sangams [associations] need to be 
cultivated like that in thought….. at the end of the day, political ideas 
come from the middle class. They are the ones who determine policies, 
politics and economics………so we thought it will be better for us to 
federate with the middle class who are educated and can bridge the divide 
between the lower and upper classes’. (AR-070304-02) 
 
Through the federation, they were attempting to chart a new politics of 
visibility in order to reverse their persistent condition of civic invisibility. But 
at the same time, they are aware that their interests are divided by one essential 
feature—the middle class don’t want to lose what they have, while the poor are 
seeking what they don’t have. He emphasised that for this effort to be 
successful, it has to be one of kootuthanmai, which roughly translates as 
cooperation or collaboration. He stressed that ‘we don’t want help from them, 
we are just interested in representing ourselves through a ‘letter-pad 
association’. 117  
 
                                                 
117 He was referring to the fact that middle class associations are registered, and write letters of 
protests and requests to the concerned authorities on ‘proper’ stationery with letterheads, which 
according to him could possibly gain better attention than handing petitions in a political rally 
or making oral requests to their slum-lord.   
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 While it was too early to make a call on the success of this experiment, 
this concern over such collaborations slipping into patronage is well-founded, 
since patronage is often mistakenly celebrated as partnership. An article in The 
Hindu reported that in one area, ‘[c]utting across class barriers, the residents of 
Radhakrishnan Nagar [a middle-class colony] and Sivagamipuram [a slum] 
joined hands to improve their living conditions’.  The article explained that a 
lack of civic consciousness amongst the slum dwellers resulted in street litter, 
open air defecation and clogged drains, resulting in a general stink in the area 
affecting the middle-class residents. The residents ‘decided to step out of their 
mansions and draw up a plan to keep the neighbourhood clean. They took the 
first logical step…and then tried to rope in the slum people from the 
neighbouring Sivagamipuram’, the article reported. The journalist added that  
…cutting across class barriers, the residents of Radhakrishnan Nagar and 
Sivagamipuram came together to keep their area clean. While the 
moneyed class contribute a substantial sum towards the upkeep, the poor 
demonstrate their will by not littering the roads and discarding all the 
wastes in a bin constructed for the purpose. The results are palpable, as 
the environs have become cleaner. 118 
 
In making the above observation, he failed to question whether the middle 
class were simply buying civic adherence from the slum dwellers. Patronage is 
an old habit, but it is not the only dampener to the pursuit of partnership. In 
recent times, more than patronage, middle-class attitudes towards the poor have 
changed considerably from passive indifference associated with their patronage 
tendencies to one of active incrimination amidst an increasing portrayal of the 
poor as the undeserving class.  
 
Engaging with the political society: illegitimacy and incrimination 
Relationship between the middle class and the poor in urban India generally 
keeps shifting between benevolence/pity and castigation. But recently it seems 
to be based less on the former and more on the latter, with the middle class 
                                                 
118 Cleaning up together. (1997, 22 September). The Hindu, p. Metro Section - II. 
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viewing the poor in terms of illegitimacy and criminality. For instance, 
increasingly, instead of sympathising with the slums for their poor living 
conditions, slum-dwellers are ostracised as anti-social elements, involved in 
illegal and criminal activities. This attitude parallels a similar change in the 
position of the Indian judiciary where in contrast to the earlier position of the 
Supreme Court invoking Article 21 of the constitution upholding the right of 
every person to shelter and housing, by 2000, the court observed, “Rewarding 
an encroacher on public land with a free alternative site is like giving a reward 
to a pickpocket”. This characterisation of the poor as drawn by the court, 
likening a slum dweller to a pickpocket was a definitive departure from the 
acknowledgement that the struggles of the poor to survive deserve respect and 
support (Kumar 2005). Even the press hasn’t resisted participating in this 
onslaught. ‘Encroachment of roads / illegal activities’ read a headline in The 
Hindu, describing the pavement dwellers as not only a hindrance to the local 
residents, but also as indulging in anti-social activities and illegal trading.119 
 
Middle-class residents voicing their concerns over the development of 
their neighbourhood exhibit a marked intolerance towards what they consider 
as the illegitimate presence of the lower classes. One resident exclaimed 
angrily: 
Today there are associations for everything. It needs to be controlled and 
limited. Take for example, this hawkers’ association, the association for 
platform businesses. It is a completely baseless association. It is illegal. It 
is them who have stolen the footpaths of T Nagar and Pondy Bazaar away 
from us. (ECR-020904-01) 
 
Today, little sympathy is expressed for the pavement vendors. Pavement 
vendors are viewed loathsome by the residents who do everything possible to 
have them removed:  
This whole area used to be like full of vendors we could never exit 
Harrington Road early because everybody would collect around the tea 
bunk and drink this tea. So now we have removed all of that, cleaned up. 
                                                 
119 Bhattacharya, S. (2003, 15 November). Encroachment of roads / illegal activities: Jamarah 
Thottam residents suffer in silence. The Hindu, p. 3. 
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Just started a green patch so like that you couldn’t go across and stand 
there you know. (HRRA-210204-01) 
 
The informality of the trade and habitation of the poor is equated simply with 
irregularity and illegitimacy. Presented as interlopers, ‘people who have no 
business to be there’ (SR-190304-01), middle-class residents associations end 
up if not with outright antagonism then a not-so-friendly relationship with the 
lower classes.  
 
 This is despite the fact that the middle-class residents clearly draw on 
the services of the poor for their daily domestic needs. In return, at one level, 
the poor employees often depend on their middle-class employers for petty 
loans. At another level, for major festivals, slum organisations solicit middle-
class colonies for funds. While the middle-class individual is not so reluctant to 
extend a monetary favour to his domestic employee, in the case of the latter, 
when it comes to one association asking another for financial contribution, 
there is a clear expression of resentment and portrayal of such a demand as 
extortion (see Kaviraj 1997).  
 
 Not willing to have any kind of relationship with the poor, be it 
voluntary subscription or coerced extortion, many of the NMC developments 
choose to wall themselves in, more or less creating a ‘fortified enclave’ 
(Caldeira 1999). The poor are allowed entry to this citadel only as domestic 
employees, subject to strict control and surveillance.120 But such efforts to 
internalise the environment is easier said than done. The landscape of most 
Third World cities is unmapped to such an extent that it allows the proliferation 
of multiple territorial claims, creating an ambiguous condition of ‘volatile 
geography’, and rendering the entire system of land ownership records and 
boundaries completely negotiable (Roy 2002). This became apparent when one 
                                                 
120 These enclaves are not as ostentatious and fortified as the ones that Caldeira (1999) 
describes in Sao Paulo where they are caricatured with high walls and fences, armed guards, 
and technologies of surveillance. But her description of the upper class fear of contact with and 
contamination from the poor increasingly associating them with criminality while continuing to 
depend on them for domestic service is eerily true here.  
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residential complex tried to construct a boundary wall and demarcate itself 
clearly from the surrounding lower-class settlement. What should have been a 
simple exercise of erecting a wall turned into a tussle with the local people 
living around the development who contested the boundary line. As 
resentments grew, even before the wall could be completed, it was destroyed 
allegedly by ‘these local people’ (ECR-040904-01). 
 
 Given this unpleasant history, the residents’ association of the complex 
decided not to have any relationship at an associational level with the local 
community. Elaborating on the ‘bad blood’, an association official said: 
..even before any of us moved in, they had a big fight with the builder. 
These people did not allow the builder or the Corporation from sinking 
the pipes, that is, the sewage pipes. They did not allow that. Because their 
area is here. So far they have been enjoying this area and now we are here 
more people are going to commute. Generally, I mean the haves don’t, I 
mean the have nots don’t like the haves….they wanted some money for 
consecrating the temple, they want the money for putting ( ) the land 
opposite, that is, the playground. They wanted to put wall around that. 
They wanted money from the builder. They have an association. They 
wanted money for their association. I don’t know why somebody, I mean, 
my builder should give money to them. These are the things that they did. 
Here it is. Then hundred women gathered and made a, I mean, gheraoed 
the builder and then police came and so many people came and many 
things happened okay. (ECR-040904-01). 
 
Portraying the issue as ‘more of they coming to us, we don’t go to them’, he 
was convinced that the only way of preventing the situation from snowballing 
was by having no relationship at all. Interestingly, he mixed the issues of 
extortion and encroachment in the same breath. As a middle-class resident, he 
felt disturbed and violated equally by the monetary insistence on subscriptions 
and spatial insistence by contesting the physical boundaries of their locality. 
But instead of his desire of having ‘nothing to do with these locals’, the 
situation has tipped the other way where a mutual atmosphere of antipathy and 
hostility pervades.  
 
Many residents in this complex acknowledge that the local community 
has been living there for a long time, before the arrival of the middle class, and 
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could obviously feel encroached upon as well, but instead of seeking a 
dialogue, they were convinced that non-interference was the best option. The 
middle-class colony of Kapaleeswarar Nagar in Neelangarai took a similar 
position towards the nearby fishermen kuppam:  
…..if you don’t interfere with them [the fishermen kuppam] there is no 
problem at all. They have been here for hundreds of years, thousands of 
years. They are there. They have settled there long back and we don’t 
want to be seen as encroachment. …..We don’t mind and we don’t 
interfere. (ECR-210304-01) 
 
Having said that, a penumbra of illegality and criminality casts a long shadow 
over their interactions with the poor, if it takes place at all. This Kapaleeswarar 
Nagar resident gave the particular example of one kuppam resident (a non-
fisherman) who conducted martial arts classes, in what he deemed were 
‘encroached’ spaces, first on the beach, and later in a temporary shed erected in 
one of the Nagar’s undeveloped plots. When the association along with the 
owner of the plot complained and tried to evict him, he gathered a few 
fishermen to stop the eviction. Afraid of going to the police, the plot owner 
engaged a goon from another neighbourhood to evict him. But the resident 
narrating this incident insisted that ‘they [the fishermen] wouldn’t have come 
on their own, they came because [the encroacher] summoned them to come. 
Otherwise they wouldn’t have come’ (ECR-210304-01). It was clear in his 
mind that the fishermen were acting as mercenaries in the hands of the 
encroacher.  
 
 A similar incident happened in Valmiki Nagar where a conflict over 
the use of the adjoining road emerged between a TNHB residential colony and 
a private club, both on the seaside (Figure 31). The residents’ association, 
convinced that the road belonged to their development, had it barricaded to 
prevent the club customers from using it. After several efforts to remove the 
barricade had failed: 
…the club people what they did was they brought people from the 
kuppam, incited them and overnight eighty to hundred people came, 
broke down the barricade, made it nothing and went away. After that they 
[the club owners] called us for talks. We went and said first replace the 
barricade then we can have talks. They thought the kuppam will be a 
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problem for us. We said clearly there is no problem between the kuppam 
and us. Tomorrow if we tell them, they will do similar thing to you. They 
are only an instrument. (ECR-150304-02) 
 
Figure 31: Conflict in Valmiki Nagar between ‘civil’ and ‘political’ society 
 
In the minds of the middle-class residents, this is another reason why they 
don’t subscribe to the idea of partnering with the lower classes, as they 
perceive the poorer communities like the fishermen as mere ‘muscle power’, 
with no agenda of their own. From the above narrated incidents, it is clear that 
the middle-class associations believed that the fishermen’s support could be 
purchased if needed, and hence didn’t need a formal partnership. But these 
associations have a dismissive attitude not just towards the poor, but also 
towards more institutionalised efforts taken by NGOs, even when it involved 
activities specific to their neighbourhood concerns.  
 
5.3.3 Engaging with civil society ‘proper’ 
In the minds of many residents, their associations are frail structures, and to 
extend their operations beyond their own property boundaries is a Herculean 
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task. Identifying the need for a strong gelling agent to hold their efforts 
together, many residents identified NGOs and ‘proper’ civil society 
organisations as the necessary apparatus to take the lead and raise the stakes to 
a different level. But there is confusion over how they conceive and imagine 
NGOs and civil society organisations. Some of them continue to view them as 
merely charitable organisations with a clientalist agenda while others are 
beginning to grasp its role in terms of people empowerment and grass-roots 
mobilisation.  
 
Residents identify the crucial role of NGOs and ‘proper’ civil society 
organisations based on various criteria: that their associations are inadequate to 
tackle the challenges because of practical and logical feasibility issues, and that 
there are proper, professional institutions to undertake these larger tasks. But 
by thus arguing, are they absolving themselves of a larger responsibility? 
Surprisingly, NGOs that work closely with the residents’ associations 
acknowledge that residents’ associations are not capable of tackling larger city 
level issues. Thus, an official of Exnora, a high-profile NGO working closely 
with residents’ associations in managing the urban environment argued that: 
…all this social scientists and NGOs and everyone getting into this act is 
giving a far too technical definition to residents welfare associations. 
Residents welfare associations started off basically in areas where there 
was a need for improving infrastructure……this was more a grouping of 
people for getting some basic infrastructure. Now if you expect that this 
group is going to be perpetual and that they are going to be regularly 
participating in things like waste management and all that, it is going to 
be difficult. So you need this civil society institutions to initially set-up 
things, run it for a while but ultimately there has got be a more perfect 
group. It could be a professional NGO. When I say a professional NGO I 
am talking about those who are not for profit but run on very professional 
lines and things like that. Ultimately they are the ones who run it on a 
long term basis. (MBN-310804-01)121 
                                                 
121 Exnora was started in 1989 by MB Nirmal to promote self-help concept among citizens in 
areas of environmental management, with specific focus on municipal solid waste 
management. The parent organisation is Exnora International under which there are various 
affiliate wings – national exnoras, state exnoras, district exnoras, forum of civic exnoras and 
finally the smallest unit of civic exnoras, functioning at the street or colony level, in addition to 
other initiatives such as the Naturalists’ Club, Women’s Guild, Farmers’ Exnora and Friends of 
the Beach Exnora. But it is the civic exnora which has captured the attention of residents’ 
associations who use its platform to negotiate with the state authorities for the procurement of 
better amenities.  
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At the same time, this NGO representative admits that contemporary lifestyle 
choices are not creating a condition where the residents’ association can 
intersect and interact with NGOs or any formal civil institutions. He cites 
different reasons, including the ‘peculiarities of vocation’ which keeps the 
employees for longer hours at their office desks. More importantly, he 
identifies the culprit in the new homeownership trend as it has transformed the 
way people are serviced. As the Corporation outsources civic tasks like 
garbage collection and disposal to the private sector, NGOs like Exnora feel 
that privatisation is an indulgent way of servicing the residents, drastically 
reducing their civic engagement and sense of voluntarism. Specifically 
remarking on the multinational company (Onyx) that was hired for garbage 
collection and disposal, he says: 
 …this company was hired for a very smallest thing like taking the 
garbage to Pallikaranai [the landfill site] and setting fire to it. You can 
ask me how Onyx has affected. We had about 700 Civic Exnora branches 
where people were under a kind of pressure to do source separation with 
no option having been left to deal with the garbage. What they found with 
the Onyx coming and doing this work so efficiently, they lost the 
initiative for source separation with no compulsion anymore for them to 
do them. They say now Onyx is doing it so why should we do 
it…..Originally it was public, Corporation was doing that, then it became 
volunteerism, Exnora was doing it, so if you compare before, public and 
volunteerism, public means Corporation, then volunteerism was 
something great because people had ownership towards their job and 
ownership towards achievement. Now volunteerism has been replaced by 
something, I would say, a blunder, in that sense, by commercialism. So 
you have to pay through your nose that too foreign exchange to foreign 
company…….people’s participation has been wiped out by our, what you 
call, privatisation. (MBN-310804-01) 
 
If people are willing to ‘pay through their nose’, as he says, to get privatised 
services rather than go through the whole drudgery of voluntary collective 
action, it is also because garbage collection companies like Onyx represent a 
status marker where neighbourhoods that are served by them consider 
themselves privileged (Chapter Four), and others which aren’t try to procure 
them in informal and unofficial ways.  
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This sense of paying for services comes from an enhanced revelation of 
the residents as consumers in the neo-liberal climate. When nearly 400 families 
reside together in a complex-style development, they view the benefits of 
collective bargaining from a consumerist mode. Their material interests have 
expanded not only in terms of consumer durables but also in perceiving public 
goods such as water, electricity, gas, telephones as the same, that is, pay and 
procure, if possible from the public sector, and if not, from the private 
suppliers. Thus, in many flat complexes, developers promise twenty-four hour 
uninterrupted electricity with generator back-up in a context where electricity 
supply is erratic and subject to illegal grid-tapping. An NGO official reflecting 
on this explained that for a long time there was a legal issue attached to 
consumption where consumers were considered as only those who pay for 
services. Thus, 
a whole range of everyday problems are associated with things that you 
necessarily don’t pay for and certainly not directly, maintaining roads, 
civic issues, street lighting and paving and all of that, any civic, standard 
civic issues, planning issues, all of this, you cannot say that you are 
paying the CMDA for something, you are paying the corporation for 
something. (CAG-030904-01) 
 
Today, the situation has changed with increasing commodification of housing 
and the facilities that come with it: 
So you find tailor-made schemes which make it more attractive […] to 
buy a house the kind of features, things that are put in place are all; don’t 
necessarily fit in with our scheme of things. 24-hour electricity supply for 
example I think works against; for example electricity. I will give you the 
example and I will tell you why this doesn’t necessarily work in the 
interest of the rest of the society. When you have an apartment block that 
is being built say 250-260 apartments and part of the features the 
apartment provides is 24-hour electricity back-up, what you are doing is 
giving up your rights as being 270 consumers together to ensure reliable 
electricity from the department. Because what you are doing is you are 
investing in an alternative system which is sort of factored in your own 
cost whereas if you were to put that money into a sort of a community 
struggle to get better electricity then everyone would benefit from this. 
But instead what happens is some of these guys are even willing to get 
off the chain, get off the grid…..they are willing to run hours and hours 
on it, spending whatever money it takes, but they don’t realise that every 
time they do this, it is a further disincentive for the system to improve, for 
the overall system to improve…..as citizens you don’t realise that there is 
an electricity problem in the state or in the city you live in because you 
never faced the electricity problem so then you believe the system is 
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excellent and electricity is supplied all the time and constant and all of 
that. (CAG-030904-01) 
  
There is a fundamental change in the perception and position of the new 
middle-class residents. If they are faced with a crisis, say of water, they rally 
together not to petition officials or public authorities but to raise resources, to 
investigate opportunities of private supply, such as purchasing water from 
private tankers and lorries, or having expensive treatment plants installed. This 
affects to a large extent not only the way residents’ associations view their 
collectivity but also the possibility of their collaboration with ‘proper’ civil 
society organisations. To explain this phenomenon better the following section 
analyses the efforts of an initiative in Valmiki Nagar called Puduvellam, a 
‘proper’ NGO formed by a local resident with aspirations of collaborating with 
the residents’ associations in the area to tackle concerns of water and other 
environmental issues.122 
 
Mobilising for water 
Despite the prominent presence of three major waterways criss-crossing the 
geography of the city, namely the Cooum and Adyar River and the 
Buckingham Canal, Chennai has for a long time been a water-starved city 
relying on rain-fed reservoirs and ground-water for its supply. Irrigation tanks 
were a prominent source of water harvesting for much of South India where the 
rivers are non-perennial. Different types of tanks were used to tap rain water 
including percolation ponds, natural lakes, artificial reservoirs and temple 
tanks. Of these, temple tanks proved to be quite crucial as the religious faith of 
the people could be harnessed successfully to protect the environment and 
natural resources. Chennai city had at one point 39 temple tanks in addition to 
the several yeris or artificial tanks to tap and harvest the rain water.123 Though 
the exact number of temple tanks that remain in the city today is not clear, most 
of them are dry, the result of poor maintenance and recharge. One such tank is 
                                                 
122 Puduvellam means ‘new water’ in Tamil 
123 Sacred tanks of South India. (2002). Chennai: CPR Environmental Education Centre. 
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attached to the Marundeeswarar temple in Thiruvanmiyur and the activities of 
Puduvellam were dedicated to its rejuvenation.  
 
 The neighbourhood of Thiruvanmiyur was originally a village on its 
own with a well-recorded ancient history dating back to the early Pallava 
period of the Sangam age (first and fifth century AD). The history of the 
temple is steeped in legendary narratives. Its five main water bodies (two wells 
inside the temple complex, two tanks – one, axially fronting the temple, and a 
large lake nearby) were celebrated for their sacredness and holy redeeming 
qualities. Today, the imposing presence of the temple complex on the 
surrounding geography is greatly diminished, overwhelmed by urbanisation 
and encroachments. The two tanks are empty and the lake has long since 
disappeared, making way for concretised urban growth (Figure 32).  
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Figure 32: Marundeeswarar Temple, Thiruvanmiyur, Chennai 
Source: INTACH, Chennai 
 
In 1993, an attempt to revitalise the temple area was made when the residents’ 
associations in the vicinity (including the predominant one of Valmiki Nagar) 
joined with the Rotary Club of Madras to desilt the tank and conserve rain 
water. The scheme, the ‘Thaneer’ Project, seemed a success when 7 feet of 
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water was reported in the tank after a good monsoon.124  But within a few 
years, the tank dried up, falling once again into disrepair. Various reasons were 
cited for this failure, one being that the primary responsibility rested with the 
Valmiki Nagar Residents Welfare Association, which by the late-1990s had 
become a dormant body, and thus was unable to maintain the tank. Another 
alleged reason is that in the process of desilting the tank the workers, appointed 
by the Rotary Club, punctured the clay bed crucial for retaining the rain water, 
resulting in the rain water seeping through the sandy layer.  
 
 A decade later in 2003, a new committee was formed to undertake one 
again efforts to revitalise the tank and its vicinity. This time the project was at a 
larger scale involving the State authorities from the Hindu Religious and 
Charitable Endowment Department, the Chennai Corporation, Chennai Water 
Supply and Sewage Board (Metrowater), the Highways Department, and 
Archaeological Survey of India, working in close collaboration with the local 
communities represented by Puduvellam through the coordinating presence of 
the Tamil Nadu Chapter of the national NGO, the Indian National Trust for Art 
and Cultural Heritage/INTACH (Figure 33).125  
 
                                                 
124 Bharathi, R. (1994, 9-15 January). Cleaned Marudeeswarar Temple Tank handed over. 
Adayar Times, p. 8. ‘Thaneer’ means water in Tamil. 
125 INTACH was founded in 1984 as a membership-based organisation serving as a catalyst for 
heritage awareness and conservation in India.  
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Figure 33: Puduvellam, Marundeeswarar Temple, Thiruvanmiyur, Chennai 
 
The restoration of the tank paralleled an authoritative, almost dictatorial 
exercise undertaken by the State Government to make rainwater harvesting 
mandatory in all buildings. While much fanfare has been made about the 
success of this initiative, in the case of Thiruvanmiyur, the tank project 
involved more than rainwater harvesting. The exercise presented an 
opportunity to rid the tank vicinity of encroachments, besides the said objective 
of retaining water in the tank. Those involved emphasised the need to keep the 
tank clean of garbage and prevent people from using it as an open toilet. 
Neighbourhood residents were asked to participate as volunteers, serving as a 
crucial maintenance and surveillance crew. Puduvellam’s role was mainly to 
canvas for their support and the enlisting of volunteers.  
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In this regard, Puduvellam was responsible for disseminating 
information on the project, and raising partial funds for the renovation (it has 
offered to contribute 25 per cent of the estimated cost of the project, with the 
remaining 75 per cent coming from the Chennai Corporation). To this end, it 
first conducted a Children’s Art Festival focussing on the theme of 
conservation and water, held within the large tank in March 2003, and later Adi 
Perukku, a Hindu ritual was held in the smaller tank in August 2003. Greeting 
cards made from the Children’s Art Festival were sold to raise money. Finally 
on 10 and 11 January 2004, a neighbourhood festival called as the 
Thiruvanmiyur Thiruvizha was held around the temple tank area with music, 
dance and competitions for women, youth and children.126  Unfortunately for 
Puduvellam, these events failed to highlight the woods for the trees as its core 
objective was lost on the middle-class residents. Residents attended 
enthusiastically the festivities, but failed to commit as volunteers of the project 
for several reasons (Figure 34).  
                                                 
126 In another neighbourhood in the city, centred again around a historic temple and its tanks—
Mylapore—the residents of the area also launched an environment-based development 
initiative called ‘Namma Mylapore’ again in collaboration with INTACH to revitalise this 
historic part of the city. A Mylapore festival is successfully held annually, organised by the 
local neighbourhood newspaper, Mylapore Times, with much publicity, thanks to some 
generous amount of corporate sponsorship. 
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Figure 34: Activities of Puduvellam 
Source: Puduvellam (ECR-300304-03) 
 
Many claimed that they did not have first-hand information about the initiative. 
They insisted that their participation was not solicited directly by personal 
door-to-door requests, and they got to know about the initiative only through 
reports in the local neighbourhood newspaper. Puduvellam had advertised in 
the neighbourhood weekly Adayar Times, calling for volunteers to help clean 
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the tank, with details about the organisation as well as special event days 
including festivals and cleaning-up days. Much of the information was lost on 
an average reader, whose eyes train on selected items such as festival 
announcements. They view them as an innovative alternative to leisure and 
entertainment, but choose to ignore the volunteering request. A long-time 
resident of Valmiki Nagar, an ex-government official, who has been involved 
in the residents’ association and other neighbourhood level initiatives, when 
asked about Puduvellam said: 
But I must say they are doing good work I am sure they are but they have 
not done they have not exerted themselves to reach out to the people here. 
That’s the impression I have got. Nobody has come and seen me. I am 
not complaining. I could not expect anyone to come and see me but the 
fact is they have not gone about doing that. Occasionally we get a 
pamphlet or something like that but that is good work. Fault lies on both 
sides. I have a feeling that they are well-meaning people, I am sure there 
are a number of reasons in starting this work which is excellent work but 
the impression I have and I may be wrong here is that they did not 
indulge in much of an attempt to get everybody together and of course 
even if they had everybody would not even have come in but a larger 
number might have come in, and quite frankly people here are not all 
that interested either. (ECR-150304-01, emphasis added) 
 
Puduvellam officials refute the claim that proper dissemination was not done, 
insisting that personal door-to-door campaigning was undertaken with 
pamphlets distributed to every household outlining a simple request 
‘Puduvellam invites you all for a meeting to discuss the role of civil society in 
the protection and conservation of the Marundeeswarar Temple Tank’. But few 
Valmiki Nagar residents attended the meeting. This is mainly because Valmiki 
Nagar residents, as illustrated by the comments of this resident above, view 
Puduvellam as something outside of the Valmiki Nagar community, 
associating it with Thiruvanmiyur and its village. In referring to Puduvellam he 
says ‘they are well-meaning people’, and by terming himself and his colony as 
‘people here’, he clearly applies a process of othering which makes this need to 
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find common cause as a community difficult, despite the fact that Puduvellam 
is an initiative started by a resident of Valmiki Nagar. 127 
 
Residents also view Puduvellam as a charitable institution to which 
they can at best make monetary contributions but not commit to personal 
participation. There are others who have focussed more on its accessory 
activities such as clearing up the encroachments and resolving some of the 
traffic issues in the area while failing to notice the primary objective of water 
management. As a Puduvellam official pointed out, ‘when we organise a talk 
on water, people don’t turn up. But later they say, we heard about it, we want 
to know about it’ (ECR-010404-02). Few of them have actually taken up the 
brooms and spade on Saturday and Sunday mornings to be physically present 
at the tank for cleaning exercises. Those who have engaged with this effort 
through direct participation see it as a fantastic objective but one that has to 
struggle against the wave of rigid Hindu traditions that prohibit such 
community-based actions or initiatives. 
 
If the residents of Valmiki Nagar do not want to get their hands dirty, it 
is because there are fundamental socio-religious strictures attached to this 
reluctance. The prevalent caste hierarchy creates a social stigma attached to 
garbage and its collection, where ‘Corporation workers who collect garbage, 
rag-pickers and scavengers are often dalits from the bottom of society with 
very few opportunities to mount the social ladder’ (Tropp 1998: 160).  Besides 
the children from the nearby schools who have signed on to the campaign, it is 
mostly the poor and lower class people from the village who turn up in large 
numbers for the cleaning exercises. This is something that the founder of 
Puduvellam, himself a resident of Valmiki Nagar, acknowledges (ECR-
300304-03).  
 
                                                 
127 This tendency of the middle class to rely on the process of othering to acquit themselves of 
social culpability will become clearer as we examine their engagement with public space 
concerns in the next chapter.  
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Indian scholars have speculated on the reluctance of most Indians to 
participate personally in efforts involving public cleaning. Both Kaviraj (1997) 
and Chakrabarty (1992) draw on the distinction between the inside (home) and 
the outside to reveal the anxieties of upper class/caste people who are 
accustomed to living in caste societies. In a very distinctive construction of 
communal space by the caste system, the middle class venture in the outside 
oblivious of the filth and convinced that this is a space for which they have no 
responsibility.128  
 
This interpretation explains the indifference of most upper 
caste/middle-class Valmiki Nagar residents to cleaning the tank. For, bound by 
their class/caste privileges, they seek solutions to the water crisis in a manner 
completely different from that of Puduvellam which is a long-term, grass-roots 
strategy. While residents acknowledged the need for a comprehensive 
environmental strategy to manage the water crisis, this was only at an abstract 
level. Their preference is to purchase water from private suppliers or even 
installing treatment plants for gray water recycling which, according to one 
resident, addresses better the ‘problem at hand’ (ECR-170304-01).  
 
If they have failed to find common cause here, it is also because the 
middle-class residents are convinced that such self-help programmes and 
grassroots initiatives are meant for the poor who are the ‘have-nots’, and that 
the ‘haves’ do not need bottom-up engagement. The agenda of Puduvellam, in 
their viewpoint, is more beneficial to the poorer community in the village as 
they are unable to afford water through private means and their role in the 
initiative is not as partners but as (financial) patrons. In a cause that is clearly 
underlined by class overtones, middle-class residents do not see any 
convergence with their own concerns. They see the tank improvement for its 
immediate benefits as a beautification project. When INTACH made a short 
film on the temple tank recording the memories of long-time Valmiki Nagar 
                                                 
128 This comes through in their use of public spaces which will be addressed in the next 
chapter.  
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residents, their recollections were mostly aesthetic, about how they could see 
fish in the tank, and the area around it being clean and without encroachments. 
Not many made the link between refilling the tank and recharging the ground 
water aquifer.  
 
Thus, in spite of the fact that Puduvellam was initiated by a resident of 
Valmiki Nagar to ensure a grassroots presence of residential communities in a 
project located within their neighbourhood and involving the participation of 
prominent State authorities and NGOs, residents have turned the project 
outwards, locating it beyond their own area of concern, and placing their 
interests as outsiders looking in. The analysis of this particular initiative reveals 
the failure of middle-class resident groups to engage with ‘proper’ civil society 
organisations, mainly because of their undermining of grass-roots efforts as 
something for the poor and not for the middle class. They instead rely on 
private modes to secure not just commodities and consumer durables but also 
key infrastructure services, which are generally considered to be goods of 
public consumption. This tendency brings us to the third and final section of 
this empirical analysis which is the ability and the willingness of resident 
groups to engage with the state and public authorities. 
 
5.4 Engaging with the state 
To say that the state is in metamorphosis since and as a result of neo-
liberalisation is probably stating the obvious. This process is a universal tale of 
political transformation wherein the state adjusts its role to align better with the 
interests of private capital. But the intention here is not to dwell on the 
interface between the state and private forms of capital, but to reflect more on 
the engagement of the citizens with the state in a condition where it is not just 
the state but its subjects as well who are seeking benefits from privatisation. 
There is a nagging suspicion that in the light of the middle-class reliance on 
private suppliers, their withdrawal from state dependency would be as much as 
the state’s own withdrawal from the provision of a variety of services. But this 
is confounded by another premise that whatever state presence is left is 
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increasingly of a bourgeois nature wherein state actions tend to resonate with 
the bourgeois aspirations of the middle class (Baviskar 2003; Fernandes 2004).  
It seems as if an active interface between the state and its middle-class citizens 
could persist in light of this alleged convergence, all the more so with recent 
state vows to deliver the city back to its ‘proper citizens’ (Chatterjee 2004).  
 
Yet, traditionally the middle class have generally been marked by 
political apathy and disdain for politicians (Chapter Two). The Exnora official 
described politicians as ‘one dirt we cannot remove….It is something non-
recyclable waste these people are’ (MBN-310804-01). While as ‘proper 
citizens’ the middle class endorse recent state actions involving city 
beautification schemes, they are still cautious about playing into the hands of 
the state. Wary of becoming a pawn in machine politics, they resist their 
portrayal as a massive vote-bloc. While residents are aware of the advantages 
of collective bargaining gained through their associations, they also foresee 
other risks in this kind of exposure. Consider the comments of the following 
resident on her association and the way it can be (mis)used: 
Because we are in a huge volume, we are about 1000 or so residents in 
200 flats here we easily get things done through our own initiatives. 
Outsiders say Premiers [name of the flat complex] get their things done. 
But we restrict entry of politicians during elections. We don’t want to be 
treated as a collective vote-bank. (AR-130304-01) 
 
She was clear that while the collective existence of her residential complex 
with a large number of families ensured recognition amongst the Corporation 
officials, it shouldn’t become a collectivity that is harnessed for political gains. 
Similarly, when a prominent federation organised their annual general meeting 
at the peak of election campaigning in 2004, political parties tried to turn this 
event into a platform for vote canvassing. A candidate from the main 
opposition party secured permission from the association officials to speak at 
their meeting. But it made many of the middle-class attendees nervous and they 
resented the hijacking of their meeting agenda on neighbourhood development 
and welfare issues, into an open political rally outlining the merits and 
achievements of the concerned party and its candidate. One of them stressed at 
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the meeting that just because they have got together as a group did not mean 
that ‘we are becoming political’ (AR-070304-01). When a week later another 
political party requested permission to canvas at a similarly organised event, 
the association politely refused.  
 
Burning your fingers with politics 
During the 1996 local elections (initiating the process of local governance after 
two decades), many residents’ associations were so enthusiastic about this 
opportunity that some even decided to contest the elections. This event was 
seen as an opportunity to step up from mere expressions of their grievances, 
and take a direct role in addressing problems. Reporting this trend, The Hindu 
exclaimed: 
Move over bureaucrats and politicians! Citizens now want to take part 
directly in civic management. Determined to get involved in decision-
making for civic improvements, residents of at least three middle-class 
colonies in the suburban Chitlapakkam have fielded their own candidates 
for the local body elections. The aspirants are representatives from the 
residents’ civic welfare associations.129  
 
Hardly had this effort germinated into a realisable form when it quickly dried 
up into disappointment. Six months later, most of the elected independent 
candidates found themselves battling bureaucracy and bankruptcy in their vain 
attempts to get things done. In April 1997, The Hindu again noted that the 
voters ‘who thought that the independents they elected…..would solve their 
civic problems appear a disappointed lot today’.130 What could have been an 
innovative experiment died a quick death, and wasn’t repeated in the 2001 
local elections.  
 
 The spirit of this effort was also dampened by the abundant mass of 
scepticism surrounding it. NGOs like Exnora, which work closely with the 
residents’ associations, chose not to participate in the 1996 local body 
                                                 
129 Ramachandran, K. (1996, 12 October). Residents' candidates in the field. The Hindu, p. 3. 
130 Shanker, S. (1997, 28 April). Model of inaction. The Hindu, p. Metro I. 
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elections, wary as they were of lending a political colour to their organisation. 
The President of Exnora wryly commented in a local newspaper interview that 
‘[p]eople still consider politics to be a dirty business’, and when queried about 
the possibility of Exnora having a bigger role within the Corporation, he said 
that they were not ready for that role.131 In fact, a decade later, their stance has 
taken a turn aggressively against the Corporation and its councillors accusing 
them of being threatened by volunteerism and nullifying people’s initiatives 
(MBN-310804-01).  
 
Given the context of this rather poor opinion that an important NGO like 
Exnora holds of the recent political changes in the city, the creation of fertile 
conditions wherein residents associations could engage openly and 
productively with the state and public authority seems limited. While there are 
examples of governments in various Indian cities reaching out to middle-class 
residents’ associations through formal mechanisms of collaborative 
partnerships (such as the Bhagidari scheme in Delhi), in Chennai, there is more 
reticence amongst the middle class towards a direct form of partnership with 
the state, as seen in the reactions of the residents towards the state-promoted 
Citizen for Safe Roads initiative openly seeking middle-class support and 
participation.132  
 
Citizen for Safe Roads 
Chapter Four highlighted traffic as one of the primary infrastructure issues 
where the bourgeois nature of the urban development agenda is visible. With 
traffic improvement schemes geared towards the middle and upper classes, it is 
reasonable to expect that the state would try and enlist them as their political 
partners in such attempts. It was thus that in 2002 the City Traffic Police 
                                                 
131 Exnora President says it will keep out of Corpn. elections for present. (1996, 22-28 
September). Adayar Times, p. 1. 
132 Bhagidari: The citizen – government partnership was initiated in 2000 by the Delhi 
government, engaging the participation of resident welfare associations, market and trader 
associations and NGOs in everyday governance of the city. Limited to middle class colonies, 
the scheme now boasts of 1100 bhagidars (partners). For an analysis of the scheme see 
Chakrabarti (2008); Gaurav and Singhal (2008); Uppal and Ghosh (2006).  
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launched the Citizen for Safe Roads (CSR) scheme, where citizens would 
partner traffic police in the city’s traffic management.  
 
Encouraged initially by the enrolment of more than 2000 volunteers, the 
traffic police formed an executive committee called the Chennai Traffic Task 
Force (CTTF). One action of the CTTF was the ‘meet the people’ programme, 
where a meeting was convened with the residents’ associations. More than 150 
representatives attended the first meeting. Sensing the potential for the 
residents’ associations to play a major role, a model partnership case study was 
undertaken with a residents’ association in the city – Harrington Road 
Residents’ Association (HRRA). The Joint Commissioner of Police (Traffic) 
GUG Sastry explained that in this case:  
We sat down with the association people and mutually we discussed and 
prepared a traffic improvement action plan for the whole area including 
where the parking areas, no parking areas should go, what are the 
facilities they want and other things. And the association also came up in 
a big way sponsoring the signage on the road. We implemented the plan. 
It is one of the successful things, you know, what do you call a model. 
You would say. And not only that it has a good representation of the CSR 
who regularly come to that junction and regulate traffic. It is a good 
example of a successful partnership. (GUGS-100904-02) 
 
This model example was proclaimed a success, with the press reporting a 
smooth flow of traffic, separate parking slots and neat pavements in the area, 
all due to the combined efforts of the residents’ association, the traffic police 
and the Corporation.133 The next obvious step would have been to replicate it 
elsewhere in the city with other residents’ associations. But the scheme didn’t 
kick off as it had done with HRRA. The Commissioner admitted that: 
We requested other associations to take up that initiative, but I am afraid 
the response wasn’t that encouraging. In fact, we had to go twice and our 
own officers went twice and tried to discuss and tried to prepare some 
kind of action plan. So what we what I imagined was really that it would 
take-off and that each association would have its own little small little 
traffic improvement managers that can be integrated and we can have lot 
of things done in different areas. But it really has not come up that way. 
(GUGS-100904-02) 
                                                 
133 Harrington Road receives a face-lift. (2004, 12 May). New Indian Express, p. 3; Fostering 
civic pride. (2003, 24 July). The Hindu, p. Metro Plus 3. 
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Yet, he placed a large part of his faith on residents’ associations as an essential 
component to the delivery of his citizen-led scheme. Insisting that they should 
be encouraged, he allowed them some respite under the argument that:  
..many of the residents associations are so preoccupied with the water 
problem that they are not even able to focus on other things….many of 
these areas have the problems of water and sewage. These two things 
have not been tackled properly. So they are more bothered about that and 
then naturally traffic is something that is taken for granted, that it is going 
to be bad….they have to take an integrated view of the whole thing, you 
know, your objective in getting in the residents’ associations not only in 
traffic point of view that they should take care of their own area, in terms 
of crime prevention, traffic improvement and little environmental 
perspectives, in terms of garbage disposal, keeping things clean. That is a 
difficult task. We have been approaching them, we keep doing that. We 
keep knocking the doors of these people. Sometimes or the other it will 
be done.  (GUGS-100904-02) 
 
The extent of naivety in this statement from a high-profile official is perhaps 
surprising. While water remains the primary occupation of the residents of the 
city, it is not that they do not ponder over issues like traffic (Figure 35). Letters 
to the editor section in the daily and weekly newspapers lament traffic and 
transportation issues including the location of bus-stops, erratic and non-
existent bus services, identification of dangerous traffic conditions, requesting 
the need for a traffic light, pedestrian crossing, and a general improvement in 
the management of traffic. And during field interviews, several residents 
identified traffic issues (and parking) as a concern. 
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Figure 35: RK Laxman, The Times of India on poor road conditions 
Source: Laxman (2004: 138; 37) 
 
However, in the case of HRRA, traffic was the most pressing issue. The 
president of HRRA in the opening line of the interview said: ‘We have seven 
schools in one Km radius, so traffic was a nightmare’ (HRRA-210204-01). 
Even for HRRA partnering with the traffic police to find a solution was not 
their first option.  As she explained, for a while they called the Corporation and 
the city officials to complain about problems, expecting a rectification. It was 
only later that they considered CSR’s voluntary programme and decided on the 
recourse to partnership. Another reason is that one of the traffic wardens 
appointed by the city police to popularise the CTTF initiative is a member of 
HRRA, and he played a major role in facilitating its enrolment as the model 
volunteer.  
 
Not all associations admit this as a possibility. As the Commissioner 
himself said ‘[t]he moment we go and tell them, okay, let’s join hands to 
improve traffic in this area the first thing they ask is to post two constables 
here, post an officer here’. Many times, when the city officials, such as the 
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police, organise ‘meet the public’ forums, the residents turn up with a laundry 
list of grievances. Their perception of these events is that they are some kind of 
a petition durbar where they can air their complaints. In August 2003, the first 
citywide public interaction organised by the City Traffic Police to promote 
CSR generated 768 written petitions and numerous oral complaints on how to 
improve the traffic scenario, civic conditions and basic amenities. But when the 
time came for the residents to apply the collectivity of their associations in 
formulating a traffic management plan for their areas, they were missing. 
Residents though argue against the improbability of their involvement:  
..as an association we can only give suggestions. We cannot physically 
make the changes. Also, addressing traffic problems involves dealing 
with a lot of vested interests. So many hardware shops are here on the 
main road with lorries carrying overloaded things. They use our roads as 
bypass road. We cannot manage their movement. It is the police that 
should do it. (ECR-250304-03) 
 
When the above resident expressed his fear of ‘vested interests’, he was 
referring to commercial vehicles such as private van and bus operators who 
have their own associations, and are generally seen by middle-class residents as 
members of the mafia.  
 
An interesting exchange between two residents appeared recently in the 
reader’s civic letters column of Arcot Road Times which highlights well the 
middle-class position on larger city level problems like traffic and the 
conflicting discourse it generates.134 A ‘concerned senior citizen’ identified 
several traffic related issues in the area requiring ‘immediate action by the state 
authorities’.  A fellow resident responded by reminding him that it is difficult 
for the police ‘to tackle such traffic related problems’, and that one should look 
at volunteering to address these issues. The complainant shot back saying that 
the police first needs to provide at least the basic traffic amenities of pedestrian 
crossing and platforms, after which volunteering could be productively 
                                                 
134 Problems created by new traffic system in Ashok Nagar. (2008, 2 June). Arcot Road Times; 
Response to 'Problems created by new traffic system in Ashok Nagar. (2008, 10 June). Arcot 
Road Times; Response to GPS. (2008, 12 June). Arcot Road Times. 
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discussed. These exchanges show the two contrasting positions of residents in 
terms of addressing traffic issues, i.e. expecting the state to carry the burden 
versus sharing the tasks with the state. They also suggest why initiatives like 
CSR fail. Partnering with the police is seen derogatively as volunteering, and 
much of this chapter has already shown the little stamina middle class have for 
such an effort.  
 
Residents also tended to discuss traffic concerns at a microscopic (self-
centred) level, resulting in a fragmented set of suggestions which could hardly 
be implemented by the city as a meaningful, comprehensive strategy. For 
instance, in the case of Arcot Road, most of the large residential complexes 
catering to the new middle class front directly onto Arcot Road, while the 
surrounding older middle class and lower class settlements are accessed by 
smaller roads (such as Kaliamman Koil Street) perpendicular to Arcot Road 
(Figure 36). As part of the several flyovers built in the city, the Corporation 
had considered constructing one on Arcot Road but eventually decided against 
it. This was a major disappointment for the new middle-class residents and in 
the interviews they rued this missed opportunity. On the other hand, older 
middle-class settlements talked about the choked condition of the smaller roads 
leading to their colonies and felt that building a flyover would only make 
matters worse. The car-dependent lifestyle of the new middle class relied on 
the express routes that flyovers offered to bypass the miserable traffic 
conditions of a ‘Third World’ city. They didn’t consider the issue that 
constructing a flyover involves the relocation of bus stops, and the problems it 
could pose for the social classes who live close by and rely on public transport.  
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Figure 36: Traffic issues on Arcot Road 
 
Attempts by the police to engage the community in traffic management plans 
and neighbourhood crime watch will only remain aspirational in a condition 
where residents rely on private security guards for protection, and on private 
modes of transportation for commuting within the city. This indicates not only 
their reduced dependency on public provision of the same but also their 
disinclination to indulge in any kind of partnering exercises. The residents’ 
association expect the state to provide facilities which will ensure that their use 
of the private means is not jeopardised. Thus, rather than partnering with the 
police for community neighbourhood watch, they prefer to use the police 
resources to compile an information database on servants and security guards, 
ensuring thus that their domestic interests are well guarded.135 It is in this 
instance of engaging with the state that one can easily discern the residents’ 
                                                 
135 Although the police and residents’ associations have claimed to have successfully 
established community police booth in several locations as part of their neighbourhood watch 
scheme, these booths are mostly empty. Rarely do the neighbourhood residents volunteer as 
patrollers. This is a sad state of affairs for, in Chennai, in many colonies there was an active 
culture of night patrolling with male volunteers from the neighbourhood, one that has been on 
the decline for many years now. 
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prioritising their needs as consumers but effectively enforcing their rights as 
citizens to do so. The interests of a citizen-consumer are in open display here. 
But interacting with or responding to the demands of a citizen-consumer is 
problematic. The hyphenated condition that exists between the citizen and the 
consumer is not straightforward but complex, one that is difficult to unravel. 
Yet the citizen-consumer is here to stay and cannot be dismissed easily. 
 
‘Consumer-citizens are here to stay’ 
In changing its name from Consumer Action Group to Citizen Consumer and 
Civic Action Group (CAG), a senior official of this prominent NGO explained 
that the term consumer benefits from the accountability principle built into it, 
and is a part of most of their work that focuses on the citizen. Elaborating this 
further he said: 
In fact we refer to consumers today as citizen consumers, being this all 
encompassing group of people who are primarily citizens but are able to 
enforce rights and so therefore their enforcement of rights comes as 
citizens but the obligations and responsibilities are made accountable to 
them by their sort of adorning this larger citizen-consumer concept. 
(CAG-030904-01) 
 
If the citizen suggests an interface with the state and the consumer with the 
producer or service provider, in today’s entangled relationships between the 
state, society and market, thinking as a citizen-consumer is inevitable. 
According to him, consumers are not just about addressing small-scale, self-
centred interests, but also important in tackling development problems:  
..this concept of citizen-consumer. So it is this broader definition of 
individuals who are citizens and therefore they have rights as citizens but 
also are in some way or the other are all entitled to certain amenities, 
systems and infrastructure services and all of that just by virtue of them 
being citizens and it shouldn’t be limited to their payment. Okay, so there 
this I would place broader responsibility on this citizen consumer concept 
and not try and split them up into citizens and consumers. (CAG-030904-
01) 
 
The risk here is that the citizen-consumer is perceived by the residents’ 
associations only in terms of its more effective bargaining power. In an ideal 
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situation it has potential for making a positive impact on city development as 
the CAG official argued. Yet in reality, associations selectively assert their 
power as citizen-consumers, and where, mostly, the rights of the citizens are 
more easily invoked for consumer demands than the other way around: 
I think really the future is in the associations, the associations move out 
of the consumer and shift closer to the citizen and therefore their rights, 
duties, and obligations are all seen the larger, broader context and I think 
really the association have, are a very potent kind of power and……they 
can occupy incredible amount of space in the near future. I saw it 
particularly true for example with the Cable TV problem where 
associations were able to get individual residents not to comply with 
these schemes. Of course it is very sort of selfish private that sort of 
initiative but given that, I think that power exists. We had a meeting, was 
it, two years ago on this Cable TV in Madras and we took the Music 
Academy Hall. It was overflowing, and when, it is ironical, because we 
had a year before that a meeting on the lack of open spaces in the city and 
how the existing open spaces were being privatised and we had ten 
people in the audience. So that just shows you where priorities are. 
(CAG-030904-01) 
 
The unreliability of these associations became evident when, of the 50-60 
associations that signed up for CAG membership at the height of the above 
crisis, only 5-10 renewed their membership the following year. This goes back 
to the fundamental trait of residents’ associations observed in the early parts of 
this chapter – they are constructed in response to a crisis and find it hard to 
sustain themselves in the absence of one, learning the harsh way that common 
issues are not the hard issues. If traditionally the middle class have been wary 
about establishing a direct interface with the politicians, then the recent 
political transformations in the city haven’t succeeded in quelling their 
suspicions and fear. Instead, the bourgeois jargon of the state has created a 
rather confident citizen-consumer class, where (s)he is slyly learning to make 
citizen demands from the state for meeting their consumer needs.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the collective action of the middle-class residents’ 
associations, amidst the premise that neo-liberalisation has created a clement 
climate for middle-class residents, whose aspirations are aided by clear 
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‘bourgeois’ pursuits of the state. The investigation explored the way their 
residents’ associations have utilised this opportunity of resonating together 
with the state and other actors in the creation of a bourgeois urbanism. The first 
sections showed that while the postcolonial evolution of the residential 
morphology in the city resulted in fragmentation and internalisation of the 
residential associations, a sense of empowerment of the residents’ associations 
abetted by their recent trend of institutionalisation is prevalent. The 
accompanying phenomenon of corporatisation though raises the question of 
how the associations would utilise their new found powers – would they use 
their collective bargaining to merely better their consumerist quest or would 
they apply it to become a meaningful partner in the emerging new geography 
of governance. Middle-class residents associations were tested for their 
penchant for partnership, and were assessed for their willingness to engage 
formally with other residents’ associations (including the political society of 
the lower classes and the poor), with ‘proper’ civil society organisations and 
NGOs, and with the state. 
 
 A major stumbling block was the inherent inability of the middle-class 
residents’ associations to federate. While natural inhibition prevents them from 
aligning with other middle or upper class resident groups, cross-class alliances 
were found to be seriously disadvantaged by a sense of patronage that the 
middle class hold towards the poor and the lower classes. Furthermore, an 
increased self-acknowledgement of the new middle class as the ‘proper 
citizens’ of the city has resulted in a heightened incrimination of the poor 
indicating lesser proclivities to align with them. Irrespective of the dominance 
of the middle class in terms of membership in civil society organisations and 
NGOs, their residents’ associations display little tendency to engage or partner 
with these ‘proper’ institutions. This was despite the fact that many of the 
associations identified the ‘informality’ and ‘limitedness’ of their operations, 
and recognised the need for civil society groups to take up larger causes and 
concerns. Yet, when the opportunity for partnering was presented, as illustrated 
through the example of Puduvellam, residents’ associations failed to capitalise 
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on the initiative. Several reasons contributed to this failure including cultural 
prejudices which meant that the mostly upper-caste middle-class community 
was reluctant to participate in the physical cleaning activities and ‘get its hands 
dirty’. Instead, they preferred to engage with the effort as individual patrons. 
Their responses were also influenced by superior assumptions that grass-roots 
initiatives are only for the poor and the deprived, i.e. for the have-nots, not for 
the haves. This rejection was also aided by the reliance of the middle class on 
private means of service provision making them less willing to partner in 
public engagements.  
 
Public services in the city are now being procured from private 
suppliers, with most residents’ associations preferring this alternative. In this 
context, state level exercises requiring the participation of middle-class 
residents as partners prove to be a damp squib, as the recent Citizen for Safe 
Roads initiative showed. Middle-class associations in this scenario revealed 
their bargaining position as citizen-consumers, wherein they call upon the state 
invoking their rights as citizens to safeguard their interests, now secured 
through their consumerist bargaining. Though there is a recognition of the 
significant role of citizen-consumers in addressing city development issues, it 
is not clear if presenting the residents as citizen-consumers enables them to 
take on an enlarged role. The balance is clearly tipped in the hyphenated 
condition where the resident as a consumer cleverly deploys him-/herself as a 
citizen for his-/her own consumption gains.  
 
In this scenario, there is not only a sense of uselessness in whipping up 
a citizen-like frenzy, but also some amount of harm and danger as much of this 
mass coalescence is wasted over an ideology of privatism and individualism. 
As a large proportion of the middle-class lifestyle choices are provided for 
within the four walls of their residential complexes, residents become 
accustomed to a self-imposed internality based on fee-paying consumption 
practices, yielding a disengaged condition from the ‘outside realm’. Middle-
class residents’ associations behave like closed associations of modern elite 
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groups sequestered from the wider popular life of the communities. Even if 
their empowerment creates a forum for discussion, it mainly involves 
discussions of their highly privatised and internalised interests in safe 
conditioned environments. The prospect of residents’ associations functioning 
in a kind of alternative civil society platform appears dim. As they operate in 
privatised spaces outside of a public sphere, it raises the question as to whether 
and how they valorise public sphere, given their tendency to impose a negative 
externality on what is outside their complex. In this context, it is useful to 
explore the middle-class perceptions and imaginations of the public spaces 
within the city. This constitutes the topic of enquiry for the next chapter.  
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6 
 
 
Public Spaces:  
Ordering and Othering 
 
 
 
In Madras the bus station near the High Court is one of the more 
popular latrines. The traveller arrives; to pass the time he raises 
his dhoti, defecates in the gutter…..Still in Madras, observe this 
bespectacled patriarch walking past the University on the 
Marina…he squats, pisses on the pavement, leisurely rises;….and 
continues on his promenade. It is a popular evening walk, this 
Marina; but no one looks, no face is averted in embarrassment.  
(Naipaul 1964: 69) 
 
 
Referring to the above observation, Chakrabarty (1992) highlights Naipaul’s 
continued orientalist-modernist preoccupation with dirt, even if his vision of 
India had evolved over nearly three decades from being An Area of Darkness 
(1964) to A Million Mutinies Now (1990).136 Nevertheless there is a perceptible 
change in his observation of Indians’ general disregard for the unwholesome 
aspects of their public places. In An Area of Darkness he reveals extreme 
disgust at Indians defecating everywhere, be it on the railway tracks, the 
beaches, the rivers, the hills or the streets, a habit apparently common to all 
classes of Indians, as he says ‘[w]hen they are done they advance…They climb 
back on to the avenue, jump on their cycles or get into their cars, and go away’ 
(1964: 70, emphasis added). In 1990, amidst the persistent dirt, he notices that 
the increased wealth and rise of new particularities and identities has fuelled 
the rise of a middle-class anguish and anxiety towards dirt and poverty, as 
                                                 
136 Naipaul’s observations are in fact a revered reference for any scholar working on the same 
issue, dating back to Mary Douglas (1966). In this sense, this chapter beginning with Naipaul 
is no exception. 
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shanty-towns spring up close to their modest and clean settlements. He 
contrasts the middle-class suburb of Sion located next to the slum of Dharavi 
(purportedly the largest slum in Asia), and says that the former is the Bombay 
one knew, the Bombay of paved roads, buses and people in lightweight clothes, 
while the latter, a swamp, suffers from the stench of excrement and dust.  It is 
clear that unlike his self-confessed ‘brown Englishman’s’ eyes that saw crowd, 
and its associated characteristic of filth, without class distinction in the 1960s, 
he was now able to vaguely delineate the geography of two divided cities, one 
rather clean and somewhat spacious, and the other crowded and dirty, a spatial 
delineation underwritten by class lines (Chapter Four).   
 
If in 1964, Naipaul’s eyes captured a ‘bespectacled patriarch’ dirtying 
the public space, in 1990 he observes ‘depressed-looking dark people’ sitting in 
the dirt and eating their food indifferent to everything else. In the former, one 
can well see one of the many middle-class Indians using or rather abusing the 
public spaces just like everyone else. Travelling in India in the 1960s, he 
recounts tales of a certain class of Indians (the English-speaking middle-class 
to be specific) who had ‘a passionate urge to explain to the visitor that they 
must not be considered part of poor, dirty India, that their values and standards 
are higher, and they live perpetually outraged by the country which gives them 
their livelihood’, but who after complaining ‘with feeling about the indiscipline 
and crudity of Indians, proceeded…to change his clothes in public’ (2002 
[1962]: 6-7). In 1990, he refers to the large swell of the poor and the destitute 
who, in the absence of shelter, choose to conduct their domesticity in the public 
spaces of the city (see Kaviraj 1997). So, in making this distinction, does 
Naipaul imply a larger question? Would his now-accustomed eyes have caught 
anything more substantial if he had arrived a few years later, after the formal 
onset of the economic reforms in 1991? Would he find the men and women of 
the middle class a drastically changed lot? 
 
In all probability, today, Naipaul would still find middle-class citizens 
getting out of their cars and joining the line of squatting pissers on the road. An 
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elderly resident remarking on the way people used the open space abutting her 
middle-class residential complex said: 
Here on this side it is open, like an open ground, that is a public toilet, if 
you see in the morning…..in India, in general, there is no hygiene 
awareness, even an educated person, you can’t find fault with the 
uneducated people. They [the educated people] will take the trouble of 
getting down from the car or scooter to dirty on the road. I have seen that. 
(ECR-020904-02) 
 
So, what has changed? Chapter Four observed in Chennai the enhanced 
contrast of socio-economic inequalities with the onset of neoliberalisation, one 
that is possibly heightened by the re-emergence of the middle class asserting 
their claims to the city and its public spaces. Accompanying their renaissance 
is a vocal urge to explain that they are not ‘part of the poor, dirty India’, and 
that they aspire to a higher quality environment. By reclaiming the urban 
landscape, this social class wishes to restore some semblance of propriety to 
the city. While as individuals they may not have come clean of certain cultural 
habits such as urinating in public spaces (an act blessed by class ubiquity), 
what is happening is that, ennobled by neo-liberalisation, middle-class citizens 
have for the first time structurally organised themselves into institutions whose 
sole objective, under the guise of rejuvenated civic responsibilities, is to claim 
their right to an unhindered access to a clean and healthy environment 
(Chatterjee 2004). 
 
As they collectively rally themselves together to assert their public 
consciousness, it should be noted that the middle-class organisations are not 
alone in this pursuit. Chapter Four discussed the role of the state in improving 
the economic fortunes of the city, particularly through appropriate material 
representations. While recent transport schemes contributing to this strategy 
were discussed in that chapter, another equally powerful asset to market to 
potential investors is the city’s public spaces. Capital is for the first time being 
lavished by the state to improve the public arena and repackage it in an 
attractive format. As the city’s ‘public face’, these spaces are crucial to 
embrace and seduce global capital. With the state and its citizens engaging 
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with the re-imagination of public spaces, the condition seems ripe for forging a 
‘politics of partnership’. The bourgeois essentials underwritten in the pursuit of 
the public spaces suggest an easy convergence between the desires and 
interests of a bourgeois state and the middle-class civic organisations (Baviskar 
2003; Fernandes 2004). And yet, as seen in the previous chapter, this is not a 
simple case of conjoint pursuit where alliances are easily formed. Rather a 
complex condition is suspected where affiliations between the different actors 
oscillate between coalition and conflict, thus rendering useless a simplistic 
assumption about middle-class citizenship claims via a reconstructed bourgeois 
public sphere.    
 
 This is illustrated through an examination of recent attempts at 
transforming the beaches of Chennai. With nearly 20 Km of sandy stretch, 
Chennai prides itself in possessing several beaches including the most popular 
Marina Beach, Santhome Beach, Elliot’s Beach, and the newly developed 
stretch of New Beach in Thiruvanmiyur (Figure 37). Much of the popular 
discourse has been dominated by attempts of the state and the civic institutions 
to re-imagine Marina as a presentable banner to a global audience. This chapter 
examines first the scripting by the postcolonial state of a globalised aesthetic 
imagery for the Marina. The reactions that the state proposals triggered 
amongst the bourgeois civil society institutions (mainly heritage and 
environmental groups) and the political society of the fishermen communities 
will be explored, as well as the specific forms of partnership that emerged 
between these actors.   
 
The second part of the chapter focuses on the debates surrounding the 
southern beach stretch along ECR, particularly the New Beach. Here, the role 
of the state is considerably reduced, with bourgeois civil society limited to the 
shoreline middle-class residents’ associations. This section therefore considers 
the dominant role of residents-led initiatives in framing a beach imaginary 
(mainly around the concerns of dirt and danger), and their ensuing politics of 
partnership with the state and the fishermen. The debates surrounding the 
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Marina and the southern beaches reveal a stringent practice of ordering 
followed by a differentiated process of othering to reinforce a single dominant 
perspective. It is via an understanding of the mechanics of ordering and 
othering employed in each case that both case studies are analysed.  
 
Figure 37: Beaches of Chennai 
Not to scale 
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6.1 The making of the Marina 
Chapter Four discussed the foundation of Madras as a city that was never 
meant to be and noted its characteristic lack of (and appreciation of) natural 
features. The only advantage was that in a coastline with few natural harbours, 
it provided for ships to come close to the shore. But its evolution does display 
the morphology of a colonial port city, where its 5 Km beach stretch north of 
the Cooum River became crucial for the mercantile activities of the British East 
India Company. After the establishment of the imperial government in 1858 
and the declaration of Madras as a Presidency capital, sites along a 3 Km  
seafront stretch south of the Cooum River were chosen for housing new 
administrative and institutional facilities. With the extension of this southern 
stretch, the British decided to make the oceanfront accessible to the public and 
a broad boulevard was constructed in 1884. Evoking old Sicilian recollections 
to create ‘one of the most beautiful promenades in the world’, the new 
boulevard was named the Marina (Evenson 1989: 9; Figure 38).  
 
Figure 38: Historic images of the beach, Chennai 
Source: http://www.madraschennaiphotographs.com retrieved 28 May, 2007;  
© Vintage Vignettes, Chennai; Left is a view along North Beach Road while right 
offers a view of the Marina with the colonial institutions in the background. 
 
Colonial administrators took pride in this transformation, as an intervention 
unique to their legacy and unknown to the earlier precolonial period. Through 
this development they sought to establish a new system of public spaces which 
was effectively used to display their colonial power as well as more 
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benevolently emphasise concerns about public health, providing ‘the natives’ 
with a healthy educative civic life. Thus, walking, driving carriages, riding 
horses and listening to the music played at the military bandstand were some of 
the fashionable pastimes of the Europeans and native elite, with the colonisers 
keeping a tight watch on those who used the space through strict prescriptions 
on dress and behavioural codes (Srivathsan 2000). 
 
In due course, the use of public spaces and the beach in particular 
changed. Chapter Two has already mentioned that the British-created Indian 
middle class spearheaded the rise of a nationalist movement for independence. 
Public arenas became crucial for the Indian elites to express antagonism to the 
colonial state, and to garner support from the masses (Kaviraj 1997). Thus, in 
Madras, Marina became a key site for staging the spectacle of inversion where 
the colonised were no longer passive spectators to the display of colonial 
power but active protestors challenging their dominance and hegemony. After 
independence, Marina played a crucial role in the assertion of the postcolonial 
state. In the first instance, different departments of the government occupied 
the colonial buildings dotting the seafront with the legislative assembly and the 
state Secretariat moving into the Fort St. George complex at the northern end 
of the Marina (Figure 39). Secondly, the expansive stretch of the Marina 
provided the Dravidian state with an enviable backdrop onto which it could 
physically inscribe its politics of Tamil cultural nationalism, mostly in the form 
of statues, monuments and memorials (Chapter Four, Figure 40).137 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
137 The memorials of former Chief Ministers CN Annadurai and MG Ramachandran are 
located on the Marina, and are today popular tourist destinations.  
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Figure 39: Postcolonial governance from colonial remnants, Chennai 
Source: Muthiah (1990: 21, 32; © Ajay Khullar)  
 
 
Figure 40: Memorials on Marina Beach, Chennai 
Clockwise from top left – Anna memorial, MGR memorial, triumph of labour 
statue, Gandhi statue, and Kannagi statue 
 
But by the 1990s, there was a closure of sorts to this use of public spaces to 
convey a particular sense of regional identity. With the onset of neoliberal 
economic reforms, prominent public spaces like the Marina assumed renewed 
significance as a banner to attract transnationlised investment. As the most 
visible and popular public space, Marina symbolises an important source of 
publicity for the city. Thus, the Dravidian state adopted a new strategy to 
orchestrate its representation through a reprocessed urban imaginary that is 
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congenial for global capital investment. Since this coincides with the 
embourgeoisement of the Dravidian state (Chapter Four), it suggests an 
employment of a bourgeois vocabulary in its re-imagination. It also implies an 
assumption that such a move will undoubtedly find favour with the bourgeois 
sections of the society. Subscribing to the latter is presumptuous, given that 
elites assuming various positions in the decision-making process are not 
necessarily unanimous (Alley 1997). The following section focuses on two 
specific attempts of the state in 2003 to analyse its transnationalised, bourgeois 
re-imagination of the Marina, and also charts the multiplicity of voices that 
rose in response to its gestures, some in complicity and others in contrariety.  
 
6.1.1 Global dreams on the Marina, and the ensuing nightmares 
Despite the state’s initial reliance on public spaces like the Marina to narrate its 
political ideology, public spaces eventually took a backseat amidst the 
overwhelming problems of postcolonial governance, revolving around the 
provision of basic amenities such as housing, education, health, roads, water 
and sanitation. As the public spaces in the city slowly fell into neglect and 
decay, the weak institutional nature of the local government and scarce 
finances made matters worse. In the case of the Marina, at least three 
authorities overlapped in their responsibility for the beach. While the 
Corporation was in-charge of the general maintenance and beautification of the 
beach, the maintenance of the roads, buildings and structures on the beach fell 
under the portfolio of the Public Works Department (PWD), and the Revenue 
Department was responsible for the removal of encroachments.138 Following 
the dissolution of the Corporation in 1973 (Chapter Four), the state entrusted 
the newly-formed Madras Metropolitan Development authority (MMDA) with 
the responsibility of drafting an integrated development plan for the beach, and 
a Marina Development Committee was set up in 1979. A plan was long in the 
                                                 
138 Since 1996, the Corporation is responsible for the maintenance of the entire stretch, with the 
PWD taking care of the memorials on the beach. There has also been some concerted effort in 
coordinating the upkeep exercises of these different bodies at a more regular level. The 
government announced in 2003 the formation of a state-level beach authority, with a separate 
committee for Chennai, but with the change of government in 2006, this body remains inactive.  
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making and it was not until 1993 that a recommendations report was submitted 
to the government. Schemes for beach beautification were drawn up with 
proposals for improving amenities in the area.  
 
The release of the report coincided with the implementation of 
economic reforms, and the government decided to use its recommendations, 
launching a few schemes to clean and beautify the Marina. A Madras Vision 
2000 strategy was announced in 1993, and the proposals for beach 
beautification were incorporated within this plan. Since then this 3.5 Km 
stretch has undergone some amount of facial uplift with amenities including 
improved walkways, pedestrian plazas, additional parking space for vehicles, 
children play areas, high mast lights, police patrolling and lawns in the 
forefront (Figure 41).139 But by the new millennium, such efforts had hardly 
made an impact, and the vitality of Marina to portray the global ambitions of 
the city became more urgent. It was in this context that the ADMK state 
government led by Jayalalithaa announced in 2003 two ambitious proposals for 
transforming the Marina. These proposals involved structural interventions 
beyond the cosmetic improvements undertaken so far and offered a completely 
revamped imaginary for the Marina, evoking strong reactions from the citizens.  
 
 
 
                                                 
139 Announced by Jayalalithaa’s ADMK government, Madras Vision 2000 was abandoned by 
the DMK when it came to power in 1996. Beach beautification was in fact the only visible 
realisation of this programme. Even then there was a problem with these beautification efforts 
as they are were intermittent, with the beach often relapsing into its dishevelled look within a 
few months.  
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Figure 41: Marina promenade, Chennai 
Source: Muthiah (1990: 45; © Ajay Khullar)  
 
In January 2003, the state government reviewed the ten year old plan of the 
MMDA for the beautification of the Marina, and signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) with the Construction Industry Development Board 
(CIDB) of Malaysia, handing the responsibility of the project to the latter. That 
this was a mega-scale vision was clear from the budget set at Rs. 1000 crores. 
The Marina beautification, planned for completion within six years, spanned a 
1.5 Km stretch and included proposals for ‘complexes of international 
standards to provide office accommodation for multinationals and 
embassies’.140 The strength of the ‘we are going global’ signal was obvious, as 
the proposal talked confidently about global collaborations, targeting a global 
community, and the need to  create a global architecture. Marina beach, not 
unlike earlier times, was again going to be the cloth from which these visions 
                                                 
140 MoU on dream projects with Malaysia. (2003, 15 January). The Hindu, p. 3. 
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would be cut and tailored. The aggressiveness of the state government was 
evident from the way it paid little heed to an earlier decision to protect and 
conserve the colonial skyline of the Marina.141 As it openly acknowledged the 
need to relocate the residents of the fishing hamlets, the announcement 
provoked strong reaction not only from the fishermen communities, but also 
civil society groups. This resulted in specific expressions of alliance in the 
complex ‘politics of partnership’ game involving these particular attempts to 
globally locate the city.  
 
The state, fishermen and the environment: an entangled net 
This wasn’t the first time that the government was announcing its intentions to 
relocate fishermen. Their presence has constantly been a reminder of the 
ambiguous nature of public spaces in a postcolonial setting. The practices of 
fishermen communities and their villages (kuppams) are based on an 
understanding of ‘commonness’ rather than ‘publicness’. This relates to their 
conduct of common activities including the parking of their catamarans, drying 
their nets, the fish, clothing and utensils on the sands, digging shallow wells for 
water, and in many cases using the wet sands as open-air defecation areas. In 
the postcolonial years, those who relied on the beach as a public space found 
their bourgeois sensibilities clashing with the common activities of the 
fishermen (Figure 42). Accompanying this conflicting understanding was the 
efforts of consecutive governments to subordinate the fishermen and control 
their use of the beach.  
 
                                                 
141 In the 1950s when the question of the direction of urban development of the city was being 
discussed amidst pressures to decolonise the cityscape, the then Chief Minister C 
Rajagopalachari had regulations stipulated banning high-rise constructions on the Marina, 
insisting on preservation and the need to resist such tendencies. 
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Figure 42: ‘Common’ and ‘public’ uses of the beach 
Source: Top four photos – www.flickr.com, retrieved 10 August, 2008; Bottom 
– Venkatachalapathy (2006: 128; © Aravindan 2006). The top four pictures 
indicate the various uses of the beach by the fishermen communities living 
along the shore, while the bottom picture reflects the use of the beach by the 
general public who see it as a crucial ‘lung’ space in a city starved of open 
spaces. 
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In the 1970s, the Tamil Nadu government constituted the Tamil Nadu Slum 
Clearance Board (TNSCB) to undertake the clearance or improvement of slum 
areas with the objective of the eventual elimination of slums within the cities. 
Without elaborating much on its criteria for defining a slum, fishermen 
kuppams on the beach were classified as slums and chosen for resettlement, 
connoting illegitimisation of fishermen presence on the beach. Slums in the 
city reflected a process of encroachment on land that didn’t belong to the 
settlers who through the act of squatting violated the proprietary notions of 
ownership. By clubbing the kuppams with the slums, the government decreed 
fishermen’s appropriation of the beach as an act of squatting, thus requiring the 
intervention of the law. In some cases their huts were demolished with 
tenement structures constructed on the same locations, and in other cases they 
were relocated inland farther away from the beach. But in due course, 
fishermen ignored these new housing allocations (often renting them out) and 
returned to their original locations closer to the beach, reconstructing their 
hutment dwellings. That the government policies on slum resettlement was 
hardly informed by the cultural practices of the poor was clear by the choice 
made by the fishermen to return to their earlier housing form. But it is not just 
the state that viewed the kuppams in this light, but the print media as well.  In 
1996, a write-up in The Hindu brought attention to squalor on the shores of the 
Marina: 
The 3.5 km long beach, which boasts of a breathtaking broad expanse of 
sand, should automatically lead to visions of beach umbrellas, Frisbees 
and plain fun. Yet, the Marina has never made it to the big league of 
world famous beaches……A fresh danger threatens the beachface now. It 
could well acquire the dubious distinction of being the “longest slum” if 
the mushroom growth of huts all along the shore continues. (emphasis 
added).142 
 
                                                 
142 Vydhianathan, S. (1996, 16 September). Squalor on the shore. The Hindu, p. Metro I. 
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While acknowledging the question of tourist interest versus the convenience of 
fishermen, the report referred to the fishermen as ‘slumdwellers’ who had 
made the beach less attractive for visitors. 
 
The state, instead of learning some valuable lessons from these failed 
attempts at relocation, persisted with its policies on the beach. All through the 
1980s, fishermen activities were subject to strict controls, in terms of where 
they could park their catamarans, and where they could dry their fish and nets. 
By the mid-1980s, things came to a combative stand when, after several 
directives, in November 1985, catamarans and fishing gear were seized by the 
police from the Marina.143 Fishermen’s agitations to reclaim their possessions 
turned violent, and in December, in an encounter with the police, six people 
were killed and about a hundred injured. Finally, the Supreme Court directed 
the government to return to the fishermen their catamarans and gear, with 
another attempt by the state to regulate the fishermen leaving a bloody trail. 
The bitterness of this violent clash marred the populist reputation of the state 
government and for a while, an uneasy truce existed between the state and the 
fishermen. The state’s efforts were limited to superficial improvements on the 
foreshore of the beach and it refrained from interfering with the fishermen 
clusters close to the water. But with the dawn of the new millennium and the 
heightened global aspirations of the city, the state gave up its policy of subdued 
interventions on the beach. Through the MoU with the Malaysian government, 
it aggressively sought to promote Marina’s transformation into a transnational 
corridor, involving yet again the relocation of fishermen.  
 
Fishermen resist resettlement on the basis that there is a strong sense of 
territoriality attached to their fishing: “Fishermen from each kuppam (hamlet) 
fish only in a particular stretch of the sea and moving into another kuppam’s 
territory causes violent fights…..Forcing 60,000 of us from four different 
                                                 
143 In this particular instance, clean-up activities were associated with the visit of Pope Jean 
Paul XXIII to the city in December 1985, and who was scheduled to address a mass gathering 
at the Marina.  
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kuppams to live in one small area will cause havoc”.144 Emphasising the 
futility of relocating the fishermen inland, a fisherman argued:  
Now, we, we shouldn’t lose the beach, we feel our rights are being taken 
away. If you take us and put us in Perambur, where there is a housing or 
slum board, if you put us there how will we survive? You should give us 
employment, that is too difficult. Even if you give us employment, we 
should know the trade, right. (ECR-090404-02) 145 
 
In this particular instance, fishermen found support from environmental NGOs 
and activists in the city. This wasn’t surprising, since over the years, many 
environmental NGOs have aligned themselves with fishermen’s problems, 
particularly the artisanal fishermen, residing along the Marina and southwards. 
Artisanal fishermen still use their catamarans, as opposed to the highly 
mechanised fishing in the north of the city. They  are restricted in terms of the 
distance they go into the sea, and along with the general problems of pollution 
and climate change, have suffered massive decreases in their catch. In this 
situation, the state seemed to imply that instead of holding onto a losing 
proposition, fishermen are better off giving up their claims to the coast and 
relocating elsewhere.  
 
But fishermen resist such proposals. Their resistance were supported by 
Medha Patkar, an environmental activist of national repute who for many years 
has rallied against the construction of dam projects in India. She came to the 
city in February 2003 to lead a protest against the proposed eviction of the 
fishermen, demanding their participation as stakeholders in any plans to 
beautify the beach. Barely had the government responded to the agitation of 
activists like Patkar against the proposed displacement of fishermen, when a 
few months later, the government made another announcement, again related to 
the Marina. This snowballed yet again into a crisis and created further 
opposition to the state’s global dreams for the Marina. 
 
                                                 
144 Kamat, A. (2003, 15-28 February). 'Beautification' at what cost? Frontline. 
145 He was referring to Perambur as this is an inland neighbourhood, also housing mostly the 
poor and lower classes, but far from the shoreline and hence a complete dislocation for the 
fishermen.  
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Getting rid of heritage, and rewriting history  
On 4 April 2003, Chief Minister Jayalalithaa informed the State Assembly that 
the “run-down” buildings on the 30-acre, 88-year old Queen Mary’s College 
(QMC) on the Marina would be razed to make way for a brand new secretariat 
complex. In January 2003, along with the Marina Beautification Plan 
commissioned to the Malaysian government, a proposal was made for an 
administrative city, comprising of the Assembly, the Secretariat, and all 
government offices. When initial feasibility studies concluded that the project 
would take at least fifteen years to implement, the government opted to put this 
proposal on hold and look for an immediate alternative, narrowing down its 
option to the QMC site (Figure 43).  
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Figure 43: Proposals for the Marina 
 Aerial photograph © 2008 Microsoft Corporation 
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Within hours of the announcement, students of QMC had organised a 
‘Save QMC’ movement, and while they kept vigil in the campus, 9 writ-
petitions were filed in the Madras High Court from various organisations. This 
included the Citizen, Consumer and Civic Action Group (CAG) and the Indian 
National Trust for Art and Cultural Heritage (INTACH), basing their 
arguments on the violation of environmental and heritage regulations. The 
students’ protest caught the sympathy and support of citizens across the city. 
Residents of Nochikuppam on the Marina, which only a few months earlier had 
been marked for relocation, gathered outside the college in support of the 
students. The fishermen’s interests were intertwined with that of the college as 
almost 400 girls from their community were studying in the QMC, and the 
fishermen feared that the current demolition plans will affect their one chance 
to gain education.146 
 
While two redevelopment proposals within a span of few months 
seemed like a fast-track way of implementing a global vision, opposition to 
these initiatives was equally expedient. Within 48 hours, an interim injunction 
was obtained from the Madras High Court, staying the demolition temporarily, 
and an indefinite stay procured four days later. 40,000 signatures protesting the 
proposed demolition were collected from different sections of the society. 
Opposition parties also tried to gain political leverage from this crisis, which 
came to a heady halt, when on 22 April, the Union Ministry of Environment 
and Forestry imposed a blanket ban on demolition and reconstruction of 
heritage and historic buildings, and buildings of public use, including those 
used for education, on coastal stretches. There was political malice involved in 
this decision, as the notification removed authority from the state for coastal 
developments, most importantly its large-scale plans to transform the 
Marina.147 
                                                 
146 Besides being the oldest institution in the state, as an all-girls college it catered to the 
education of women from the socio-economically deprived parts of the society.  
147 The fact that the Union Minister for Environment and Forestry was TR Balu, a member of 
the DMK, an opposition party in Tamil Nadu played a large role in issuing the order swiftly. 
Earlier, members of the DMK, the communist parties and other political groups had openly 
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The success of the ‘Save QMC’ movement was a cause for jubilation 
amongst many. Muthiah, the popular city historian and a heritage activist wrote 
that: 
 the most heart-warming sign of positive action in Tamil Nadu in recent 
years was the steps the girls of Queen Mary’s College and their faculty 
took…..as well as members of the several public, to prevent the takeover 
of the campus by the Government to build a Secretariat on it….in 
threatening the Queen Mary’s campus, an even bigger threat is being 
posed to the city by endangering its biggest lung and public space, the 
Marina. Such heritage and environmental issues are causes today to fight 
for as passionately as for one’s campus.148  
 
Not willing to be pinned down by this debacle, the Chief Minister hit back, 
insisting that those who claim for heritage and environment preservation are 
“elitist” and represent “self-proclaimed NGOs”. And yet, as the representative 
of CAG (one of the NGOs that had filed a writ-petition against the proposed 
demolition of QMC) explained, it was truly a case of cooperative effort where  
….the CAG filed a case as well and in fact we did, it was a part of our 
common strategy. We sat together with the students, the teachers, and 
everyone and drafted a strategy that required the students to go first, then 
the teachers to go second, because we can get dismissed very easily by 
saying, X, Y and Z, because Jayalalithaa knows us, but the other way 
around, to getting the students out was very important. (CAG-030904-01) 
 
These agitations over the transformation of the Marina seem to suggest a more 
successful example of the new politics of partnership, where civil society 
groups comprising mostly of middle-class activists established a comfortable 
alliance with the fishermen and student groups, in opposition to a dominant, 
bourgeois state. But then  Marina was an extreme example where the state’s 
global visions had turned into an unbearable glare. As a result, almost every 
non-state actor was forced into coalition in order to eclipse this effect. It is 
                                                                                                                                 
criticised the government, registering their support for the student community. Several of them, 
including MK Stalin from the DMK (the former city mayor) were also arrested in this regard.  
148 Muthiah, S. (2003, 4 April). The girls of Queen Mary's. The Hindu, p. Metro Plus 5. 
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relevant to ask whether, In a ‘normal case’ scenario, the voices would be so 
united. Probably not, as seen in the subsequent efforts of the state.   
 
Back to square one: checkerboard of reactions 
While the above two particular proposals came to a halt, the government 
remained undaunted, and in August 2003, smaller structures on the Marina 
were demolished. This included Seerani Arangam, a popular venue for holding 
public rallies, amongst a few other buildings.149 While the opposition party, the 
DMK filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in the court, these demolitions 
surprisingly did not evoke much reaction from either the fishermen or the 
middle-class activists. In fact, there was a quiet sense of acquiescence amongst 
the latter.  
 
Seerani Arangam has considerable historic significance, almost as 
much as the QMC. This was where the physical display of ‘inversion of power’ 
against the colonial British took place, as the nationalist leaders used the power 
of the spectacle to raise calls for independence during many public meetings.150 
While city historian Muthiah acknowledged that ‘such a site deserves better 
than man-made rocks, fountains and fauna’, referring to the state proposal to 
replace the structure with a landscaped fountain, Madras Musings, a bimonthly 
newsletter published by him reported in 2003 that:  
..we are not exactly unhappy over the demolition of Seerani Arangam and 
the consequent banning of public meetings and constructions on the 
beach, as part of the efforts to keep the Marina and beach clean…..there 
was no permanent construction of any kind at this historic site in those 
days. In 1968, a group of volunteers, the Seerani Force, raised Seerani 
Arangam, during the regime of CN Annadurai, but over the years, it has 
become an eyesore, dilapidated by the day, marring the beauty of the 
Marina. But worse, the numerous meetings held at the site have posed an 
environmental threat to the Marina, traffic congestion has worsened, and 
there have also been many instances of hooliganism let loose on the 
unwary beachgoer during such meetings, not all of them political. Anti-
                                                 
149 Marina's eyesore demolished in midnight operation. (2003, 26 September). New Indian 
Express, p. 3. 
150 Muthiah, S. (2005, 26 September). Gandhiji and Thilakar Thidal. The Hindu, p. Metro Plus 
5. 
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social activities in the shadow of the Arangam have also thrived, we 
understand. Not so long ago, the CMDA Heritage Committee, and the 
Save the Marina Committee, in both of which there was non-
governmental and private sector participation, had agreed that Seerani 
Arangam should be demolished. As we understand it, the suggestion to 
demolish Seerani Arangam at the meetings was pushed by the non-
governmental participants. Obviously no one felt very strongly about 
Seerani Arangam.151 
 
The judiciary too seemed to ratify the efforts of the government in this 
instance. In response to the PIL, the Chief Justice asked if there was anything 
wrong in razing structures ‘for beautifying the beach or for at least restoring its 
old glory’, failing to note that ‘restoring its old glory’ involved erasing historic 
structures.152 CAG seemed to be the only one to read deeper into its 
demolition: 
No, because it was a public space and a meeting space. So no it isn’t and 
finally the bottom end is the beach is a public space……….Not allowing 
permanent structures on the beach, yes, is a good idea, yes we do agree 
with it. But the structure that was demolished, was demolished because of 
the state’s allergy to public meetings which are not controlled by them. I 
think that was a bad sign, a very, very bad sign. (CAG-030904-01) 
 
It is clear that the crisis related to the relocation of the fishermen and the QMC 
represented a boiling point where activists from all classes were able to rally 
together against state action. Once abated, they went back to their own tasks. 
The enunciation of their opinions on the demolition of Seerani Arangam 
illustrates the infeasibility of resonating together on every single occasion. This 
diversity of civil society groups is not only indicative of the richness of 
democracy but also reveals the fluidity of the politics of partnership that 
emerges in the new geography of governance. Alliances are temporal, 
depending very much on the demands of the situation. What needs to be 
specifically acknowledged in terms of the public spaces is that there is not one 
single template from which the arguments pertaining to its imagination can be 
drawn. For a city that is blessed with nearly 20 Km of beachfront and several 
                                                 
151 The portents in a demolition. (2003, 16-31 August). Madras Musings, p. 3. 
152 Subramani, A. (2003, 21 August). No move to demolish memorials: Govt. The Hindu, p. 3. 
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beach stretches, it also means that the debates that evolved on the Marina 
wouldn’t necessarily be applicable in the other stretches, let alone other type of 
open spaces.  
 
In discussing the urban public realm, Beauregard and Bounds (2000) 
differentiate between public and the parochial spaces, explaining that public 
spaces are the ones where interests and identities are publicised to city wide 
and even national audiences (and transnational ones as well), whereas, in 
parochial spaces, deliberations of social collectivities remain restricted to 
similar interest affinity groups. The ability of the civil society organisations to 
develop from an associational to institutional status determines to a large extent 
whether the dialogue over a particular open space is constructed on a public or 
parochial level. In this context, it would be useful to examine the beach 
discourse constructed by the middle-class residents’ associations residing along 
the southern shoreline, and will be addressed in the next section focussing 
primarily on Valmiki Nagar and New Beach in Thiruvanmiyur, and to a less 
extent on Neelangarai Beach (Figure 44). 
 
Absent Societies/Chapter 6: Public Spaces                            
268 
Figure 44: Case study beaches in southern Chennai 
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6.2 Residing along the shoreline 
 Ironically, for a city that owes its colonial foundation to its oceanfront, neither 
did its colonial settlers nor its indigenous colonised communities have a taste 
for seaside residence. The seafront was viewed advantageously purely from a 
commercial perspective. Even when, in the later part of the nineteenth century, 
a promenade was developed along the beach for leisure and recreational 
purposes, much of the residential development was inland, and the shoreline 
south of the Adyar River remained unmolested. But, in the post-independence 
decades, as existing neighbourhoods became congested, reeling under 
uncontrolled urbanisation, better-off residents began to look for alternative 
residential locations. It was in such a pursuit that, in 1958, a judge of the 
Madras High Court, Justice Balakrishna Iyer, purchased a piece of land along 
the coast south of the village of Thiruvanmiyur to build his retirement home.153 
Iyer saw value in the unspoilt nature of the beachside property, and envisioning 
a potential for further development, had the area plotted in the early 1960s as 
half-acre to one-acre residential parcels. A primary north-south road with four 
secondary seaward roads running east-west constituted the basic layout. The 
development was initially named as Judges’ Colony, renamed as Valmiki 
Nagar by the Corporation in 1978.  
In subsequent years, in villages like Neelangarai (two miles further 
south of Valmiki Nagar), the beachfront was similarly plotted and sold to 
affluent residents from the city. But it was not just the upper classes who 
acknowledged the value of this shift to the southern shoreline. The state 
realised the impossibility of providing housing within the city and acquired 
large parcels of land along ECR for state-led housing developments. 
Neighbourhoods along ECR thus represented a heterogeneous mix of different 
classes (Chapter Three). By the late-1980s and early 1990s, with the 
                                                 
153 Lawrence, J. (1995, 03 December - 06 January). Valmiki Nagar - a three-part series on an 
Adayar neighbourhood. Adayar Times, p. 6; Also based on resident interviews ECR-010304-01 
and ECR-150304-01 
Absent Societies/Chapter 6: Public Spaces                            
270 
development of multiple-dwelling flat complexes in areas like Valmiki Nagar, 
a dense, cosmopolitan character pervaded the place. Through a combination of 
deliberate orchestration and accumulation by degrees, neighbourhoods like 
Valmiki Nagar began to signify a specific image for the new middle class. 
Living in Valmiki Nagar by the beach became a metaphor for a desirable way 
of life: 
I was always um fascinated by the coast….I always preferred to 
live…you know close to the sea and there was even during a hot summer 
day, you know, sea breeze would set in early and stuff like that. So when 
I got the opportunity to buy a flat I looked at areas you know close to the 
coast and Valmiki Nagar happened to be one of them …Valmiki Nagar 
was open and sandy with open spaces and things like that when I moved 
in. (ECR-310304-01) 
 
..very close to the beach which I always wanted right from my young age. 
Even though I never have the habit of getting up early, I always feel that 
we should get up early, go to the beach, was one of my dreams. So 
probably at my age of forty, this dream might come true. (ECR-140304-
01) 
 
Despite the air of exclusivity, Valmiki Nagar residents have had to collectively 
organise themselves for obtaining basic amenities, just like any other middle-
class colony (Chapter Five). Amidst concerns of the neighbourhood’s general 
upkeep, they also began to worry about the beach, which, in the absence of 
sustained maintenance effort by the Town Panchayat first and more recently 
the Corporation, became nobody’s concern.154 Decades of fast-paced 
urbanisation began to take a toll on the beach, and the residents realised that it 
was no longer a premium but a liability. Initial attempts of the residents 
reflected an extended application of the mindset of their associations to 
maintain the beach. Initially the Valmiki Nagar Fourth Seaward Road 
association decided to extend its spatial remit to the beach, and from this effort 
a separate organisation called the Beach Buddies emerged to address 
exclusively the concerns of the beach.  
                                                 
154 Valmiki Nagar was under the purview of Thiruvanmiyur Town Panchayat until its 
absorption in 1978 by the Corporation boundary expansion. While the city’s Corporation 
remains the most empowered, other local bodies in the metropolitan area including the 
municipalities, town and village panchayats represent weak efforts at local governance.  
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6.2.1 Parochialising a public space 
These initial efforts illustrate the ‘parochial’ nature of this beach as the 
residents emphasised the difference between ‘their’ beach and the more public 
beaches like the Marina and Elliot’s Beach.155 The co-founder of Beach 
Buddies explained the motivation behind their effort: 
The Beach Buddies which got created three years back, uh, stems from 
the fact that we are living very close to a stretch of beach which is really 
beautiful and the fact that it can become, go the Marina or Elliot’s Beach 
way, we didn’t want to wait till it became a messy beach….this [Beach 
Buddies] was formed separately, where it didn’t restrict the members to 
be only from Valmiki Nagar Fourth Seaward Road. So we had people, of 
course initially the members were all living here and they were all, each 
one brought in a skill set of, you know, which could actually, which made 
this whole group very unique. (emphasis added) (ECR-270304-03) 
 
Other residents also expressed apprehension over ‘their’ beach going the 
Marina way: 
Oh! Thiruvanmiyur beach is not comparable [with the Marina]. Marina 
beach was good at that time [ten years ago]. Clean beach, was not 
crowded. One of the main agendas of coming to Madras was going to the 
beach. Ok, it will invariably happen every time. Now, I don’t think I have 
visited Marina very often. It has been too many years, more than a 
decade. (emphasis added) (ECR-040904-01) 
 
A retired couple who had just moved into the area from Tambaram (an interior 
suburb of Chennai) described the beach as ‘very nice’, ‘clean’, a blessing for 
old people: ‘since we didn’t have it there [in Tambaram], this is a real godly 
offering to us….We never went to a beach when living in Tambaram’. In their 
perception, Marina ‘for a long time, it has now become too much, that is too 
much rush’ (ECR-020904-01). In contrast, they felt that Thiruvanmiyur beach 
‘is in the residential area for the use of the residents’. Another resident said: 
                                                 
155 Elliot’s Beach is a half Km stretch fronting the southern neighbourhood of Besant Nagar, 
north of Thiruvanmiyur. Its transformation in the last few decades from a ‘parochial’ beach 
used mostly by the nearby residents to a more ‘public’ beach is notable. With leisure facilities 
ranging from food outlets to skating rinks, Elliot’s Beach has become a popular destination for 
the city yuppies. Proposals for its re-imagination abound in plenty from several sources 
including the Corporation and the residents. This has generated much debate, an analysis of 
which is outside the remit of this chapter.  
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..as long as I lived in Besant Nagar, I was going to the beach. That, 
Elliot’s Beach, I was going. Marina, we don’t go. After that, this beach, 
this Thiruvanmiyur Beach…..that is nice. You can very well go 
there…..Marina beach is now very spoilt, they have made it very bad. It 
was really nice at one time, in those times, about twenty years ago, before 
coming to Madras, when we visited it, we went there and it was really 
good. Now what is happening is the people coming and going, they leave 
the plates and stuff behind after eating, using it as a toilet, doing so, they 
have spoilt the Marina beach. (ECR-020904-02) 
 
From the above narratives, cleanliness and crowd emerge as crucial factors 
differentiating the public and parochial beaches. But there is more to be probed 
in the semantics of this distinction than what meets the eye. For, inbuilt into 
their fear of their beach ‘going the Marina or Elliot’s beach way’ is the evident 
fear of class invasion as the beach became more public. In analysing the 
changes that beset Coney Island in New York at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, Zukin et al (1998) show how, as the beach became accessible to a 
mass public, middle-class residents resisted the muting of class distinctions. 
The distinctive imaginary of public and parochial spaces is thus something that 
is subject to and susceptible to the social practices of class. This is seen best in 
the explicit statement of the following Valmiki Nagar resident who, without 
mincing words stated that: 
My concept has been very very clear. I don’t go to any place which the 
janata patronises because you know it doesn’t go well with your status 
and you know my style of living.156 It is that simple…I try not to 
patronise any place where the janata goes to whether it is a holiday 
destination or whether it is a, you know, beach like Marina or Besant 
Nagar. I would go to Besant Nagar but never step into the Marina beach 
never ever. You know it gives you a very, it is a very sorry sight in that 
sense you know because of the way people use it. (ECR-250304-02) 
 
The fear of class invasion taking place in Thiruvanmiyur beach was echoed by 
another resident who remarked on the reduced opportunities of recreation in 
the neighbourhood: 
Of course, we are on the beach and it should be the meeting place and it 
should be the place where the entire neighbourhood gets together 
socially, but, um, the beach is hardly usable now. No, it doesn’t happen 
because you know unfortunately there are, it is very hard to say, but 
socio-economic status plays a big role in things. Whether you want it to 
                                                 
156 Janata literally means the people, but in slang refers to the mass public. 
Absent Societies/Chapter 6: Public Spaces                            
273 
or not it does. So what happens is when people from the surrounding um 
villages and the surrounding areas, slums or whatever you want to call 
them, urban settlements, all flock to the beach, because they need a public 
place too, then the residents of this area will not go, you know, and that is 
what happened. (ECR-170304-01) 
 
In this regard, the collective activity associated with the safeguarding of the 
beach reflects the class monopoly that is in-built into this parochialism. It is in 
this context that Gupta reveals extreme scorn for small associations that are 
often formed based on interpersonal relations as they are innocent of the notion 
of the “public” and do not create social trust: ‘In the absence of any awareness 
of public responsibilities, interpersonal associations are little more than cliques 
and cabals’ (2001: 213). He is concerned that the low level of 
institutionalisation characteristic of the umpteen associations in India reveals 
the poverty of social ethics and an absence of concern with “the other”. It is 
against this background that the activities of Thiruvanmiyur’s two beach 
related associations, Beach Buddies and East Coast Beach Walkers’ 
Association (ECBWA) will be examined in the following paragraphs.  
 
6.2.2 Beach Buddies: ‘We wanted to achieve so much but…’ 
An off-shoot of the Valmiki Nagar Fourth Seaward Road Residents’ 
Association, Beach Buddies initially started as an awareness campaign amongst 
the residents. Its agenda progressed to the physical cleaning of the beach, 
relying on residents to volunteer for a ‘Sunday morning exercise’. But middle-
class residents, after a few weeks of zealous ‘sample participation’ in the beach 
cleaning exercises, lost enthusiasm for the same. Previous chapter, through the 
example of Puduvellam, revealed that middle-class residents resist ‘dirtying 
their hands’ when it comes to physical efforts to improve their neighbourhood. 
They are quite willing to lend themselves to one-day token exercises, when 
they take up shovels and spades, and sweat it out in the streets and open spaces. 
Yet, when it comes to a routine exercise, they much rather pay someone else to 
do the same. Thus, Beach Buddies eventually employed a narikuravar (gypsy) 
or a rag-picker for this task, priding itself in sponsoring his livelihood.   
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But Beach Buddies did not have a sustained financial subscription on an 
annual basis from the residents, and hence struggled to fund itself, relying 
mostly on donations. It is therefore not surprising that within a few months, its 
activities slowed down. Handicapped by an unsustainable flow of funds, Beach 
Buddies could not afford the employment of a cleaner, and the beach promptly 
fell back to its unkempt appearance. In addition to this financial distress, Beach 
Buddies was also hampered by its decision to remain a residents-only initiative. 
 
Lone rangers on the beach 
Despite the efforts of its founders to avoid ‘making it a very boring social 
organisation, you know, talking about, giving a very, what do you call this 
mourning kind of a feel, this the end of the world appeal’, in spite of doing ‘it 
in a way which didn’t put anybody down, that you are being ignorant or…you 
are not caring enough’, and acknowledging that ‘movements like this shouldn’t 
die because after a point people don’t sustain it’ (ECR-270304-03), those 
involved with this effort were unable to prevent all this from affecting their 
organisation: 
The sustaining couldn’t happen because again the; suddenly the interest 
starts getting diluted you know, and that is one thing I realised here. The 
social, anything to do socially you know unless we are terribly committed 
to it, it doesn’t last and we move on to other, you know, whatever life 
and…….our core group started again breaking up because people were 
just moving away from here. They were all temporary people. (ECR-
270304-03) 
 
At the time of interview, Beach Buddies had come to a standstill for nearly two 
years after a year of heightened activities. While its founders were convinced 
that all was not lost, it is not uncommon to see similar initiatives losing steam 
and fizzling out in no time. Most efforts are initiated by a select set of socially-
minded individuals with a sense of civic awareness and responsibility, 
involving a few episodes of enthusiastic participation, but which disband soon 
afterwards (Figure 45). They rarely evolve into permanent organs, as they are 
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not pinned by institutions that are generally associated with civil society 
(Chapter Five).  
 
Figure 45: RK Laxman, The Times of India on the limited longevity of 
cleanliness campaigns 
Source: Laxman (2004: 154) 
 
The kind of vigilante exceptionalism practiced by Beach Buddies captured a 
very limited audience who eventually tired of the repetitive slogans. While 
Beach Buddies talked about giving space for people to come in and realise their 
dream of doing something for the community, it was clear that these people 
were from similar socio-economic background, i.e. the middle class. Insisting 
on the need for ‘like-minded people’, Beach Buddies activists emphasised their 
resistance to expanding their social sphere and include other groups, and 
therefore resisted the institutionalisation of their association: 
See, I was very straight about this okay. I knew my limitation. I would, at 
some point in the future, I would like to take this one [expanding its 
social sphere] but I am not ready for it. These [the middle-class residents] 
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are the people I understand. I understand middle class, uh, whatever, you 
know, the people who live around. If I can make a difference to them; I 
wasn’t looking at making a; I wasn’t looking at; those were my 
circumstance when I typically worked with what I could and I was very 
clear about that. So I called the kids around my neighbourhood and I 
called people around my neighbourhood and I worked with them. (ECR-
300304-02) 
 
At the same time there is realisation that limiting to members from the same 
class deprived them of the big picture: 
I realised that to do this you need to have a bigger picture you need to do 
it from a point of understanding it completely with a stronger and more 
powerful voice. (ECR-300304-02) 
 
Ellickson (1998) has argued that informal social networks can make useful 
contributions, through collaborations and cooperation exercises, to coterminous 
institutions pursuing similar objectives at a more socio-political level. But 
Beach Buddies dismissed the possibility of federating with other informal and 
formal networks involved with the beach. Insisting that its approach was 
different, its members were sceptical of forming federations or 
institutionalising themselves: 
You know what would happen? The whole place would fall apart. 
Because these are all; anything that becomes a larger group becomes 
highly politicised and the feeling of the; I think it is good to be a little 
fragmented on this because can you imagine then……..I would say that 
we must be in a minority…..I certainly wouldn’t want to institutionalise 
it. (ECR-300304-02) 
 
Nature on the beach: interacting with fishermen 
Part of the reason for their resistance to federating is their unwillingness to 
involve the fishermen from the nearby kuppam in their efforts. This comes as a 
surprise given the clear ‘preserve the nature’ steer of their activities:  
When we came up with the concept of Beach Buddies, it wasn’t, not so 
much about the beach, but, it, it is something pure nature at your 
doorstep…..our entire communication was meant to be about nature, 
meant to be about your natural environment, oh, and not just the natural 
environment, per se, your responsibility to your environment….you know 
the fact that the ocean needs to be protected and fish needs protecting. 
You cannot pollute and stuff like that. We were constantly trying to 
sensitise people. (ECR-270304-03) 
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They even attempted to tie the whole issue of keeping the beach clean with 
other ‘external’ environmental issues including water conservation and tree 
plantation. But they did not see the fishermen as an inherent part of this 
‘natural environment’.  
 
While Beach Buddies acknowledged that fishermen are ‘more in touch 
with nature than anybody else’ (ECR-300304-02), they dismissed the 
possibility of collaboration between the two groups on the insistence that ‘you 
need to have a different set of sensibilities’ (ECR-270304-03). They reasoned 
that ‘their’ beach stretch was an empty one, outside the fishermen’s territories, 
and emphasised that they ‘actually stayed clear from the kuppam beach’ (ECR-
270304-03). In fact, they were anxious to avoid potential conflicts with other 
users of the beach, particularly the fishermen, and the best way, according to 
them, was to stay clear. But while they were cautious about not interfering with 
the fishermen’s use of the beach, there were instances when they couldn’t help 
passing judgement on the way fishermen used the beach. This particularly 
became evident when the conversation veered towards the use of the 
beachfront as an open toilet. In this aspect they opined that ‘the fishermen 
don’t use the beach right’ (ECR-270304-03). There is thus a fundamental 
contradiction in their commentary on the fishermen: 
…they [the fishermen] have been, in fact, this is, we have encroached 
upon their area as we say and they have their own systems in place for a 
long period of time. The only thing which we wanted to bring across to 
them is while this place is yours, we would like you to stay you know 
along the times, that too, and change your lifestyle to the extent that this 
place can be used by everyone. Uh, the beach is as much yours as ours 
and we are not, we are not claiming you know the use of the land but uh 
there are better ways of changing your, your know, change your lifestyle, 
upgrade your lifestyle. They have this strong belief that nature has 
provided them with this open place for them to use and the sea washes 
away all the muck and they don’t realise the muck also comes back. 
Whatever is just thrown in filters out which is not part of the beach, of the 
sea. But they say that we have always been like this and we have never 
had a problem. (ECR-270304-03) 
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Even though they talked about ‘educating’ the fishermen against these habits, 
and working with NGOs and the Corporation to build toilets for their use, it 
came to nothing. As a result of their muddled stand on the fishermen, they 
simply could not send any social message across. This precluded the possibility 
of a politics of partnership, even though they admitted that as a lone entity they 
couldn’t go far with their efforts.  
 
Isolated as a group, Beach Buddies developed a fundamental distrust of 
‘others’ on the beach. Thus, when the garbage bins they had placed in the 
beach disappeared, they pointed to a vague set of others: ‘there used to be all 
these people on the beach; it is nice to roll it [bins] around’, and evasively said 
that it could have been ‘the young boys from the nearby areas who come to 
play cricket on the beach’, or ‘the fishermen who think that it could be used to 
store water’, or in general some ‘anti-social elements’ (ECR-270304-03).  
 
Their reluctance to partner was not just with the fishermen but also with 
the Corporation. But in this instance, they blamed the Corporation for not 
showing interest in their activities:    
Surprisingly, Corporation refused to have, like when we approached them 
and said see we have; the Corporation, has, um, um, goes ahead cleaning 
the, you know, urban areas with garbage, why don’t you send the people 
to clean the beach?.....They said, we are, our limits are up to this, up to 
whatever road is defined……..we were really shocked at the attitude the 
Corporation had. We had spoken to the Councillor, more to the AE 
[Assistant Engineer] of this area. They said no, we don’t have that 
whatever infrastructure or the manpower to assign people to go and clean 
the beach. (ECR-270304-03) 
 
Their approach reflects more the attitude of residents who demand to be 
serviced, rather than as public partners willing to share some of the 
responsibilities of an already overstretched public body. But they didn’t seem 
to rue about this so much, placing their objectives with the middle-class 
residents who in their opinion were the ‘biggest users and because they were 
the biggest enjoyers of the spaces of the beach and they took the most 
interest…..I do think that it works best with people within proximity of the 
beach’ (ECR-300304-02).  
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In their inactive state today, Beach Buddies activists seem content to be 
a ‘remembered lot’, waiting for the ‘right kind of people’ (read as middle-class 
residents) to come along and take up the initiative again: ‘If you notice, all 
beach areas are handled by organisations like these, you know, defence of the 
beach is all by the [middle class] people’ (ECR-270304-03). And it is probably 
true of the southern beaches. But what they don’t realise is the varying range of 
such efforts from inter-personal associations to organised institutions. The 
former is eventually bound to fail as their momentum dies, and it is only the 
latter, through institutionalisation, that has better chances of survival and 
success.  
 
It is to illustrate this point that the next section will focus on the efforts 
of another group of residents living along the Thiruvanmiyur shoreline (not just 
Valmiki Nagar but also other nearby neighbourhoods) who have successfully 
gathered together to develop the beachfront. Centred mainly around the 
middle-class habit of ‘beach walking’, the East Coast Beach Walkers 
Association (ECBWA) has taken up the development of a one Km beach 
stretch, immediately south of Valmiki Nagar, popularly referred to as New 
Beach (Figure 46). While Beach Buddies opted out of a politics of partnership, 
ECBWA has harnessed this well, successfully achieving more than Beach 
Buddies. But their politics of partnership has involved an alignment of purely 
middle-class interests with the state, to the exclusion of other social groups. 
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Figure 46: Beaches of Thiruvanmiyur – Valmiki Nagar and New Beach 
Valmiki Nagar Beach   New Beach 
Today, with the dormancy of Beach Buddies, Valmiki Nagar beach portrays an 
overgrown, ‘uncared’ for look, while nearby New Beach has developed into an 
enviable stretch for beach walkers, mainly through the efforts of ECBWA. 
 
6.2.3 East Coast Beach Walkers Association: consuming the beach 
Amongst the numerous traits and habits that the Indian bourgeoisie inherited 
from the colonial British, a popular one is the habit of promenading on the 
beach. In Chennai, one cannot miss the hoard of middle-aged middle-class 
citizens taking a leisurely early morning stroll along the various beach stretches 
Absent Societies/Chapter 6: Public Spaces                            
281 
in the city, be it the Marina, Elliot’s Beach or the Thiruvanmiyur beach. For 
many of the middle-class residents this has become a status signifier of sorts as 
they socialise during these walks. So much so that a ‘wave of enterprise’ has 
begun to emerge around these beach walkers, or what a recent article in The 
Hindu referred to as the ‘dawn brigade’. Temporary stalls selling herbal drinks, 
ready-to-eat healthy meals, magazines and newspapers, and some even offering 
health tips dot the shoreline, eager to capture the middle-class market.157 
 
 Long-term residents of Valmiki Nagar pride themselves in being the 
earliest beach walkers in the area: 
Now the beach (laughs), I have been walking along the beach for the last 
many many years. I used to walk when I worked here in Madras [1960s 
and 1970s]. Then I went out of Madras. I came back and settled here in 
1987, when I retired from service. And for the last seventeen years, I 
have been walking here everyday. During the first ten of those seventeen 
years…..I used to walk everyday. So we are amongst the earliest walkers. 
If I may say so, most of them who are walking now are newcomers. 
(ECR-150304-01) 
 
The above resident was eager to differentiate himself from the current breed of 
beach walkers who are not only relatively new to the area but have also 
organised themselves to form an East Coast Beach Walkers Association 
(ECBWA) to ensure certain transformations in the beach. The previous chapter 
remarked on how the new middle-class residents in the city wish to utilise the 
collective bargaining of the residents’ associations to highlight their position as 
citizen-consumers. And much of the ECBWA’s agenda pursues a similar 
strategy, as it is a collective organisation to fulfil the consumption needs of the 
beach walkers.  
 
Reflecting on the failure of the Beach Buddies initiative, one of the 
residents described them as social reformers who were unable to achieve the 
kind of physical transformation they had hoped for: 
                                                 
157 Padmanabhan, G. (2005, 09 May). Waves of enterprise. The Hindu, p. Metro Plus 5.  
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It started so well, I mean, you know. I thought it was an excellent 
scheme, get the kids involved, you know, make the environment aware, 
keep the beach clean. It was wonderful but somehow you know in India, I 
don’t know, numbers, just numbers, sheer numbers and sheer demand of 
services just defeats, you know.(ECR-170304-01)  
 
And it was exactly this, the advantage of numbers that the ECBWA employed 
to enforce its vision of the beach. In existence since the mid-1990s, the Vice-
President of the association explained its origins: 
Before 1995, it was an ordinary mud road. Here, for near about 100-200 
people were walking, coming here for walking. So we needed to provide 
them with conveniences, secondly this area needs to be established 
properly. So we formed an association…..As friends if we joined together 
to form an association, then whenever we want we can approach, 
otherwise we cannot develop this. With this intention, we formed this 
association…..At that time, in that period the Corporation Mayor was Mr. 
Stalin (1996-2001). In this period, we approached him like if you develop 
this road, so many people walk on this road, in future, more in thousands 
will benefit from it….every age group will benefit from it because there 
are people coming in the morning and evening. Saying so, we approached 
him first. When we first approached him, this road was near about one 
Km end to end one Km. If you see in that, one half is Corporation, other 
half is Panchayat [Kottivakkam Town Panchayat], panchayat area.158 So 
even if we approached one to gain benefits for one, the other is affected. 
That’s why, only if we make our association strong, so we are only 
respected. If the request comes from our association, they will do things 
for us. We all decided it should be so. So association needs to be 
strengthened. We approached the walkers to become members. Only then 
for these developments we can ask others and if they are going to meet it 
then they will give us something confirmed otherwise if we individually 
as ten and twenty people ask they will be indifferent. Today, politically if 
you see they look for voting banking. If the government does one thing, 
the kind of benefits they expect from that is voting but if beyond all that 
if they do something for us, it is because only if so many of us approach, 
then only we get something………year by year we strengthened the 
association. After strengthening, about 100, then 200, then 300, now near 
about above 500 members are there in the association now. (ECR-
040404-01) 
 
Through its collective bargaining with the Corporation, a Member of the 
Parliament (who lives nearby), and a Member of the Legislative Assembly, 
they have been able to build a neatly laid out tar-topped road, with a separate 
paved area for the walkers, benches for seating, street lighting, an all night 
                                                 
158 Thiruvanmiyur is the last ward in the Corporation of Chennai, after which in the south, 
begins the Kottivakkam Town Panchayat. 
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high-mast light, and a police community booth, amongst other things (Figure 
47). In procuring these facilities it is evident that the ECBWA has understood 
well not only the ‘numbers game’ but also the advantages that can be had from 
the politics of partnership.  
 
Figure 47: Improvements through ECBWA 
Clockwise from top left: Community police booth in the background, high-
mast night lighting, provision of drinking water, and bus shelters 
 
A ‘popular’ partnership 
While both Beach Buddies and ECBWA focus primarily on middle-class 
demands, ECBWA were able to establish a rapport with the Corporation and 
the politicians based on its collective strength. Whereas, in the case of the 
Beach Buddies, when they asked the Corporation ‘to do their duty and clean 
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the beach’, in the absence of a larger collective support, the Corporation easily 
dismissed their demand as one coming from a one-off ‘irritating fellow’.159 
Both organisations also relied on social events and gatherings for 
dissemination. But, if the Beach Buddies relied on a residents’ exclusive 
jumble sale and kid’s bazaar confined to the four streets in the neighbourhood, 
the kind of activities that ECBWA organised are on a more popular level, 
involving a larger group of associations and civic institutions: 
….here there is a residents’ association, Thiruvalluvar Nagar Residents’ 
Association. They also got involved with us, joined us…Also now, Lions 
Club here has been launched. Lions Club of Elliot’s Darshan, in that 
name, they are servicing here. Example, if you see ‘Breezy Beach’, they 
have formed a group of ten clubs or so. If you see, every year we 
celebrate either Independence Day or Republic Day grandly here through 
association. Then, three months once we have a free health camp. Then, 
like that, they also do volunteer service, the lion’s club, they volunteer for 
health camp, they have done a lot like that. (ECR-040404-01) 
 
Patriotic celebrations often get noticed by political parties, as political leaders 
are invited as chief guests who are then obliged to at least hear out their 
demands, if not fulfil them. Health camps smack of philanthropic intentions, 
endorsed by a wider circle of people. On the other hand, the kind of chief 
guests invited to the Beach Buddies events included specialists like 
environmentalists talking (most definitely in English) about nature 
conservation. 
 
 Remarking on the preoccupation of shoreline residents with beach 
development issues, Theodore Baskaran, a well-known naturalist/historian and 
a resident of Thiruvanmiyur criticised this middle-class sense of resident 
environmentalism: 
Now I was involved in the beach and went for the meeting. They called 
that ‘save the beach’ meeting. And some concerned went. And then I 
raised the point that what, that if we want to do anything with the beach, 
we should interact with the people who are in the beach, that’s the 
kuppam people. And to deal with the kuppam people you have to have 
                                                 
159 In India, whenever someone steps into any government department office, with a complaint 
letter or request for intervention, the officials will generally adopt a lax attitude, saying, ‘leave 
it in writing, and we will take a look at it’. When the plaintiff insists on ‘immediate action’, the 
officials will often get annoyed at the persistence, saying, ‘Ugh! What an irritating fellow’. 
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your name whatever organisations you are finding, you have to have your 
name in Tamil. If you put a ‘save the beach’ association, what will they 
understand? You immediately alienate them by giving an English 
title.……..I only raise the Tamil issue because you have to. As it is they 
think environmental movement is a preoccupation of the elite and 
English-speaking wallahs. Like that you are creating distance…..all these 
groups are very elitist and all these groups are very removed from the 
kuppam people. That is very harmful for conservation movement. You 
know, because the, those people see that any activity relating to the 
environment is anti-people. In fact that is how it is perceived. So I think 
they have to, they have to keep carrying them [the kuppam people] along 
with the whole movement. They are not doing that. Simply they keep 
talking in English. (TB-090404-03) 
 
In this sense, both Beach Buddies and ECBWA are equally exclusive. 
 
‘Dealing’ with fishermen: ‘They are not in the picture..’ 
Confined by its middle-class needs, ECBWA, like Beach Buddies, is reluctant 
to include the nearby fishermen kuppams in their efforts. In the first instance, 
the association viewed the kuppam as potentially opposing the scheme: 
….there was some opposition to this gesture. Because this was a bit 
‘fisheries’ area. Because this was a fishermen kuppam, walking could be 
a disturbance to them, they thought. (ECR-040404-01) 
 
In fact, just like Beach Buddies, ECBWA too asserted that its interventions 
were taking place in a stretch where there is no fishermen presence or usage: 
Here, the fishermen, in this one Km area, they are not disturbed. For 
them, there is no trouble from this. There is an area taken up exclusively 
for them, allocated like that, north and south for them. The big benefit for 
us is that this one Km was without any disturbance from them and we 
were able to service to this extent otherwise there would have been 
problems between us and them. (ECR-040404-01)  
 
The ECBWA official clarified further: 
No, in our association, no one [from the fishermen kuppam] has 
approached us and said, why have you done like this, there is so much 
trouble for us. We haven’t either gone to them and asked for anything. 
Because they don’t live for us and we don’t live for them. In between, 
that hasn’t been there. So far there hasn’t been anything from them. 
(ECR-040404-01) 
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There is an underlying perception of threat from the fishermen to the middle-
class use of the beach in this insistence of spatially distinct territories. Seen in 
this context, even proposals like levelling the sand dune and installing more 
seating facilities closer to the water suggest an ulterior motive on behalf of 
ECBWA:  
….occasionally they [fishermen] come here but regularly they don’t 
come here. Permanent area [of the fishermen] is there beyond that area. 
Somebody once might come and spread their nets but they will remove it 
immediately. Because the peoples are there, that’s why we have asked for 
levelling. If we level it and put another post, public will sit covering the 
full stretch. If they sit, they [the fishermen] will feel delicate about 
coming into this area and will make way for us. (ECR-040404-01) 
 
It seems that these organisations’ (Beach Buddies and ECBWA) view of a 
compartmentalised beach catering to different user groups is underwritten by a 
nervous anticipation of conflict if users spatially overlap.160 There is a 
tendency of a middle-class extension of power relations present in the more 
permanent forms of urban landscape to the beach as a public space. This comes 
out in the approach of ECBWA which is socially restricted in its politics of 
partnership with the fishermen and also in terms of its interventions on the 
beach. 
 
Narrowed by residents’ interests 
A member of ECBWA explained their resistance to institutionalised social 
mixing: 
See this area consists of three types of society, lower, middle and upper 
classes. In all these different walks of life the lifestyles are different…if 
you are in the lower strata, he will have his own economic considerations 
for it. Middle class, he has some educational constraints for him, upper 
class his own business constraints for him. So what they all do, they 
cannot have a common hold. To come to a common hold, everybody has 
to sacrifice and compromise so many issues which is not happening 
                                                 
160 In a study of class relations in the beaches of Rio de Janeiro, Freeman (2002) counters the 
popular portrayal of the beach as a space where a diversity of beach goers share the same sand, 
and argues that the beach is not an undifferentiated mass of people distributed randomly along 
the beach. Instead, a sophisticated understanding of the landscape prevails through a spatio-
temporal distinction as a result of which the beach, in a highly stratified manner, is marked by 
hegemonic tendencies. 
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away. Now at this stage when we come here, we are all already middle-
class people. Basically, by and large, people who use the beach are 
middle-class people, who are here at this gathering are middle-class 
society……..So we want to have in our own fashion certain type of life. 
Here, to have a common platform is very very difficult. Because of 
economics, number one, second is educational background. Third is 
intellectual competency also will come into work……there are 
differences in our lifestyles and probably in our attitudes, in our 
principles or approach or perceptions and all. It is bound to be there. It is 
already there. So we cannot go and just mix with x or y. (ECR-010404-
03) 
 
ECBWA’s middle-class members are convinced like Beach Buddies that no 
one uses the beach more than themselves, and insist that it is their interest that 
is intertwined most with the beach. They acknowledge that the beach is used by 
other social classes. But according to them, the poor and lower classes who 
probably come once in a week ‘to have a break’ from the struggles of their 
daily life, and the upper classes who generally depend on enclosed exclusive 
clubs for recreation, could not possibly have as much to do with the beach as 
the middle class do.  
 
Spatially, ECBWA covers a very small area where its interventions remain 
limited to the foreshore, by the roadside. While it has indicated a desire to 
extend further into the sands, it is unwilling to think about beach development 
issues at large: 
See, our service is all along the roadside only. Because suppose any, if 
we collectively through sponsorship achieve something then when the 
government takes some action in the future it may get demolished. That 
this shouldn’t happen, we are concentrating only on the roadside…..Our 
developments are all along the roadside. It is just cleaning and levelling 
that we have asked help for. So in this area, we don’t want to do anything 
big collectively or through sponsorship………What we can do 
maximum, there is a limit to it. Beyond that whatever it is we need to get 
permission from government. Any provision in this area, first we give the 
letters to the Panchayat or Corporation. We individually cannot take any 
action. Association is there. But the road belongs to the government. 
Beach is government. Even if we put a light here or do some social 
service here or even if we put up a board or even if we put these benches 
here, even for these we need to give letters through the association. We 
get permission from them and then only do things. Because tomorrow 
disturbance, the question of whom did you ask before you placed these 
shouldn’t arise. So even now in this Corporation area we have arranged 
for about six benches for that also we gave letters. (ECR-040404-01) 
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In addition to this cumbersome process of getting the approval from officials 
for every little effort of theirs, there are a couple of reasons as to why they are 
unwilling to take the success of their exercise to a larger scale. First of all, 
ECBWA is really an extended activity of the nearby residents’ associations 
(Valmiki Nagar and Thiruvalluvar Nagar), albeit one more successful than the 
Beach Buddies. The fact that it operate like a residents’ association has much to 
do with the residents’ desire to operate on a small scale and remain that way: 
Us, we function like for this residential area only. This ECBWA extends 
only for Thiruvalluvar Nagar. If you look at its address, it reads as 
Thiruvanmiyur Thiruvalluvar Nagar ECBWA. So, in this area, what 
developments we can do we do. If you look at residents’ associations they 
will do work only in their residential area. They don’t go outside…….So 
this is Thiruvanmiyur Thiruvalluvar Nagar walkers’ association only…if 
you take this association, the members are from here maximum. 
Residential area members are our members. (ECR-040404-01) 
 
When posed with the question of potentially federating with similar beach 
initiatives of residents living in other neighbourhoods along the East Coast 
Road, the ECBWA official maintained that they are not against federations but 
if ‘we take care of our area, they take care of theirs, then it is okay’ (ECR-
040404-01). He considered the activities of his association as a public service, 
one that is an exemplar for replication elsewhere. He also insisted that there is 
no issue of keeping the gains of their efforts to themselves, and disagreed with 
the suggestion that the association was not willing to share its ‘fruits’ with 
others.  
 
In this context, it is obvious that the association’s ‘partnering’ with the 
state is a careful exercise, with a limited agenda, and amidst conviction that 
larger beach development issues have to be addressed and monitored by the 
state officials:  
For this, the government should take action…government gives the 
permission [for developments]. Actually if you see, in the sea shore area 
everyone says building construction for 500 metres there shouldn’t be 
any construction. Now all this (points around) is built unapproved. Who 
gives permission? The government. If the government doesn’t do 
anything about it, we cannot do much about it. Because the public needs 
to adjust to it. They [the government] should become aware of the fact 
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that they are behaving against rules and regulations. They don’t get it 
either. If they have built so much, so many buildings, what can we do 
about it? (ECR-040404-01) 
 
Not only do they think that overall it is the government’s responsibility, they 
also endorse the recent efforts of the state. Thus, the association, contrary to the 
various middle-class civil society protests against the MoU with the Malaysian 
Government for the Marina Development Plan, supports these very efforts. To 
the extent that the fishermen communities on the Marina are blamed for 
disrupting the project: 
…there is a government project itself that is Marina to Neelangarai, there 
is a beautification project, collaboration with the Malaysian government. 
For that itself they are not making way…….If you see foreshore estate, 
Pattinapakkam [fishermen neighbourhoods along Santhome Beach], see 
that one area. There is a bypass road, the use of this bypass road was to 
be used if there is a road disturbance. But now you cannot go near that 
road area. To that level they [fishermen] have destroyed it. Now the 
reason for that is it is their residential area their living condition will 
remain like that. People tried to reform them and it hasn’t been possible. 
In the Marina to Neelangarai project that is the first one to be affected. 
But they refused to vacate it. So the project is stalled. Because throughout 
the world, what now is second should be made first, that was the idea.161 
The government’s voluntary service due to the Malaysian government 
that has been stopped. What they [the fishermen] did was disturbance. 
(ECR-040404-01) 
 
6.2.4 Masked by development 
Overall, the ECBWA has emerged as a popular body known for successfully 
enforcing order on the beach. Besides arranging with Onyx and the 
Corporation to have the beachside cleaned daily, ECBWA consults with 
relevant state officials on a recurring basis over several development concerns: 
So any fault, any mistake, anything, we report to the Corporation 
immediately through the association…They will immediately attend to it 
and clear it for us. Like that, security, when you look at the police patrols 
in the night hours, throughout the night they cover it….because we gave 
letter to the police department, like in the evening time…when you come 
and see after sunset up to twelve ‘o’ clock people keep going here and 
there. So they need security. We asked for police protection and their 
patrol vehicle parades this place up to morning through out night they 
                                                 
161 He was referring to the commonly posed question: Marina is the second longest beach in the 
world, but why can’t it be the world’s best beach? 
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cover and go in the morning. There is a police community booth. That 
facility is here. So there is no fear for those who park here……they give 
protection to ensure that there is no disturbance. Sometimes, this 
vehicular parking is some disturbance, they are told then. If they are 
regular visitors they know the rules and regulations to follow. (ECR-
040404-01) 
 
Today, New Beach projects a bourgeois imagery which is the envy of other 
beachside residential neighbourhoods: 
…you see this, what is this hamlet just before, they have now done a nice 
walk path, uh, Thiruvanmiyur…..See, they have done a very nice 
promenade okay, a beautiful promenade okay. You have two Km, three 
Km, everyday in the morning people go down and walk there. We wanted 
you know, we wanted to build a small promenade kind of thing….so that 
you know old people can come and sit in the evening there, and then you 
have children on these swings and see-saws and you those stuff. That is 
what I thought that we should do here. (ECR-270304-01) 
 
But it is not just the middle-class seaside residential neighbourhoods that aspire 
for such improvements. Even the fishermen living in the nearby kuppams think 
positively of these ‘improvements’. Fishermen in Thiruvanmiyur kuppam said 
that despite the fact that beach beautification exercises reflect the claims of 
other social classes (mostly middle and upper classes) to the beach, they do 
accept it as a principle and welcome it as a strategy. Specifically responding to 
the development of New Beach, the head of the fishermen community in 
Thiruvanmiyur kuppam said:  
We welcome all those changes. We shouldn’t resist or oppose that. To a 
certain extent we endorse them…we have been living like this without 
any developments. We hope that by at least looking at these 
improvements, our people should have some awareness and 
aspirations…They put a road for walking, then they put a platform for 
sitting, then they put a car parking. Now in the city area, there is prone to 
be development like that. (ECR-090404-01) 
 
There is clearly a rational-utilitarian aspect to their position that cannot be 
ignored. Engulfed by rapid urbanisation, fishermen kuppams, particularly those 
along the southern beaches, find themselves in close proximity to the new 
residential communities, exposed to their ‘modern lifestyles’. They view it 
advantageously as they reap some of the benefits including electricity 
connections, modern appliances in the household and private vehicles for 
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transportation. Also, fishermen residing along the southern stretch are also 
artisanal fishermen like the one along the Marina, and whose livelihood 
opportunities through fishing has reduced drastically over the years. This has 
had a spatial impact on fishermen’s use of their immediate environment, as 
their activities on the beach have shrunk. One can notice the reduced number of 
catamarans, and the limited drying of nets and fish on the beach: 
Now, there isn’t the situation for it [drying] because there isn’t the catch. 
Only if there is catch then we will know the kind of situation it creates 
[on the beach]. That is why it hasn’t formed into a conflict nor has there 
been opposition to it [from other social groups]….the profession of 
fishing is not like in old days. Fish is not available like in old times. Fish 
growth is low…For example the season now is for the big nets. Yearly 
for three months, only for three months we use that. In recent times, it 
hasn’t happened so they don’t know about it. For those who visit the 
beach it seems as if we don’t use it anymore…If we can get that type of 
fish, we will use these nets. Now because that type of fish is reduced we 
don’t use it….That is why the beach walkers don’t see us so much on the 
beach. Now for 2-3 or even 5 years if you take, because the fish catch is 
low, we don’t use those nets. Maybe when we start using that we will be 
seen. (ECR090404-04) 
 
The social repercussions are equally poignant. Of the 600 families living in the 
Thirvanmiyur kuppam, about 460 practice fishing. But in the absence of 
fulltime fishing opportunities, many men are taking up alternative jobs, such as 
night-time watchmen and security guards in the surrounding middle and upper 
class neighbourhoods. While the fishermen insist that this is temporary, and 
that ‘how much ever one goes out [of the community], we need to go fishing in 
the end, there is no way out’ (ECR-090404-02), this current scenario is creating 
a client-patron relationship between the kuppam and the middle-class 
residential neighbourhoods. While it is not acknowledged openly, a 
dependency pattern is forming as a result of which middle-class residents are 
unwilling to recognise the fishermen as partners in the beach development 
exercise. While the middle-class residents suggest that they prefer to avoid the 
fishermen fearing conflict, fishermen suspect that they are held in contempt: 
They [the middle class] think of us only as untouchables. They think of 
us as second-class citizens and they don’t include us in any of their 
venture. Only when elections happen, people approach for votes. 
Otherwise we are left on our own. No one comes and asks us for 
anything, saying, we have started an association, tell us your complaints, 
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we will tell you ours. They don’t do that. If you say kuppam, they have a 
certain condescendence and the arrogance of the educated. They have 
created a situation where we are relegated to second-tier living. (ECR-
090404-01) 
 
At the same time they are aware that they are the ‘usual suspects’ when any 
thing goes wrong on the beach, and hence support some of the beach 
improvements such as installation of artificial lighting. At a time when 
environmentalists are crying hoarse over the all-night high-powered high-mast 
disturbing the night-time ecology of the sea, it is interesting to see fishermen 
support for the same.162 They have their own reasons for doing so: 
The reason why we welcome the lighting is that there is often some form 
of offence or the other taking place. There is a general incrimination of 
the fishermen and the people from the kuppam. We are accused. People 
go to the beach, stay until say 7pm in the evening. There are some thefts 
happening there. We don’t want to be considered as an accomplice to 
that. So we welcome the lighting. It is not only for surveillance but also 
because in the darkness when you can’t see the person they easily point 
the fingers at the fishermen….we feel that the absence of proper lighting 
in the beach area is a problem for that. When we go fishing the lighting 
doesn’t affect us. In fact when we come back in the dark we can see the 
light. (ECR-090404-01) 
 
This line of argument is contrary to the one toed by ‘pro-environment groups’ 
like the Beach Buddies which had expressed ‘great reservations’ about the 
installation of lights and paving on the beach: 
We felt that the moment that [lighting and paving] happens…..we know 
that it [the beach] is gone. It has become commercial, you will have 
hawkers coming in, you will have people coming in to spend more time 
on the beach which means more late night and lights will make it even 
more easy for them to hang out which means anti-social elements and 
during the nesting season the turtles [the olive ridleys] will have a 
problem because they will see the light towards the beach and they will 
all get disoriented. That was our greatest concern. (ECR-300304-01) 
 
When fishermen were queried about whether they shared the concerns of the 
environmentalist regarding the protection of the sea turtles, they replied that 
‘we are not affected or concerned by the turtles. That is the area of the wildlife 
                                                 
162 The most prominent issue in recent times is the way intense urbanisation along the coast has 
affected the hatching pattern of the Olive Ridley sea turtles. They are supposed to follow the 
movement of the moonlight, but are disoriented by the presence of these artificial lights.  
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department. Once upon a time, maybe it [the turtles and their protection] was 
important [for us] but now with time it isn’t…..we take care so that they don’t 
get trapped in our boats, that’s all’. With environmental issues taken up by 
residents of the seaside neighbourhoods who are unwilling to partner with the 
fishermen, an environmentalist-fishermen nexus, established successfully in 
the Marina, has become impossible on the southern stretches. Most residents 
wish to stay out of the fishermen’s way, but to a large extent carry a negative 
opinion of them. Pursued in isolation, environment becomes an ‘elite concern’. 
The fishermen, though aware of being considered a culturally inferior social 
group, focus attention on their socio-economic demands and consequently have 
little time for environmental issues. Desirous of benefiting from the larger 
gains of development, fishermen communities such as Thiruvanmiyur kuppam 
located in densely urbanised areas resonate more with the beach beautification 
exercises and indicate little support for environmental voices against such 
moves.  
 
The practice of ordering the beach as pursued by the bourgeois 
residents, and as detailed above, shows it to be predominantly exclusive to 
middle-class desires. Amidst highly localised interests and concerns, the 
opportunities for a formidable formation of the politics of partnership have 
been limited, driven mainly by self-interest. It is also notable that this ordering 
of the public space has been accompanied by a parallel process of othering, one 
that justifies their exclusionary traits and disciplinary tactics, and in general is 
steeped in inculpation of the other. The practice of ordering and the process of 
othering are virtually two sides of the same coin, reinforcing each other. They 
underline the creation and reproduction of a master narrative, where the ‘other’ 
is simultaneously erected and rejected by ordering.   
 
6.3 Ordering through othering 
Public spaces rather than serving as the spaces of democracy often become the 
ideological terrain for a dominant social group, which captures these spaces to 
render certain values as commonsense. A process of discursive naturalisation 
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and normalisation of the social hierarchy is automatic to this appropriation, one 
that is practically applied through the practice of ordering and the process of 
othering. But the translation of dominant ideologies is not necessarily 
unchallenged. At one hand, the presence of different social groups and their 
interplay at various levels creates a field where meanings are more complex 
than a simple twofold division of right and wrong. In this context, alliances can 
only be superficially produced, as illustrated through the politics of partnership 
in the Chennai beaches. Secondly, the circumscription of the bourgeois 
ideology on the public spaces is limited because of the ambivalent nature of 
representing the self in the public. Bauman (1998) argues that any form of 
engagement with the whole self takes place only inside at home, and the self in 
the public is reduced to a surface. One is prompted to look no further than the 
surface of others in the public sphere, as a result of which it comes across as a 
morally limiting act. This weakened assertion of the self in the public results in 
a simultaneously diluted understanding of the other.  
 
In this chapter, previous sections explored the practices of the state and 
middle-class groups in ordering the beach. Accompanying this is the process of 
identifying the incompliant others, one that involves an emphasis of social 
class distinctions based on the uneven material conditions of everyday life. 
Unsurprisingly, given the bourgeois ideology of the discourse, it is the poor 
and the lower classes who are portrayed as the deviant category. But, as the 
introduction to this chapter highlighted, according to some middle-class 
members (including Naipaul), there is no class difference between the line of 
pissers on the street who can equally be from the middle or lower class. Yet, 
neo-liberalisation seems to have given the middle-class authority and 
responsibility of restoring public spaces to a sense of decorum and propriety. 
For the middle class to assume the vanguard position in this process of 
reclamation, it is crucial for them to extricate themselves from complicity as 
defilers of public spaces. To this extent the process of othering becomes even 
more crucial. But as the following accounts illustrate, othering of culprits is not 
a simple and straightforward process of differentiation between the ‘proper’ 
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self and the aberrant other. Rather, the more they try to exculpate themselves, 
the more implicated they are in the ‘other’.   
 
6.3.1 Dirt and danger on the beach 
In July 2002, a high-profile advertisement appeared in The Hindu under the 
title of Favourite Beach Pastimes. Idyllic images of beaches around the world 
complete with beach umbrellas and people lounging in their bathing suits were 
juxtaposed with an image of the Marina which showed early morning squatters 
defecating in the open. The text below the images mentioned that ‘[i]nstead of 
being the second longest beach in the world, the Marina can today claim to be 
the second longest public toilet in the world’, and it went on to make a call to 
the readers to help stop ‘this steady degradation of the beach’. Appearing in an 
English daily commanding primarily a middle-class readership, the 
advertisement appealed immediately to their bourgeois sentiments. It 
announced an initiative Marinavai Maathalam Vaa (Come, let us change the 
Marina), launched by Citizens Rights Action Group (CRAG), a 
conglomeration of bourgeois interests. The head of this organisation is a 
convenor for the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII), and its membership 
and sponsorship was drawn from the different corporate houses, multinational 
companies, prominent residents and non-resident Indians, and many middle-
class professionals working in various globalised sectors in the city.163 Even 
though, as its campaign progressed it claimed to take a more comprehensive 
view of the problem of dirt on the beach, including plastics, paper, bottles and 
other waste materials (bye-products of middle-class consumption), the fact 
remains that the initial image of squatters on the beach using it as an open-
toilet was the attention grabbing one, striking a chord with middle-class 
sensibilities.164  
 
                                                 
163 CRAG was formed in 2002 by a group of professionals and registered as a trust to work for 
the protection of the rights and enhancement of the quality of life of Chennaiites.  
164 The evolution of CRAG’s activities was profiled regularly in the Metro Section of The 
Hindu between May and November 2002 (27 May; 05 August; 03 September; 26 September; 
17 October; 25 October and 06 November).  
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The nuisance of defecation 
Even though it is debatable as to who uses the beach as an open-toilet, in the 
minds of many middle-class members there is no doubt that it is clearly the 
fishermen who are the ‘defilers’ of beach through their ‘natural habits’. First of 
all, almost all middle and upper class residents of seaside neighbourhoods 
along ECR identify defecation as a major problem. Some residents described 
the beach as a ‘shitting strip’ (ECR-040904-03), and for others, ‘I guess I 
would want the beach to be more public oriented but not public oriented to the 
extent that a person uses it as his own personal urinal or whatever’ (ECR-
210304-02). In many neighbourhoods along the ECR, beach issues have 
revolved specifically around the issue of defecation on the beach. Promptly 
associating it with the fishermen, one resident moaned the inability of people to 
‘come and enjoy a clean beach bereft of the fishermen’s colony and various 
other nuisances’, and stressed the need ‘to reach out to them [fishermen] and 
say that they should not use the beachfront for defecation’ (ECR-310304-02).  
 
There is a discernible intolerance towards this issue, as a resident 
insisted that ‘they [fishermen] just not use but abuse the beach. Because you 
can see in the morning, especially in the morning, it is very lousy. They want to 
abuse the beach’ (ECR0-40904-01). Some middle-class residents frame the 
issue in terms of cultural resistance from the fishermen. Reading a spatial 
determinism in this expression of a specific socio-cultural trait, one resident 
commented that: 
I think ideologically the fishermen who always reside on the beachside all 
over the country they all feel that that is their homeland and the sea is 
their god, the sea brings food…So defecating in front of the sea and its 
things washed away into the sea is something which they feel as a 
cultural integration amongst themselves……..See in Bombay, if you go 
to say Mahalaxmi, if you go to Worli, there are all fishing communities 
there, but what has happened over time is that fishing communities is still 
there, the development has come, that is separate so you don’t really see 
them, but they continue to go fishing and come back, dry their fish and 
they don’t want to get integrated in all this. So the government, people 
also don’t interfere with them. See, they have their own slums there. They 
want to live in slums. They don’t want to live in houses like this. So they 
don’t want to go and use a toilet. They want to defecate on the sand, on 
the seashore. So you don’t change my habit, sorry. (ECR-270304-01) 
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But interviews with the residents of the fishermen kuppam reveal that they are 
equally uncomfortable with the issue of open-air defection, identifying it as a 
problem that needs to be addressed and resolved:  
It is a question of awareness, we need to change that slowly. Because as 
times change, we should change also. We definitely need to change. In 
that sense, we don’t like using the beach as open-air toilet. That needs to 
be changed slowly….We need awareness for that. (ECR-090404-01) 
 
Really you have to expose this point. It will be very good if you do so. 
Women are in plenty but they all live in the huts. They have a big 
problem attending to nature’s calls. In the beginning when there were no 
movement of people, and this whole area used to be deserted, one side in 
the open area was used by men and the other side by women. Now if you 
go there it is totally populated. Where ever you go, people are moving 
about. We don’t like to use it as a toilet when we are looked at by others, 
and if we do so it is only because we have no choice. We do want an 
enclosed toilet rather than going in the open. (ECR-200304-02) 
 
Middle-class residents though fail to be reassured by such acknowledgements, 
insisting that these are insincere statements merely to pacify middle-class 
anger: ‘this is all humbug. They have televisions in their huts, they use 
motorised boats for fishing, they have all kinds of modern facilities but they are 
not willing to construct a toilet. Why do they wait for the government to come 
and build them some? And even when you build them some, they never use it’ 
(ECR-010404-04). In making such a comment, they fail to realise that while it 
is much cheaper to buy a television or other commodity goods, building a toilet 
is an infrastructure concern that is much more cost-consuming, one that many 
expect to be provided for by the government. There are equally valid reasons 
why toilets in the slum and kuppams are rarely used. Some residents did pause 
to speculate on the root causes of this problem rather than merely blame the 
fishermen: 
They [the government] did build toilets but not to their requirement or 
purpose. Often they are built with no good water, drainage or lighting. 
This is the main reason. All the toilets often have no door, no lights. It is 
understandable that they don’t want to use it. (ECR-310304-02) 
 
We have not helped them with their lifestyle by putting up a proper set of 
hygiene stuff for them. We have just like gone in with half measures of 
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putting in with two toilets somewhere and who cares three toilets and this 
is not how we live our lives, okay and to expect some 300 people to live 
with 2 or 3 toilets is not reality, is not valid at all. But that is something 
that we have done. In that way, I think it has been totally unplanned and 
that is not a valid proposition at all. (ECR-210304-01) 
 
Quite often the toilets that are built they won’t have water at all. So badly 
maintained that people can’t use it. It is all very well to talk you know we 
have built it for them, why can’t they use it and all that. Did you involve 
them? Did you ask them? I mean, if there is a toilet how will they want 
it? I mean, they are not consulted. Somebody else decides for them. So 
this kind of thing is a problem. (ECR-010404-02) 
 
Moreover, in already crowded neighbourhoods, where the kuppams and the 
slums are located in close proximity to the middle and upper class settlements, 
the location of a public toilet becomes contentious. In Neelangarai, when the 
residents of Chinna Neelangarai Kuppam decided to built a public toilet for 
their use, it developed into a contested issue as it happened to be close to an 
upper-class beach resort (Bella Vista and Buena Vista resort complex). The 
owner of the resort was concerned about a public toilet next to his complex, 
and fearing adverse impact on his business, obtained a stay order on its 
construction from the Madras High Court. The half-completed building was 
eventually demolished (not sure by whom), and the kuppam residents continue 
to use the beachfront as an open-air defecation area (more as an act of defiance 
now than anything else). Also in retaliation, a children’s play area proposed by 
the middle and upper class residents of Neelangarai was stopped, as they 
alleged vandalism by the fishermen, an accusation refuted by the latter (Figure 
48). 
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Figure 48: Neelangarai Beach 
 
For the middle class, when it comes to the issue of defecation, fishermen are 
‘readily available at hand’ culprits and they refuse to engage with the question 
of whether they are the only ones. But the use of beach for defecation area is 
not exclusive to the fishermen, and as the resident of the Thiruvanmiyur 
Kuppam asserted, ‘now it is alright, not so bad. Four years ago it was very bad. 
Now slowly, step-by-step they [fishermen] have come to a point of using 
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toilets……No one uses the seashore’ (ECR-090404-01). So who uses it, or as 
the middle-class residents claim, ‘abuses’ the beach? In probing this further, 
middle-class responses again pointed to the poor and the lower classes, but this 
time, the middle class had an implicit responsibility in sharing a larger part of 
the blame.  
 
 Since the late-1980s, neighbourhoods like Valmiki Nagar along the 
beach have become the centre of intense construction activities, with the 
building of several middle and upper class residential complexes. Real-estate 
sector in India operates still without an ‘industry’ status, most of the 
constructions involve dubious capital, and the buildings are often built in 
violation of building codes and regulations (Chapter Five). The numerous 
construction site workers who slog it out in this sector do so under dire 
conditions that hardly meet health and safety criteria. Employed on a 
temporary status, they live in make-shift shelters, and work in sites that have 
no provisions of basic amenities such as toilets. In this context, construction 
workers have no choice but to use the nearby beach as a toilet zone. Residents 
are aware of this: 
I do know for a fact that…..when there was construction happening and 
construction workers weren’t given adequate toilets, they used to use the 
beach. We went and spoke to a lot of these people and discovered that 
they didn’t have either water source or enough toilets……the thing is that 
there are some people who don’t have choices. I don’t know if you can 
just say low class, lower classes yeah, I don’t think lower classes will 
come from their houses, walk here, use it as a toilet and go back just 
because they feel like watching the ocean. (ECR-300304-02) 
 
…the people who come and defecate, it is not the kuppam people but the 
construction workers. Lot of them. They have no place to go. So they, 
early morning, they come. That has to be tackled. (ECR-040904-02) 
 
…so many constructions around where the builder doesn’t build a make 
shift toilet for them. Where will they go? I have found it is much cleaner 
now once the buildings have been built. There was some construction 
activity going on. It was very dirty at that time. (ECR-010404-02) 
 
While the domestic needs of the middle class are serviced by the poor and 
lower classes (Chapter Five), the latter are relegated to the shadows in the 
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middle-class environment. There is no facility in middle-class settlements that 
acknowledge their presence or provide for them in terms of servants’ rest areas 
or toilets. Middle-class residents hardly pause to consider the possibility of 
where, during the course of daily work, do their servants go to defecate. As 
residents, their irresponsibility is more explicit as they are unable to provide 
the basic amenities for their domestic workers: 
See in our building we have a common toilet for the watchmen and for 
the people who work in our building. Most of them don’t provide and 
they expect the watchmen to stand there the whole day. What will he do? 
Either he has to do it outside their house or somewhere. He has to use the 
bathroom sometime during the day. What they do is they go to the 
beach….I think more than the fisherfolk it is the others who don’t have 
access to any toilets. (ECR-010404-02) 
 
These narratives show that fishermen are not the only ones who defecate on the 
beach. But blaming the fishermen is an advantageous othering for middle-class 
residents who have little social interaction with them. In reality, other social 
groups also defecate on the beach. Comprising mostly of construction workers 
and domestic servants, their presence though is related to the specific need of 
meeting the demands of the middle-class settlements, and in the absence of 
dedicated toilet facilities in the residential complexes, they use the beach for 
defecation. Thus, in failing to provide for the working classes (this time around 
there can be no denial that it is their responsibility and not the government’s), 
there is an undeniable middle-class culpability attached to the act of defecating 
on the beach.  
 
Not necessarily the poor: other sources of dirt 
For some residents, defecation is not even an issue, and they consider it only an 
irritation compared to larger issues of dirt and pollution on the beach: 
I don’t know, this exact question of defecating on the beach, I think is a 
western, you know, a western concept that defecating is pollution, which 
I don’t go by. You know, I don’t buy this argument at all. See when a 
westerner sees somebody defecating on the beach, he immediately throws 
up and says ‘Oh my god!’, and he has a (fit) you know. But the pollution 
the westerner causes whether it is an environment burning Carbon 
Dioxide, driving his car, using CSDs, Chloroflorocarbons, you know, 
radiation, nuclear waste, uh, he thinks that is cleaner, which is you know 
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a stupid illogical argument. I rather have a fisherman defecate in the open 
rather than a gung-ho western put out you know ideas about cleanliness 
and pollution, coming here and telling us not to defecate on the beach, 
whereas he is burning up you know far more of the world’s resources at a 
faster pace……than the poor fishermen. So I would rather have that any 
day……..really they [the fishermen] haven’t polluted the beach using it. 
They have kept it sparkling clean. They are earning their livelihood. The 
defecation is definitely not a pollution, that’s just producing the western 
lifestyle that defecation in the open is pollution but to me I mean it is not. 
It is probably safer and cleaner than having sewers you know, community 
sewers dumping all the waste. (ECR-310304-01) 
 
In saying so, the above resident dismissed the problem of defecation as a 
western construction, one that is reproduced by the westernised, 
transnationalised middle-class residents of the city. It is not just such ideas that 
are absorbed by the latter. Consumption habits are also replicated, leading to 
the suggestion that the urban middle class is probably equally or even more 
guilty of polluting and dirtying the beach than the highly publicised defecators: 
…just the way they [fishermen] used to use it is different. The urban 
people use it differently. So the way they [fishermen] approach was quite 
different. They in fact, they never messed the place like the urbanites do. 
Because, here, they bring in outside stuff like plastics and glasses and I 
mean you name it, it is there. It is amazing the kind of garbage we picked 
form the beach. You know, from the small plastic bag to chappals 
[slippers] to clothes. (ECR-270304-03) 
 
In a direct implication of the middle class, particular attention was drawn by 
some residents towards the way the beachfront has become a dumping ground 
for the garbage generated after the umpteen rituals conducted by the upper-
caste, middle-class Hindu households. Hindu practices amongst the upper caste 
families involve performance of rituals on a regular basis (sometimes as 
frequent as every month, in response to certain auspicious moments of the 
Hindu calendar), and in concurrence with seasonal festivals. Often performed 
domestically, with flowers, fruits and vegetables, Hindu law decrees that to 
retain the good spirits and ward off the evil ones, the remains from the 
ceremonies be disposed in water. While in earlier times, they were thrown into 
wells located in the backyard of the house, now-a-days, with the disappearance 
of independent houses, families residing in residential flat complexes come to 
the beach to dispose them. It is not uncommon, after a particularly popular 
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festival day to find a large amount of ritual waste lying washed ashore, and this 
is what many residents observe in their rambles along the water: 
But most of the dirt comes from these flowers you know, rituals and then 
lime, things like that and coconut, they are the ones. And people put it in, 
the thing is though they are biodegradables, they will put it in a plastic 
cover and they throw it and naturally the waves brings it back. So people 
have no concept. (ECR-010404-02) 
 
…because a lot of other garbage on the beach is the stuff that people 
throw away after their devotional ceremonies, pujas, wells are no longer 
there, I think it plays a big part. (ECR-300304-02) 
 
The repercussions of this type of pollution take on greater significance during 
prominent festivals when its impact on the seaside is clearly seen. For instance, 
during the festival of Ganesha Chathurthi, the birthday of the elephant-headed 
Hindu god, idols are taken to the sea in large processions for immersion after a 
ten day celebration. In recent years, this festival in particular has become 
immensely popular, celebrated boisterously in public by right-wing Hindu 
activists (Fuller 2001). But beyond the socio-political implication, there are 
growing environmental concerns about the impact on the sea of the toxic 
chemicals of these idols, with environmentalists alleging that these toxins kill 
fish and other sea organisms. In Chennai, for the past few years, responding to 
this concern, the City Police has designated specific zones along the sea where 
such immersions can take place. While this is enforced during big festivals, the 
police cannot prevent daily beach goers from discarding their ritual waste into 
the sea (Figure 49).  
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Figure 49: Other sources of dirt – plastic and ritual waste on the beach 
Source: Right – Green Ganesha. (2008, 19 August). New Indian Express, p. 3, 
cautioning against the toxic effects of Ganesha idols. 
 
When one starts speculating on the various sources of dirt and pollution on the 
beach, it seems that marginal groups such as fishermen and the poor are less 
responsible than the middle class who, through the sheer mass of their 
consumption, generate more waste. But the question of consumption is rejected 
by the middle class whose first instinct is still to blame the poor. In recent 
times, they have targeted the patronage of commercial interests on the beach by 
the poor and lower classes by raising their bourgeois version of environmental 
concerns. The various informal food and snack stalls (referred colloquially as 
channa or bajji stalls after the particular type of snacks) are often looked down 
by middle-class beach users: 
..I remember one day, I was really annoyed with this one lady, because 
she was pouring her leftover oil into the sand. 165 I was trying to tell here 
not to do that and she, you know, she got really mad, and she talked 
back….and she said look I am a very poor person. This is my business 
opportunity and why can’t I be here, which made perfect sense to me but 
you see that is exactly what I am saying that she is very right and she is 
not doing anything wrong, she is a very poor person and she has a right to 
be there but she has to use that space responsibly. That is all my point. I 
am saying this on behalf of the fisherfolk, on behalf of me, on behalf of 
the beach, that’s all. I am saying, don’t pour oil there, use the space 
                                                 
165 The snacks are often fried in oil, and at the end of the day, one can find used oil discarded in 
the sands. To that extent this observation is right.  
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responsibly and when you leave it must seem like nobody was there. 
That’s all. (ECR-300304-02) 
 
No, I don’t think so [allowing food stalls on the beach]…..It is a different 
thing you having peanuts and some (snacks) which they come and sell. 
That’s a different thing. It is not so bad but I mean this bajji bonda, then 
they throw the whole oil and onions onto the sand. That’s not nice. 
Yesterday, I saw one whole lot of corns on the sand. He had thrown the 
whole thing right on the sand. (ECR-010404-02) 
 
These narrations fail to acknowledge that commercial interests cater to all 
classes of users on the beach, and that none of them tend to leave the beach as 
if ‘nobody was there’. While the middle-class beach users complain against the 
presence of ‘commercial activities’, they admit that:  
There are different stratas of people, socio-economic, they have their own 
concept of what they should do on in a place like beach. They have their 
own affordability levels. You can’t say that ‘listen, you must be going to 
an organised shop which sells quality ice cream and not eat at roadside 
corner shop’. I don’t think so. It is a common property. You can have 
certain rules in terms of hygiene, cleanliness, for proper usage of trash so 
that people don’t make it dirty. (ECR-010404-03) 
 
They are also aware that the formal commercial establishments catering to the 
middle and upper class beach goers create as much garbage as the informal 
ones serving the poor and the lower classes (Figure 50). Several popular 
restaurants have opened alongside New Beach with associated adverse impacts 
on the beach. An early morning ramble by the backside of these restaurants 
reveals piled up garbage from these establishments which are not disposed 
frequently. Yet, the ECBWA maintains that: 
There is no disturbance to us from the restaurants. Evenings only they 
open. In the morning time it is not open. In the evening, the people who 
come are decent fellows, because it is a costly place, like a hotel, so those 
who come to eat, if you see they come according to its status. (ECR-
040404-01) 
 
When asked about the garbage created by these enterprises, the ECBWA 
official insisted that ‘we cannot avoid that. The government gives 
permission….they are doing it in their own area’ (ECR-040404-01). On the 
other hand, he vehemently argued for the removal of the informal food stalls on 
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the basis that ‘[i]t shouldn’t be there. It is not good for health. Over time we 
need to rectify it…..we need to avoid it. If the association gets the report that 
they are coming here, selling useless no good stuff, then on health 
conditions...we have avoided by giving instructions against them’.  
 
Figure 50: Vendors on the beach – informal and formal 
Informal food stalls Restaurants like Bella Ciao are popular 
with the new middle-class residents  
 
Along the beach today there are quite a few beach clubs, resort complexes, and 
restaurants which are known to discharge their waste directly into the sea. Yet, 
the middle-class residents have failed to organise collectively against such 
pollution, choosing instead to pick on the informal traders. Empowered by the 
collective strength of an association like the ECBWA, middle-class residents 
have no qualms about disciplining the hawkers and traders on the beach citing 
concerns of health and general welfare, but are weak-kneed about taking 
similar actions against the institutionalised polluters. An easy way of reading 
this is to say that it is natural for the predator to pick on the weaker ones. As a 
trait this is highly characteristic of the middle class, and is noticed by the 
fishermen: 
…when we sun dry the fish, some VIPs living nearby complained of 
smell, saying that pollution should be under control. They act like that, 
but really, fish, smell of fish or dried fish is specific to its users. There 
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isn’t anything harmful to it. It isn’t a breeding ground for mosquitoes or 
anything harmful to people. It doesn’t pollute the beach…fishing doesn’t 
pollute….but if you see today, there is a situation of sewage getting into 
the sea….From Sindur Sea Club for example there is a direct discharge. It 
goes to the sea.166 We were the only ones to object to it. We did. Have 
you seen what they built? They have put a hole through their compound 
wall to let their sewage out directly to the sea. (ECR-090404-02) 
 
As patrons of commercial establishments such as clubs and restaurants, the 
middle class are hardly in a position to chastise the poor or the fishermen for 
dirtying the beach.  
 
Middle-class residents when confronted with these observations avoid 
the implication by admitting that in fact, all sections of the society defile the 
beach. This is done with a certain amount of faux-magnanimity in sharing the 
blame:   
If you take the social classes, you start from the lowest, they go and shit 
all over and piss all over. That has to stop. That only education can do. 
Social awareness has got to be created at every level. Middle class are the 
worst. Some I would say, they will take channa [peanuts] here, like the 
groundnuts and all and then throw the paper. What? They are the 
educated class. They are the people who are contributing to a hell lot of 
garbage. So if you want to improve, you have to educate all of them. 
(ECR-010404-03) 
 
And the people who actually litter the beach, it is not the illiterate and the 
poor. It is the well-dressed people who come in bikes who come in cars 
who put on music, who enjoy the beach and they throw all their wrappers. 
So that is very disturbing. You know there is no excuse. (ECR-310304-
02) 
 
I generally feel that the civic sense of the people in general because of 
their economic background and more so because of their utter 
carelessness is pathetic in India. Generally speaking, I know that whether 
it is urban or whether it is non-urban, you know, people just don’t have 
the sense. Education is not going to change people as far as the civic 
sense goes. (ECR-250304-02) 
                                                 
166 This is one of the membership-based beachside clubs that has come up recently in 
Thiruvanmiyur. Its members include residents of Valmiki Nagar and other neighbourhoods 
along ECR. This fisherman’s observation about middle class aversion to the smell of fish also 
highlights their upper-caste nature where many households are vegetarians. But as already 
mentioned in Chapter Three, caste implications in the middle class discourse haven’t been 
studied. 
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In doing so, they reveal the inherent contradiction of their own statements. 
While the middle class seems to be convinced that civic sense and 
responsibility are ‘enlightened’ features, which can be developed through 
education, the implications of middle-class abuse of public spaces and their 
inability to confront powerful polluters neutralises the same conviction. The 
point is that when it comes to public spaces, Indians are still struggling to reach 
a consented understanding of what is essentially a western concept bequeathed 
by the colonisers. MB Nirmal, the Exnora President lamented that:  
Basically people come there [to the beach]. They still don’t know how to 
use public spaces if you ask me. People are not conscious of how they 
use public property. Littering, throwing anything where they want, 
spitting, using it as an open toilet, open bath, food thrown all over, 
leftovers, you find everything on the beach. That consciousness has not 
come to the people. (MBN-310804-01) 
 
This point is surprisingly well understood by many middle-class residents in 
explaining their inability to develop a crystal clear discourse as far as civic 
responsibilities in public spaces are concerned: 
People just lack the sense. Outside of their house there can be a dump 
yard right in front of their house, you don’t care about it. You keep your 
house clean but you dump all your, you know, waste just outside and 
through the door. Why can’t you ensure that your vicinity, your 
compound wall is kept clean? People just don’t do that. That is the worst 
thing in India. (ECR-250304-02) 
 
…somewhere along the line, our Hindu tradition, our Hindu philosophy 
and everything, never had any community based actions or initiatives, 
you know. If you look at the Hindu system of life and it was very, even in 
you know, the householder would sweep his compound and throw the 
rubbish outside his gate. His compound will be very spic and span and 
that philosophy has been sort of inbuilt into all of us. You keep your little 
environment clean, you are not bothered about what happens outside. I 
meant, if you go to any little town in South India, you will see this 
phenomenon. Their little backyard will be spic and span but the rubbish 
will be thrown on the road or thrown across. I think this somehow filters 
down to your philosophy of life because you are also just worried about 
your immediate, you know, surrounding which is your own little house, 
own little building whatever. (ECR-310304-01)167 
 
                                                 
167 These quotes echo Mishra’s (1995) statement cited in the beginning of Chapter Five.  
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Dark  side of the beach: dangerous others 
The concept of the outside as something that is not amenable to control results 
in the exterior being abandoned to an intrinsic disorderliness where no order, 
rules, restraints could be expected (Chakrabarty 1992; Kaviraj 1997). This 
notion of dirt is accompanied by a fear of danger, as the outside and its system 
of open spaces portray a deeply ambiguous character, full of malevolence, 
suspect and dangerous. ‘All that do not belong to the “inside” 
(family/kinship/community) lie there, cheek by jowl, in unassorted collection, 
violating rules of mixing: from faeces to prostitutes. It is, in other words, a 
place against which one needs protection’ (Chakrabarty 1992: 543).  
 
 It is common to see frequent portrayals of the beach and other public 
spaces in the city as dangerous zones, lacking in safety and security for the 
general public. This is unanimously presented by the state, the media and the 
beachgoers. In justifying the demolition of various structures on the Marina 
Beach, the government claimed that the unused structures were being used by 
‘anti-social elements’ and that demolition was necessary in the interests of 
public safety.168 Similarly, an article in The Hindu in 2002 brought attention to 
fact that ‘[c]ivic neglect and growing crime rate has felled the pride of the 
city’.  Some of the issues mentioned included ‘waylaying and soliciting’, 
chain-snatching, ‘other “organised” crime, and the use of some of the beach 
structures for “clandestine” activities’.169 The fear of safety is highlighted by 
many of the middle-class residents living along the beachside residential 
neighbourhoods: 
The beach has become very unsafe in the evenings with all kinds of shady 
things going on, you know. (ECR-070304-04) 
 
I do not know if it [Thiruvanmiyur Beach] is still safe. I would not think 
so. Previously, we used to walk to Thiruvanmiyur Beach…Now we try to 
take our car up to Thiruvanmiyur Beach because lots of incidents have 
happened…..Safety is still a big issue. It is, if safety is something that 
you are also looking at as a problem, safety is still an issue. (ECR-
250304-02) 
                                                 
168 High-powered panel for beach improvement. (2003, 11 August). The Hindu, p. 1. 
169 Subramanian, K. (2002, 04 August). Pride of city under neglect. The Hindu, p. 3. 
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At one level, it is understandable that public spaces are feared as ‘dark’ spaces 
(literally and not so literally) and potential zones of social disorder: ‘I know 
that the first time I went on this turtle walk [late in the night] I said, am I 
sticking my head out…the perception of beach being this dark place in the 
night where you can do things that you won’t do, you know’, a resident 
recollected (ECR-303004-02). But while the fear of beachgoers is mainly a 
psychological construct that induces perceptions of danger and disorder, it is 
reinforced by social institutions. There may be no real correlation between the 
perception of danger and actual crime statistics, but measures are often 
introduced to allay these fears. As residents talk about ‘various instances of 
people getting mugged and robbed’, and wish to ensure that ‘theft, robberies 
should not happen’ (ECR-040904-01), lighting (both street lights and high-
mast lights) and police patrolling on the beach are introduced to allay their 
fears: 
Because there is light, people are; If there is no light there is no 
security...We are bothered about us, you know. Because everybody goes 
and sits there, so safety point of view, I am thinking even beach when 
you go there with family, we see the watch, ‘Oh! 6:30! We have to go, 
go, go, go, it’s dark. So when light it there, though you can’t really say 
that it is safer with the lights, but you can see somebody’s face, it is 
reassuring. (ECR-310304-02) 
 
No, this [lighting] is a good thing because people feel a little safe you 
know. And there are lights and there is place for people to come and sit 
down. It is so nice to see all the women come and sit there, it is a meeting 
place for many people. (ECR-010404-02) 
 
Installation of lights and police booths along the beach is seen not just in terms 
of safety and security but also as overall infrastructure improvement: 
This comes under beautification. If you see seashore beautification 
throughout from Marina, if you see, there will be this lighting. But not 
just in this particular area, throughout beach areas if you see, even in 
Bombay Marine Drive, see there, what a lighting! Like that, there is no 
harmful effect. Today, public should be able to come, sit and leave 
without fear. (ECR-040404-01) 
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While this may be true at one level, beachside residents and walkers emphasise 
its need mostly through an articulation of fear.  
 
Here, akin to Chakrabarty’s (1992) portrayal of the open and the 
outside as malevolent and dangerous spaces, the middle class view public 
spaces as spaces for the pervert and the dissident. Spaces like the beach are 
sites of social transgressions and human actions, unconstrained by political or 
social laws or mores. The question then is who in the minds of the middle-class 
residents are the moral transgressors? An obvious answer is all those who do 
not adhere to the bourgeois scripts of ‘proper’ public behaviour, which 
involves a class-based subscription, and as a result the transgressors portrayed 
as the ‘dangerous classes’ are defined and underlined by poverty and social 
marginality. The stand-off between middle-class users and the urban underclass 
reaches its boiling point in the public spaces when almost all the marginalised 
sections of the society are clubbed together as the deviant other. This is the 
zone where ‘you have drug peddling there, then illegal booze, prostitution, if 
you want to keep up prostitutes you go to Elliot’s Beach. Elliot’s Beach is 
known as the (prostitute zone)’ (ECR-040904-03), and as an elderly female 
beach walker noted ‘it pains me as a women to see that the beach is the place 
where girls go cheap now’ (ECR-310304-02).170  
 
In the first instance, transgressors are clubbed together into one 
category, and held responsible for all socially non-conforming actions. Mostly, 
it is the fishermen, as seen in a report in The Hindu on Squalor on the shore, 
which wrote that the fishermen huts are used for ‘clandestine activities’, and 
that the fishermen kuppams are supposed to be the ‘hotbed of mercenaries and 
                                                 
170 Given the fact that she was an elderly ‘traditional’ woman, it doesn’t come as a surprise that 
she sees women in public places as morally loose and without virtue. In a society where codes 
of behaviour particularly those involving physical contact between men and women is highly 
circumscribed, public spaces like parks and beaches have developed the reputation of being 
places where male-female relationships could be more ‘loosely’ expressed outside of the 
strictures of the domestic definitions.  
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criminals’.171 They are generally held responsible for any untoward social 
incidents that take place on the beach: 
…Thiruvanmiyur kuppam….has become one big stretch…a very big 
slum…They are also into crime typically. So then they [the police] won’t 
come in. They have not entered, the police. To that extent, there is this; 
all kuppams are slums because that is where political parties recruit their 
henchmen, like that. They can be, they are like mercenary bullies, there 
will be some people, not all of them, some people. (ECR-010404-04) 
 
An earlier section in this chapter has already analysed fishermen’s support of 
development projects like lighting as an opportunity to absolve themselves of 
the usual crime accusations made by the middle class. Fishermen from 
Thiruvanmiyur Kuppam felt that installing lighting on the beach would help 
identify the real criminals instead of baselessly incriminating them. And to a 
certain extent, not all residents depict them as criminals:  
…the perception that fishermen are actually criminals….the criminals 
come from outside….I realised that, I can’t say for sure, but I never ever 
once had a problem. In fact, it was safer when we were walking through 
the fishing villages than when we were walking between the villages. 
(ECR-270304-01) 
 
But the middle class still look at poverty as nurturing crime. Talking about 
‘some bad elements’ lurking around in the beach, a resident brought attention 
to a particular incident where a beach walker had been robbed of his cell phone 
and when the thieves were robbed, they turned out to be ‘guys, these were six 
young boys, from these nearby areas, the slums….but these kind of incidents 
really puts you off going to the beach’ (ECR-25304-02).  
 
Relating a particular incident of harassment on the beach, a resident 
was unwilling to identify the fishermen from nearby kuppams, but felt that it 
was someone poor. On further probing, he immediately clarified and said: 
‘there are good people, bad people. You think middle classes don’t have bad 
people, upper class won’t have bad people…these are all, poor people when 
they do something wrong it comes out very blatantly, everybody is jumping on 
                                                 
171 Vydhianathan, S. (1996, 16 September). Squalor on the shore. The Hindu, p. Metro Section 
1. 
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their backs, these rascals are doing it!’. He further added: ‘when the people are 
not having money, any individual will do it, not just the fishermen. Of the ten 
of them who might be fishermen, one might be the criminal, even within ours, 
how do you find everyone is 100 percent honest?’ (ECR-010404-03, emphasis 
added). 
 
His narration shows that a senseless clubbing together of all social 
transgressors into one ‘dangerous class’ is soon derailed when one probes the 
residents further to disaggregate the various ‘anti-social’ activities on the 
beach. When asked to elaborate on who they exactly refer to when they say 
that the crowd is not very nice anymore, most of them ended up doing a volte-
face, pointing at their own classes, this time a particular segment, the 
youngsters: 
…you do get even during week nights you do get quite early on, they 
come up for what they call fun, young people, young boys, and a lot of it 
essentially harassment. You don’t have a very nice crowd coming in and 
what is interesting is that a lot of family friends who used to come out 
with their children don’t anymore…..yeah, then from 7:30pm onwards 
you have then beachgoers who come in their motorbikes, lot of young 
students on their motorbikes, they come. Walking here with children 
when they race up and down…it is no fun to go then because you are so 
much concerned about the safety of the children. (ECR-070304-04) 
 
One thing clearly, a beach, I don’t know, looks like people have started 
thinking that, I mean, that why everybody has to have a cell phone and 
their own motorcycle, and they thought that visiting a beach is also a 
necessity in life. It’s as if they come there not for enjoying the beach. A 
lot of youngsters who come to the beach are all for other purposes, very 
noisy, not for peaceful purposes at all, the air doesn’t sound healthy at 
all…….they don’t care about surrounding, other people. They are more 
of animals than human beings. That’s what I think, especially the 
youngsters, okay. They have become too bad really. (ECR-310304-02) 
 
In fact, many of the ‘anti-social’ activities identified by the beach users 
including booze, drugs and prostitution directly implicate the middle and upper 
class youngsters who are prominent consumers of this ‘illegal’ market. A 
resident cynically said, ‘I would rather have the boys from the kuppam hanging 
around than these upper class boys with their alcohol bottles on the beach’ 
(ECR-310304-02). It may seem as if the youngsters are viewed harshly, 
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particularly given the middle-aged nature of the beach walkers and their 
general disillusionment with the contemporary lifestyles of the youngsters. 
 
At the same time it cannot be denied that spaces like the beach are the 
few spaces in the city where they are not compelled by stringent norms and 
regulations, and find an opportunity to exercise hedonism to some extent. In a 
society where prohibition still reigns supreme, and consumption of alcohol in 
public is highly monitored, the beach lined with recreational and leisure 
activities has become a popular destination for the casual gathering of young 
people. The behaviour of the middle and upper class youngsters while 
determined by their own definitions of expanding leisure and consumption, and 
by a lifestyle parameter that is specific to their age group, is perceived by other 
middle-class beach goers as inimical and suggestive of the ‘dangerous class’. 
What is unique here is that unlike most cases where youth gangs are still 
demarcated by class boundaries and almost instantaneously associated with the 
poor and lower classes, in this particular case, they are home grown ‘vagrants’ 
blooming in the middle-class backyards. It not only illustrates the 
incompleteness of the process of othering, but also brings to the forefront the 
fact that the more the middle class attempt to distinguish themselves through a 
class-based condemnation of the other, the more they find themselves 
paradoxically implicated and inculpated. The contradictions leave the middle-
class opinions fractured, and thus renders problematic their practice of ordering 
and the parallel process of othering. This can be noted in the following extracts 
from two readers’ letters to the editor that appeared in Madras Musings, where 
the first described what he considered to be a beach tragedy and the second 
responded by viewing it as an unintended good: 
..I have been living very close to this beach [Elliot’s Beach] since 1980. 
There is a tribe of philistines, mostly young and obviously from affluent 
families who visit the beach in droves on holidays. Most of them seem to 
have been provided with expensive two-wheelers and cars, which they 
drive to and fro at breakneck speed, with loud music blaring even after 
midnight and disturbing the families living in houses situated on these 
streets.172  
                                                 
172 Beach tragedy. (1996, 16-30 September). Madras Musings, p. 3. 
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R. C. Narayan has been a witness to the ‘Beach Tragedy’ (MM, Sept. 16) 
enacted by the affluent ‘philistines’ who ride expensive two-wheeler/cars 
and disturb students in and around Besant Nagar by playing loud music 
and driving their vehicles at breakneck speed, in the dead of night…I, 
however, see some unintended good from these late night and early 
morning activities of the goons. Their presence prevents the slum-
dwellers from using the entire beach area as an open air lavatory! The 
residents close to the Beach should thank the intruders on this count 
alone.173  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
In the early weeks of fieldwork, a freelance journalist writing on city 
development issues offered some help in the selection of study areas. When the 
objective of the research was explained as examining middle-class construction 
of citizenship, and that public spaces would constitute one realm of the study, 
she regretted not starting earlier when the QMC crisis was at its peak (April 
2003), and exclaimed that this movement proved the ability of the middle class 
to participate successfully as citizens in the public sphere. A few weeks later, 
walking along New Beach, she once again proudly asserted the achievements 
of middle-class residents in transforming this strip, another example, according 
to her, of buoyant middle-class activism. Though the middle-class role in 
shaping the debates surrounding both examples cannot be denied, she failed to 
question the highly differentiated nature of the response coming from a same 
class of actors. Rather than assuming their reactions as particularistic and case-
specific, this chapter has sought to probe deeper the variegated nature of the 
middle-class discourse related to the re-imagination of the beach.  
 
While it is generally acknowledged that neoliberalisation offers the 
middle class an argumentative framework within which their bourgeois 
ideology can develop as a master narrative, the case studies of the Marina and 
the New Beach show that the bourgeois narrative by operating within the 
politics of partnership is contingent upon affiliations forged between different 
actors, and depends on the organised nature of middle-class participation. In 
                                                 
173 Unintended good. (1996, 1-15 November). Madras Musings, p. 3. 
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the case of the Marina, their involvement was in the form of civil society 
institutions associated with environmental and heritage issues, with their 
bourgeois discourse aligning with the interests of the political society 
(fishermen and student groups) and in contradiction to the bourgeois imaginary 
of the state. Analysis of the debate reveals a subjective bourgeois ideology, and 
that there isn’t a universal one-size-fits-all template for its imagery.   
 
The convergence of middle-class interests with that of the state is more 
acutely seen in the southern shoreline where, the inter-personal associational 
nature of the middle-class residents’ associations involved in the 
transformations of this beach strip rendered a coalition with the state more 
desirable. But this is set firmly against the possibility of partnering with the 
political society (fishermen). In New Beach, residents’ associations involved in 
its ‘upkeep’ have cleverly solicited the state as visible consumers and 
prominent users while keeping the fishermen out of the equation. Using the 
bourgeois ideology of order, their discourse is dominated by concerns of dirt 
and danger, both of which use the process of othering to implicate the 
fishermen and the poor as improper users of the beach. But a detailed 
examination of the middle-class position reveals that the practice of ordering 
and its parallel associated process of othering is a weakly constructed one,  
incapable of not only distinguishing a righteous bourgeois self from an aberrant 
other but in the end produces a deviant bourgeois identity that is very much 
implicated in the other. 
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Conclusion:  
From a politics of indifference to  
a politics of intolerance? 
 
 
 
We’re [the middle class] a rentier class left over from the last 
century. We tolerate everything, but we know that liberal values 
are designed to make us passive…We’re deeply self-centred but 
can’t cope with the idea of our finite selves…We believe in equality 
but hate the underclass. (Ballard 2003: 139)  
 
 
Millennium People, the eighteenth novel of the maverick English writer JG 
Ballard (2003) follows a group of disillusioned middle-class residents in 
London, whose aim is to rouse their docile social class to anger and violence, 
and dismantle the self-imposed burdens of civic responsibility and the 
trappings of a consumer society.174 It explores the middle-class psyche, 
beginning with picketing and peaceful demonstrations against the usual 
bourgeois anxieties of maintenance fees and parking charges, but eventually 
spiralling out of control in the form of violent protests on the streets, with the 
middle class systematically torching video stores, attacking travel agencies, 
and sabotaging museums and galleries.  
 
                                                 
174 Portrayal of middle class angst and the social disruption caused by their inexplicable acts of 
explosive violence is a long-running theme in several of Ballard’s novels. But while his earlier 
novels focused on a single middle class individual, Millennium People comes closest to 
highlighting the possibility of a collective bourgeois revolution (see Noys 2007). 
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Despite the deadpan humour with which Ballard approaches his 
fictional prolepsis of middle-class dissent, there is concern over several 
prejudices that he advertently (or inadvertently) subscribes to. At moments of 
peaking ‘middle-class revolt’, several characters in the novel describe the 
middle class as the “new proletariat”, not just in terms of being enslaved by a 
capitalist (consumer) culture, but also in the way they take to the streets, 
intolerant and violent. There are as well instances when the middle-class 
residents refer to their enclosed residential enclave as a ‘high-priced slum’ and 
a ‘sink estate’, comparing their action of setting ablaze their bourgeois homes 
to the way working people torch their council estates. As they exclaim that they 
are now the “underclass” of the bourgeoisie, all the stereotypes of the lumpen-
proletariat are played out, particularly when Dr. Gould, the enigmatic character 
spearheading the middle-class revolution, claims that ‘[b]reaking the law is a 
huge challenge for professionals…That’s why the middle class will never be a 
true proletariat’ (2003: 169), and David Markham, the protagonist (of sorts) 
insists that ‘[v]iolence isn’t our thing. We’re too much bourgeois’ (2003: 190).  
 
In this context, Noys (2007: 399) identifies a ‘reactionary libido’ in 
Ballard’s works when he compares Millennium People with his follow-up 
novel Kingdom Come (2006), where, in contrast to the former’s treatment of 
middle-class revolt in a relatively tolerant fashion, the latter ‘focuses on a 
potential revolution amongst the working-class and petit-bourgeois inhabitants’ 
in ‘a patrician, or even reactionary, critique of working-class culture’, 
condemning it as fascist, “vulgar” and “destructive”, while middle-class 
consumption is presumed to be “tasteful” and “healthy”. When Markham in 
Millennium People concludes that the middle-class revolution was doomed 
because nature had bred them to be docile, virtuous and civic-minded, it is 
obvious that Ballard is simply toeing the line of a well-established 
preconception (or misconception) that the middle class is incapable of 
intolerance and violence.175  
                                                 
175 Although Ballard (2003) in an interview opined that it is ‘a myth to think that the middle 
classes are incapable of violence’, what comes across in the Millennium People is the 
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For, the middle class, by establishing an affinity with liberalism, 
emerged in the industrial era as a tempered social class, perpetuating a ‘middle-
class mentality’ that is constitutive of a disciplinary ethos embracing tolerance, 
hard work, and a strict moral code. Such an understanding reached a 
heightened status of endorsement in the post-War period when the middle class 
was considered crucial to the modernisation strategies of the 1950s and 1960s 
contra to an unreliable working class which needed to be managed and 
disciplined. Lipset (1959) epitomised this belief best when he argued that 
although the working class is economically more liberal than the middle class, 
it is also more authoritarian and intolerant, an aspect he attributed to low 
income, low-status occupation, and little education, while the middle class is 
committed to democratic norms and a sophisticated, complex view of the 
political structure which makes necessary the norms of tolerance.176 
 
But, can everyday mores of the middle class including moderation and 
reluctance to pass judgement (Wolfe 1998), be explained as tolerance on their 
part or is it more a reflection of their indifference? Philosophers and political 
thinkers ruminating on toleration explain that while tolerance is a moral virtue, 
necessary when one rejects the convictions of others, indifference is not, as it is 
based on a morality of condescension. And what one generally encounters is a 
liberal synthesis of toleration that is embedded with aspects of both 
indifference and intolerance.177  
 
One only needs to take a cursory look through the readers’ mail section 
in Indian daily newspapers to realise that tolerance remains a utopian virtue for 
                                                                                                                                 
perception that the tolerance of the middle class gives way to violent expressions only when 
the middle class find themselves impoverished, and become part of the “new poor”, thereby 
embracing the reactions of the proletariat. For the interview, see Bearn, E. (2003, 1-15 
November). A rebel in suburbia. Telegraph. Retrieved 21 May, 2008 
176 This view has understandably generated much argument in sociological circles where 
scholars have tried to prove and disprove Lipset’s thesis through their own set of empirical 
investigations, but consensus is still elusive.  
177 See for instance, Mendus (1999); Walzer (1987, 1997a; 1997b); Habermas (2003); Galeotti 
(2001); Seligman (2004, 2008).  
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the middle class which finds its ground expression in the extremes of 
indifference and intolerance. The complaints that fill this passive yet popular 
‘public forum’ include everything from the macro concerns of economic 
development, education, foreign policy, national unity, secularism/religious 
fundamentalism, and nuclear (dis)armament to the nitty-gritty, micro-level 
problems of everyday life involving irregular bus/train services, garbage 
collection, potholes in local neighbourhood roads, water supply and pavement 
encroachments. In all these issues, the write-up is pretty much the same: a 
‘concerned citizen’ who wishes to bring attention to the indifference of 
government officials to the present-day state of affairs, and who invariably 
concludes by emphasising that ‘one cannot tolerate this neglect anymore’. The 
writers in accusing the state authorities of indifference are only convicting 
themselves as much of the state machinery is dominated by middle-class 
bureaucrats and values, and hence, as one could comfortably argue, reeks of 
‘middle-class indifference’.  
 
Many of the middle-class residents readily acknowledged in the 
interviews that indifference is an inherent (non)expression of their quotidian 
practices. This trait is one of the first things that scholars studying the Indian 
middle-class identify (Varma 1998; Fernandes 2000a, 2000b; Mazzerella 
2003), with some going to the extent of accusing the middle class of even a 
lack of social conscience (Gupta 2000). There is also the suggestion that their 
politics of indifference is giving way to a politics of intolerance, mostly 
associated with their increased propensity for self-gratification. Thus, when a 
middle-class individual writes in the English dailies insisting on his inability to 
tolerate certain conditions any longer, (s)he represents a growing middle-class 
intolerance and exigency for quick action that is beginning to dominate the 
agenda of urban change in several cities, and not just in India.  
 
There are several reasons that account for this shift from indifference to 
intolerance at the present moment. A convenient culprit is of course 
neoliberalism where it could be argued that a retrenched state bureaucracy 
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amidst the dominance of private/global capital is making the middle class even 
more anxious as the ‘welfare spoils’ are further reduced. Indeed blaming 
neoliberalism has some heuristic value not only because it has increased the 
confidence of the middle class in themselves and their bourgeois values, but 
has also contributed to their ontological insecurity by polarising the society 
sharply. Their intolerance comes from their supposed frustration at not 
progressing their efforts rapidly enough to enhance their quality of life, 
opportunities which are more available now than before.  
 
But unlike Ballard’s (2003) middle-class characters in Millennium 
People who were rebelling against themselves, setting arson to the very civic 
institutions that bound them to a liberal cultural consensus, bourgeois revolt in 
real life targets mostly the urban disadvantaged as the cause of social chaos. 
This is discernible in India where the middle class in their concerted attempt to 
clean up the cities have initiated a ‘politics of forgetting’ (Fernandes 2004) 
against marginalised groups whose exclusion from the aestheticised 
envisioning of urban spaces is justified not merely through arguments of 
illegitimacy and incrimination but also more worrying, by tying it to the 
powerful discourse of citizenship. As Gandy (2008) reveals, the burgeoning 
middle-class intolerance towards the poor is based on a reconstruction of urban 
space where they are portrayed as impostors, and is set within a weak civil 
society whose practice of citizenship has been deeply coded by moralistic 
social distinctions rather than by any clearly articulated conception of human 
rights. In a context where there has rarely been an equal and uniform exercise 
of the rights of citizenship, the argument made by the middle class staking a 
moral claim to citizenship is a cause for alarm. This is because their position 
disallows large sections of the urban poor to be treated as legitimate citizens, 
since the habitation and livelihood of the poor are often premised on a violation 
of law (Chatterjee 2004). It is against this recognition that this thesis has 
contoured the emerging aspects of urban citizenship in a postcolonial Indian 
city.  
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Chapter One approached with caution the jubilant assertion that cities 
can be ideal breeding ground for the emergence of citizenship in neoliberal 
times. The ability of neoliberal citizenship to uphold the imaginary of 
commensurable citizens is questioned, as it disseminates a paradigm of 
citizenship based on a bourgeois ethic of propriety and property, thereby 
creating a more exclusive form of citizenship. Needless to say, the 
embourgeoisement of citizenship finds its expression in the emerging ‘new’ 
middle class, which makes it essential to understand the epistemology and 
ontology of this social group before undertaking an investigation of their 
claims to cities and citizenship.  
 
Chapter Two addressed the analytical importance to undertake a 
detailed examination of this problematic social class, and goes beyond the 
traditional concerns of what actually comprises the middle class (a bit of the 
capitalist and a bit of the labourer). It focuses on the significance of the middle 
class in a postcolonial society like India where it is seen as a member of the 
“ruling coalition”, and hence an ally of the capitalist state. What is equally 
relevant is the speculation about the elitist and bourgeois tendencies of the 
Indian middle class, characteristics which are supposed to find heightened 
expressions in the new middle class, as they subscribe increasingly to the 
culture of materialism, individualism and conspicuous consumption. The 
argument as well is that the new middle class, as a product of neoliberalisation, 
is attempting to create a central, normative position for itself, by invoking 
citizenship claims in pursuit of what could be construed as clear hegemonic 
aspirations for the city.  But given its political illiberalism, the suspicion is that 
the resulting bourgeois citizenship will be a defective one.  
 
Chapter Three detailed the rigour and rigmarole of tackling subjectivity 
on field –given the choice of methodology: qualitative research techniques, and 
the complexity arising from the decision of not just conversing with the 
‘citizens’ but with the city as well. It complemented Chapter Two by 
elaborating on the fieldwork experience of interviewing the middle class, a sort 
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of comparing notes between what is said in theory and what you find in 
practice. Details of the case study areas were provided, selections based on the 
recent ‘urban turn’ in the city, one that is expanded upon in the following 
chapter.  
 
Chapter Four looked at the political economy of postcolonial Chennai, 
and provided a development history of the city as it is held in tension between 
being a capital of a regional Tamil state and a metropolis of a postcolonial 
Indian nation-state. The superficial development agenda of successive 
Dravidian governments meant that the city’s role was reduced to a mere 
backdrop for staging the Dravidian spectacle. This resulted in a malignant city 
that was symptomatic of the decadent 1970s, a condition that peaked in the 
1980s when the city was literally left ungoverned. All this changed in the 
1990s with the official onset of neoliberalisation which placed the onus on the 
regional states to implement economic reforms. No longer able to harbour an 
indifferent or a superficially defined stance towards the city, as it literally 
became an investment ‘bait’, Dravidian politicians ushered in a process of 
embourgeoisement amidst hopes that the pursuit of a ‘bourgeois urbanism’ 
would be successful in attracting transnational investors.  But the gains of 
neoliberalism failed to translate uniformly across the city’s geography, and 
instead created a sorry tale of two cities, a blighted ‘North Madras’ and a 
booming ‘South Chennai’, with the latter proving to be the epicentre of global 
capital investment. It is in this context of southbound growth that fieldwork is 
set in the southern part of the city.  
 
Based on Kumar’s (1993) argument that civil society is an essential 
social order of citizenship, and Chatterjee’s (2004) postulation that civil society 
as bourgeois society is inhabited in India by a small section of elites and the 
middle class claiming to be proper citizens, Chapter Five investigated middle-
class residents’ associations as an alternative civil society. Residents’ 
associations are the most prominent form of collective action for the urban 
middle class, offering them the best platform for engagement as citizens. In this 
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exploration, the chapter queried their participation in the new geography of 
governance that emerges in a neoliberal context, one requiring a politics of 
partnership with local communities, other civil society initiatives, and the state.  
 
However fieldwork revealed that residents’ associations are so prone to 
fragmentation and question the value of federating amongst themselves for the 
purposes of addressing concerns over a wider geography. There is also a 
problem of the residents’ associations engaging with the political society of the 
poor. In most Indian cities, middle-class residential colonies often exist cheek-
by-jowl next to the slums and working class neighbourhoods. While this is 
convenient for the middle-class residents whose domestic needs are serviced by 
the residents of the slums (in the form of maids, drivers, errand boys, and 
security guards), interactions at the associational level between the two social 
groups have been minimal and mostly in the form of patron-client 
relationships. In recent times, engaging with the poor has become more 
problematic as the middle-class residents’ associations increasingly turn hostile 
to their presence, and adopt a discourse of illegitimacy and incrimination. The 
concerns of the residents’ association reveal a marked intolerance of the poor 
who are portrayed as encroachers, mercenary criminals, and even as 
extortionists. It can be argued that while the old middle-class residential 
colonies failed to partner with the neighbouring poor because of their 
preference for a relationship of patronage rather than partnership, the new 
middle-class are more viciously condemning the poor. Their position is marked 
by a clear sense of social censure, accompanied by attempts at spatial closure 
but in the context of ‘volatile geographies’ of a postcolonial city this is easier 
said than done.  
 
Yet, it is not just with the political society that the middle-class 
residents’ associations’ engagement oscillates between indifference and 
intolerance. It applies as well to their relationship with other more 
institutionalised and formalised forms of civil society. While they 
acknowledged the opportunities that NGOs and what they termed as ‘proper’ 
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civil society organisations offered to address a wider canvas of issues, they find 
them less useful, particularly to tackle demands of service provision, giving the 
increasing privatisation of public services. Residents who maintain a dual role 
as members of residents’ associations and NGOs preferred to separate both 
realms and didn’t see the need for ‘mixing the two causes’. Most residents are 
indifferent to the activities of NGOs in their own area, prejudiced that 
grassroots initiatives or bottom-up approaches are for ‘have nots’ and not for 
the ‘haves’.  
 
The reluctance of the middle class for civic engagement reached a 
climax when it came to the possibility of engaging with the state. Given the 
bourgeois policies of a neoliberal state, one would have expected a 
convergence between a bourgeois state and a bourgeois middle class. Yet, the 
middle class were found to be in no mood to engage with the state even if it 
were on issues pertaining to their own interests. Their long-harboured ill-
feelings towards politicians and democracy was addressed in Chapter Two. Not 
willing to be mistaken as a collective vote-bank by the politicians, a la the 
poor, middle-class residents’ associations shun any direct encounters with 
politicians preferring to engage at best with the state bureaucrats and ‘officials’ 
for their needs. Middle-class indifference to state gestures can be explained by 
its needs which are increasingly set in the realm of consumption, and to which 
they make their claims as consumer-citizens, constructing their argument as 
‘buyers’, not ‘beggars’. The hyphenated condition of consumer-citizenship 
makes an understanding of middle-class notion of citizenship more complex 
and intricate as the middle-class themselves are only just beginning to discern a 
pattern to their ‘random’ manoeuvres between the demands of a citizen and 
that of a consumer.  
 
Chapter Six explored their citizenship claims in the associated realm of 
public sphere. Given the bourgeois predilections of the state and civil society, 
one cannot help but wonder if the public sphere can continue as an active realm 
for an impartial enactment of citizenship. In the context of Indian cities this is 
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felt acutely in the recent conflicts over public spaces which are representational 
spaces of the public sphere. Public spaces have always posed a challenge to 
Indian users who negotiate it through a web of class and cultural biases. As a 
result, elites, middle class and the poor alike have been found guilty of a 
general lack of civic sense or public consciousness. And yet, the middle class 
often insists and clarifies that they are not like the ‘dirty poor’, amidst claims 
of having acquired newfound sensibilities towards public spaces. Similar to the 
previous chapter, their discourse on public spaces (in this instance, the beach) 
is studied through an analysis of the emerging politics of partnership which 
requires engagement of sorts between the state, the ‘civil society’ of the middle 
class, and the political society of the masses. The complexity of this 
partnership is rendered problematic by the fact that the ‘spatial complex’ of 
open spaces in Indian cities were originally defined by a concept of 
‘commonness’ that was clearly not ‘public’, and one that still lingers in the 
fishermen’s notion of the use of the spaces of the beach. On the other hand, it is 
not surprising that, given the bourgeois concept of ‘public’, the middle class 
subscribes to this definition thereby setting themselves up in conflict with other 
groups who persist with its use based on an understanding of ‘commonness’.  
 
What emerges in this condition is the ambiguity of the middle class in 
defining a clear position, depending on the nature of the conflict, and the 
stretch of the beach under consideration. In examining the involvement of the 
middle class in the attempts to re-imagine the Marina Beach, the most ‘public’ 
of several beach stretches in the city, it seemed that their role was more 
appreciable as an institutional activist working on behalf of ‘public interest’. 
But as their reactions were specific to particular state-led proposals to remake 
the Marina, the impossibility of a unanimous middle-class position became 
clear. Instead one encountered a multiplicity of bourgeois voices, some in 
complicity and others in contrariety. The infeasibility of middle-class civic 
concern resonating together on every single occasion was visible.  
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In the more parochial beach stretches in the city, deliberations of 
middle-class collectivity came not in the form of institutionalised civil society 
organisations but as residents’ associations of beachside inhabitants. 
Associating shoreline residence with a ‘lifestyle’ choice, residents’ associations 
are committed to the maintenance of the beach in the absence of sufficient state 
effort, viewing the beach as an extension of their own ‘backyard’. There is a 
clear attempt to differentiate it from the Marina as they invoke a cleanliness 
discourse based on their aversion to crowd (read as the poor and the lower 
classes). But their efforts require a dedicated amount of volunteerism from the 
residents. Given the middle-class propensity to relapse easily into a state of 
indifference, it came as no surprise that the first attempt (Beach Buddies) died a 
natural death after a few episodes of enthusiastic participation. The insistence 
of Beach Buddies on limiting it to a narrow clique of like-minded people didn’t 
help in furthering its cause either, as its members developed a fundamental 
distrust of ‘others’. Thus, fishermen who lived in nearby kuppams were kept 
deliberately out of such efforts, claiming a ‘different set of sensibilities’.  
 
This effort was soon replaced by a more institutionalised form of 
organisation (ECBWA), again involving middle-class residents. Unlike the 
earlier initiative, this is more successful as it built shrewdly on a politics of 
partnership, engaging mostly with the state, but again to the exclusion of other 
social groups. Its agenda is based on a consumerist angle as it sought to 
increase their membership and thereby the strength of its collectivist demand. 
Its failure again to involve the fishermen is explained away by a mutual 
condition of indifference on either side, as well as the argument that ‘it is the 
middle class that by and large who use the beaches’. Unlike the opposition of 
middle-class civic institutions to the Marina redevelopment proposals, this 
association actually endorsed the state efforts to transform the Marina and rued 
that the fishermen were not allowing ‘development’ to proceed.  
 
The fishermen in response are mostly phlegmatic about such opinions. 
Many of them do not practice fishing anymore, and are often engaged by the 
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neighbouring middle-class community as security guards and domestic 
workers. Coming in close contact with their ‘lifestyle’ they are desirous of 
‘development’ thus endorsing the recent physical improvements to the beach. 
While the fishermen display a fatalistic acceptance of middle-class attempts at 
ordering the beach, they resent their portrayal and rejection by the middle class 
as a deviant ‘other’. Bourgeois depictions of dirt and danger on the beach point 
fingers at the poor masses who, through their inability to appreciate the niceties 
of the ‘public’, become easy culprits. But probing the middle class further on 
the reasons for dirt, revealed that in addition to the issue of defecation on the 
beach (a practice associated with the fishermen and the poor), they could not 
deny that they themselves contribute to much of the debris on the beach, 
mainly through the sheer magnitude of their consumption practices. No where 
is the contradiction of the middle class more apparent than in their attempts to 
build a public space discourse where, on the one hand they view civic sense 
and responsibility as an ‘enlightened’ feature, while on the other, they 
implicate themselves as abusers of public spaces as much as the other classes. 
As the middle class residents discovered, dirt and danger can be traced as much 
to the ‘uncultured’ habits of the poor as to the ‘errant’ behaviour of their own 
class.  
 
Much of this discourse about the beach and public spaces in general 
drastically changes when viewed against the backdrop of the 2004 tsunami 
which occurred a few months after the completion of fieldwork in September 
2004. This was soon followed by another natural disaster, the 2005 floods, both 
affecting poor communities to a large extent. The 2004 tsunami in particular 
triggered a groundswell of sympathy and relief work in the initial months, 
settling since then into a complex machinery of rehabilitation. The role of the 
middle class in these initiatives is not to be undermined, given the fact that 
after the preliminary spell of charitable actions, it is the middle class that is 
largely ‘calling the shots’, either as members of NGOs involved in the 
rehabilitation efforts, or as technical experts advising the state in rewriting the 
coastal regulations and proposing new forms of managing shoreline 
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communities (mostly the marginalised ones). This is taking place amidst a 
nagging suspicion that such natural disasters have not altered the 
indifferent/intolerant position of the middle class towards the marginalised 
communities such as the fishermen residing along the coast and the poor 
squatters along the rivers, canals and creeks.178 There are further fears that 
natural disasters like the 2004 tsunami and the 2005 floods have created a 
tabula rasa for a clean pursuit of elitist re-imagination of the coast. This is of 
course a hypothetical postulation and needs to be examined in greater detail.179  
 
The conclusions noted above force the larger question of what these 
findings reveal about the politics of the middle class. In a sense the question is 
a theoretical echo as Chapter Two has already asked if there is a politics which 
typifies the middle class, particularly when they prefer to be active political 
actors through a process of “depoliticisation”. It was in response to this query 
that this research engaged with investigating the emerging politics of the 
middle class amidst concerns that it may be based on a narrowly defined 
bourgeois narrative. Such a supposition is bound to raise fears of bleak 
conclusions, where one expects to find a scenario of a complete ‘discourse 
capture’ by one powerful group (in this case, the middle class), overbearingly 
muting the voices of ‘irrelevant others’. But what emerges from this thesis is 
that the assertions of the middle class take place in a context of ‘politics of 
partnership’ which dictates the ‘new geography of governance’ (Chapters Five 
and Six). It involves actors from all social groups and creates a constant flux of 
changes with each actor deploying strategies and tactics to achieve their 
particular ends. As Zunino (2006) explains, with private and public actors 
coming together, the power configurations are particularistic, illustrating the 
differential capacity of actors to exert power. While power is unequally 
                                                 
178 Rutten (2001) in the context of the 2001 earthquake in Gujarat finds that initial middle class 
displays of social concern and help for victims in no way contradicts statements about their 
increasing indifference or even intolerance to the plight of the poor in their society. Rather, 
they reveal a brutal ruthlessness where they blame the poor for their unhappy state.  
179 Shifting of the urban environmental discourse in Chennai to the ‘right’ in the post-tsunami 
and post-2005 floods context is currently being investigated by the researcher. A paper to this 
effect was presented at the Fifth International Critical Geography Conference held from 3-7 
December, 2007 in Mumbai, India.  
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distributed among participants in a decision-making process, ‘it does not 
follow that the less powerful, the subordinated ones are more recipients, 
subjects of power being exercised over them: they are also an essential part in 
the reproduction/diffusion of a given social structure; and for that diffusion to 
occur, they make use of the existing structure’ (Zunino 2006: 1830).  
 
Empirical findings show that the politics of the middle class are 
provisional, going through a process of negotiation. Middle-class discourses on 
the beach (Chapter Six), show an ensemble of efforts which are not only 
contested by other social groups at various points of the discourse, but also by 
their own inability to construct a hermetic claim to propriety. It therefore 
comes across as being spatio-temporally limited and uneven. It is also obvious 
is that the middle-class claims are based not on any simplistic manipulation 
thesis, but through an emphasis of subtly articulated class reproduction 
practices.  
 
Having said so much, can we further conclude that the middle class in 
their oscillation between a politics of indifference and a politics of intolerance 
is currently in a temporal state of bourgeois conditioning, a response to a 
cumulated period of anger and resentment? And will this soon pass over as 
they relapse into their earlier state of socio-political absenteeism? Empirical 
findings show most middle-class claims come across in a fractured form 
making its stand point messy. As the middle class disseminates mixed 
messages, they fail to subscribe unanimously and overwhelming to an 
ideological extreme. Instead, they take a middling position in the debate, and 
frequently implicate themselves in the blame-game. It seems like the traditional 
Marxist perception of the middle class emphasising its contradictory 
(non)location within the class structure, and thereby its paradoxical nature is 
still relevant. This suggests a class that is not given to handling power, is ill-
equipped to lead as a dominant class, and generally makes a hash of things at 
both ends. Rather, the middle class appears more satisfied with its limited role, 
bargaining with the state for minor spoils in the form of consumer benefits. 
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While Chapter Two suggests that the new middle class is no longer content 
with this ‘sidelined’ role, their inherent paradoxical nature is still prime. This 
influences the resulting form of citizenship, which is created neither within the 
spaces of modernity nor that of democracy. Its conceptualisation is thus within 
an anomalous blueprint, thereby rendering the middle-class practices faulty. 
Rather than a simple dismissal of their assertions based on the historical 
argument that the middle class has rarely developed into a sustained and 
distinct social class, this thesis through a theoretical and empirical engagement 
with their contemporary discourse shows that the middle-class claims to 
citizenship is not just steeped in rhetoric but also fundamentally flawed.  
 
Since this thesis is about documenting middle-class voices, it is only 
appropriate to conclude with a verbatim observation of a middle-class resident 
who reflected quite pointedly on his class’s role play as ‘citizen’: 
It is only posturing. What is happening, this is my observation, middle-
class people do not have a say outside their [residential] campus. One 
thing is, they are busy with their careers and all that. They are always to 
be under constant pressure, to go up in their careers, manage things,  
manage stress, [..] their children’s education and all, and they have very 
little time to do any community work for that matter. I am talking about 
the typical middle class that has very little time. Because I know, think of 
even [..] the maximum they can express is they read newspapers and 
agree and disagree on such things. Other than this they are not very voicy 
and they can’t go and even if they go and make any political statement 
they are afraid of their own sense of security….Even if there is an 
accident happening on the roads you can’t find the middle-class people 
opening their doors and talking the patient to the hospital and all that. 
More for the fear of losing much of his time there subsequently, than not 
necessarily not being able to help. He may sympathise, ultimately he may 
look back what are the consequences – he has to go to the police station, 
things like that so these things and all that. So they are afraid even to do 
such things. So they don’t have a say outside of the campus. They can’t 
make political statements, they can’t collectively go and protest against 
any injustice and all that. They are more of silent people. Okay. Now 
what is happening is those aspirations or what they cannot voice in front 
of their boss or in their office or in office also it becomes more a rat race. 
They can freely express here. It is only an expression of what they can’t 
do, what they can’t voice outside the campus, in a signal either with a 
police fellow or somebody who is crossing the road in the wrong place or 
against the political leaders. They like to do little small politics here that’s 
all. It is only a satisfying thing like that. (AR-190404-02, emphasis 
added) 
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Appendix 1 
 
 
Some key statistics about Chennai 
 
 
 
Statistical information presented in this section complement the discussions in 
the thesis (Chapter Four, in particular) about the regionalism of Chennai 
(historic and contemporary). Understanding its impact in numeric terms is 
important to place the global aspirations of the city in ‘real’ perspective. 
According to the 2001 Census, Chennai is the fourth largest city and urban 
agglomeration in India.180 But even though Tamil Nadu emerges as the most 
urbanised amongst the large Indian states with 44 percent level of urbanisation, 
Chennai City’s population of 4.3 million constitutes only 15.8 percent of the 
state’s urban population, and the metropolitan area’s population of 6.56 million 
accounts for less than a quarter of the same. In this regard, the draft Second 
Master Plan prepared by CMDA (2007) notes that Tamil Nadu is one of the 
few states in India with a hierarchy of urban areas dispersed fairly uniformly 
throughout the state (Tables 8 and 9). 
 
                                                 
180 The Census of India defines an Urban Agglomeration as a continuous urban spread 
constituting a town and its adjoining urban outgrowths (OGs), or two or more physically 
contiguous towns together and any adjoining urban outgrowths of such towns.  
Absent Societies/Appendix 1: Chennai Statistics                                   
333 
Table 8: Population of  major urban agglomerations 
Urban 
Agglomeration 
  Population   Percentage Share 
of State's Urban 
Population 
  Percentage Share of 
State's Total 
Population
         
Greater Mumbai   16,434,386   40.00   16.96
Kolkata   13,205,697   58.88   16.47
Delhi   12,877,470   99.78   92.97
Chennai   6,560,242   23.87   10.51
Hyderabad   5,742,036   27.59   7.53
Bangalore   5,701,446   31.74   10.79
Source: Census 2001 
 
Table 9: Urbanisation characteristics of major Indian states  
State   No. of UAs   No. of Towns   Urbanisation (%)
         
Maharashtra   15   378   42.4
Delhi   1   62   93.2
West Bengal   21   375   28.0
Tamil Nadu   27   832   44.0
Andhra Pradesh   37   210   27.3
Karnataka   24   270   34.0
Source: Census 2001 
 
But it is not just in terms of its demography that Chennai’s primacy in 
relationship to its state is less prominent than other cities like Mumbai, but 
economically as well. Chennai’s contribution to the state domestic product is 
slightly over 10 percent, while cities like Mumbai and Bangalore have a more 
substantial influence in their state’s economy, accounting for a quarter of its 
net domestic product (Table 10). In 2003-04, Mumbai’s share had increased to 
35 percent, and Bangalore’s net district domestic product comprised 28 percent 
of the state’s total in 2004-05, while Chennai’s stagnates at 11 percent (CMDA 
2007).181  
 
                                                 
181 For Mumbai, see http://www.maharashtra.gov.in, and for Bangalore, see http://des.kar.nic.in  
Retrieved 04 August, 2008. 
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Table 10: Net domestic product distribution (1999-00) 
  Net Domestic 
Product;   
in Rs. millions 
  Per Capita Net 
Domestic Product 
  % Share in State Net 
Domestic Product 
  
  (At Current Prices) 
Mumbai 542,623  46,573  25.24
Chennai 134,808  31,036  11.10 
Bangalore 186,400   29,134   21.71
Source: Statistical hand book of Tamil Nadu 2004; Deshpande and Deshpande 
(2005); and Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Karnataka 
(2003)182 
 
Another useful comparison between Chennai and other Indian cities is in terms 
of the area administered by the local bodies (Table 11). While a smaller, 
central area generally comes under the jurisdiction of the municipal 
corporation, it is invariably surrounded by a larger metropolitan area overseen 
by a non-statutory metropolitan development authority (Chapter Four). 
Chennai’s Corporation boundary covers a manageable 174 Km2, while the 
metropolitan area is a larger 1,189 Km2. The former was last expanded in 
1978, and the Chennai Metropolitan Area (CMA) was first drawn in 1967, and 
has changed little. On the other hand, regional competitors like Hyderabad and 
Bangalore have expanded their boundaries (both at the municipal and 
metropolitan level) considerably in recent times, adopting a wider 
comprehensive approach to developing their city-regions in view of their 
globalising economy and its spatial needs. Both Hyderabad and Bangalore 
municipal corporations have nearly quadrupled their area to 778 Km2 and 741 
Km2, from an earlier, more diminutive area of 172 Km2 and 226 Km2 
respectively.  
 
                                                 
182 Bangalore statistics downloaded from http://des.kar.nic.in. Retrieved 04 August, 2008. 
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Table 11: Comparative municipal and metropolitan areas 
    City Area (Km2)   Metropolitan Area (Km2)
        
Mumbai   437    4,335
Kolkata   187    1,854
Delhi   1,397    1,483
Chennai   174    1,189
Hyderabad   778    1,905
Bangalore   741    2,191
Source: Compiled from several sources 
 
How regional is Chennai? 
The above statistics relate back to the question of how national or regional is 
Chennai as a metropolitan city, one that was discussed in Chapter Four. 
Regional forces make their claim of a linguistic majority, a point vehemently 
argued in the three port cities of Mumbai, Kolkata and Chennai. Table 12 
shows the clear domination of a single regional language in the case of Kolkata 
and Chennai in the beginning of the 1990s, thereby reinforcing the success of 
regional (Dravidian) politics. In the case of Mumbai, while the linguistic 
dominance of the regional language Marathi has decreased, this, ironically has 
not reinforced the cosmopolitanism of the city but only yielded to parochial 
regional forces like the Shiv Sena, which have built a reputation of militantly 
pursuing the interests of the ‘local’ Marathi population (also discussed in 
Chapter Four).  
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Table 12: Linguistic regionalism in the three port cities  
    Distribution of Mother Tongue (Percentage) 
        
    1901   1991
         
Chennai         
Tamil   63   77
Telugu   21   11
Urdu*   —   5
          
Kolkata         
Bengali   51   64
Hindi   41   21
Urdu*   —   12
          
Mumbai         
Marathi   53   44
Hindi   15   16
Gujarati   21   14
Urdu*   —   12
       
* 1901 Census did not recognise Urdu as a language   
Source: Census 1901 and 1991 
 
Another factor that is useful in understanding the regionalism of Chennai is the 
composition of in-migrants into the city. Census 2001 shows that Chennai has 
the lowest number of in-migrants amongst the top six urban agglomerations, 
including Mumbai, Delhi, Kolkata, Hyderabad and Bangalore (Table 13). At 
less than 500,000, only 6 percent of the population are in-migrants, as against 
the 2 million plus in Mumbai (15 percent) and Delhi (7 percent) and nearly a 
million in Kolkata (16 percent) and Bangalore (13 percent). Moreover, 75 
percent of the in-migrants are from within the state, second only to Hyderabad, 
reinforcing yet again the regional nature of Chennai.  
 
Table 13: In-migrants – Last residence 0-9 Years  
Source: Census 2001 
Urban 
Agglomeration
Population Total In-migrants Percentage of In-
migrants to Total 
Population
 Within the State Other States Other Countries
Greater Mumbai 16,434,386 892,706 (35.86) 1,571,181 (63.11) 25,665 (1.03) 2,489,552 15.1
Kolkata 13,205,697 470,601 (57.20) 297,279 (26.20) 54,509 (6.60) 822,389 16.4
Delhi 12,877,470 77,663 (36.87) 1,988,314 (94.13) 46,386 (2.20) 2,112,363 6.6
Chennai 6,560,242 334,972 (76.90) 94,964 (21.80) 5,684 (1.30) 435,620 6.2
Hyderabad 5,742,036 407,861 (81.82) 88,216 (17.70) 2,406 (0.48) 498,483 8.7
Bangalore 5,701,446 401,932 (52.78) 353,156 (46.38) 6,397 (0.84) 761,485 13.4
In-migrants (Percentage)
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It is obvious from the above tables that although Chennai is the fourth largest 
metropolis in India, its claims of a national profile are compromised by its 
regional nature. Thus, amongst the six largest cities in India, while Chennai is 
far behind Mumbai in terms of the socio-economic profile, it also finds itself in 
danger of being left behind by its regional competitors like Bangalore and 
Hyderabad which have taken several measures to upgrade to the national and 
thereby global platform. In this context, it is also useful to take a look at the 
city’s other key statistics, particularly related to infrastructure indicators.  
 
Assessing Chennai’s infrastructure 
The Chennai Metropolitan Area (CMA) includes the Corporation, eight 
municipalities, 28 town panchayats, and 10 panchayat unions. CMDA in 2003 
announced an ambitious Rs. 18,000 crore investment plan for the metropolitan 
plan, in an effort to transform it into a ‘world-class city’ (Chapter Four). 
Spaced over three phases of short, medium and long term, the investment 
envisaged improvements to traffic and transportation, housing, and essential 
services of water, sanitation, electricity, storm water drainage, and solid waste 
management (Table 14). 
 
Table 14: Percentage distribution of CMA Investment Plan  
CMA Investment Plan 2003 
       
Traffic and transportation   57.0
Housing (TNHB)    3.0
Housing (Slums)    4.0
Water supply    13.0
Sewerage    10.0
Storm water drainage   1.0
Solid waste management  0.5
Electricity    11.5
    
Total    100.0
Source: CMDA 2007 
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The above table shows that the onus is on traffic and transportation 
improvement schemes, with Chapter Four already establishing that traffic and 
transportation solutions focus more on the bourgeois demand of the middle and 
upper class residents of the city, with less focus on a comprehensive strategy 
that can ease the movement problems of the poor within the city. On the 
contrary, a comparison of the modal split for the three cities of Chennai, 
Hyderabad and Bangalore shows that a majority of the commuters still 
continue to rely on public buses and other cheaper modes of transport including 
cycling and walking (Table 15). 
 
Table 15: Modal split comparison in percentage 
      Chennai Hyderabad   Bangalore
            
Private cars     4 11   5
Two wheelers     18 29   30
Train     5 —   —
Bus     29 44   40
Bicycle     13 3   1
Walking     28 —   16
Others     3 13   8
Source: Compiled from CMDA (2007), GHMC City Development Plan (2006) 
and Bangalore City Development Plan (2006) 
 
A similar concern persists in the related sector of housing. TNHB was inactive 
from 2001-06, subsequently choosing a public private partnership model, 
involving private developers. Also, with only 4 percent budget allocation for 
the activities of the Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board within the Rs. 18,000 
crore Investment Plan, the poor face being priced out of an increasingly 
privatising housing market. In this regard, Chennai city’s slum population’s 
housing-related crisis will only exasperate. It should be noted that while 
Census 2001 identifies the slum population in Chennai as 25 percent of the 
city’s total population, this figure increases to 31 percent when viewed in terms 
of the number of households (Table 16). There are 962,213 households in the 
city of which 296,012 live in slum conditions.  
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Table 16: Slum population in major Indian cities  
Municipal 
Corporation 
  Population   Slum Population   Percentage of 
Slum 
Population
Greater Mumbai   11,978,450   6,475,440 54.05
Delhi   9,879,172   1,851,231 18.74
Kolkata   4,572,876   1,485,309 32.48
Chennai   4,343,645   1,079,414 24.85
Hyderabad   3,637,483   626,849 17.23
Bangalore   4,301,326   430,501 10.00
Source: Census 2001 
 
While those living in the slums wallow in miserable conditions, far worse than 
the rest of the city, the city in general suffers from poor infrastructure services. 
Chennai’s persistent water crisis has been addressed in chapters Four and Five. 
Although CMDA (2007) claims that nearly 98 percent of the city’s population 
is covered by piped water supply, according to Census 2001only 45 percent of 
the households in the city have reported having tap water as source of drinking 
water. In fact, per capita availability of water (in litres per day – lpd) is one of 
the lowest amongst Indian cities, 105 lpd, in comparison to 162 lpd in 
Hyderabad, 147 lpd in Bangalore and 168 lpd in Mumbai (CMDA 2007). 
During the acute water crisis of 2003-04, supply had drastically reduced to 70 
lpd per person (CMDA 2003). A World Bank report by Misra and Eng (2007) 
alleges that Chennai’s water supply is the poorest dipping to 32 lpd per person 
(Figure 51).  
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Figure 51: Estimation of water supply in Indian cities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Misra and Eng (2007) 
 
In terms of sewerage, while the Investment Plan for Chennai Metropolitan 
Area (2003) mentioned that the sewerage system in the city covered 97 percent 
of the city’s population, it acknowledged that in reality only 68 percent of the 
households had access to the sewerage system. Similarly, in terms of solid 
waste management, an estimated 3000 tonnes of solid waste are generated 
within the city area per day (174 Km2), much more than that recorded by the 
Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad (2240 tonnes/day; 172 Km2) or the 
Bangalore Mahanagara Palike (1742 tonnes/day; 226 Km2) (Table 17). 
Moreover, in Chennai, solid waste is disposed of at two designated landfill 
sites in the city with no official policy of recycling or source segregation. 
Whereas, Hyderabad and Bangalore have already set up processing plants to 
treat the waste before being disposed, and encourage vermin-composting on a 
smaller scale. Apart from the above infrastructure concerns, there is also the 
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issue of land use transformation in the past few decades, highlighting the 
pressures of hyper-urbanisation of the city.  
 
Table 17: Solid waste generation in three Indian cities 
Source: CMDA (2007); GHMC City Development Plan (2006); and Bangalore 
City Development Plan (2006) 
 
Analysing the evolution of Chennai’s land use pattern 
As Table 18 indicates, the predominance of residential use (50 percent) 
explains to a large extent the inclination of developers to concentrate on 
residential developments within the city. Moreover, while at the all-India level, 
67 percent of urban households are owned (Census 2001), in Chennai, only 40 
percent are ownership-based (CMDA 2003). There is a strong demand amongst 
the residents for home ownership, resulting in the hyper-active residential real 
estate development, and which ironically shrinks the amount of land allocated 
for dedicated open spaces and recreation. The draft Second Master Plan 
(CMDA 2007) shows that of the total 1543 land use reclassification requests 
filed between 1977 and 2005, 102 were for reclassification of open space and 
recreation sites into other uses, of which 49 were for residential redevelopment 
(48 percent), whereas only 16 were reclassified as open space and recreational 
use in return. While one would expect that home ownership status will make a 
resident demand better amenities of his environment including parks and play 
areas, the last thirty years to the contrary have witnessed a drastic reduction in 
the open spaces by more than half (from 5.25 percent to 2.09 percent). This is a 
                                                 
183 CMDA (2007) claims that 585 grams per capita per day of solid waste are generated in the 
Chennai city area. But if you assume their estimate of 3000 tonnes per day and a city 
population of 4,343,645 million, then it works out to be 690 grams per capita per day.   
  Chennai   Hyderabad   Bangalore
          
City area (Km2) 174   172   226
          
Solid waste/day       
(in Tonnes) 
3000   2240   1742
          
Per capita solid 
waste (grams/day) 
690183   615   405
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dismal figure compared to Bangalore which registers nine percent of its total 
land as public open spaces (Westfall and de Villa 2001).  
 
Table 18: Evolution of land use distribution in Chennai City  
Land Use Pattern in Chennai City (Percentage)  
  1973   2001   2006
           
Residential 44.46   52.94   54.25
Commercial 4.68   7.05   7.09
Industrial 5.10   5.07   5.17
Institutional 17.38   18.11   18.48
Open Space and Recreational 5.25   2.07   2.09
Agriculture —   0.53   0.57
Non Urban —   0.47   0.47
Others 23.13   13.75   11.89
Source: CMDA 2007 
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Appendix 2 
 
 
Interview schedule 
 
Table 19: List of experts/key informants interviewed 
E’s
          
    Experts       
      
    
Name Organisation 
  
Interview date 
1   V Nagarajan Editor, A Guide to Chennai Real 
Estate 
  20/10/2003 
2   Santhanam Chief Planner, Chennai 
Metropolitan Development 
Authority (CMDA) 
  20/10/2003 
3   G Dattadri Retired Planner, Department of 
Town Planning 
  Several 
4   M Anantharanjan Doss Retired Planner, CMDA   Several 
5   C Chandramouli Census Operations, Tamil Nadu   04/11/2003 
6   CH Gopinatha Rao Planning Consultant   09/12/2003 
7   P Somnath Tamil Nadu Housing Board 
(TNHB) 
  08/12/2003 
8   Tara Murali Indian National Trust for Art and 
Cultural Heritage (INTACH) 
  28/01/2004 
9   A Srivathsan/S Ravi School of Architecture and 
Planning, Anna University 
  04/02/2004 
10   Prof. MA Kalam Department of Anthropology, 
University of Madras 
  06/02/2004 
11   Prof. T Vasantha Kumar Department of Geography, 
University of Madras 
  18/02/2004 
12   Vijay Mehta Chennai Traffic Task Force   10/03/2004 
13   CS Raman Chennai Traffic Task Force - 
Thiruvanmiyur 
  25/03/2004 
14   Louis Meneses Retired IAS Officer   02/04/2004 
15   Theodore Baskaran Naturalist/Historian   09/04/2004 
16   MB Nirmal President, Exnora   31/08/2004 
17   Bharat Jayaraj Consumer Action Group   03/09/2004 
18   TK Ramkumar Exnora Official   03/09/2004 
19   GUG Sastry Joint Commissioner Police - 
Traffic 
  10/09/2004 
20   Prof. Champakalakshmi Historian   15/09/2004 
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Table 20: List of property developers and agents interviewed 
 
 
Table 21: List of journalists interviewed 
    Journalists       
            
    Name Company   Interview Date 
1   V Nagarajan A Guide to Chennai Real 
Estate 
  20/10/2003 
1  Senthil Kumar The Economic Times  11/12/2003 
2   Lata Amarnath/Swati The Hindu   02/01/2004 
3   Vincent de Silva Mylapore Times   28/01/2004 
4   Vidya Arcot Road Times   17/02/2004 
5   SP Ambrose Adayar Times   03/03/2004 
6   S Ramakrishnan Anna Nagar Times   18/03/2004 
 
          
   
Property 
Developers     
    Name Company   Interview Date 
1   Sumanth Sumanth Builders   21/10/2003 
2   Ravi Appaswamy Appaswamy Builders   01/11/2003 
3   Kumar Naveen Builders   04/11/2003 
4   Mehul Doshi Doshi   25/11/2003 
5   Vijay Jain Housing   10/12/2003 
6   Jamal Deen Jamals Enterprises   10/12/2003 
7   Kalyanaraman Khivraj Estates   16/12/2003 
8   Navratan Lunawath Arihant   19/12/2003 
9   Subba Reddy Ceebros   21/12/2003 
10   TA Ramachandran Ashok Leyland   22/12/2003 
11   Nirmala Rajan Chaitanya   30/12/2003 
12   Suresh V Nath Ramaniyam   05/03/2004 
13   Ravi DBS Lancor   06/03/2004 
            
       
    Property Agents       
1   CB  Richard Ellis     13/10/2003 
2   Colliers International     20/11/2003 
3   Chesterton Meghraj     11/12/2003 
4   Hanu Reddy Realtors     14/12/2003 
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Table 22: List of residents interviewed  
Interview No. Name Development/Neighbourhood Area Interview Date Interview Type Taped/Transcribed Code Gender Age
1 1 Gopalan Ceebros Keshavaperumalpuram Other 03/02/2004 Individual Yes/No MISC-030204-01 M ±60
2 2 Srinivas Puduvellam/Valmiki Nagar ECR 10/02/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-100204-01 M ±40
3 3 Jaikumar Siddharth Heights Arcot Road 15/02/2004 Group Field notes AR-150204-01 M ±40
4 Muralidharan Siddharth Heights M ±40
5 4 Ganesan Arcot Terrace/Appaswamy Arcot Road 16/02/2004 Individual Field notes AR-160204-01 M ±50
6 5 Sangeetha Venkatesh Alacrity Mohana Arcot Road 17/02/2004 Individual Field notes AR-170204-01 F ±35
7 6 Ashokan Doshi Gardens Arcot Road 22/02/2004 Group Field notes AR-220204-01 M ±40
8 Ramanathan Doshi Gardens M ±50
9 7 Asha Doshi Gardens Arcot Road 22/02/2004 Individual Yes/No AR-220204-02 F ±35
10 8 Ravi Subramanian Ceebros Gardens Arcot Road 22/02/2004 Group Yes/No AR-220304-03 M ±35
11 Vivekanandan Ceebros Gardens M ±35
12 Radhakrishnan Ceebros Gardens M ±60
13 Narayanan Ceebros Gardens M ±35
14 9 Rajaratnam TNHB/Valmiki Nagar ECR 28/02/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-280304-01 M ±40
15 10 Akila Mahalingam Doshi Gardens Arcot Road 29/02/2004 Couple Yes/Yes AR-290204-01 F ±35
16 11 Jayapalan Rajagopal Doshi Gardens Arcot Road 29/02/2004 Individual Yes/No AR-290204-02 M ±60
17 12 P Radhakrishnan Ceebros Gardens Arcot Road 29/02/2004 Individual Yes/No AR-290204-03 M ±60
18 13 Balasubramanian Valmiki Nagar ECR 01/03/2004 Individual Yes/No ECR-010304-01 M ±60
19 14 Suresh Neelangarai ECR 04/03/2004 Individual Field notes ECR-040304-01 M ±40
20 15 Vairasekhar KK Nagar Federation Arcot Road 04/03/2004 Group Field notes AR-040304-02 M ±40
21 Elango KK Nagar Federation M ±40
22 Rajamani KK Nagar Federation M ±40
23 16 Vasumathi Rajagopal Doshi Gardens Arcot Road 05/03/2004 Individual Field notes AR-050304-01 F ±40
24 17 Narayanan Vijayashanthi Arcot Road 06/03/2004 Individual Field notes AR-060304-01 M ±40
25 18 Puneeta Sai Nagar Women's Civic Exnora Arcot Road 06/03/2004 Group Field notes AR-060304-02 F ±40
26 Vimala Rao Sai Nagar Women's Civic Exnora F ±40
27 Shyamala Ramamurthy Sai Nagar Women's Civic Exnora F ±40
28 Usha Sai Nagar Women's Civic Exnora F ±40
29 Sundari Srinivasan Sai Nagar Women's Civic Exnora F ±40
AGM KK Nagar Federation Arcot Road 07/03/2004 Participant 
Observation Field notes
30 19 Kalyan Krishnan KK Nagar Federation Arcot Road 07/03/2004 Individual Yes/Yes AR-070304-01 M ±50
31 20 Kasinathan Rani Anna Nagar/KK Nagar Federation Arcot Road 07/03/2004 Group Yes/Yes AR-070304-02 M ±50
32 Kaliasundaram Rani Anna Nagar/KK Nagar Federation M ±40
33 Vedanayakam Rani Anna Nagar/KK Nagar Federation M ±40
EGM Ceebros Gardens Arcot Road 07/03/2004 Participant 
Observation Field notes
34 21 Shankararaman Ceebros Gardens Arcot Road 07/03/2004 Individual Yes/Yes AR-070304-03 M ±35
35 22 Chitra Sastry Lakshmi Maa/Valmiki Nagar ECR 07/03/2004 Couple Yes/Yes ECR-070304-04 F ±35
36 23 Mahendran Majestic Arcot Road 08/03/2004 Individual Yes/Yes AR-080304-01 M ±40
37 24 Madhan Raj Shivani ECR 09/03/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-090304-01 M ±35
38 25 Sankar Raman Lakshmi Maa/Valmiki Nagar ECR 10/03/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-100304-01 M ±40
39 26 Nagarajan Keshav Dugar/Keshavaperumalpuram Other 11/03/2004 Individual Yes/No MISC-110304-01 M ±60
40 27 Shiva Sankar Valmiki Nagar ECR 12/03/2004 Individual Field notes ECR-120304-01 M ±40
41 28 Alamelu Naidu Premier Grihalaxmi Arcot Road 13/03/2004 Individual Field notes AR-130304-01 F ±35
42 29 Umasankar Abishek ECR 14/03/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-140304-01 M ±35
43 30 Sankaravadivelu Shivani ECR 14/03/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-140304-02 M ±40
44 31 Anusha Sundarrajan Salma's Royal Residency Arcot Road 14/03/2004 Group Yes/Yes AR-140304-03 F ±35
45 Uma Chandrasekhar Salma's Royal Residency F ±35
46 Banu Murali Salma's Royal Residency F ±35
47 Revathy Raghuraman Salma's Royal Residency F ±35
48 Mythili Rajagopalan Salma's Royal Residency F ±60
49 Chitra Sekhar Salma's Royal Residency F ±40
50 Gomathi Venkatraman Salma's Royal Residency F ±40
51 32 Ramanathan Valmiki Nagar ECR 15/03/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-150304-01 M ±60
52 33 Rajagopal TNHB/Valmik Nagar ECR 15/03/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-150304-02 M ±40
53 34 Balagopalan Manasarovar/Valmiki Nagar ECR 17/03/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-170304-01 M ±60
54 35 Murali Mohan Doshi Gardens Arcot Road 19/03/2004 Individual Yes/Yes AR-190304-01 M ±60
55 36 Narayanan Ceebros Gardens Arcot Road 19/03/2004 Individual Yes/Yes AR-190304-02 M ±35
56 37 Jaya Rajagopal Kapaleeshwarar Nagar/Neelangarai ECR 19/03/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-190304-03 F ±40
57 38 Muralikrishnan Manasarovar/Valmiki Nagar ECR 20/03/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-200304-01 M ±35
58 39 Jayaprakash Chinna Neelangarai Kuppam ECR 20/03/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-200304-02 M ±40
59 40 Prema Chinna Neelangarai Kuppam ECR Yes/Yes ECR-200304-03 F ±40
Express Exnora Civic Forum Anna Nagar Arcot Road 20/03/2004 Participant 
Observation Field notes
60 41 Sripathy Kapaleeshwarar Nagar/Neelangarai ECR 21/03/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-210304-01 M ±60
61 42 Raghuraman Abishek ECR 21/03/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-210304-02 M ±35
62 43 Rukmani Ramani Shivani ECR 24/03/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-240304-01 F ±40
63 44 Krishna Prasad Valmiki Nagar ECR 25/03/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-250304-01 M ±50
64 45 Sridhar Manasarovar/Valmiki Nagar ECR 25/03/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-250304-02 M ±40
65 46 VR Menon Valmiki Nagar ECR 25/03/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-250304-03 M ±60
66 47 Raghavan Friends of the beach/Neelangarai ECR 27/03/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-270304-01 M ±50
67 48 Thiagarajan Kazura Gardens ECR 27/03/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-270304-02 M ±40
68 49 Aruna Beach Buddies/Valmiki Nagar ECR 27/03/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-270304-03 F ±35
69 50 Vivekanandan Ceebros Gardens Arcot Road 28/03/2004 Individual Yes/Yes AR-280304-01 M ±35
70 51 Gem Marie Journalist Colony ECR 30/03/2004 Individual Field notes ECR-300304-01 F ±35
71 52 Aarthy Abraham Beach Buddies/Valmiki Nagar ECR 30/03/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-300304-02 F ±35
72 53 Srinivas Valmiki Nagar ECR 30/03/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-300304-03 M ±40
73 54 Murali Padmanabhan Manasarovar/Valmiki Nagar ECR 31/03/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-310304-01 M ±40
74 55 Arokia Das Valmiki Nagar ECR 31/03/2004 Couple Field notes ECR-310304-02 M ±40
75 56 Sirish Purohit Manasarovar/Valmiki Nagar ECR 01/04/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-010404-01 M ±35
76 57 Bhavani Pudvellam/Valmiki Nagar ECR 01/04/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-010404-02 F ±35
77 58 Parthasarathy Kottivakkam Beach Walkers ECR 01/04/2004 Group Yes/Yes ECR-010404-03 M ±60
78 Kalyan Kottivakkam Beach Walkers M ±40
79 Chandrasekhar Kottivakkam Beach Walkers M ±40
80 Mani Kottivakkam Beach Walkers M ±60
81 59 Nitya Balaji Valmiki Nagar ECR 01/04/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-010404-04 F ±40
82 60 Ramaswamy Journalist Colony ECR 02/04/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-020404-01 M ±40
83 61 Sujatha Kundra Valmiki Nagar ECR 02/04/2004 Individual Yes/No ECR-020404-02 F ±35
84 62 Nurullah Journalist Colony ECR 03/04/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-030404-01 M ±40
85 63 Saibaba Vutukuri Valmiki Nagar ECR 03/04/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-030404-02 M ±35
86 64 Ammu Sunrise Avenue/Neelangarai ECR 03/04/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-030404-03 F ±40
87 65 Arunachalam East Coast Beach Walkers' Assoc. ECR 04/04/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-040404-01 M ±40
88 66 Bhuvana Ramanan Valmiki Nagar ECR 06/04/2004 Individual Yes/No ECR-060404-01 F ±35
89 67 Govindaswamy Federation of Welfare Assoc. of ECR ECR 07/04/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-070404-01 M ±40
90 68 Rajan Ceebros Gardens Arcot Road 07/04/2004 Individual Yes/Yes AR-070404-02 M ±35
91 69 Mark Fernandes Bella Vista/Neelangarai Beach Forum ECR 09/04/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-070404-01 M ±40
92 70 Ratnavelu Thiruvanmiyur Kuppam ECR 09/04/2004 Group Yes/Yes ECR-070404-02 M ±40
93 Vimal Kumar Thiruvanmiyur Kuppam M ±40
94 Krishnan Thiruvanmiyur Kuppam M ±40
95 Jayabalan Thiruvanmiyur Kuppam M ±50
96 Pakkiri Thiruvanmiyur Kuppam M ±50
97 71 Balaji Ceebros Gardens Arcot Road 11/04/2004 Individual Yes/Yes AR-110404-01 M ±40
98 72 Viji Krishnan Ceebros Gardens Arcot Road 11/04/2004 Individual Yes/No AR-110404-02 M ±35
99 73 Ramanathan Neelangarai Beach Forum ECR 15/04/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-150404-01 M ±50
100 74 Gnani Journalist Colony ECR 15/04/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-150404-02 M ±40
101 75 Subramanian & Srilatha Shivani ECR 01/09/2004 Couple Yes/Yes ECR-010904-01 M ±35
102 76 Divya &Suresh Krishnamurthy Shivani ECR 01/09/2004 Couple Yes/No ECR-010904-02 M ±35
103 77 Ramaswamy Shivani ECR 02/09/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-020904-01 M ±60
104 78 Kamala Ramakrishnan Shivani ECR 02/09/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-020904-02 F ±60
105 79 Theagarajan Shivani ECR 04/09/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-040904-01 M ±40
106 80 Purushotham Thiruvalluvar Nagar ECR 04/09/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-040904-02 M ±40
107 81 Ellke & Juergen Besant Nagar ECR 04/09/2004 Couple Yes/Yes ECR-040904-03 M ±40
108 82 Sundaram AG'S Colony, Kottivakkam ECR 08/09/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-080904-01 M ±40
109 83 Sambamurthy Manasarovar/Valmiki Nagar ECR 10/09/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-100904-01 M ±60
110 84 Raj Gupta Casuarina Drive/Neelangarai ECR 12/09/2004 Individual Yes/Yes ECR-120904-01 M ±60
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Figure 53: Location of participating residential developments on ECR 
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